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Abstract 
This thesis investigates autism as it has been understood in the cognitive and 
social (neuro)sciences, within the United Kingdom, since 1985.  Of specific 
interest is how these sciences discover, construct, and experiment upon 
individuals who are understood as socially abnormal.  Theoretically, the thesis 
is positioned between Foucauldian History and Philosophy of Science, Medical 
Sociology, and Science and Technology Studies.  Empirically, two key sources 
of information are relied upon.  Firstly, there is an extensive critical reading of 
the published literature from 1985 to the present.  Secondly, twenty qualitative 
research interviews were conducted with academic researchers, based within 
the UK, and with core interests in psychology in general and autism in 
particular.  It is firstly argued that the cognitive sciences rely upon a particular, 
historically novel, construction of the social in order to articulate autism as 
social disorder.  It is then argued that, although autism is frequently reported as 
heterogeneous and illusory within the laboratory, social disorder appears self-
evident when the autistic individual is required to interact with both the 
researcher and broader society.  Following these findings it is argued that the 
researcher does not observe autism but, rather, that they achieve it.  Finally it is 
argued that the language of autism is itself capable of ushering in novel 
conceptualisations of social conduct that may apply to all individuals and not 
just those diagnosed with the condition.  Following these empirical findings it 
is argued that autism is best understood as the consequence of particular socio-
historical conditions.  It is asked if these socio-historical conditions may 
include a novel knowledge-power nexus arising in the mid-twentieth century, 
named here a socio-emotive politics, of which autism is just one consequence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
This thesis has been funded through the ESRC Open Competition 
(ES/I01196X/1) and the financial support of that body is greatly appreciated. 
As an undergraduate at The University of Birmingham, Stuart Derbyshire and 
Michael Larkin provided the expertise and encouragement to make a change of 
focus and discipline possible and I am endless grateful to them both.   
Numerous individuals from across The University of Nottingham have 
provided endless support for the last three years.  I have been fortunate enough 
to work under three very different although equally influential supervisors; 
$OLVRQ 3LOQLFN 3DXO 0DUWLQ DQG $QWRQLD +DPLOWRQ  ,¶P VXUH WKDW IRU YHU\
different reasons, they would dispute many of the conclusions that I reach here, 
although they could not have been reached without them.  The Centre for 
&ULWLFDO7KHRU\¶V )RXFDXOW UHDGLQJ JURXS ± in particular Stef Petschick, Meg 
Beyer, and Lauren Selfe ± have been wonderful companions on an 
occasionally treacherous road.  Members of the Hamilton Laboratory in the 
School of Psychology have tolerated (and occasionally embraced) my presence 
amongst their number and it has been a pleasure to be able to complete this 
project alongside Lauren Marsh and Amy Pearson, among others.  All of my 
friends and colleagues within both Sociology and Social Policy and the 
Institute for Science and Society, of whom there are so many it is unfair to 
name only a selection, have made coming into university everyday something 
to be cherished rather than dreaded.  Amal Treacher-Kabesh has been so much 
more than a post-graduate convenor; proof-reading and discussing work, life, 
and the rises and falls of Roger Federer on an almost daily basis.  Alison 
+DLJKVLPLODUO\KDVJRQHVRIDUEH\RQGKHUGXWLHVWKDW,FDQ¶WHYHQUHPHPEHU
what they are.  Amongst fellow students I would particularly like to thank 
Andrew Turner who, as both a tutor and a friend, contributed a great deal to 
my thought where Science Studies was concerned and Beverley Gibbs for 
being just so damn great.  Andy Balmer, Des Fitzgerald, and Brigitte Nerlich 
have also provided valuable comments on sections of this piece. 
3 
 
I am, of course, most thankful to those outside of academia who have tolerated 
and encouraged me for as long as I can remember.  Ali Oakes has been the 
most understanding housemate imaginable.  Flick and Clive the most 
supportive parents.  Kate and Toff a wonderful sister and brother-in-law.  
Above all though this is for Jenny, for everything. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Contents 
 
Abstract          1 
Acknowledgements       2 
Contents        4 
1. Introduction       6 
1.1 A contemporary Subject     6 
1.2 A contemporary subject     10 
1.3 The current project      13 
2. Literature review       17 
2.1 Introduction      17 
2.2 Constructing the normal     18 
2.3 Constructing the social     27 
2.4 Constructing autism     40 
2.5 Conclusion      50 
3. Reflecting on method(ology)     52 
3.1 Introduction      52 
3.2 The project in hand     52 
3.3 Personal closeness     67 
3.4 Critique, the purpose, and status of Science Studies 70 
3.5 Conclusion       78 
4. Constructing a social subject: Autism and human sociality in the  
1980s.         80 
4.1 Introduction      80 
4.2 Accounts of autism from within cognitive psychology 82 
4.3 A psychoanalytically inspired challenge   94 
4.4 Conclusion      101 
5. A coherence of alien forms: Order and disorder in autism  104 
5.1 Introduction      104 
5.2 Heterogeneities      107 
5.3 A singular experience of autism    121 
5.4 Conclusion      127 
6. Autism, the social, and society     130 
6.1 Autism and society     130 
5 
 
6.2 Transforming ought into is    135 
6.3 Conclusion      149 
7. Ontologies of our social selves: Normalisation and  
pathologisation in autism      152 
7.1 Introduction      152 
 7.2 Researching up the autism spectrum   153 
7.3 Canguilhem and autism     160 
7.4 Putting the subject to rest     163 
7.5 Conclusion      177 
8. Conclusion: Autism, history, and socio-emotive politics  180 
8.1 Chapter findings      180  
8.2 Overarching claims     188 
8.3 Limits       202 
8.4 The shape of things to come    206 
Bibliography        208 
Appendix A: Interview schedule     236 
Appendix B: Information for participants    238 
Appendix C: Participant consent form    241 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Introduction 
 This thesis is concerned with two contemporary phenomena.  Firstly, 
the emergence, rise, and nature of autism as a diagnostic classification.  
Secondly the emergence, rise, and nature of laboratory sciences which lay 
claim to DQ REMHFWLYH NQRZOHGJH RI µWKH VRFLDO¶ D FODLP PRVW UHFHQWO\
embodied in social/cognitive neuroscience.  As will be argued throughout this 
thesis, these phenomena can be viewed as entangled and mutually reinforcing 
in nature. 
A contemporary Subject 
The condition of autism was first hypothesised to be a discrete 
nosological entity by American-based psychiatrist Leo Kanner in 1943.  The 
history of the word autism itself is slightly longer, the term (origin: autos, self) 
being used by Eugene Bleuler in 1912 to refer to a mode of thinking evident 
³LQGUHDPVSUHWHQGSOD\DQGUHYHULHVDQGLQWKHIDQWDVLHVDQGGHOXVLRQVRI
WKHVFKL]RSKUHQLF´(Feinstein 2010: 6):KLOHWKHLGHDRIµDXWLVWLFIDQWDV\¶KDV
been largely abandoned (Evans 2013: 4)%OHXOHU¶VRULJLQDOQRWLRQRIDUHWUHDW
towards the self and away from interpersonal relations has remained 
UHDVRQDEO\ VWDEOH DQG LV HYLGHQW LQ WKH WLWOH RI .DQQHU¶V ILUVW SDSHU Autistic 
disturbances of affective contact (Kanner 1943).  In more recent decades, 
V\PSWRPRORJ\KDVEHHQGHVFULEHG LQ WKH IRUPRIDQ µDXWLVP WULDG¶ IHDWXULQJ
³LPSDLUHG VRFLDO LQWHUDFWLRQ LPSDLUHG YHUEDO DQG QRQ-verbal communication 
and the presence of repetitive and restricted pDWWHUQV RI EHKDYLRXU´ (White 
2013: 114).  Within the 5th Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders  (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association 2013) this triad 
has been condensed into a dyad of socio-communicative impairments and 
restricted interests and repetitive behaviours.  While autism is widely 
XQGHUVWRRG DV D µQHXURGHYHORSPHQWDO¶ FRQGLWLRQ (Norbury & Sparks 2012), 
there is neither cause nor cure known for the condition.   
:KLOHDXWLVP¶VIRUPDOKLVWRU\PD\VWDUW LQ3, it is well recognised 
that there was an epidemic of autism diagnoses in the 1990s (Eyal et al. 2010: 
2) and it is this contemporary era that is of foremost concern to this thesis.  
Prevalence rates for autism increased from around four cases per 10,000 in 
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1978 (Wing & Potter 2002: 151) to an estimated one percent of the United 
.LQJGRP¶V VFKool children in 2009 (Baron-Cohen et al. 2009: 500).  One 
remarkable study, conducted in South Korea under the wing of an American 
research team, concluded that prevalence rates in 7 to 12 year old children was 
1:38, and 1:27 in boys (Kim et al. 2011).  
With this increase in autism prevalence there has been concomitant 
increase in financial and academic investment.  Between 2007 and 2011 there 
ZHUHRYHUµFRPSHWLWLYHIXQGLQJDZDUGV¶JLYHQWRSURMHFWVFRQFHUQHGZLWK
autism in the UK, the geographic region of primary concern within this thesis.  
These funding awards amounted to just under £21million, around 80 percent of 
which came from government sources (Pellicano et al. 2013: 20).  This 
significant UK investment is, however, dwarfed by that made in the USA, 
where $357million (£234million) was spent in 2010 alone (Pellicano et al. 
2013: 20).  Within the UK, funding was split between a number of disciplines, 
ranging from molecular genetics to education.  Fifty-five percent of all funding 
DZDUGV PLOOLRQ ZHUH DOORFDWHG WR SURMHFWV RQ µELRORJ\ brain and 
FRJQLWLRQ¶  7KH PRVW VLJQLILFDQW DUHDV RI IXQGLQJ ZLWKLQ WKLV FDWHJRU\
FRQFHUQHG TXHVWLRQV RI ³FRUWLFDO GHYHORSPHQW VRFLDO FRJQLWLRQ DQG DQLPDO
PRGHOVRIDXWLVP´(Pellicano et al. 2013: 22).  
Again since the 1980s, the nature of the population classified as being 
autistic has changed significantly.  A fledgling cognitive research programme 
being established in the 1970s consistently used samples with mean I.Q.s in the 
60s, and autism was believed to be a condition which almost exclusively 
affected those with intellectual disability (Baron-Cohen et al. 2005: 628).  By 
comparisoQ LW LV QRZ DUJXHG WKDW ³LQWHOOHFWXDO GLVDELOLW\ LV QRW SDUW RI WKH
broader autism phenotype...[and] the association between extreme autistic 
WUDLWV DQG LQWHOOHFWXDOGLVDELOLW\ LV RQO\PRGHVW ´ (Hoekstra et al. 2009: 534).  
Similarly, it is argued that:  
³WKH DSSDUHQW DVVRFLDWLRQ EHWZHHQ PHQWDO UHWDUGDWLRQ DQG DXWLVWLF
syndromes is not because they usually have common causes, but rather 
because the presence of both features greatly increases the probability 
RIFOLQLFDODVFHUWDLQPHQW´(Skuse 2007: 387) 
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Within recent decades, then, the relationship between intellectual disability and 
autism has been questioned in a novel manner.  Diagnostically, High 
)XQFWLRQLQJ $XWLVP DQG $VSHUJHU¶V 6\QGURPH KDYH H[FOXGHG LQWHOOHFWXDO
disability by definition.   
Further, over the last thirty years autism has become an all pervasive 
cultural experience.  µ$XWLVWLFILFWLRQ¶KDVEHFRPHDUHFRJQLVHGJHQUH(Carlson 
& Kittay 2009: 320) and:    
³$XWLVPQDUUDWLYHLVDERRPLQGXVWU\$XWRELRJUDSKLHV%LRJUDSKLHV
Stage plays.  Movies.  Documentaries.  Novels.  Stories for children.  
Improving manga for adults.  Space fantasy comics for more-or-less 
grown-XSVQRZFDOOHGJUDSKLFQRYHOV 7KHUH¶s the exhilarating 2007 
HBO special, Autism: The Musical...  And above all, there is a vast 
amount of story-WHOOLQJLQWKH,QWHUQHW´(Hacking 2010: 632)  
As Stuart Murray has stated, this genre of autism fiction reflects the fact that, 
within our contemporary society, autism is: 
"...the condition of fascination of the moment, occupying a number of 
cultural locations that reflect a spectrum of wonder and nervousness - 
the allure of potentially unquantifiable human difference and the 
nightmare of not somehow being 'fully' human." (Murray 2008: 5) 
Somehow this condition of autism which was named just eighty years ago and 
that just thirty years ago lay entirely outside of public imagination (if 
production of, and response to, films and texts concerned with autism is at all 
indicative (Murray 2008: 120)) and which referred to a tiny number of 
individuals with intellectual disabilities, has become central to what it means to 
EH KXPDQ  $V RQH VFKRODU KDV QRWHG ZH ³DUH SDUWLFLSDWLQJ LQ D OLYLQJ
experiment in concept formation of a sort that does not come more than once 
LQDGR]HQOLIHWLPHV´(Hacking 2009a: 506).    
A note on terminology: Autism 
Over the time period covered in this thesis (broadly, 1985-2013) autism 
has undergone several name changes.  Within DSM-IV - text revisions, for 
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H[DPSOH WKH RIILFLDO WLWOH ZDV µ$XWLVWLF 'LVRUGHU¶ (American Psychiatric 
Association 2000)  µ$XWLVWLF 'LVRUGHU¶ ZDV DOVR GHPDUFDWHG IURP VLPLODU
GHYHORSPHQWDO FRQGLWLRQV QRWDEO\ $VSHUJHU¶V 6\QGURPH GHVFULEHG DV
clinically identical to Autistic Disorder, but with normal age of language onset) 
and Pervasive Developmental Disorder ± Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-
126 RU µDW\SLFDO DXWLVP¶ (American Psychiatric Association 2000: 134).  
During the writing of this thesis, those responsible for the publication of DSM-
KDGERWK$VSHUJHU¶V6\QGURPHDQG3''-NOS removed from the diagnostic 
manual and the categorical Autistic Disorder transformed into the (pseudo-
GLPHQVLRQDO µ$XWLVWLF 6SHFWUXP 'LVRUGHU¶ $6'  $ VLJQLILFDQW QXPEHU RI
researchers (e.g. Sucksmith et al. 2011) deviate even from DSM-¶V $6'
preferring Autistic Spectrum Condition (ASC).  The usage of ASC nods 
towards the significant debates over neurodiversity that surround ASD and the 
claim that autism is a form of human difference, rather than human disorder 
(Kapp et al. 2013).   
,QDQDWWHPSWDWFRQVLVWHQF\WKHZRUGµDXWLVP¶LVXVHGWKURXJKRXWWKLV
thesis.  While it is appreciated that terminology cannot be politically neutral, 
µDXWLVP¶LVXVHGIRUVW\OLVWLFUDWKHUWKDQDFDGHPLFUHDVRQV7KHXVHRIWKHWHUP
autism is not intended to imply either the inclusion or exclusion of individuals 
with, for example, AsSHUJHU¶V 6\QGURPH RU D SDUWLFXODU SRVLWLRQ Rn the 
difference/deficit debate. 
Even given their intensity, debates over the naming of autism as a 
classification have been dwarfed when it has come to the naming of particular 
individuals.  Contemporary papers referenced within this thesis refer to 
³LQGLYLGXDOV ZLWK DXWLVP´ (e.g. Ropar & Mitchell 1999) ³DXWLVWLFV´ (e.g. 
Mottron et al. 2006) HYHQ ³DXWLVWV´ (e.g. Camerer et al. 2005)  µ$XWLVWLF¶ LV
preferred by some individuals as it recognises the centrality of autism to their 
identity, and the belief that DXWLVP FDQQRW VLPSO\ EH µVXEWUDFWHG¶ IURP WKHLU
personality.  This terminological debate garnered significant interest recently 
when Michelle Dawson, an autistic author of a paper published in PLoS One 
(Soulières et al. 2011), publically chastised that publication for editing 
³DXWLVWLFV´ WR ³SHUVRQV ZLWK DXWLVP´ LQ ILQDO SURRILQJ D GHFLVLRQ WKDW ZDV
10 
 
subsequently apologised for and reverted from1.  Throughout this thesis, an 
attempt has been made to use terminology that is consistent with the data under 
GLVFXVVLRQ HJ LQNHHSLQJZLWK LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ZRUGLQJV2.  It is therefore the 
FDVHWKDWµLQGLYLGXDOVZLWKDXWLVP¶DQGµDXWLVWLFV¶DUHLQWHQGHGWREHV\QRQ\PV 
A contemporary subject 
7KH V ZHUH FKULVWHQHG WKH µGHFDGH RI WKH EUDLQ¶ (Beaulieu 2003: 
561), largely in response to the emergence of various novel forms of 
neuroimaging technology which purported to allow the visualisation of live, 
unimpaired (human) brains for the first time.  These novel technologies were 
immediately believed to hold great promise within medicine, but the 
experimental sciences, too, saw the possibility of innovation.  Within the 
experimental psy-disciplines, diverse neuroscientific methodologies were put 
to use in attempts to understand various aspects of human behaviour. As noted 
above, the majority of autism research funding in the UK goes into projects 
FRQFHUQHG ZLWK µELRORJ\ EUDLQ DQG FRJQLWLRQ¶ (Pellicano et al. 2013) and it 
says a great deal about how fundamental this biological and neurological 
research has become to laboratory based psychology that these three streams ± 
biology, brain, cognition ± are taken to be a cohesive category.  It is now the 
case that neuroscience has been incorporated into experimental psychology so 
fully that cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience can be argued to 
have a symbiotic relationship (Beaulieu 2002: 76). 
Vidal argues that continuities in thinking concerning the brain extend 
IDUEH\RQG WKHFRQWHPSRUDU\QHXURVFLHQFHVDQG WUDFHV WKHEHOLHI WKDW µZHDUe 
RXUEUDLQV¶EDFNWRWKHELUWKRIPRGHUQLVPLQWKHth century (Vidal 2009: 7).  
Nonetheless, it has been widely argued that emerging biosciences, and 
neurosciences in particular, have had particularly profound effects upon 
contemporary understandings of the human subject.  As Meloni has stated:  
³$OWKRXJKKXPDQEHLQJVDUHFHUWDLQO\QRWPRUHELRORJLFDOEHLQJVWKDQ
they were thirty years ago, they tend to identify themselves, explain 
                                       
1
 http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?root=7361 
2
 ThLVLVWKHFDVHERWKIRUµDXWLVWLF¶¶individual with autism¶ and for other phrases used by 
ZLWKLQWKHILHOGRIDXWLVPVWXG\HJµQRUPDO¶ 
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themselves, and see their image more and more through the lens of 
QHXURELRORJLFDO JHQHWLF DQG PROHFXODU WHUPV´ (Meloni 2011: 156-
157) 
  It is thus claimed the neurobiological enterprises are affecting the ways in 
which contemporary subjects are constructed and construct themselves.  
Ortega, for example, states that the: 
 ³...preference for cerebral explanations cannot be reduced to an 
aversion to psychoanalysis or psychologizing in general.  Rather, it 
emerges as part of the spread of neuroscientific claims beyond the 
laboratory.  Neuroscientific theories, practices, technologies and 
therapies are shaping the way we think about ourselves and related to 
RWKHUV´(Ortega 2009: 436) 
7KLVUHVKDSLQJRIWKHVHOIFDXVHGE\D³IRONQHXURORJ\´(Vrecko 2006), Ortega 
QDPHV WKH µFHUHEUDO VHOI¶  Similar, if not identical, conceptualisations have 
been made by Vidal ('brainhood'; Vidal 2009), Rose ('neurochemical self'; 
Rose 2003) and others.  The claim within this literature is that, when 
FRQVLGHULQJ DQ µRQWRORJ\ RI RXUVHOYHV¶ QHXURVFLHQFH LV DPRQJVW WKH PRVW
important of contemporary forces.  
If neuroscience in general has been an important contemporary 
scientific activity, then one particular trend with neuroscientific research seems 
of particular interest: the turn towards the social brain: 
³7KHKXPDQEUDLQ LQ LWVFXUUHQWFRQILJXUDWLRQ HPHUJHG,000 years 
ago, perhaps a bit earlier.  The social brain ± a distinctive perspective 
on the human brain ± HPHUJHGRQO\\HDUVDJR´(Young 2011: 640) 
It is undeniably true that the psy-disciplines have not only been concerned with 
using neuroscientific technologies to examine those behaviours constructed as 
concerning individual conduct (intelligence, memory, and so forth) but also 
those concerning social behaviours and social cognitions.  It is also true that 
such activities aimed at knowledges of social behaviour began very shortly 
after the onset of the neuroscientific revolution (e.g. Brothers 1990).  These 
projects aiming at investigating social behaviour came to be articulated under 
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the banner of µsocial neuroscience¶ (Matusall et al. 2011) and now a vast range 
oIµQHXURK\EULG¶GLVFLSOLQHVcirculate and apply themselves to the topic matters 
which were once reserved for sociology, economics, philosophy, and so forth.  
These emerging fields of study join existing work within experimental 
psychology that has been conducting laboratory investigations LQWRµWKHVRFLDO¶
since the first decades of the twentieth century (Danziger 1992: 311).  In this 
sense, the disciplines of social and cognitive neuroscience are only the latest 
attempts aiming at an objective, scientific NQRZOHGJH RI µWKH VRFLDO¶ DOEHLW
particularly high profile attempts.  There may have been a crisis in social 
psychology during the 1980s (Parker 1989), but the neurosciences have once 
again made the laboratory study of social behaviour a boom area.   
A note on terminology: Social/cognitive (neuro)science 
To say that the experimental psy-disciplines have embraced the 
contemporary neurosciences is rather imprecise.  The neurosciences are united 
by an interest in the brain, but the means to satiate that interest differ wildly.  
Some neuroscientific techniques, such as the Magnetic Resonance Image, 
require participants to lie alone in the dark surrounded by powerful magnets 
while an analysis is conducted on the amount of oxygen in the blood at a 
particular site at a particular moment (see, Logothetis 2008: 874).  Other 
experiments using electroencephalography may be conducted with the 
participant sitting at a desk, staring at a computer screen and conversing with 
the experimenter.  Some experiments examine brain function while others 
examine structure.  Some experiments require little more than the participant to 
lie still or watch a computer screen, while others require the comprehension of 
instructions every bit as complicated as those employed within traditional 
cognitive experiments.  These different methodologies come with very 
different epistemological assumptions (although, perhaps, similar ontological 
commitments) and are often used to answer very different questions.  Some of 
the varying assumptions of the different neurosciences come under 
investigation within this project, but it is important to remember that 
neurosciences is a plural noun and that, when used in this thesis, the term is 
being done so in this general sense.  Specific references to particular forms of 
neuroscientific investigation are therefore numerous throughout this project.  
13 
 
The current project 
Aims and rationale 
Surprisingly little work has concerned itself with socio-historical 
constructions of either autism or the social, although the research that has 
previously been conducted will be considered in chapter 2.  That there is such a 
paucity of research into both autism and the social is particularly striking given 
that, for the reasons described above, scientific investigations into these 
phenomena have the potential to be two of the most potent sources of self-
making within contemporary society.  What is more, no research has been 
conducted which examines the relationship between constructions of the social 
and constructions of autism.   
That the relationship between autism and the social has yet to come 
under investigation is noteworthy given that that the two subjects are so 
intimately related.  Autism, constructed as it is as a social disorder, is logically 
dependent upon descriptions of the social.  Similarly, autism is of particular 
LPSRUWDQFH WR H[SHULPHQWDO VWXGLHV RI WKH VRFLDO  6WULDQR DQG 5HLG¶V UHFHQW
textbook, for example, is entitled Social Cognition: Development, 
Neuroscience, and Autism (Striano & Reid 2009).  In experimental studies into 
the social, autism is frequently constructed as a naturally occurring experiment, 
an instance of human-minus-social, capable of illuminating upon the nature of 
social cognition and the social brain.  Thus, understandings of contemporary 
productions of the social must surely include a consideration of autism.   
It is the aim of this project to examine, for the first time, the 
intersection of constructions of the social and constructions of autism.  This is 
a relationship which, as discussed above, is of potential importance for 
understanding both autism itself and broader questions concerning ontologies 
of the self.  This thesis will thus seek to ask: 
x How have and how do particular constructions of the social from 
within the experimental sciences influence constructions of autism? 
x What is the nature of the social disorder hypothesised to be at the 
core of autism? 
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x How is the incorporation of autism into experimental studies of the 
VRFLDO LQIOXHQFLQJ WKRVH VFLHQFHV¶ FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQV RI ZKDW LW
means to be social? 
These questions will be investigated via two primary methods.  Firstly, an 
extensive socio-historical document analysis of the published literature since 
around 1985 will be completed.  The incorporation of document analysis gives 
the current project an historical scope which would not have been possible 
without reference to written sources.  Secondly, qualitative interviews will be 
conducted with a range of British (neuro)psychologists who investigate autism.  
In such a diverse and contested field, these interviews are intended to give 
insight into how a range of scientists, at different academic institutions and 
points in their career, construct autism and the social.   
Overview of chapters 
 Chapter 2, literature review, lays out three areas of research which 
inform this project.  First is a discussion of normalcy.  This portion of the 
review takes the form of an extended analysis concerning the work of Georges 
&DQJXLOKHP  6SHFLILFDOO\ LW LV DVNHG KRZ &DQJXLOKHP¶V WKRXJKW KDV EHHQ
modified and extended upon by his student, Michel Foucault, and those 
working within a broadly Foucauldian framework.  A second portion of the 
literature review concerns constructions of the social from within the 
experimental human sciences, most notably social psychology and social 
nHXURVFLHQFH  7KHVH OLWHUDWXUHV VKRZ WKDW µWKH VRFLDO¶ KDV EHHQ D IDU IURP
stable category over the last hundred or so years.  Finally, the existing social 
science literature into autism is considered.  While no other pieces have 
concerned themselves with autism as it relates to questions of the social, 
valuable contributions are outlined which have begun to chart the emergence 
of autism from around 1960. 
 Chapter 3, reflecting on method(ology), considers issues of reflexivity 
at three different levels.  Firstly the nature of the project itself is questioned 
and it is asked how the samples and methods selected for, and omitted from, 
this project may affect the overall findings.  This section also includes details 
of the literature and scientists sampled for this project, the interview schedule, 
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and the ethics procedures that were adhered to.  Secondly, the role of the 
researcher and their particular history in relation to the objects under 
investigation is considered.  Finally, there is reflection upon this pURMHFW¶V
status within Science Studies and upon the status of the knowledge claims put 
IRUZDUGE\ WKDWGLVFLSOLQHJLYHQ LWV UHSHDWHGTXHVWLRQLQJRIRWKHUGLVFLSOLQHV¶
knowledge claims.  It is concluded that to be understood, the findings of the 
current project must be situated within this complex relational framework. 
 Chapter 4, constructing a social subject: autism and human sociality in 
the 1980s is centred upon a five year period between 1985 and 1989 during 
which time the three dominant psychological models of autism (Executive 
Dysfunction; Metarepresentations; Weak Central Coherence) were articulated.  
The manner in which these theories construct the social disorder of autism is 
examined and related back to existing literature outlined in chapter 2.  A 
further, fourth, model of autism (Emotion/Affect Theory) which has since 
fallen from favour is also presented, and the construction of the social inherent 
within that theory is contrasted with the construction of the social from those 
that have remained dominant. 
 Chapter 5, a coherence of alien forms: order and disorder in autism 
turns from the literature and towards data obtained though interview.  
Discourses RI µDXWLVWLF KHWHURJHQHLW\¶, which contest that autism is 
multiplicitous in nature are examined.  Given these narratives of heterogeneity, 
LW LVVXEVHTXHQWO\DVNHGZKHUHDXWLVP¶VVLQJXODUHVVHQFHLV WREHIRXQG ,W LV
shown that researchers report a qualitatively distinct experience of social 
disorder when encountering an individual with autism.  The chapter concludes 
with a discussion concerning the nature of these experiences and what their 
presence shows about the nature of autism research. 
 Chapter 6, autism, the social, and society examines the apparent 
VHSDUDWLRQEHWZHHQWKHREMHFWLYHQDWXUHRIµWKHVRFLDO¶DVH[DPLQHGZLWKLQWKH
ODERUDWRU\ DQG WKH QRUPDWLYH YDOXH ODGHQ FRQFHSW RI µVRFLHW\¶  7KH
relationship between autism, the social, and society is considered in relation to 
four key areas drawn upon by the research scientists interviewed for this 
project; DSM-5, diagnostic practice, laboratory practice, and neuroplasticity.  
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It is argued that, in all four instances, the social of the laboratory is understood 
in relation to societal frameworks. 
 Chapter 7, ontologies of our social selves: normalisation and 
pathologisation in autism, examines two recent research trends.  Firstly, it is 
DUJXHGWKDWWKHUHKDVEHHQDPRYHWRµUHVHDUFKXS¶WKHDXWLVPVSHFWUXP  It is 
argued that research into the symptoms of autism as exhibited by sub- and non-
clinical individuals, individuals with autism who are particularly high 
functioning, and autistic savants are all beginning to normalise autism and 
make its symptoms intelligible within the context of normal behaviour.  
Secondly, it is argued that resting state neuroscientific experiments allow 
individuals previously unsuitable for experimentation to come under scientific 
examination.  The reduced task demands of resting state technologies allow 
individuals ± for example those with severe intellectual disability or infants ± 
who are not capable of following instruction to be experimented upon.  It is 
DUJXHGKRZHYHU WKDW D JUHDW GHDOPXVWEH µRWKHUHG¶ LQRUGHU WR DVVXPH WKat 
resting state technologies are able to capture social behaviour.  The chapter 
concludes by analysing the potentially novel construction of the social found 
within resting state imaging studies, and how these constructions of autistic 
sociality may be reODWHGWRWKHµQRUPDOLVHG¶HQGRIWKHVSHFWUXPFRQVLGHUHGDW
the beginning of the chapter. 
Finally chapter 8, conclusion: autism, history, and socio-emotive 
politics, considers the main findings of the thesis.  The first conclusion 
concerns the placement of the social in laboratory science and it is suggested 
that existing discussions have thus far failed to appreciate the complexity of 
this relationship.  Secondly it is argued that autism can only be understood 
within a particular socio-historical framework it cannot meaningfully have said 
to have pre-existed.  Thirdly, it is asked whether the emergence and rise of 
autism is indicative of a more significant movement in the understanding of the 
human condition, a socio-emotive politics.  The thesis concludes by 
considering the limitations of the thesis and the possibility of moving beyond 
the current experience of autism as social disorder.  
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Literature Review 
³DFRUHV\PSWRPLQDXWLVPLVVRFLDODEQRUPDOLW\´ 
- Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen 1997: 527 
Introduction 
The above quotation captures much of what the cognitive (neuro)sciences 
know about autism, and it is an interrogation of this knowledge which forms 
the basis of this PhD.  Specifically, when the goal is to examine the historical 
ontology of autism, three sets of questions arise from claims of this sort: 
x What does it mean to say that an individual, or a particular behaviour, 
LVRULVQRWµQRUPDO¶"+RZKDVQRUPDOF\FRPHWRORRNDVLWGRHV"   
x :KDWLVPHDQWKHUHE\µVRFLDO¶"+RZKDYHWKHSV\-disciplines come to 
DUWLFXODWH DQG FODVVLI\ SDUWLFXODU EHKDYLRXUV DV µVRFLDO¶ DQG RWKHUV as 
µQRQVRFLDO¶" 
And finally: 
x  How have descriptions of (ab)normality and (non)sociality from within 
the psy-disciplines congealed3 into the form of autism? 
These are questions this thesis will seek to address.   
This review will examine literatures which have asked questions 
concerning the construction of the normal, the social, and the classification of 
autism.  Firstly, a discussion of the normal will be based around the early work 
of Georges Canguilhem and his tri-partite claim that the normal: i) took on a 
new appearance in the nineteenth century; ii) always arises from 
conceptualisations of the pathological, rather than vice versa and; iii) that 
ELRORJLFDOQRUPVDUHDOZD\VYDOXHODGHQ&DQJXLOKHP¶VZRUNZLOObe analysed 
in relation to that of Michel Foucault and those working within a Foucauldian 
                                       
3
 µ&RQJHDO¶LVXVHGKHUH in a sense similar to that conveyed by Butler when it was stated that 
JHQGHU ³LV WKH UHSHDWHG VW\OL]DWLRQ RI WKH ERG\ D VHW RI UHSHDWHG DFWV ZLWKLQ D KLJKO\ ULJLG
regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of a substance, a natural 
VRUWRIEHLQJ´(Butler 1990: 44). 
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IUDPHZRUNZLWKVLPLODULWLHVDQGGLIIHUHQFHVZLWK&DQJXLOKHP¶VFRQWULEXWLRQV
being analysed.  Secondly, the small literature which has examined the 
construction of the social within experimental psychology and social 
neuroscience will be discussed.  As well as noting the contrasting descriptions 
of the social across the history of psychology, the conditions under which 
particular constructions of the social arose will be considered.  Finally, social 
scientific analyses of autism will be presented.  In particular, and in keeping 
with the aims of the current thesis, literatures which have examined the 
historical emergence of autism and those which have examined practices of 
knowledge creation in relation to autism will be discussed.   
Constructing the normal 
"Nothing is more commonplace than the distinction between fact and 
value.  From the beginning of our language the word 'normal' has been dancing 
and prancing all over it." 
- Hacking 1990: 163 
When considering notions of normality and abnormality within the 
human sciences, a founding text of particular importance is George 
&DQJXLOKHP¶V The Normal and the Pathological (1991)  &DQJXLOKHP¶V WH[W
has been of longstanding interest in France, yet has gained increased attention 
in the English language only more recently, from scholars (e.g. Rose 1998) 
initially drawQE\&DQJXLOKHP¶V FORVH DVVRFLDWLRQZLWK0LFKHO )RXFDXOW (see 
Miller (1993: 103) for an overview of this relationship).  The portion of 
&DQJXLOKHP¶V WH[W ILUVW SXEOLVKHG LQ  DV SDUW RI KLV GRFWRUDO WKHVLV
(Canguilhem 1991: 29) makes, for current concerns, three core claims: i) in the 
nineteenth century a novel conceptualisation of the relationship between 
normalcy and pathology emerged in which abnormal states were articulated as 
being quantitatively rather than qualitatively distinct from normal states; ii) 
normal states are necessarily defined in relation to pathological states and 
never vice versa; iii) biological norms are never value neutral but are 
themselves normative.  This portion of the review will be framed around an 
articulation and discussion of these three central claims of Canguilhem. 
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i) Is the pathological state merely quantitative modification of the normal state? 
 Canguilhem begins his text by considering two historical models of 
disease.  The first, what might be called a Pasteurian model, localises 
pathology in, for example, a visible bacterium.  The second, a Hellanistic 
model, does not localise but totalises, affecting all of man and her equilibrium.  
While evidently differing substantially, these two representations of disease do, 
according to Canguilhem: 
³have one point in common: in disease, or better, in the experience 
of being sick, both envision a polemical situation: either a battle 
between the organism and a foreign substance, or an internal struggle 
between opposing forces.  Disease differs from a state of health, the 
pathological from the normal, as one quality differs from another, 
either by the presence or absence of a definite principle, or by an 
alteration of the total organism.´(Canguilhem 1991: 41)  
According to Canguilhem, these representations of disease were joined in the 
nineteenth century by a third, championed by Auguste Comte, FJV Broussais 
and others.  Rather than viewing normalcy and pathology as qualitatively 
distinct states, there was:  
³.the formation of a theory of the relations between the normal and the 
pathological, according to which the pathological phenomena found in 
living organisms are nothing more than quantitative variations, greater 
or lesser according to corresponding physiological 
phenomena.  Semantically, the pathological is designated as a departing 
from the normal not so much by a- or dys- as by hyper- or hypo-." 
(Canguilhem 1991: 42, italics in original) 
Canguilhem would devote a significant portion of his text to contesting this 
contemporary conceptualisation of the relationship between the normal and the 
pathological (e.g. Canguilhem 1991: 86-89) DQG VRPH RI &DQJXLOKHP¶V
reasoning for this is of importance to ii), considered below.  For the moment, 
however, the claim is more important as an historical, rather than a medico-
SKLORVRSKLFDO WKHVLV  ,Q WKLV KLVWRULFDO UHVSHFW &DQJXLOKHP¶V WKHVLV KDV
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received strong empirical support (e.g. Hacking 1990: 162).  Indeed, the 
shifting conceptualisation of normality detailed by Canguilhem seems to be 
just one (albeit perhaps the most important) of many changes in the 
construction of the human subject that occurred during the early nineteenth 
century. 
The most important conceptual articulation of this change in the early 
QLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\KDVFRPHIURP&DQJXLOKHP¶VVWXGHQW0LFKHO)RXFDXOW It is 
well known that Foucault saw the beginning of the nineteenth century as an 
absolutely crucial moment in human history, going as far as to say that the 
knowledges of things and their orders which formed around 1800 made it 
SRVVLEOHIRU³the figure of man to appear´(Foucault 2002: 422).  That the turn 
of the nineteenth century should be so important for contemporary subject 
formation is perhaps understandable given that the Age of Revolution was 
transforming life on both sides of The Channel during this time (Hobsbawm 
1962).  One change noted by Foucault, and into which CDQJXLOKHP¶V QHZ
construction of the normal neatly fits, is the emergence of a new social 
configuration which brought into existence new objects, new forms of 
knowledge to monitor those objects, and new institutions to control them.  
Foucault referred to thLVQHZGRPDLQDVWKDWRIµELRSROLWLFV¶(Foucault 1997b: 
239-263).  
To talk of biopolitics within contemporary arenas remains divisive, but 
WKDW LVQRW WKHJRDOKHUH  ,W LV VXUHO\SDUWRI)RXFDXOW¶VHQGXULQJDSSHDO WKDW
analyses which concern strictly historical episodes seem so pertinent within 
contemporary society, an effect that was not unintended (Foucault 1994: 245).  
Nonetheless, critiques (Martin & Williams n.d.: 14-15; Raman & Tutton 2010) 
of contemporary articulations and rediscriptions (e.g. Rabinow & Rose 2006; 
Rose 2007) of  biopolitics do not generally concern the historical thesis set 
IRUWKE\)RXFDXOWDQGE\LPSOLFDWLRQ&DQJXLOKHP1HLWKHUGR)RXFDXOW¶VRZQ
analyses of the effects of biopolitics upon socialism (Foucault 1997b: 259), 
fascism (Foucault 1997b: 261), or capitalism (Foucault 1978: 141).  Of course, 
)RXFDXOW¶V KLVWRU\ OHVVRQV PXVW DOVR EH YLHZHG ZDULO\ (Miller 1993: 210; 
Madsen et al. 2013: 43) but, following other scholars, there is good reason to 
accept the contention that an intensification, if not a complete emergence, of 
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practices relating to the governance of populations occurred at some point 
around 1820 (Hacking 1983: 292), and that this led to new visions of the 
human in general, and the normal human in particular.   
 As detailed in The Birth of the Clinic (Foucault 2003) and extended 
upon in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1991a), Foucault saw a particular 
construction of the body, and a political apparatus explicitly concerned with 
this construction, emerging in the centuries preceding the 1800s: 
"...in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we saw the emergence 
of techniques of power that were essentially centred on the body, on the 
individual body.  They included all devices that were used to ensure the 
spatial distribution of individual bodies (their separation, their 
alignment, their serialization, and their surveillance) and the 
organization, around those individuals, of a whole field of 
visibility.  They were also techniques that could be used to take control 
over bodies.  Attempts were made to increase their productive force 
through exercise, drill, and so on." (Foucault 1997b: 241-242) 
7KLVQRWLRQRIµDQDWDPR-SROLWLFV¶LVSHUKDSV EHVWFDSWXUHGLQ)RXFDXOW¶VLPDJH
of the panopticon which individualises prisoners and makes the body available 
to the constant gaze of the disciplinary apparatus (Foucault 1991a: 200; 
Armstrong 1985).  In the 1800s, however, anatamo-politics was joined by a 
new gaze which saw health and illness residing in a different space outside of 
the body.  The knowledges of this new spatial configuration were: 
³DGGUHVVHG WR D PXOWLSOLFLW\ RI PHQ QRW WR WKH H[WHQW WKDW WKH\ DUH
nothing more than their individual bodies, but to the extent that they 
form, on the contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall 
characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on.  So after a 
first seizure of power over the body in an individualizing mode, we 
have a second seizure of power that is not individualizing but, if you 
like, massifying, that is directed not at man-as-body but at man-as-
species.  After the anatomo-politics of the human body established in 
the course of the eighteenth century, we have, at the end of that century, 
the emergence of something that is no longer an anatomo-politics of the 
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human body, but what I would call a "biopolitics" of the human 
race." (Foucault 1997b: 242-243) 
The difference regarding this type of knowledge of the population to that 
which went before it is captured by Hacking when he notes that: 
³+HDUWKVDQGZLQGRZVZHUHIRUORQJQRWRQO\WKHEDVLVRIWD[DWLRQEXW
also the most reliable estimator of the size of the population.  One can 
tell the story of biopolitics as the transition from the counting of hearths 
to the counting of bodieV´(Hacking 1983: 280-281) 
Foucault does not mean here that the attempt "to rationalize the problems 
posed to governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living 
beings forming a population: health, hygiene, birthrate, life expectancy, race..." 
and so forth (Foucault 2008: 317) halted the existence of anatamo-politics but 
UDWKHUWKDWWKH\FDPHWR³LQWHUVHFWDORQJDQRUWKRJRQDODUWLFXODWLRQ´(Foucault 
1997b: 253).  Census statistics may, as described by Hacking, provide a 
relatively pure example of biopolitics but, by and large, phenomena will 
emerge at the intersections of anatamo- and bio-politics.  That the novel 
conceptualisation of the normal which emerged during the early part of the 
nineteenth century was one such phenomenon occurring at the intersections, 
incorporating ideas of what it meant to have both a normal body and a normal 
population, seems particularly likely.   
 ii) Health is life in the silence of the organs 
$ VHFRQG FRUH WHQHW RI &DQJXLOKHP¶V YLHZ RI QRUPDOF\ LV WKDW WKH
normal is always defined in relation to the pathological, and never vice versa.  
Canguilhem contends that articulations of normalcy always come in the wake 
of articulations of pathology for it is only when an individual reports a 
qualitatively distinct disease experience that medicine turns its attention 
towards the phenomena in question:  
"Physiology is the science of the functions and ways of life, but it is life 
which suggests to the physiologist the ways to explore, for which he 
codifies the laws.  Physiology cannot impose in life just those ways 
whose mechanism is intelligible to it.  Diseases are new ways of 
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life.  Without the diseases which incessantly renew the area to be 
explored, physiology would mark time on well-trod ground.  But the 
foregoing idea can also be understood in another, slightly different 
sense.  Disease reveals normal functions to us at the precise moment 
when it deprives us of their exercise.  Disease is the source of the 
speculative attention which life attaches to life by means of man.  If 
health is life in the silence of the organs, then, strictly speaking, there is 
no science of health.  Health is organic innocence.  It must be lost, like 
all innocence, so that knowledge may be possible.  Physiology is like 
all science, which, as Aristotle says, proceeds from wonder.  But truly 
vital wonder is the anguish caused by disease." (Canguilhem 1991: 
100-101) 
Medicine is not capable of imposing disease experiences upon subjects and, 
therefore, trails in the wake of those experiences.  This enables Canguilhem to 
claim that: 
"...medicine always exists de jure, if not de facto, because there are 
men who feel sick, not because there are doctors to tell men of their 
illnesses." (Canguilhem 1991: 93. italics in original)  
In particular instances this model surely holds, but as a general rule subsequent 
scholarship has cast grave doubts upon it.  Unsurprisingly, given that 
Canguilhem published his thesis in Paris, 1943, ³DQRW-so-latent existentialism, 
albeit of a distinctive and idiosyncratic sort, shadows Canguilhem¶VFRQFHSWLRQ
of medicine´ (Rabinow 2000: 18).  In short, Canguilhem gives a primacy to 
the subject that the Foucauldian tradition will not accept, something which is 
HYLGHQWZKHQFRQVLGHULQJZKDW)RXFDXOWKLPVHOIPHDQVE\µH[SHULHQFH¶ 
Foucault spent much of his career attempting to distance himself and 
his tradition, including Canguilhem specifically, from existentialist 
phenomenology (e.g. Foucault 1991b: 8) and it was quite possibly for this 
UHDVRQ WKDW )RXFDXOW DEDQGRQHG WKH WHUP µH[SHULHQFH¶ IRU WKH EHVW SDUW RI D
decade (Lemke 2011: 28) after it played such a crucial role in the lexicon of 
History of Madness (Khalfa 2006: xiv).  Nonetheless, Foucault would come to 
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understand his analyses, examining radical discontinuities in thought and ways 
of seeing, as concerning experience:    
³,KDYHWULHGWRGHILQHWRVRPHGHJUHHWKHSRVVLELOLW\RI WKHKLVWRU\RI
ZKDW FRXOG EH FDOOHG ³H[SHULHQFHV´  7KH H[SHULHQFH RI PDGQHVs, the 
experience of disease, the experience of criminality, and the experience 
RIVH[XDOLW\´(Foucault 2010: 5) 
Foucault claimed WKDW µKLVWRULFDOO\ VLQJXODU H[SHULHQFHV¶ ZHUH FRQVWUXFWHGE\
the mingling and interrelations of three axes (Foucault 1984b: 2), the so-called 
tripartite nature of experience (Foucault 1994: 3), featuring ³IRUPV RI
possible knowledge, normative frameworks of behavior, and potential modes 
RI H[LVWHQFH IRU SRVVLEOH VXEMHFWV´ Foucault 2010: 254).  Lemke (2011: 39) 
UHIHUV WR WKHVHD[HV LQ WXUQDV ³WKHSURblem of truth, the problem of power, 
and the problem of individual conduct´DQG1LNRODV5RVHKDVVXPPDULVHGWKLV
attitude towards experience in the following manner: 
³'HYLFHV RI µPHDQLQJ SURGXFWLRQ¶ ± grids of visualization, 
vocabularies, norms and systems of judgement ± produce experience; 
they are not themselves produced by H[SHULHQFH´ (Rose 1996a: 130, 
italics in original)   
It can be seen just how readily this conceptualisation of experience differs 
from the existentialist-tinged Canguilhemian notion.  If experiences are formed 
within a knowledge-power nexus (Foucault 1997d: 61) WKHQ &DQJXLOKHP¶V
claim that, de jure, normalcy proceeds from pathology appears to have been, at 
least potentially, undermined.   
 If the Foucauldian conceptualisation of experience undermines 
&DQJXLOKHP¶VFDVHde jure, there is strong empirical support to undermine it de 
facto.  Historical investigations into, for example, the fugue (Hacking 2002), 
multiple personality disorder (Hacking 1995a), paedophilia (Balmer & 
Sandland 2012), post-traumatic stress syndrome (Young 1995), and the 
biosciences more generally (Rose 2007; Vrecko 2010) all convincingly trace 
processes of subjectification.  With particular reference to the current project, it 
has also been noted (Hacking 2007: 309) that the diagnosis of autism emerged 
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following increased surveillance over the normal development of children in 
the 1920s and 1930s (Armstrong 1983: 27; Danziger 1990: 79) and not, it 
seems, in response to any particular childhood experience of pathology. 
It should also be noted that there have been claims that the 
contemporary biosciences have significantly altered experience, and 
experiences of normalcy, in ways which could not have been foreseen by 
Canguilhem.  Rose, for example, has suggested that biotechnological 
enterprise throughout the twentieth century has led to the molecularisation of 
biopolitics (Rose 2007: 44) and, thus, affected experiences of health and illness 
in entirely novel fashions.  Further, the related concepts of biosociality 
(Rabinow 1999), biomedicalization (Clarke et al. 2003; Clarke et al. 2010), 
and biological citizenship (Novas & Gibbon 2008; Novas & Rose 2001; Rose 
2001; Rose 2007; Rose & Novas 2005) have suggested quite radical forms of 
subjectification within the biomedical age, perhaps most notably the claim that 
VXEMHFWVQRZH[SHULHQFHWKHPVHOYHVDVEHLQJ³DWULVN´RIYDULRXVSDWKRORJLFDO
states (Rose 2009; Rose 2010; Shostak 2010).  These claims have themselves 
been critiqued as overgeneralisations (Bröer & Heerings 2013; Pickersgill et 
al. 2011; Weiner 2006; Weiner 2009) but it does seem to be the case that some 
individuals, perhaps those wiWK+XQWLQJWRQ¶V'LVHDVH(Novas & Rose 2001) or 
Phelan-McDermid Syndrome (Navon 2011), do experience themselves in quite 
radically difference ways as a response to novel knowledges, contra the 
Canguilhemian model that experience of pathology always precedes 
intervention and, thus, descriptions of normalcy.   
iii) The normativity of biological norms 
 7KHWKLUGRI&DQJXLOKHP¶VFODLPVLVWKDWELRORJLFDOQRUPVDUHQRWYDOXH
neutral but are themselves value-based.  Canguilhem illustrates this point with 
reference to one of the most fundamental of vital characteristics, the duration 
of life: 
³the techniques of collective hygiene which tend to prolong human 
life, or the habits of negligence which result in shortening it, depending 
on the value attached to life in a given society, are in the end a value 
judgment expressed in the abstract number which is the average human 
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life span.  The average life span is not the biologically normal, but in a 
sense the socially normative, life span." (Canguilhem 1991: 161) 
This analysis leads Canguilhem to the conclusion that "the sick man is not 
abnormal because of the absence of a norm but because of his incapacity to be 
normative" (Canguilhem 1991: 186).  Whilst there are certainly many who 
contest the notion that the body is an ideologically inscribed space (e.g. 
Eagleton 1991: 10), it is at least an area of broad agreement amongst those 
following a Canguilhemian tradition.  Foucault was, as is discussed above and 
is evident elsewhere (e.g. Foucault 2006b), obsessed with the body.  In one of 
his most famed essays Foucault states that: 
³:HEHOLHYH LQ DQ\ HYHQW WKat the body obeys the exclusive laws of 
physiology and that it escapes the influence of history, but this too is 
false.  The body is molded by a great many distinct regimes; it is 
broken down by the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned 
by food or values, through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs 
UHVLVWDQFHV´(Foucault 1977: 153)  
7KXV ³WKH ERG\ LV WKH LQVFULEHG VXUIDFH RI HYHQWV´ DQG LW LV WKH WDVN RI
JHQHDORJLFDO HQTXLU\ WR ³H[SRVH D ERG\ WRtally imprinted by history and the 
SURFHVVRIKLVWRU\¶VGHVWUXFWLRQRIWKHERG\´(Foucault 1977: 148). 
 Rather than consider, once more, the literature which expands upon 
processes of anatamo-politics, biopolitics, and subjectification and how these 
processes relate to the body - as sexual, criminal, pathological and so forth ± it 
instead seems worthwhile to consider what is missing in these analyses for a 
project concerned not only with medicine but with the psy-disciplines.  Ian 
Hacking has introduced the concept of memoro-politics (Hacking 1994) as a 
µWKLUGSROH¶WR)RXFDXOW¶VDQDWDPR-politics ± biopolitics binary and thus seeks 
WR DGGUHVV D JDS LQ )RXFDXOW¶V WKHRULVLQJ E\ LQWURGXFLQJ µJRYHUQDQFH RI WKH
VRXO¶ DORQJVLGH JRYHUQDQFH RI WKH ERG\ DQG JRYHUQDQFH RI WKH SRSXODWLRQ
Hacking and others (Danziger 2008; Rose 1985; Rose 1996b; Young 1995) 
have made two points with regards to memoro-politics.  The first is that the 
latter half of the nineteenth century was a crucial moment for contemporary 
productions of the soul.  One need only think of Freud, his suggestion that 
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³ZKDW KDV EHHQ IRUJRWWHQ LV ZKDW IRUPV RXU FKDUDFWHU, our personality, our 
VRXO´(Hacking 1994: 33), and the absolutely fundamental nature of this insight 
to contemporary constructions of, for example, post-traumatic stress disorder 
(Young 1994) and child abuse (Hacking 1991) to appreciate this fact.   
A second point is that the majority of work conducted within the psy-
disciplines is not concerned entirely with memoro-politics to the exclusion of 
anatamo-politics and biopolitics.  Knowledges of both the body and of 
populations have been crucial to psychology and, as Young has noted, studies 
RIPHPRU\ZHUH³ERUQDWWKHLQWHUVHFWLRQRIWZRVWUHDPVRIVFLHQWLILFLQTXLU\
VRPDWLFDQGSV\FKRORJLFDO´(Young 1995: 11).  The concepts and subjects that 
emerge, at least partially, on the basis of the psy-disciplines take the form they 
do because of the clustering of intermediary relations (Foucault 1978: 139) 
influenced by memoro-, anatamo-, and biopolitics.  It is to one of these 
constructions, the notion of the human as a social subject, which we now turn.     
Constructing the social 
&ULWLFDOUHIOHFWLRQXSRQSV\FKRORJ\¶VHQJDJHPHQWZLWKµWKHVRFLDO¶KDV
thus far been highly restricted, both historically and sociologically.  
Historically, the exceptions to this paucity of research come in two forms.  
Firstly, there are two journal special editions which (broadly) concern 
themselves with the topic; the first an issue of Journal of the History of the 
Behavioral Sciences in 2000 (Lubek 2000), the second an issue of Theory and 
Psychology in 2006 (Stam 2006).  Secondly, a book by John Greenwood 
entitled The Disappearance of the Social in American Social Psychology 
(Greenwood 2004a) has considered the topic at length. 
While these literatures will be relied upon within this review, several 
aspects of this small literature are worthy of consideration.  Firstly, the body of 
work is almost entirely self-referencing, garnering little attention from any 
authors other than those who contribute to the volumes themselves.  Dispute 
between the parties is thus unsurprisingly at a minimum and contestation from 
alternative theoretical/methodological positions effectively non-existent.   
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Secondly, with the notable exception of Kurt Danziger, the texts do not 
engage at all with either Science and Technology Studies or the Foucauldian 
tradition of history and philosophy of science and instead put forward 
straightforwardly realist narratives.  That so much of this scholarship comes 
from authors based in Canada and working in the years immediately following 
WKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI+DFNLQJ¶VRewriting the Soul does make the absence of both 
STS and &HPS surprising, however it also makes explicable claims such as 
*UHHQZRRG¶V WKDW WKHUH KDV EHHQ a  ³GHDUWK RI DWWHPSWV WR H[SOLFDWH WKRVH
properties by which social phenomena are intuitively characterised as socLDO´ 
(Greenwood 1997: 2); this is simply not a tenable claim in an era of Actor-
Network Theory.   
Thirdly, behaviourism, psychoanalysis, and their impact upon the 
H[SHULPHQWDOVFLHQFHVDUHEURDGO\LJQRUHGSHUKDSVEHFDXVHRIWKHOLWHUDWXUH¶V
tight focus upon laboratory experimentation with human subjects.  Indeed, 
ZKHQFRQVLGHULQJ'DQ]LJHU¶VConstructing the Subject (Danziger 1990), by far 
the most cited and influential text in the broader field, Hacking notes that 
³'DQ]LJHU¶V ERRN OLVWV )UHXG RQFH LQ WKH LQGH[ DQG ZH DUH UHIHUUHG WR D
VHQWHQFHWKDWEHJLQVµ$QRWKHUSV\FKRORJLVW¶.  Now one thing that Freud was 
QRWZDVDQRWKHUSV\FKRORJLVW´(Hacking 1994: 40).  Given the limited scope of 
the current project it is not realistic for a novel analysis (or indeed integration) 
of constructions of the social from within behaviourist or psychoanalytic 
thought to take place here.  Nonetheless, such research ± perhaps considering 
empathy as a psychoanalytic rather than a neuroscientific construct (Pigman 
1995; see below) ± would certainly be a worthwhile project.  
 Despite the above caveats, this small body of work on the construction 
of the social within experimental psychology is certainly of value.  It will, 
however, be one of the goals of this thesis to examine its claims, within the 
context of autism, and in more detail than has thus far been the case.  
µ6RFLDO¶3V\FKRORJ\EHIRUH 
3ULRU WR  *UHHQZRRG FODLPV WKDW µWKH VRFLDO¶ ZDV ZLWKLQ VRFLDO
psychology, conceived of in the following manner: 
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³VRFLDORU³FROOHFWLYH´RU³JURXS´FRJQLWLRQHPRWLRQDQd behavior 
are forms of cognition, emotion, and behavior engaged by individual 
persons... because and on condition that they represent other members 
of a social group as engaging these (or other) forms of cognition, 
emotion, and behavior in similar circumstances´ (Greenwood 2004a: 
18, italics in original)  
3HUKDSVWKHPRVWSHUWLQHQWDVSHFWRIWKLVFRQVWUXFWLRQLVWKDWµWKHVRFLDO¶UHIHUV
not to particular objects of cognition but to particular forms of cognition.  It is 
not that interpersonal activities are inherently social while chopping wood is 
inherently individual, rather it is the form that either of these activities takes 
which determines whether it is social or not. 7R XVH RQH RI *UHHQZRRG¶V
examples, DQLQGLYLGXDO¶VEHOLHIWKDWDERUWLRQLVZURQJPD\EHFDOOHGDsocial 
belief if it is held due to that LQGLYLGXDO¶VPHPEHUVKLSRIDSDUWLFXODUJURXSIRU
instance, the Catholic Church).  The same pro-life belief may be deemed 
µLQGLYLGXDO¶LI 
³LWLVKHOGLQGLYLGXDOO\IRUUHDVRQVRUFDXVHVLQGHSHQGHQWRIZKHWKHU
any other Catholic (or any member of any social group) is represented 
as holding this belief ± if, for example, it is held because the person has 
DFFHSWHG UDWLRQDO DUJXPHQWV RU HYLGHQFH LQ IDYRU RI WKLV EHOLHI´
(Greenwood 2004a: 21)  
Greenwood claims that this is the conceptualisation of the social broadly 
shared by both Durkheim and Weber, positioning social psychology prior to 
1930 quite closely to a sociology (Greenwood 2004a: 85-86) which had been 
determining its own conceptualisation of the social during the 19th century 
(Donzelot 1977; Donzelot 1988).  Further, Greenwood largely endorses this 
articulation, despite the fact that work into the history of rationality (e.g. 
Foucault 1997e), not to mention forty years of STS, might make us wonder 
TXLWHZKDWH[DFWO\DµUDWLRQDODUJXPHQW¶WKDWLVµLQGLYLGXDOO\KHOG¶ZLWKRXWWKH
impact of society might look like.  
Greenwood calls this era, dominant prioU WR  WKH µORVW ZRUOG¶
(Greenwood 2004a: 18; Greenwood 2004b: 19), not least because, as Kurt 
Danziger states, during a period between 1920 and 1970 a new form of 
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experimental VRFLDO SV\FKRORJ\ EHFDPH ³SURJUDPPDWLF DQG SRWHQWLDOO\
QRUPDWLYH´(Danziger 2000: 330).  Research regimes operating after 1920, and 
Danziger notes three such regimes, each conceptualise the social in markedly 
different ways to those operating around World War One.   
µ6RFLDO¶3V\FKRORJ\IURPRQZDUGV 
During the 1920s Floyd Allport argued strongly against the so-called 
µJURXSIDOODF\¶(Danziger 2000: 333), claiming instead that all social behaviour 
was reducible to individuals, and that there was no social reality outside of 
these individual agents.  Allport still insisted upon the distinction between the 
VRFLDODQGWKHQRQVRFLDOKRZHYHUWKHVRFLDO³LQYROYHG³VRFLDOVWLPXOL´DQGWKH
LQGLYLGXDO¶VUHVSRQVHLQWKHSUHVHQFHRIWKHPVRFLDOVWLPXOLEHLQJVLPSO\RWKHU
SHRSOH´(Danziger 2000: 333),Q$OOSRUW¶VVWXGLHVIRUH[DPSOH 
³...subjects were graduate students who were given such tasks as 
cancelling all the vowels in newspaper materials, multiplying two-digit 
numbers and producing lists of associated words.  Their output was 
measured when they worked at the same table with three or four others 
and when thH\ZRUNHGDORQH´(Danziger 1992: 315) 
([SHULPHQWVVXFKDVWKHDERYHZHUHEHOLHYHGWRH[DPLQHWKHµLQGLUHFW¶effects 
RI WKHVRFLDO LQYHVWLJDWLQJD VFHQDULR LQZKLFK LQGLYLGXDOV µFR-DFW¶EXW IRFXV
upon a stimulus rather than each other.  Direct social experiments focused 
instead upon face-to-face interaction (Greenwood 2004b: 26).  This depiction 
of the social is, both Danziger and Greenwood noteµWKHVRFLDOLQWKHVKDSHRI
WKHFURZG¶(Danziger 1992: 313) and takes as its basis the assumed difference 
between the rational individual and the madness of that same individual when 
surrounded by their peers; it is the difference between these two responses that 
constitutes the subject matter of social psychology. 
It should be apparent that under Floyd $OOSRUW¶VGHILQLWLRQRIWKHVRFLDO, 
the phenomena constructed as social were quite different to those within the 
existing models of politics, sociology, and indeed previous incarnations of 
psychology, described above  1RW RQO\ ³ZDV WKH HQYLURQPHQW WKDW KXPDQV
created for themselves desocialized ± even tools are not social ± but the social 
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objects that remain, that is, other people, were reduced to a concrete physical 
SUHVHQFH´(Danziger 2000: 33).  What Danziger means by this second point is 
any influence over behaviour that membership of a particular, abstract group 
(being British, autistic, a member of the Labour party and so forth) had over 
behaviour no longer counted as social.  In short, this conceptualisation of the 
social limited itself to "exploring effects that were local, proximal, short term, 
and decomposable" (Danziger 2000: 334, italics in original). 
$ QXPEHU RI UHDVRQV KDYH EHHQ SRVLWHG WR H[SODLQ )OR\G $OOSRUW¶V
rejection of existing constructions of sociality.  Firstly, Allport wished to 
GLVWDQFH VRFLDO SV\FKRORJ\ IURP DQ\ QRWLRQ RI D µJURXS PLQG¶ RU µJURXS
FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶ WKDW KDG D UHDOLW\ RXWVLGH of the actions of individual agents 
(Greenwood 2004a: 109; Greenwood 2004b: 23).  Regardless of the rights or 
ZURQJVRIDQ\µJURXSPLQG¶K\SRWKHVLV*UHHQZRRGLVULJKWZKHQKHQRWHVWKDW
rejecting previous constructions of the social as a consequence of a 
dissatisfaction with group mind hypotheses: 
³ZDV D QRQ-sequitur, since there is no intrinsic connection between 
the original conception of the social dimensions of cognition, emotion 
and behavior and doctrines about the emergent properties of group 
PLQGV´(Greenwood 2004b: 23)  
This non-sequitur was, however, an error made not only by those wishing to 
dismiss existing conceptions of the social, but also a great number of its 
proponents (Greenwood 2004b: 23-24).   
'DQ]LJHU QRWHV WKDW $OOSRUW¶V UHMHFWLRQ RI JURXS PLQG K\SRWKHVHV
VHUYHG DW OHDVW WZR SXUSRVHV  )LUVWO\ LQ LQGLYLGXDOLVLQJ µWKH VRFLDO¶ $OOSRUW
sought to demarcate the subject area of social psychology from that of 
sociology to which, as noted above, it previously lay close (see also, Samelson 
2000: 500).  Secondly $OOSRUWZDV³DPDQZLWKDGLVWLQFWO\LGHRORJLFDOPLVVLRQ
for in pushing the claims of psychology he saw himself as defending the truth 
of individualism against the dangerous illusions of collectivism´ (Danziger 
1992: 316). 
32 
 
 *UHHQZRRGSLFNVXSRQWKLVLGHRORJLFDOWKHPHE\FRQVLGHULQJ$OOSRUW¶V
approach to (social) behaviours which did not seem to be explicable with the 
IUDPHZRUN WKDWKHDGYDQFHG VXFK µVRFLDO¶EHKDYLRXUVZHUH WDNHQ WR LQFOXGH
silent prayer and motorists stopping at red lights which despite being localised 
within an individual, appear only to make sense when considered within the 
context of group membership (Greenwood 2004b: 24) $OOSRUW¶V UHVSRQVH WR
VXFKEHKDYLRXUVZDVUDWKHUVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGKHGHFODUHGWKHPWREH³QRWRQO\
VWDWLVWLFDOO\ EXW DOVR SV\FKRORJLFDOO\ DEQRUPDO´ (Greenwood 2004b: 24).  
6HYHUDO GHFDGHV ODWHU )OR\G¶V EURWKHU *RUGRQ ZRXOG H[SOLFLWO\ ³DVVRFLDWH
theories of socially engaged psychological states and behavior with the forms 
RI VXEVHUYLHQFH UHTXLUHG E\ WRWDOLWDULDQ FRPPXQLVW DQG IDVFLVW VWDWHV´
(Greenwood 2004b: 24), a move which seems to have dissuaded various 
SV\FKRORJLVWVIURPFKDOOHQJLQJWKH$OOSRUWV¶QRWLRQRIWKHVRFLDO (Greenwood 
2004a: 158).  The social and historical context of the Anglosphere provided the 
ideological backdrop against which psychological theory was to be judged and 
psychological subjects formed. 
µ6RFLDO¶3V\FKRORJ\IURP1940 
Danziger claims that, during the great depression, the ideological 
RSSRVLWLRQWRQRWLRQVRIµFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQ¶ weakened sufficiently to allow for 
the possibility of experimental analysis of groups (Danziger 2000: 340).  While 
there are other figures within the movement, Kurt Lewin is taken as the 
figurehead who revolutionised social psychology after World War Two, 
credited with "the courage to experiment on real-world problems and with the 
ingenuity to bring complex social situations into the laboratory" (Danziger 
1992: 317).  For Lewin, what was of interest was not the behaviour of the 
individual when alone compared to when they are in a crowd, but rather 
behaviour in different types of groups, for example experimentally 
manipulated 'authoritarian', 'democratic', and 'laissez-faire' groups (Danziger 
1992: 317), and group phenomena such as 'group climate', 'group cohesion', 
and 'group decisions' (Danziger 2000: 340).   
Working from within a Gestaltian tradition, Lewin contested that: 
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³...instances of individual behaviour had no intrinsic meaning.  Their 
significance could be assessed only in terms of the situation in which 
they occurred [for example a democratic group].  Group phenomena 
were part of the situation.  They could be observed directly, just as 
*HVWDOW SDWWHUQV FRXOG EH REVHUYHG LQ YLVXDO ILHOGV´ (Danziger 2000: 
341).   
/HZLQ¶V position gave social reality to groups and not individuals and, thus, the 
construction of the social differs notably to Allport's: 
"...the individualistic orientation had been replaced by a primary 
interest in the properties of groups.  Methodological individualism 
ceased to be equated with ontological individualism.  One observed 
individuals in groups not in order to assess the "influence" of others on 
a target individual but to illustrate group characteristics taken to be as 
real as the individuals composing the groups." (Danziger 2000: 320) 
Vast portions of social psychology claimed to have been strongly influenced 
by Lewin, although Greenwood sees these links as largely illusory 
(Greenwood 2004b: 27).  These groups broadly split into one of two schools; 
the first abandoned the laboratory and moved into observational research.  The 
second group were impressed by Lewin's analysis of complex social 
phenomena within a laboratory setting but found that Lewin's Gestalt based 
phenomena - group cohesion and so forth - were not easily reconciled with a 
contemporary conceptualisation of the experiment becoming dominant: 
"At the time of Lewin's death, at the beginning of 1947, the current of 
methodological precepts in American psychology was running strongly 
in another direction.  Experiments were conceptualized in terms of the 
demonstration of functional relationships between specific stimulus 
elements, now known as independent variables, and specific response 
elements, known as dependent variables.  For such demonstrations, the 
variables needed to be defined unambiguously and measured along a 
single scale, that is, treated as unidimensional.  Complexity would be 
represented by the multiplication of variables and their essentially 
additive interaction." (Danziger 2000: 342) 
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'DQ]LJHU¶VQRWDWLRQKHUH ILWV LQWR DEURDGHUREVHUYDWLRQZLWKLQ H[SHULPHQWDO
psychology, what it meant to conduct an experiment was fundamentally 
changing. 
 As Science Studies has long argued, there is little that is self-evident 
about the scientific method; it has looked different at times ± most famously 
illustrated in Leviathan and the Air-Pump (Shapin & Schaffer 1985) ± and 
looks different in different places (Dupré 1993; Knorr Cetina 1999).  As with 
Danziger, above, MacMartin and Winston argue that, prior to 1930, the notions 
of independent and dependent variables were entirely absent from descriptions 
of what constitutes a psychology experiment (MacMartin & Winston 2000: 
350).  Similarly, correlational studies were deemed to be experimental.  As 
might be expected, it has been noted (Lubek & Apfelbaum 2000: 409; Stam et 
al. 2000: 368) that the regime of truth which advocated a particularly austere 
GHILQLWLRQRIµH[SHULPHQW¶IRXJKWYLJRURXVO\LQLWVGHIHQFHXQWLOE\WKHV
the construction had become hegemonic.  
As Danziger notes, when extended to the phenomena of interest to 
social psychology, WKH FRQVWUXFWLRQ RI DQ µH[SHULPHQW¶ DV D VSDFH ZKHUH WKH
effects of the independent variable upon the dependent variable is measured 
"implies a metaphysics of social situations and social conduct as composed of 
multitude of separate, unambiguously identifiable elements and their 
functional connections" (Danziger 1992: 322).  Within such a framework, the 
writings of the Gestaltian Lewin become unintelligible (Danziger 2000: 343), 
as do experiments in the earlier constructions of the social: 
³>7KH@ PHWKRGRORJLFDO UHGHILQLWLRQ RI WKH H[SHULPHQW LQ VRFLDO
psychology ensured that there was no longer any methodological space 
for the experimental investigation of the social dimensions of cognition, 
HPRWLRQ DQG EHKDYLRU LQ $PHULFDQ VRFLDO SV\FKRORJ\´ (Greenwood 
2004b: 29)    
Thus, the 1960s saw the study of fixed or pre-existing groups almost entirely 
cease, being replaced by "hypothetical groups that had a purely statistical 
reality" (Danziger 2000: 344).  These were groups formed for the purpose of a 
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particular experiment and who adhered to the methodological requirements of 
the new regime.   
The requirement for participants to be randomly allocated to particular 
experimental groups only made sense, however, if the social was constructed 
in a very particular manner: 
"The random assignment of individuals to experimental treatments 
would have the desired effect [of capturing social reality] only insofar 
as the relevant factors were carried by individuals in isolation and 
insofar as they differed on these factors as individuals... Only to the 
extent that one can think of society as an aggregate of essentially 
unconnected individuals does it make sense to control the effects of 
social background by statistical randomization." (Danziger 1992: 324, 
italics in original)  
Within this model, 'social factors' are carried by individual agents and their 
social behaviour is governed by the aggregation of these factors.  Individuals 
differ quantitatively (e.g. more or less of a given attitude) but not qualitatively 
HJDXQLTXHDXWLVWLFFXOWXUH 7KLVPRGHO LVHVVHQWLDOO\ VLPLODU WR$OOSRUW¶V
individualistic conception, but the social is shaped slightly less like a crowd 
and slightly more like a normal distribution. 
Given the requirement of randomisation, social psychology was left 
with a choice here between history and statistics, and experimental social 
psychology chose statistics.  Society, from this perspective, consists of 
statistical populations and not historical populations.  Danziger retains enough 
optimism in psychology to believe that this model would only be accepted if it 
was shown to have some validity outside of the laboratory.  Certainly some 
µVRFLDO¶ JURXSV GR QRW DSSHDU WR Fohere to this new model; we cannot 
randomise members of a family for example.  However, two such 
environments existed which closely mimicked the statistical society posited by 
psychology and which were of great interest to those funding research: the 
army and the classroom. 
µ6RFLDO¶QHXURVFLHQFH 
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With work in the neurosciences, which have accelerated rapidly within 
the last twenty years (Beaulieu 2003: 561) and which can be traced in their 
contemporary forms to the 1960s (Abi-Rached & Rose 2010: 20),  on the one 
hand informing, and on the other supplanting, research within experimental 
cognitive and VRFLDOSV\FKRORJ\WKHQRWLRQRIDµVRFLDOEUDLQ¶KDVEHJXQWREH
incorporated into the lexicon of psychology (Rose & Abi-Rached 2013: 141).  
$OODQ <RXQJ KDV FULWLFDOO\ H[DPLQHG WKLV QRWLRQ RI WKH µVRFLDO EUDLQ¶ ZLWKLQ
FRJQLWLYHDQGVRFLDOQHXURVFLHQFHDQGFRQFOXGHVWKDWWKHµVRFLDO¶LQWKHVRFLDO
brain simultaneously means two things (Young 2011: 642; Young 2012a: 164; 
Young 2012b: 402).  Firstly, the braiQLVµVRFLDO¶EHFDXVHRIZKDWLW does; it is 
concerned with interpersonal conduct.  In this sense the social brain is 
continuous with existing constructions of the social from within social 
psychology, outlined above.  Aside from the explicit turn to biology, there is a 
further change of focus within this body of literature:  there is far less research 
into the social per se DQGIDUPRUHLQWRHPSDWK\DµVRFLDOHPRWLRQ¶EHOLHYHGWR
EH WKH µJOXH RI WKH VRFLDO ZRUOG¶ (Young 2012a: 170, 2012b: 414).  
Considerations of empathy broadly centre around mirror neurons (Young 
2011: 642-644), first described in 1992 (di Pelligrino et al. 1992), and believed 
to be a class of neurons that respond to an action both when an individual 
performs that action and when an individual sees another individual 
performing the same action.  While the nature of mirror neurons remains 
highly controversial (see, for instance, Heyes 2010), it has been proposed that 
it is through mirror neurons that individuals are able to assign goals, intentions 
and beliefs to other agents (Gallese & Goldman 1998).  This centralisation of 
the ability to understand the mental states of other persons, to empathise and 
take their perspective is, for Young, one of the hallmarks of the social brain.   
A second aspect of the social within the social brain literature, absent 
from psychological narratives for decades (Matusall et al. 2011: 10), is 
concerned not with what the brain does, but with how it was formed.  
Specifically, there is a claim that the brain has evolved in the manner that it 
has, not only because of physical environments (e.g. the cognitive capacity to 
hunt and light fires) during the so-FDOOHGµHUDRIHYROXWLRQDU\DGDSWHGQHVV¶EXW
also because of the social environments in which it found itself.  Specifically, 
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with regards to this social environment, Young traces an evolutioQDU\µP\WK¶4 
which has been constructed in order to explain the centrality of empathy to the 
social brain.   
7KHP\WKRIHPSDWK\LVFHQWUHGDURXQGZKDW<RXQJFDOOVµWKHSUREOHP
RI RQH DQG PDQ\¶ (Young 2012a: 168-169), namely how do societies form 
when they are comprised of individuals who are taken to be self-interest 
maximisers?  It is worth tracing the tangled journey which leads to the 
solution: empathy.  That journey begins with the problem of altruism which 
was so key to early debates around sociobiology (Brown 2002).  This problem 
of altruism was apparently solved with concept of kin selection, the claim that 
altruistic behaviours can be self- (or rather gene-) interested if related kin can 
be spared whatever fate was to become them by an altruistic act.  Kin 
selection, in turn, raises the issue of altruism in non-kin, a problem solved if 
social groups were stable enough to allow the possibility of reciprocity of 
altruistic acts.  And yet, an assumption that those benefiting from altruistic 
behaviours will reciprocate those acts raises the spectre of free-riders who 
VLPSO\ ZRQ¶W UHFLSURFDWH  7KH SRVVLELOLW\ RI IUHH-riders is solved by 
introducing a desire to punish those individuals who do not contribute to the 
VRFLDO JURXS¶V ZHOOEHLQJ DOWKRXJK WKLV OHDGV EDFN WR WKH LQLWLDO SUREOHP RI
altruism, as those doing the punishing are risking themselves for no immediate 
gain.  This final problem is solved by the evolution of schadenfreude and a 
pleasure in giving punishment.  Experiencing schadenfreude requires an 
understanding of others mental states, empathy, thus empathy sits at the heart 
of the social. 
This elaborate back-story, concluding with the centrality of empathy, 
leads to a certain tension in contemporary discussions.  Firstly, empathy is 
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 :KHQ <RXQJ GHVFULEHV DQ HYROXWLRQDU\ µP\WK¶ WKH WHUP LV QRW WDNHQ WR LPSO\ DQ\WKLQJ DV
VWUDLJKWIRUZDUGDVDVWRU\WKDWKDVEHHQµPDGHXS¶5DWKHUDQGGUDZLQJXSRQWKHKLVWRULDQRI
ancient Greece and Rome Paul Veyne (Veyne 1988), Young describes an evolutionary back-
VWRU\ WKDW FRKHUHV DV D ZKROH GHVSLWH EHLQJ ODUJHO\ LPSOLFLW XQDUWLFXODWHG DQG ³HUHFWHG
SLHFHPHDO´ (Young 2012b: 11).  By deploying this terminology alongside an evocation of 
Veyne, we are left in little doubt that what Young has provided is, in the true Foucauldian 
sense, one of the first genealogies of the social brain. 
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decidedly pro-social; human kindness to others and a sense of morality are 
LQQDWH IDFWV RI RXU ELRORJLFDO H[LVWHQFH D µPRUDOLVDWLRQ RI ELRORJ\¶ WKDW KDV
recently been given detailed consideration by both Meloni (Meloni 2013) and 
Matusall (Matusall et al. 2011: 11; Matusall 2013).  Simultaneously, however, 
empathy has evolved out of a need to punish and enjoy this punishment.  The 
status of empathy, and the social, is thus conflicted within this narrative.   
As Young has been careful to stress, not all researchers within fields 
examining the social brain adhere to or are aware of this proposed, complex 
genealogy.  This string of partial histories is why Young stresses the notion of 
WKHµP\WK¶RIHPSDWK\ 
³7KHVWRU\LVLPSOLFLWLQWKDWLWLVSDUWRIWKHFROOHFWLYHFRQVFLRXVQHVV
of social brain researchers, but there is (as yet) no occasion when it is 
retold in its entirety.  Individual investigators are not necessarily 
familiar with, or subscribe to, all of the episodes.  While individual 
episodes can be (and are) operationalized through empirical research, 
the entirety ± extending perhaps seven million years ± can only be 
inferred, and a researcher can justifiably claim that her work is 
FRQILQHG WR WKH WRSLF WKDW FXUUHQWO\ DWWUDFWV KHU DWWHQWLRQ´  (Young 
2012b: 409) 
Thus, that Meloni analyses trends within primatology and notes far more of an 
emphasis upon pro-social behaviour than upon punishment (Meloni 2013: 89) 
GRHV QRW FRQWUDGLFW <RXQJ¶V WKHVLV ZH QHHG RQO\ ORRN WRZDrds evolutionary 
SV\FKRORJ\ WR ILQG WKH DOWHUQDWLYH HPSKDVLV XSRQ SXQLVKPHQW DQG µFKHDWHU-
GHWHFWLRQ¶(Buss 1995: 17; Buss et al. 1993: 544). 
The key arguments put forward by those who have examined the 
µVRFLDO¶ RI WKH VRFLDO EUDLQ DUH WKHUHIRUH ILUVWO\ WKDW HPSDWK\ KDV EHHQ
centralised within the accounts of neuroscientists and, secondly, that there is a 
consideration of social history absent from the existing social psychological 
literature.  This inclusion of this historical narrative is a significant change 
from previous conceptions of the social given the a-historical nature of the 
social within experimental social and cognitive psychology, detailed above.  
Nonetheless, the history relied upon here is an a-cultural biological history 
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rather than a history concerned with culture, institutions, and so forth.  Within 
the discourses of the social brain, the social remains in the shape of a crowd, 
albeit crowds that traversed the savannahs of the Pliocene as well as the school 
playing fields.  
With regard to the newly found focus upon empathy, it could be argued 
WKDWWKLVVKLIWWRZDUGVDQH[DPLQDWLRQRIWKHµJOXH¶RIWKHVRFLDOZRUOGLQGLFDWHV
that, for neuroscientists, the social is no longer at stake, that it is now the 
workings of the concept that are being questioned rather than the concept itself.  
With a little reflexivity, it might be noted that this also seems to be the case for 
Young who, though thoughtfully questioning the manner in which empathy 
has become central to concerns over interpersonality, never seeks to question 
how interpersonality itself came to be articulated as social.  Indeed, Young 
states that the "brain is undoubtedly social" (Young 2012a: 164) suggesting 
that that concept is beyond critical interrogation.  That claim, as this review has 
sought to show, is a contentious one and it is a goal of this project to examine 
the nature of the social itself. 
It should finally be noted that centralising empathy within 
contemporary constructions of the social opens new avenues of research, new 
ways to test hypotheses.  Given that autism is so often characterised in terms of 
a lack of empathy it is unsurprising that the condition, alongside similarly 
classified disorders of sociality such as psychopathy and alexithymia, has 
begun to take on importance within narratives of the social brain (Young 
2012a: 165; Young 2012b: 405).  Continuing a long standing tradition within 
the psy-disciplines, personified in Phineas Gage 5  RI H[DPLQLQJ µQRUPDO¶
cognitive functioning in those cases where that function is perceived to be 
lacking, autism (or more specifically the high functioning child with 
$VSHUJHU¶V) has come to stand at the centre of research into the social.  Within 
the contemporary power-knowledge nexus of social and cognitive 
neuroscience autism offers a pure case of human-minus-social.  The individual 
with autism has thus become an example of what Viney has called inherently 
useful humansXVHIXO³not for what they do, simply for what they are´ (Viney 
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 See Kotowicz (2007) IRUDQDQDO\VLVRI*DJH¶VFDVHZLWKLQWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\SV\-disciplines. 
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2013).  Given this obvious utility, how could autism not have risen to 
prominence? 
Constructing autism 
In a review article Chloe Silverman notes that: 
³7KHLGHDRI$6'²as a metaphor, a neurological disorder, a mental state, 
an increasingly prevalent diagnostic category, or a species of neurological 
difference²has an almost ready-made appeal for social scientists, 
concerned as they are with questions of human identity, difference, 
percHSWLRQ DQG VXEMHFWLYLW\ ZLWKLQ D VRFLDO DQG FXOWXUDO FRQWH[W´
(Silverman 2008: 325) 
As a field, Disability Studies has perhaps shown the most prolonged interest in 
autism (e.g. Brownlow et al. 2006; Chamak 2008), noting that the messages of 
autistic self-advocates chime with broader critiques of the medical model of 
disability stemming from within the social sciences6 (e.g. Hughes & Paterson 
1997; Oliver 1990; Shakespeare & Watson 2002).  Anthropologists have 
shown similar emancipatory interests when conducting: 
³HWKQRJUDSKLFDOO\LQIRUPHGVRFLDOVFLHQFHUHVHDUFKIRFXVLQJRQ$6'DVD
personal, family, and community/social group experience as evidenced 
through the analyses of social interactions, narrative accounts, and 
participation and engagement in activities in the home and educational, 
FOLQLFDODQGRWKHULQVWLWXWLRQDOVHWWLQJV´(Solomon 2010: 242) 
This literature (e.g. Bagatell 2010; Grinker 2010; Kaufman 2010; Ochs & 
Solomon 2010; Prince 2010; Sirota 2010; Sterponi 2010; Solomon 2010a; 
Solomon 2010b) has sought to investigate questions of identity formation 
within the autistic community and, thus, frequently seeks to undermine claims 
from within the psy-GLVFLSOLQHV WKDW LQGLYLGXDOV ZLWK DXWLVP DUH µDVRFLDO¶
Similar claims are to be found within the work of Tom Muskett (Muskett et al. 
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 Likewise, critiques of the social model of disability (e.g. Dowse 2001)  equally apply.  
Indeed, the issue of who is able to self-advocate and provide their voice is particularly relevant 
to a disorder such as autism in which communication difficulties are a central deficit (see 
chapter 3: 65-66).   
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2010) who has sought to continue the legacy of a conversation analysis 
approach to disability (e.g. Rapley 2004) by examining the complex 
interactional abilities of individuals usually believed to lack such skills.   
These studies make an important contribution, elegantly showing, for 
example, the complex  influence of group membership upon the identity 
formation of particular individuals with autism (Bagatell 2007).  They do not, 
however, directly influence the present study, concerning themselves with 
neither scientists nor the scientific concept of autism.  Surprisingly, such work 
remains reasonably sparse, although the number of contributions is increasing 
rapidly.  The rest of this review will be broadly divided into two sections; the 
first concerning itself with the historical emergence of autism, the second with 
a sociology of (scientific) knowledge surrounding the concept.   
The historical emergence of autism 
As outlined above, the 19th century saw two forms of knowledge 
emerge which allowed for the creation of new types of object.  Firstly, 
µELRSROLWLFV¶ D IRUP RI NQRZOHGJH FRQFHUQHG ZLWK SRSXODWLRQV UDWKHU WKDQ
individual bodies, intensified to a quite spectacular degree sometime around 
1820 (Hacking 1983: 292).  Secondly, memoro-politics (knowledge and 
governance of the soul) emerged at the end of the nineteenth century as part of 
DQµHYHQW¶H[WHQGLQJEHWZHHQDQG(Rose 1985: 3).  Unsurprisingly, 
scholars have viewed these developments in the 19th century as a crucial pre-
history to the development of autism (e.g. Nadesan 2005: 37).  There have 
been, however, three twentieth century events which have been repeatedly 
linked with the emergence of autism in its contemporary form. 
The first event believed to have been of particular importance was the 
emergence of a surveillance over the mental health of the child, and extension 
over the surveillance of bodies, believed to have occurred in the 1920s and 
1930s.  Certainly:  
³(DUO\QLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\ WH[WVGLG UHFRJQLVHGLVRUGHUVRI WKHPLQG LQ
infancy and childhood, but throughout the nineteenth century they were 
accorded a somewhat ambiguous status.  On the one hand, the child had 
42 
 
a kind of immunity from insanity, on account of its under-development, 
simplicity and freedom from stress.  Where children did suffer insanity 
it was of simple form: infancy was not exposed to many of the 
predisposing and exciting causes which operated at other periods of 
life; fewer faculties had developed and therefore fewer faculties were 
likely to be assaulted by disease; the delicacy of the infant brain made 
LWOLNHO\WKDWPRUELGFKDQJHVZRXOGOHDGWRGHDWK´(Rose 1985: 177)   
This situation began to change towards the end of that century, with the child 
beginning to come under the medical gaze (Armstrong 1983: 13-14; Nadesan 
2005: 45-46)DQG³WKHVDQGVLQ%ULWDLQZLWQHVVHGDYDVWH[SDQVLRQ
of charitable and governmental services to cater for the psychological 
SUREOHPVRIFKLOGUHQ´(Evans 2013: 3; see also Armstrong 1983: 27; Nadesan 
2005: 67; Rose 1985: 176).  As Armstrong has stated, it was during this period 
that: 
³$VZLWKSK\VLFDOGHYHORSPHQWSV\FKRORJLFDOJURZWKZDVFRQVWUXHGDV
inherently problematic, precariously normal.  The initial solution was 
for psychological well-being to be monitored and its abnormal forms 
identified...  The nervous child, the delicate child, the eneuretic child, 
the neuropathic child, the maladjusted child, the difficult child, the 
neurotic child and the solitary child, all emerged as a new way of 
seeing a potentially hazardRXV FKLOGKRRG´ (Armstrong 1995: 396, 
emphasis added) 
*LYHQ WKDW UHVHDUFK ³UHOHQWOHVVO\ IRFXVHV RQ WKH ILJXUH RI WKH FKLOG ZKHQ
seeking to explore what autism is and what it might mean" (Murray 2008: 139), 
it seems likely that knowledges of childhood were a prerequisite for the 
emergence of autism, and it was during the 1920s and 1930s, immediately 
preceding Kanner and Asperger, that these knowledges of childhood, and the 
requisite structures to monitor that knowledge and those children, came into 
existence.   
A second event attributed particular importance within the history of 
autism was the widespread process of deinstitutionalisation that occurred 
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around the 1960s.  Within the United Kingdom this deinstitutionalisation 
followed the Mental Health Act of 1959 (Evans 2013: 11) although, as 
analyses by Eyal et al. (2010) demonstrate, this deinstitutionalisation occurred 
throughout the Anglosphere.  Indeed, within their text The Autism Matrix Eyal 
et al. award deinstitutionalisation the central place in the history of autism, 
claiming that: 
³7KHFXUUHQW ULVH LQDXWLVPGLDJQRVHVZHDUJXHVKRXOGEHXQGHUVWRRGDV
an aftershock of the real earthquake, which was the deinstitutionalization of 
mentDOUHWDUGDWLRQWKDWEHJDQLQWKHODWHV´(Eyal et al. 2010: 3) 
It is argued by both Eyal and others that while deinstitutionalisation was, in 
part, brought about because of the increased surveillance over childhood 
(described above), it was deinstitutionalisation itself that further encouraged 
VXUYHLOODQFH ³DV LW EHFDPH SDUDPRXQW WR GHPDUFDWH WKH PHQWDO SUREOHPV DQG
needs of children and adults who had previously been confined but were now 
beinJLQWHJUDWHGLQWRWKHSRSXODWLRQ´(Evans 2013: 11).   
 The claims of Eyal et al. are compelling and, at least initially, intuitive.  
Certainly it seems to be the case that particular forms of interpersonal 
(dis)ability are far more likely to be of interest when individuals engage with 
other individuals; something far more likely to happen (or at least, be of 
concern) outside of the Total Institution.  Further, Eyal et al. offer some strong 
evidence in support of their claim.  Firstly, states (such as Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, and Oregon) and indeed States (United States, United Kingdom, 
and Scandinavia) that have embarked on the most widespread programmes of 
deinstitutionalisation are those that have the highest prevalence rates for 
autism; the opposite is also true, with low levels of deinstitutionalisation 
coupled with low levels of autism (Ohio, West Virginia, Oklahoma; France; 
Evans (2013: 3) makes a similar claim).   
Secondly, Eyal et al. claim that the changing nature of the individuals 
diagnosed with autism is also demonstrative of diagnostic substitution (Eyal et 
al. 2010: 80).  In the past there was a correlation between social class and 
autism prevalence, with poorer persons far less frequently diagnosed.  Indeed, 
DV(\DO HW DOQRWHDOORI.DQQHU¶VRULJLQDO VXEMHFWVZHUHZKLWHDQG IURP
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middle-to-upper class backgrounds.  Over time, Eyal et al. claim that this 
correlation between class and autism seems to have disappeared (Eyal et al. 
2010: 80; although see King & Bearman 2011).  This disappearance, claim 
Eyal et al., is indicative of the increased surveillance of childhood that has 
occurred post-deinstitutionalisation.  In the 1940s wealthy parents were those 
PRVWOLNHO\WRUHMHFWDGLDJQRVLVRI µPHQWDOUHWDUGDWLRQ¶DQGSURFXUHDVHFRQG
diagnosis, which Kanner offered in the novel form of autism.  Since the 
programmes of deinstitutionalisation, however, all children are under vastly 
increased surveillance (placed as they are in the family home and a 
comprehensive educational system) and therefore behaviours typical of autism 
± but, perhaps, irrelevant within the confines of the institution ± are surveilled 
and diagnosed.  This process explains, at least according to Eyal and 
FROOHDJXHV WKH µDXWLVP HSLGHPLF¶ DQG WKH QR-longer-significant correlation 
between autism and class.   
&RQYLQFLQJ DV WKH\ PD\ EH (\DO HW DO¶V arguments seem slightly 
speculative and are certainly open to critique.  Firstly, correlation is not 
causation7 and it may be possible to reach numerous conclusions with a similar 
level of face validity to the retroductive analysis of Eyal et al..  Perhaps, for 
H[DPSOHµSURJUHVVLYH¶OLEHUDO6WDWHVDUHVLPSO\PRUHOLNHO\WRRIIHUGLDJQRVLV
of autism with the aim of supporting families and simultaneously resist the 
incarceration of WKHLU FLWL]HQV"  (\DO HW DO¶V DQDO\VLV FDQQRW GLVFRXQW VXFK
possibilities.  Secondly, it might be speculated that two effects would be 
expected if deinstitutionalisation were the driver of the contemporary autistic 
concept.  Firstly, and as Eyal et al. claim, we might expect associations with 
class to diminish and, as discussed above, there does indeed seem to be some 
(disputed) evidence for this.  However we might also expect I.Q. to decrease in 
individuals diagnosed with autism following deinstiutionalisation as those 
previously considered to have (reasonably) profound disabilities were moved 
into the community.  In the case of autism, however, I.Q. has increased in 
recent decades, to the point where it can now realistically be questioned if 
intellectual disability is associated with autism at all.  The increased diagnosis 
RI LQGLYLGXDOV ZLWK KLJK IXQFWLRQLQJ DXWLVP RU $VSHUJHU¶V 6\QGURPH ZKR
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 At least, not since the 1930s. 
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often have jobs and families, seems to be a much harder phenomenon to 
explain without additional processes to deinstitutionalisation. As Nadesan has 
QRWHG ZKLOH DXWLVP ³LV D GLVRUGHU RI WKH HDUO\ WZHQWLHWK FHQWXU\ KLJK
functioning variants...are fundamentally disorders of the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries´ (Nadesan 2005: 3).  This is not, however, to 
dispute that processes of deinstitutionalisation have been anything other than 
crucial for the emergence of social disorders, as discussions of autism within 
an educational settings reveal those sites to be potent areas of concept 
formation (Fein 2011). 
Finally, a third crucial moment in the history of autism is taken to be 
the move away from psychoanalytically inspired conceptualisations of autism, 
which dominated until the 1960s, and towards the constructions of the 
FRJQLWLYHDQGELRORJLFDOVFLHQFHV)RUZKLOH0XUUD\KDVLGHQWLILHGWKHµJKRVW
RI%HWWHOKHLP¶ZLWKLQFRQWHPSRUDU\QDUUDWLYHVRf autism (Murray 2008: 190) 
and Nadesan points to the impact that psychoanalysis continues to hold with 
regards to lingering metaphors of fortresses, shells, and an inner-self seeking 
release (Nadesan 2005: 175), it is undoubtedly the case that autism is now 
understood as a neurodevelopmental disorder and within the realms of the 
biological and cognitive sciences.    Eyal et al. (2010: 172) see this shift, too, 
as being instigated by deinstitutionalisation, claiming that parents became far 
more powerful figures after their children returned from various institutions in 
order to live at home8 and were much more comfortable with the ontological 
DVVXPSWLRQVRIWKHELRORJLFDODQGFRJQLWLYHVFLHQFHVWKDQWKH\ZHUHWKHµSDUHQW
EODPLQJ¶RIWKRVHLQIOXHQFHGE\SV\FKRDQDO\VLVVXFKDV.DQQHU(Murray 2008: 
171-173), the Tinbergens (Silverman 2010), and most infamously Bruno 
Bettelheim. 
Evans has noted that the move from psychoanalysis to a bio-cognitive 
model involved a significant change in dominant methodology.  As noted 
above (Danziger 2000: 344), psychology had been largely statisticalised by the 
middle of twentieth century and, thus, as autism research moved towards 
experimental psychology in the 1960s what was required was an examination 
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 For the role of parents in the knowledge production of autism, see below. 
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of statistical populations.  By comparison, psychoanalytic reports remained 
largely based upon case studies.  This move away from case report and 
towards epidemiology and statistics, claims Evans, ushered in significant 
changes within in the field:   
³7KH PRVW VLJQLILFDQW GHYHORSPHQW IROORZLQJ WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ RI
statistical and epidemiological methods in child psychiatry has been the 
expansion of behavioural, communicative and cognitive categories and 
the virtual disappearance of the concepts of child hallucination and 
fantasy.  Autism was thereby disassociated from the key concept of 
descriptive psychopathology ± KDOOXFLQDWLRQ´(Evans 2013: 21)   
Thus, just as for conceptualisations of the social, changes in methodology 
appear to have instigated significant changes in the constructions of autism, 
with the previously central phenomena of fantasy and hallucination becoming 
divorced from the concept.  Nadesan further claims that these changing 
methods allowed the space for an examination of the modularisation of 
cognition, meaning that it became possible to think of specific cognitive 
deficits as causing autism outside of an interactional framework (Nadesan 
2005: 120, and considered at length chapter four).   
While research is limited, therefore, these three events ± increased 
surveillance over childhood, deinstitutionalisation, and the shift towards the 
statistical sciences ± have been evidenced as fundamental to the contemporary 
concept of autism. 
Autism and knowledge creation 
There is no doubt that advocacy groups have held and continue to hold a 
crucial role in the development and current understanding of autism.  
Alongside longstanding American (1965) and British (1962) national advocacy 
groups, groups today exist in Turkey, Canada, France, Israel, Japan, South 
Africa, Sweden (Eyal et al. 2010: 53) DV ZHOO DV  µGHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV¶
(Feinstein 2010: 233-264)  7KH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP¶V $XWLVP $FFUHGLWDWLRQ
Programme lists over 300 organisations in the country concerned with autism 
(The National Autistic Society 2007), and there are over 3,000 such groups in 
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the United States (Eyal et al. 2010: 1).  These groups range from large, long 
VWDQGLQJXPEUHOODRUJDQLVDWLRQVVXFKDVWKH8.¶VNational Autistic Society and 
WKH 86$¶V Autism Speaks to a multiplicity of small, local and niche 
organisations.  Many of the individuals involved in these groups became 
involved following the autism epidemic of the 1990s and thus entered the field 
of lay advocacy at time when, following the concerted efforts of groups 
concerned with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (Epstein 1995; Epstein 
1996) ZRPHQ¶V KHDOWK (Anglin 1997; Blackstone 2004; Gibbon 2008; 
Klawiter 2004), and Muscular Dystrophy (Rabeharisoa 2003; Rabeharisoa & 
Callon 2002), lay involvement in scientific knowledge creation was a well 
established phenomenon (Stewart 1990). 
Given the rich history of the advocacy movement within autism, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that parents have become frequently examined figures in 
WKH OLWHUDWXUH RQ DXWLVP ZLWK WKH µOLYHG H[SHULHQFH¶ FRSLQJ VWUDWHJLHV DQG
perspectives of parents considered at length (Brewin et al. 2008; Gray 2002; 
Gray 2003; Gray 2006; Hastings et al. 2005).  More importantly for the current 
project, however, a small body of work has begun to consider the role of 
parents and advocacy groups in relation to knowledge creation and concept 
construction in autism.   
As noted above, Eyal et al. claim that parents became increasingly 
important figures within autism research following the waves of 
deinstitutionalisation that occurred throughout the 1960s.  While experimental 
psychologists such as Ivar Lovaas and Eric Shopler actively sought parental 
support and engagement (Eyal et al. 2010: 167-193), the generation of 
psychiatrists and psychoanalytically inclined psychologists before them did not, 
IUHTXHQWO\ EHLQJ DFFXVHG RI  µSDUHQW EODPLQJ¶ 7KDW VXFK theories, 
unsurprisingly, caused outrage among parents is well documented; one of the 
first parent authored texts on autism was in direct opposition to psychoanalysis 
(Rimland 1964), and that author is on record as having lengthy and 
occasionally heated correspondence with Bettelheim (Silverman 2004: 118-
121).  Within the body of work to consider knowledge creation in autism it is 
convincingly argued that the shift to consider autism, not as an affective inter-
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personal condition, but as a neurodevelopmental disorder was at least partially 
provoked by parental advocates.  That psychoanalytic theories continue to 
cause consternation amongst parents is certainly true (see Feinstein (2010), for 
example).  That scientists respond to this parental consternation by shaping 
their research in order to avoid such sensitive issues seems similarly likely.  
7KXV LIRQO\ LQGHWHUPLQLQJ WKH W\SHVRITXHVWLRQVZKLFKFDQ¶WEHDVNHGDQG
the forms knowledge which cannot be considered (Nadesan 2005: 175), the 
ghost of Bettelheim continues to haunt the corridors of autism research centres.   
Chloe Silverman (2008) draws upon the work of Epstein (1995) and 
others in detailing how both parent and self-advocacy groups embody a form 
of biosociality (Rabinow 1999) in relation to autism, claiming that:   
³7KH DFW RI VSHDNLQJ IRU SHRSOH ZLWK $6' LV OHJLWLPDWHG E\ PXOWLSOH
affinities built on genetic association and physiological likeness, or by 
WKH LGHDRIKHULWDELOLW\ DQG WKHDIIHFWLYH FODLPV RISDUHQWKRRG´ LELG
39-40)  
6LOYHUPDQ RXWOLQHV WKLV µJenetic kinship¶ VWDWLQJ WKDW SDUHQWV XVH JHQHV DV a 
ZD\ WR WDON DERXW ³DIIHFWLRQ ORYH FRPPXQLW\ DQG innate understanding´
6LOYHUPDQ 7KLVILQGLQJUHODWHVWRDEURDGHUWKHVLVRI6LOYHUPDQ¶V
that runs throughout her body of work (Silverman 2004; Silverman 2008a; 
Silverman 2010; Silverman 2012)  6LOYHUPDQ¶V FODLP LV WKDW ZLWKLQ
biomedicine "Love is an advantage and a technique rather than a liability" 
(Silverman 2012: 99) and that the role of love in knowledge creation has been 
largely undervalued.  With specific reference to autism, Silverman claims that 
focusing upon love as an analytic tool achieves several goals: 
³)LUVW LW LOOXVWUDWHV WKH GHJUHH WR ZKLFK ZD\V RI UHSUHsenting autism 
depend on particular institutional and epistemological arrangements.  
Second, it shifts the focus from psychiatrists, epidemiologists, and 
geneticists to parents, counsellors, diagnosticians, and lawyers, as they 
try to make sense of and apply systematic, authoritative knowledge in 
their daily lives and work.  Third, and most important, in describing 
changes in autism over time and how expert knowledge works in 
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practice, it highlights the centrality of love as a way of knowing about 
bodies, pHUVRQVDQGUHODWLRQVKLSVLQELRPHGLFLQH´(Silverman 2012: 3) 
,Q WKLV VHQVH 6LOYHUPDQ¶V ZRUN LV SODFHG YHU\ PXFK ZLWKLQ WKH FDQQRQ RI
(feminist) science studies which has sought to emphasise that knowledge 
creation within the sciences is dependent upon a far greater number of 
individuals and institutions than simply those working within the laboratory 
(Latour 1987: 27), that a far greater number of techniques are required to make 
VFLHQFHZRUNµLQSUDFWLFH¶WKDQLVXVXDOO\DOORZHGZLWKLQWKHVFLHQWLILFPHWKRG
(Collins 1974: 177), and that, in particular, forms of knowledge production 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKZRPHQDUHFRQVLVWHQWO\µRWKHUHG¶DQGGHHPHGXQLPSRUWDQWRU
potentially destructive (Keller 1985: 175). 
 Silverman claims, too, that focusing upon love shifts attention away 
from scientists and towards parents, teachers, and lawyers.  However, 
conducting scientific research is an inherently emotional activity (Pickersgill 
2012b), and Fitzgerald has argued that emotion is absolutely central to the 
DFWLYLWLHV RI DXWLVP VFLHQWLVWV LQ SDUWLFXODU FODLPLQJ WKDW ³DQ XQLPSHDFKDEO\
scientific, laboratory-based work of looking for, and thinking about, the 
neurobiology of autism is often aQ HPRWLRQDO DQG DIIHFWLYH ODERXU WRR´
(Fitzgerald 2013: 133).  Indeed, Fitzgerald claims of a particular interviewee 
that: 
³WKH V\QFKURQLFLW\ RI WKLV UHVHDUFKHU¶V FDSDFLW\ WR think autism and 
her willingness to feel it [is of importance].  My suggestion is that it is 
precisely her ability to trace her science through these two experiences, 
to memorialise them and articulate them together, which enables her to 
continue to push through the very complex work of autism 
QHXURVFLHQFH´(Fitzgerald 2013: 143, italics in original) 
It seems to be the case, then, that research into autism is not only a condition 
concerned with socio-emotive states, autism as a construct looks the way it 
does because of the affective labour of parents, scientists, educators, and of 
course those with autism themselves. 
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Conclusion 
 This literature review has sought to walk a line between description and 
prescription (Butler 1988: 530), describing bodies of knowledge which begin 
to make the emergence of autism an intelligible phenomena whilst 
simultaneously prescribing a framework under which the current project can 
proceed.  Focusing first upon description, Nikolas Rose has said that the 
scientific discourses of psychology were made: 
³...possible by the existence of certain ways of thinking about 
populations, statistics, evolution and heredity, by certain theories of 
nature, origin and treatment of mental pathology, and by certain 
conceptions of the role and objectives of good government and the laws 
RIHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOOLIH´5RVH 
This review has sought to show, in uniting three disparate literatures, that 
autism can be understood in the terms outlined by Rose.  Firstly, it has been 
shown that knowledges about populations (alongside bodies and souls) that 
emerged during the 19th century were crucial in forming psychological subjects 
prone to certain forms of abnormality.  Secondly, that the statisticalisation of 
the psychology experiment reinforced a certain conceptualisation of the social, 
a conceptualisation that centres empathy within human evolutionary history 
and thus claims that disorders of empathy are central to understanding the 
human condition.  And, finally, literatures arguing that the governing of 
economic and social life have been central to the construct of autism have been 
presented, with claims that of policies of deinstitutionalisation, and the 
activities of advocacy groups hold significant sway over scientific proceedings 
in relation to autism.  Given the entanglement of these phenomena, it is 
perhaps no wonder that researchers talk of matrix of possibilities (Hacking 
1975: 15), intelligibility (Butler 1990: 17) or grids of visualisation (Rose 
1996a: 130).  
 Prescriptively, the literatures that have been presented provide 
theoretical context and avenues of explanation for the current project.  Three 
questions were suggested at the beginning of this review.  Firstly:   
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x What does it mean to say that an individual, or a particular behaviour, 
LVRULVQRWµQRUPDO¶"+RZKDVQRUPDOF\FRPHWRORRNDVLWGRHV"   
Here D GLVFXVVLRQ RI &DQJXLOKHP¶s work was presented and it was argued, 
given the degree of historical variance, that an analysis of the relations between 
normal and pathological social behaviour would, in the case of autism, be 
LOOXPLQDWLQJ  %\ FRQVLGHULQJ &DQJXLOKHP¶V ZRUN LQ UHODWLRQ WR )RXFDXOGLDQ
processes of subjectification (and the specific description RI µH[SHULHQFH¶
which arises from this perspective), a particular approach to the above question 
has been demarcated, whereby experience of abnormality is deemed the result 
rather than the cause of socio-historical (including scientific) processes.  This 
is the perspective that will be taken thorughout this thesis.    
 A second question asked was: 
x :KDWLVPHDQWKHUHE\µVRFLDO¶"+RZKDYHWKHSV\-disciplines come to 
DUWLFXODWH DQG FODVVLI\ SDUWLFXODU EHKDYLRXUV DV µVRFLDO¶ DQG RWKHUV DV
µQRQVRFLDO¶" 
An analysis of historical constructions of the social from within experimental 
psychology and social neuroscience has revealed considerable variability in 
constructions of the social.  Given that autism is articulated as a social disorder 
it seems a reasonable conclusion to suggest that such constructions of the 
social may be an important factor in constructions of autism and, again, this 
thesis will seek to investigate this question. 
 Finally, it was asked: 
x How have descriptions of (ab)normality and (non)sociality from within 
the psy-disciplines congealed into the form of autism? 
The literature considering autism from social scientific perspectives has 
suggests numerous factors contributing to the emergence and rise of autism 
over the last seventy years.  Nonetheless, constructions of normalcy and 
pathology and, perhaps most notably, constructions of the social are almost 
entirely missing from such analyses.  There does, therefore, seem to be scope 
for significant novel findings within the current project. 
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Reflecting on method(ology) 
Introduction  
Pierre Bourdieu has FODLPHGWKDWLQRUGHUIRUVRFLRORJ\³WRSURGXFHDQG
to reward reflexive scientific habituses, it must in effect institutionalize 
reflexivity in mechanisms of training, dialogue, and critical evaluation" 
(Wacquant 1992: 41).  Those who have attended post-graduate methodology 
courses will confirm that, if Bourdieu remained with us, we would be able to 
return good news to the Collège de France.  The types of reflexivity deployed 
E\ WRGD\¶V 3K' VWXGHQWV DUH GLYHUVH (Stronach et al. 2007) and may not be 
HQWLUHO\ WR %RXUGLHX¶V OLNLQJ EXW WKH FRQFHSW itself is so mainstream that it 
holds prominent positions in even the most mainstream of methods textbooks 
(Bryman 2008: 682; D. Silverman 2010: 123).  
This is not to suggest that we should be blasé about reflexivity or 
diminish its importance, but it is to suggest that it means different things to 
academic traditions and that we need to be reflexive when considering 
reflexivity and consider that, following deconstructions of the concept, it has 
become deeply problematised (Lynch 2000).  This methodology section will 
be based around an extended reflection on the project from three different, 
although overlapping, levels in relation to the current project, researcher, and 
academic discipline.  Justice will not be done to these conversations on 
reflexivity, and the prospect of a definitive solution is non-existent, but it is an 
important step nonetheless. 
The project in hand  
2.1Methods 
Two principal, explicit methods are used throughout the analytic 
chapters (4-7) of this thesis; semi-structured interviews and a critical analysis 
of published literature.  Document analysis dominates the first of these analysis 
chapters, concerned as it is with historical constructions of autism, while 
interview data are to the fore in the latter three.   
Critical analysis of the literature 
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Analysis of the published literature is certainly not novel within this 
field (e.g. Danziger 1990).  Nonetheless, the decision to draw upon printed 
sources rather than rely solely upon interviews with the key figures that were 
available for contact was a considered decision, and one made for several 
reasons.  Firstly, given the questions of interest to the current project, it was 
deemed important for there to be some historical, as well as sociological, 
scope.  Aside from the particular difficulties inherent in using sociological 
methods and data to explore questions of history, an analysis of the literature 
also allowed a much wider range of materials to be of use than would have 
been the case if qualitative interviewing were the only method used.   
During the 1980s experimental research into autism was still a nascent 
field, with relatively few practising researchers.  What is more, and despite 
being a relatively recent period, the majority of researchers senior to the field 
during the 1980s have now ceased to be actively involved in research, leaving 
only a handful of participants with personal experience of the field available 
for interview.  Therefore, the possibility for any form of rigorous interrogation 
of autism research in the 1980s, even as it continues to exist in the form of 
memories, seemed improbable without reliance upon written sources.  
Introducing a critical review to the project allowed for an increased sense of 
rigour and an exhaustive reading of the primary literature.   
The rigour and potentially endless wealth of empirical material does 
not, of course, make literary analysis a method beyond reproach.  Perhaps the 
most pertinent critique in relation to Science Studies is that offered by Latour, 
namely that such an analysis breaks the so-called first rule of method: 
³:HVWXG\VFLHQFHin action and not ready made science or technology; 
to do so, we either arrive before the facts and machines are blackboxed 
RUZH IROORZ WKH FRQWURYHUVLHV DQG UHRSHQ WKHP´ (Latour 1987: 258, 
italics in original) 
By studying only the published literature, it could be argued, we have missed 
the action.  If science is to be characterized as the two-faced Janus (Latour 
1987: 4) WKHQ ZH PD\ KDYH DUULYHG ZKHQ RQO\ WKH OHIW IDFLQJ µUHDG\ PDGH
VFLHQFH¶UHPDLQVYLVLEOHWKHULJKW IDFHDOUHDG\µEODFNER[HG¶Even accepting 
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that we see only a partial picture of the sciences within the published literature, 
we may tentatively still launch two counterclaims to suggest that, while the 
method certainly does not provide unproblematic access to the truth, it is still 
among the best options available for current purposes.  Firstly, we may claim 
that it would be exceptionally hard, if not impossible, to view autism research 
from the 1980s in action.  As Latour has said in relation to the construction of 
QHZ REMHFWV ³JHQHDORJ\ DQG DUFKDHRORJ\ RI WKLV VHGLPHQWHG SDVW LV DOZD\V
possible in theory but becomes more and more difficult as time goes E\´
(Latour 1987: 92) and this would seem to be the case in the current instance.  
A second counter would be that very little in autism is truly µEODFNER[HG¶DQG
beyond dispute.  It may well be the case that any disputed claims surrounding 
models of autism and sociality are indeed more open to examination through 
the literature than in other areas of research. 
Critical analysis of the literature: Topics and Sampling 
 Critical reading did not begin with any predetermined methods, topics 
or historical periods of particular interest.  Contemporary text books (e.g. 
Volkmar et al. 2005) conclude that three psychological theories of autism - 
Executive Dysfunction, Weak Central Coherence, and Theory of Mind (and 
their associated offshoots) ± dominate the field today.  Further research seemed 
to show that these three theories all emerged during the late 1980s and, thus, an 
interrogation of that time period was deemed important.  While reading the 
literature it because apparent that a theory known as the Emotional/Affective 
Theory, most readily associated with Peter Hobson, was also widely cited 
during the 1980s and, thus, that theory also came under consideration.  Indeed, 
quite why the emotional/ affective theory of autism is no longer deemed 
important became a key question.  Ultimately, some 66 articles and books from 
the time period were considered, and readings only ceased when it seemed that 
a natural break (either temporally or in research interest) had been met. 
Qualitative interviews 
The use of qualitative interviews within social science research is 
popular and, perhaps, growing in response to societal change (Gubrium et al. 
2012: 1)1RQHWKHOHVVWKHGHFLVLRQWRµJHWDWWKHDFWLRQ¶ZLWKLQWHUYLHZVUDWKHU
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than ethnography, a methodology with such strong traditions in Science 
Studies (e.g. Latour & Woolgar 1986) DQGFRQVLGHUHGE\PDQ\WREHWKH³JROG
VWDQGDUG´ LQ TXDOLWDWLYH UHVHarch more generally (Murphy & Dingwall 2003: 
54), should clearly not be predetermined.  In this instance, the decision was 
easier than might be the case in other projects.  The plethora of viewpoints and 
competing claims surrounding autism was a determining factor in choosing the 
condition as a case study through which to analyse models of sociality and the 
construction of pathology.  The extensive time commitments required of 
alternative qualitative methods such as ethnography would have prohibited the 
sampling of these wide-ranging views and would have been more appropriate 
if a single site was of particular interest.  Accordingly, the use of interview was 
deemed to be the most suitable method for the current project.   
The claim, seemingly inherent in the decision to utilise qualitative 
interviews, that the method gives at least a partial awareness of the practises of 
scientists and their views on various topics, is a claim that needs to be 
considered in the light of numerous, vigorous critiques.  Certainly, the claim 
regarding the generalisability of interview data has been frequently questioned 
(Hammersley 2008: 89-100).  Indeed, two of the most vocal critics of the 
qualitative interview as an unproblematLFZLQGRZRQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶H[SHULHQFHV
are associated with the institution inside of which this thesis is being written.  
Robert Dingwall and Elizabeth Murphy have made frequent critiques of 
interviews along the following lines: 
³7KHLQWHUYLHZLVDQDUWHIDct, a joint accomplishment of interviewer and 
UHVSRQGHQW  $V VXFK LWV UHODWLRQVKLS WR DQ\ µUHDO¶ H[SHULHQFH LV QRW
PHUHO\XQNQRZQEXWLQVRPHVHQVHXQNQRZDEOH´(Dingwall 1997: 56)  
Indeed, Dingwall and Murphy believe that there is a good reason to doubt that 
WKHUHLVPXFKRIDUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQLQWHUYLHZGDWDDQGµUHDOH[SHULHQFH¶ 
"Treating interviews as social interactions, in which all parties strive to 
present themselves and their behaviors to their listeners as appropriate, 
has radical implications.  Interviews do not yield more or less adequate 
reports on mental states underlying behavior. We recognize them 
instead as occasions on which informants are called upon to offer 
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"accounts" for their actions, feelings, opinions, and so on.  In providing 
these accounts, informants seek to present themselves as competent 
and, indeed, moral members of their particular 
communities.  Interviews are occasions for informants to display 
themselves as adequate parents, good patients, well informed citizens, 
responsible adults, and competent professionals - or to produced 
socially acceptable explanation of their failure." (Murphy & Dingwall 
2003: 95-96) 
As Hammersley notes, the essence of the critique put forward here is that 
"interview data can only tell us what goes on in interviews, or perhaps even 
just what went on in a particular interview" (Hammersley 2008: 89).  This 
strong critique of the qualitative interview, which can be summarised by 
stating that knowledge gleaned from interview is entirely insular and does not 
relate to scenarios outside of that interview, is in need of serious consideration 
for the consequences for the interpretation of the interview data obtained for 
this project are of some importance.  
To a significant extent, the degree to which one thinks that the, or a, 
truth can be obtained via the qualitative intHUYLHZGHSHQGVXSRQRQH¶VJHQHUDO
epistemological and ontological commitments, whether one accepts 
³SRVWPRGHUQ WUHQGV´ (Borer & Fontana 2012: 45) DQG ³'DGDLVW DOWHUQDWLYHV´
(Hammersley 2008: 128) within research and whether one believes a truth is to 
be found anywhere.  If one does not believe that there is a truth to be found 
anywhere, then the strong critique of qualitative interviewing is a misnomer; 
one is actually advocating a strong critique of all knowledge claims, interviews 
included.  These questions of relativism are raising fundamentally different 
queries, and they will be considered in the final sections of this chapter.  Of 
more immediate interest are critiques aimed specifically at interview 
methodologies.   
Perhaps the most famed methodological traditions to pose specific 
questions of qualitative interviewing are those drawing influence from 
ethnomethodology and/or discursive psychology.  Potter and Hepburn (2005), 
for example, have produced a critique specific to qualitative interviewing.  
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Potter and Hepburn parse that critique of interviewing into two classes; the 
first class are problems which they see as frequent although ultimately 
UHFWLILDEOHHUURUVWKHVHFRQGFODVVDVEHLQJ³HQGHPLFDQGLQHVFDSDEOH´(Potter 
& Hepburn 2005: 282). 
The former class of problems, those frequently found within interviews 
but that are not inherent to the method, can be comprehended under the rubric 
RI D ³IDLOXUH WR FRQVLGHU LQWHUYLHZV DV LQWHUDFWLRQ´ (Potter & Hepburn 2005: 
291).  Potter and Hepburn offer several examples of this failure to 
contextualise interview data.  Firstly, the importance of activities of the 
interviewer prior to, during, and after the interview are often excluded from 
UHVHDUFK RXWSXWV PLPLFNLQJ WKH QDWXUDO VFLHQFHV¶ ³JD]H IURP QRZKHUH´ WKDW
comes under such frequent attack (e.g. Haraway 1988: 581).  Secondly, the 
talk of the interviewee is often made to cohere to the standards of written 
DFDGHPLFWH[WDQG³UHQGHUHGDVDSOD\VFULSW´ (Potter & Hepburn 2005: 285) 
in blocks of text consisting of formal prose.  
 The danger of treating data as being outside of an interactional 
framework, and the possibility for violence contained within that approach, has 
been considered at length by Donna Haraway (2004).  Haraway discusses 
6RMRXUQHU7UXWK¶VIDPRXVVSHHFKRI$LQ¶W,D:RPDQ, the text of which 
QRZ µDGRUQV WKH ZDOOV RI RIILFHV LQ :RPHQ¶V 6WXGLHV GHSDUWPHQWV DFURVV
$PHULFD¶: 
"That written text represents Truth's speech in the white abolitionist's 
imagined idiolect of The Slave, the supposedly archetypical black 
plantation slave of the South.  The transcription does not provide a 
southern Afro-American English that any linguist, much less actual 
speaker, would claim.  But it is the falsely specific, imagined language 
that represents the "universal" language of slaves to the literate 
abolitionist public, and this is the language that has come down to us as 
Sojourner Truth's "authentic" words.  This counterfeit language, 
undifferentiated into the many Englishes spoken in the New World, 
reminds us of a hostile notion of difference, one that sneaks the 
masterful unmarked categories in through the back door in the guise of 
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the specific, which is made to be not disruptive or deconstructive, but 
W\SLFDO´ (Haraway 2004: 58, italics in original) 
 
Haraway notes that Truth was from New York, not the South, and probably 
spoke in an Afro-'XWFKGLDOHFW9HUVLRQVRI7UXWK¶VVSHHFKQRZH[LVWLQVXFK
dialects and these exist alongside the original as well as those in more 
formalised English.  In the very act of transcription, then, Truth has become a 
µWULFNVWHU¶: 
 
³...an ideal type, a victim (hero), a kind of plot space for the 
abolitionists' actions, a special human, not one that could bind up the 
whole people through her unremitting critical difference - that is, not an 
unruly agent preaching her own unique gospel of displacement as the 
ground of connection... The change in the shape of the words makes us 
rethink her story, the grammar of her body and life.  The difference 
PDWWHUV´ (Haraway 2004: 59) 
:KHQ 3RWWHU DQG +HSEXUQ¶V FULWLFLVPV UHJDUGLQJ D IUHTXHQW ODFN RI
contextualisation are examined WKURXJK 6RMRXUQHU 7UXWK¶V H[DPSOH LW VHHPV
apparent that those criticisms have some weight and that a failure to 
contextualise research data has potentially significant consequences.   
Nonetheless, the transcripts in this project do not fully adhere to the 
recommendations of Potter and Hepburn, as the reduction in sample size that 
even those authors accept would be necessitated by such detailed transcription 
processes (Potter & Hepburn 2005: 291) was deemed unacceptable, given that 
a range of viewpRLQWV ZHUH EHLQJ VRXJKW  ,QVWHDG D µ-HIIHUVRQ /LWH¶ V\VWHP
advocated by Potter elsewhere (e.g. Potter & Wetherell 1987) is deployed.  
Transcripts are not truly cleaned, some pauses and repetitions remain, but there 
is some formalization of spelling and some of the finest detail is inevitably 
lost.  Such decisions are not being defended here, merely stated for 
consideration. 
With regard to the issues with qualitative interviewing which Potter and 
+HSEXUQ EHOLHYH WR EH µHQGHPLF DQG LQHVFDSDEOH¶ IRXU H[DPSOHV DUH JLYHQ
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Firstly, Potter and Hepburn point towards the fact that interviewers, who 
inevitably determine the framiQJRIDQ\HQFRXQWHU³IORRGWKHLQWHUYLHZZLWKD
VRFLDO VFLHQFH DJHQGD DQG FDWHJRULHV´ (Potter & Hepburn 2005: 292).  This 
criticism suggests that as interviewers bring various concepts to the interview, 
those topics inevitably come under discussion and in some sense become 
reified:  
³$WLts most basic these issues face us with the possibility that a piece 
of interview research is chasing its own tail, offering up its own 
agendas and categories and getting those same agendas and categories 
EDFNLQDUHILQHGRUILOWHUHGRULQYHUWHGIRUP´(Potter & Hepburn 2005: 
293) 
A seconG FULWLTXH UHIHUV WR WKH QRWLRQ RI µIRRWLQJ¶ DUH IRU H[DPSOH
interviewees and interviewers speaking at any given moment as the 
representatives of a group, such as autism scientists, or as an individual agents?  
How many roles might one person take within an interview: An individual? An 
autism scientist? A psychologist? An advocate? A parent? A layperson?  In 
FRPELQDWLRQ ZLWK 3RWWHU DQG +HSEXUQ¶V WKLUG FULWLTXH WKDW ERWK LQWHUYLHZHU
and interviewee always speak from a position of interest and thus have a stake 
LQ WKH GDWD ZH DUH UHPLQGHG KHUH RI )RXFDXOW¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI SRZHU
summarised (appropriately) within an interview: 
³LQ KXPDQ UHODWLRQVKLSV ZKHWKHU WKH\ LQYROYH YHUEDO
communication..., or amorous, institutional, or economic relationships, 
power is always present: I mean a relationship in which one person 
tries to control the conduct of the other.  So I am speaking of relations 
that exist at different levels, in different forms; these power relations 
are mobile, they can be modified, they are not fixed once and for all.  
For example, the fact that I may be older than you, and that you may 
initially be intimidated, may be turned around during the course of our 
conversation, and I may end up being intimidated before someone 
precisely because he is younger than I am.  These power relations are 
WKXVPRELOHUHYHUVLEOHDQGXQVWDEOH´(Foucault 1997c: 292) 
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Tracing these changing power relations within a qualitative interview is, 
according to Potter and Hepburn, a mammoth and perhaps impossible task.  
For their final critique, Potter and Hepburn hark back, once more, to Dingwall 
and Murphy and the claim that: 
³ZHZLOOQHHGWRSD\DWWHQWLRQWRWKHSUDFWLFDODQGLQWHUDFWLRQDOUROHRI
cognitive terms [such as think, feel, and so forth] and be very cautious 
about treating such terms as if they referred to psychological objects of 
VRPHNLQGZLWKLQLQGLYLGXDOV´(Potter & Hepburn 2005: 300)  
In short, the suggestion that talk refers unproblematically to generalised 
cognitive activity is an assumption that should be viewed warily. 
 It is not entirely clear what the solution to these problems might be.  
Potter and Hepburn argue for the prioritisation of naturalistic methods 
whenever possible (Potter & Hepburn 2005: 301) and, like others (Rapley 
2004: 111), DUHLQIDYRXURIWKHµGHDGSV\FKRORJLVWWHVW¶ZKHUHE\RQO\GDWDWKDW
would exist in the absence of the researcher should be considered valid.  
Despite this claim that naturalistic methods are superior, even Potter and 
Hepburn seem to suggest that the difference between naturalistic and interview 
data is a difference of degree rather than kind (Potter & Hepburn 2005: 301) 
and that, to continue the links with Foucauldian thought, forms of knowledge 
can never be divorced from power relations.  For the reasons mentioned 
previously, the use of qualitative interviewing can be strongly defended here as 
being amongst the most suitable of available methods, but this should not stop 
a reflection upon the local, situated knowledges produced within it. 
Qualitative interviews: Topics 
The questions driving this thesis are those concerning the construction 
of autism within cognitive psychology and social neuroscience and the 
interview schedules were drawn up with these questions in mind.  It was 
decided that pre-determined questions, formalized in the interview schedules, 
would be kept to a small number and that questions and topics that arose 
naturally during the course of the interviews would, to a significant degree, 
guide the discussion.  A schedule consisting of around twenty questions was 
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initially created.  There was an intent to keep questions as general as possible 
in order to avoid a project which ZDV µFKDVLQJ LWV RZQ WDLO¶ DV 3RWWHU DQG
Hepburn might have it, an approach previously utilised in projects such as that 
conducted by Kate Weiner (e.g. 2006).  In much the same way that this project 
is interested in exploring PRGHOVRI VRFLDOLW\ :HLQHU¶V WKHVLVZDV FRQFHUQHG
with the notion of geneticisation.  Despite this interest, Weiner deliberately 
avoids discussing genetics (Weiner 2006: 124) and when it became apparent 
that WeiQHU¶V SDUWLFLSDQWV GLG QRW UHO\ VROHO\ XSRQ JHQHWLF H[SODQDWLRQV WR
explain heart disease this was taken as analytically important (Weiner 2009: 
421).  It seems likely that, if Weiner had asked questions about genetics she 
would have received answers about genetics, answers which could reasonably 
be classed as interview artifacts.  Thus, attempts were made here to ask only 
broad questions about autism and refrain from introducing questions 
concerning µWKH VRFLDO¶  As discussed above, the experimenter cannot be 
removed from the research but adopting such a generalist position seems to at 
least partially mitigate against some of the problems posed by interview 
methods.   
The interview schedule itself can be found in Appendix A (p.236).  
Broadly, interview questions covered five areas; i) how the participant came to 
be interested in their research topic, ii) the nature of autism, iii) the nature of 
WKHSDUWLFLSDQW¶VFXUUHQW research, iv) the impact of social neuroscience, and v) 
the role of advocacy groups in research.  A great deal of flexibility was 
included however and topics of discussion would be allowed to wander to a 
quite significant degree.  Further, the interview schedule did not remain static 
throughout the project.  For example, the question included on DSM-5 was 
incorporated in response to the answers of participants interviewed early in the 
project, all of whom were keen to discuss this topic.  Nonetheless, the five 
areas covered above were usually addressed at least in passing.  
Qualitative interviews: Samples 
 The intent of this project was to interview researchers with interests in 
psychology, neuroscience, and autism and who were based in the United 
Kingdom.  In addition to existing knowledge of the field, potential participants 
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suitable for interviewing were sought through a variety of means; an internet 
search, discussion with members of the Hamilton Laboratory at The University 
of Nottingham, and finally by asking interviewees for contacts.  Potential 
interviewees were contacted by e-mail with a brief explanation of the goals of 
the project and an attached information sheet gave further details (Appendix B: 
238).  It was made clear to participants that both individual and institutional 
identities disclosed within interviews would be removed in the act of 
transcription, that data would be securely stored, and that the project had 
passed the School of Sociology and Social Policy at The University of 
Nottingham¶V LQWHUQDO HWKLFV SURFHGXUHV  3DUWLFLSDQWV ZHUH WKHQ JLYHQ WKH
opportunity to ask any outstanding questions and, once satisfied, signed a 
consent form (Appendix C: 241).  If participants had any further questions they 
were answered informally, again by e-mail.   
In addition to a small number of pilot interviews conducted with PhD 
students at the University of Nottingham, data from which was not used in the 
thesis, twenty research interviews were ultimately conducted for this project.  
This sample consisted of 13 women and 7 men, or alternatively 7 Professors, 2 
Readers, 1 Senior Lecturer, 1 Associate Professor, 2 Lecturers, and 7 
Postdoctoral Researchers of various kinds.  Eighteen researchers were 
interviewed at their place of work, 1 was interviewed at a restaurant, and 1 was 
interviewed at their home9.  Twelve researchers declined to take part in the 
project for a variety of reasons (although none claimed the nature of the project 
was a determining factor) and an additional 12 researchers were contacted but 
did not respond.  Interviews that were conducted lasted between 38 and 73:07 
minutes, with a mean length of 54 minutes and 30 seconds.  Approximately 
one-half of the interviews reached a natural close while the other half were 
ended at a scheduled time, usually an hour.   
The extracts presented in this thesis have been anonymised in the 
following manner: each participant was allocated a random two letter code 
(e.g: DF).  The number presented alongside these initials refers to the interview 
number (e.g. DF03 was the third interview conducted), and the longer numbers 
                                       
9
 8QLYHUVLW\ORQHZRUNHUSROLF\ZDVDGKHUHGWRGXULQJWKHYLVLWWRDUHVHDUFKHU¶VKRPH 
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following the colon refer to transcript line numbers being quoted (e.g. DF03: 
430-434).     
Qualitative interviews: Analysis 
 After all of the interviews had been fully transcribed (see above), text 
was coded by hand into broad, reoccurring themes.  For example, themes 
emerged regarding the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-5), autism in relation to normal behaviour, and issues 
of heterogeneity in autism.  Once this initial coding procedure was completed, 
themes were interrogated to look for particular areas of (dis)agreement in 
various constructions.  For example, it became apparent tKDW µDXWLVWLF
KHWHURJHQHLW\¶ DQ LVVXH UDLVHG E\ QHDUO\ DOO SDUWLFLSDQWV ZDV FRQVWUXFWHG LQ
quite different ways by different participants at different times (see chapter 5, 
particular p.107).  These more nuanced coded sections formed the basis of the 
data presented in the analysis chapters of this thesis which are based upon 
interview data.  Where interview and literature data are presented alongside 
one another, as they are on occasion, the interview data exclusively led to a 
consideration of particular literary sources and not vice versa. 
2.2 Absent voices 
 A silent past 
The first analysis chapter of this thesis starts with a critical analysis of 
cognitive psychology in the 1980s before three subsequent chapters go on to 
consider notions of autistic sociality within contemporary settings.  The claim 
is that within the laboratories of cognitive psychologists autism is 
reconstructed and takes on its modern appearance. 
Despite this portrayal of construction within the laboratory, Science 
Studies has taught us that a picture such as this is, at best, vastly 
oversimplified.  Analyses of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) 
groups of the mid 1980s (Epstein 1995; Epstein 1996) ZRPHQ¶V KHDOWK
movements (Anglin 1997; Blackstone 2004; Gibbon 2008; Klawiter 2004), and 
the French Muscular Dystrophy Association (Rabeharisoa 2003; Rabeharisoa 
& Callon 2002) have long made us aware that the idea that science is 
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µXSVWUHDP¶IURPVRFLHW\is grossly inaccurate.  As is made clear in the literature 
review (pp.46-49), within the field of autism research laboratory work is 
similarly entangled with broader society.   
What justification can be provided for silencing the historical, and 
indeed contemporary, voices of these organisations, especially when we know 
that the likes of Bernard Rimland blurred or dissolved the line between 
advocate and scientist, engaging in heated debate with Bettelheim as both peer 
and parent (Silverman 2004: 118-121)?  What justification can be given for 
considering social neuroscience in the light of cognitive psychology but not the 
advocacy groups of that era?  Any theoretical justification for the exclusion of 
advocacy groups will be weak.  The choice of research topics was driven 
primarily by a personal interest in researching psychology as a science and was 
limited by the duration of the thesis.  Within the literature review an attempt 
has been made to consider the impact of advocacy groups in general, and 
within autism in particular, but given the particular research questions asked in 
this work, that picture is inevitably incomplete.  We must reflexively be aware 
that this picture is incomplete and any assumed causality partial.  Findings 
must be considered in the light of this partial knowledge base. 
 A silent present 
One noticeable set of voices completely excluded from the current 
project are those of individuals who have themselves been diagnosed with 
autism, an omission which other authors view as particularly problematic.  
'UDZLQJ XSRQ GLVDELOLW\ VWXGLHV 6WXDUW 0XUUD\¶V WH[W Representing Autism 
(Murray 2008) concerns itself with how autism is represented in various forms 
across diverse media, giving time to fictional and non-fictional accounts of 
autism in film, text, advertising, and photography within both contemporary 
and historical (i.e. prior to 1943) setWLQJV  0XUUD\¶V FHQWUDO FODLP LV WKDW
representations of autism are almost exclusively concerned with the human 
condition in general, rather than the autistic condition in particular: ³Autism is 
endlessly fascinating, these novels seem to say, but never more so than when 
we might quickly characterize it and use it to look at something else" (Murray 
2008: 98).  Thus, for Murray, within a great number of texts concerned about 
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autism, the individual with the condition "becomes a prop, a prosthetic device, 
for the discussion of a range of issues - masculinity, family cohesion, adult 
responsibility - that ultimately have their meaning in non-disabled contexts" 
(Murray 2008: 163).  Within the vast majority of work on autism, then, there is 
a distinct lack of autistic presence.  Murray finds the lack of such presence 
highly problematic, concluding at one point that much contemporary work on 
autism may ultimately be considered "embarrassing and shameful" (Murray 
2008: 134). 
It is hard to deny that the current project is guilty of the sins Murray 
has identified, that autism is in some sense here a prosthetic or a prop used for 
other purposes.  As has been repeatedly stressed this thesis is not only 
concerned with autism and in some senses apes the natural sciences in using 
autism precisely because it allows access to other matters, be they 
constructions of the social or the workings of the cognitive neurosciences.  
Accordingly, autism is almost exclusively referred to in this work as a 
condition, a disorder, or (perhaps worse) a concept rather than as an embodied 
aspect of a unique agent.  Without wishing to suggest that this framing 
(exclusion) is unproblematic, the decision not to interview those with autism 
was not simply made for reasons of space and interest.  Two reasons present 
themselves for the exclusion of autistic voices from within this project. 
 The first regards the power dynamics within an interview scenario and 
making comparisons between interview sessions.  If, as discussed above, an 
LQWHUYLHZ LV µa joint accomplishment of interviewer and respondent¶ it seems 
beyond doubt that interpersonal relationships will have real consequences on 
the type of data collected.  Even granting that power relations are flexible and 
shift from moment to moment, it seems undeniable that the power relations 
between a PhD researcher and a senior academic will be vastly different to 
those between a PhD research and an individual with autism.  Thus, to draw 
comparisons between constructions within these very different interview 
scenarios seems deeply flawed.  
 A second critique extends one familiar to disability studies and regards 
representation.  The social model of disability (Hughes & Paterson 1997; 
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Oliver 1990; Shakespeare & Watson 2002) has sought to give voice to 
individuals labelled as disabled.  But who is free to speak for whom within the 
context of disability, and who is able to speak at all (Barnartt et al. 2001: 436)?  
Spivak, in the context of post-colonialist studies with which there are obvious 
comparisons, has said ³Whe oppressed, if given the chance...can speak and 
know their conditions.  We must now confront the following question...can the 
subaltern speak?´ (Spivak 1988: 25, italics in original).  While there are 
HYLGHQWO\DJUHDWPDQ\LQGLYLGXDOVZLWKDXWLVPZKRFDQµVSHDNDQGNQRZWKHLU
FRQGLWLRQV¶ WKH³VLOHQFHGFHQWUH´(Spivak 1988: 24) of the condition is quite 
literally a silent centre.  Autism is defined by a triad of impairments in social 
interaction problems, communication difficulties, and restrictive and/or 
repetitive behaviours (Baron-Cohen 2000) and between twenty-five and forty 
percent of individuals diagnosed with autism have been classified as nonverbal 
(Levy & Bar-Yuda 2011: 343).  Thus, while a significant number of 
individuals with autism are able to put forward their views and eloquently 
express their opinion regarding their conditions, there are a good number of 
individuals within the autism spectrum with whom we may draw the 
comparison of subalterns.  Given that interviews and other text-based sources 
will be fundamental empirical tools within the grasp of current project (for 
reasons given above) it was concluded that attempts to give voice to autism 
ZHUHGRRPHGWREHµORVWLQWUDQVODWLRQ¶(Tsang & Ho 2007) for reasons of both 
representation and comparison.  This is not to claim that representation is not 
possible (see, for example, the two attempts detailed by Silverman 2008a: 47; 
2008b: 327) RQO\ WKDW DQ DWWHPSW ZLWKLQ WKLV VSDFH PD\ OHDG WR  ³WKH
unquestioned privileging of elite discourses produced and distributed from 
sites of power, and the risk of theoretical imperialism´ (Tsang & Ho 2007: 
640).  The hope is that other projects, utilising diverse methods and conducted 
by diverse parties, will be able to engage with self-advocates productively and 
inclusively.  This project trains its eye firmly upon scientists but, once again, 
an awareness that an autistic voice is missing is essential10. 
                                       
10
 It should also be noted that these subalterns are almost certainly under represented/ absent in 
the psychological experiments which the interviewees of this project conduct, hence they are 
doubly missing from the present analysis: from this thesis itself and from the accounts of 
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3. Personal Closeness 
Emotion, affect, and autism: How is one to disentangle these 
phenomena?  In several senses, autism is clearly about emotion and affect.  
Leo Kanner first told us what autism is in his paper Autistic Disturbances of 
Affective Contact (1943)  7KLV LGHD LV FRQWLJXRXV ZLWK 3HWHU +REVRQ¶V
research, discussed at length in this thesis, which contests that autism is a 
diVRUGHU ³RI DIIHFWLYH DQG VRFLDO UHODWLRQV ± DQG LUUHGXFLEO\ VR´ (Hobson 
1989a: 22).  Simon Baron-&RKHQ¶V ERG\ RI ZRUN FODLPV WKDW DXWLVP is a 
disorder of at least some aspects of empathy (Baron-Cohen 1995).  If autism is 
a disorder of some emotion or other, it has also been a consistent claim that 
autism has a similarly emotional cause, be that a biological cause, for instance 
a broken mirror neuron system preventing the experience of emotion 
(Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro 2010), or a social explanation in which a child is 
denied affective relations by, perhaps, an aloof mother (Bettelheim 1972).  
However, as is made clear within the literature review (p.49), the study 
of autism is not just about emotion, it is itself emotional.  It cannot pass notice 
KRZFORVHVRPDQ\ LQYROYHG LQ UHVHDUFKDUH WR WKHµREMHFW¶RIDXWLVP 0DQ\
could not be closer; the self-advocacy movement is a significant player 
(particularly in the United States, e.g. Aspies for Freedom 2002) and this 
extends into research as those with a diagnosis continue directly to contribute 
to the scientific research on autism (e.g. Michelle Dawson; Gernsbacher et al. 
2005; Dawson et al. 2007).  An even greater number of researchers have 
children or other relatives diagnosed with autism and these researchers 
contribute to nearly all academic fields involved in autism research; from 
anthropology (e.g. Grinker 2010), to communication studies (e.g. Nadesan 
2005), to history (e.g. Feinstein 2010), to bio-psychology (e.g. Rimland 1964).  
1DGHVDQ¶VRSHQLQJVHQWHQFHLQConstructing Autism LV³7KLVVWRU\EHJLQVZLWK
P\VRQ.DPDO´DQGWKLVis typical, similar utterances being found 
in all those texts cited above.  It is inconceivable that this emotional closeness 
does not affect the nature of the research produced, for that research may never 
have been produced if not for the emotion (Silverman 2012: 5).   
                                                                                                    
scientists WKDW LQIRUP LW  7KH HIIHFWV RI VFLHQWLVWV µUHVHDUFKLQJ XS¶ WKH VSHFWUXP to the 
exclusion of those with, for instance, no verbal skills are discussed in chapter 7 (from p. 153). 
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The study of autism is, therefore, both about emotion and is in itself 
emotional.  This collapsing of the method and the topic, the researcher and the 
researched, is something that psychology, along with the other human 
sciences, must contend with as a general rule.  If psychology is the study of 
individual human behaviour, and is conducted by individual humans, then the 
s/Subject is inevitably discovering and/or creating itself (Gergen 1973).  The 
attempted insertion of a clean break between the experimenter and the subject, 
the so called repudiation of Wundt (Danziger 1990: 34), has lasted a century 
and, unsurprisingly, remains an impossibility in the age of neuroscience 
(Langlitz 2010: 49).   
Perhaps the most startling example of this dynamic nominalism, the so 
called looping effects of human kinds (Hacking 1986a; 1995b), in the history 
of psychology can be found within the educational system.  Danziger (1990: 
130-135) has convincingly argued that significant differences in the 
educational systems of Germany and the United States of America led to very 
different psychologies developing in those two countries during the early 
twentieth century.  In turn, the emergent psychologies had a profound effect 
upon the  American education system: 
"...the Galtonian use of statistics greatly facilitated the artificial 
creation of new groups whose defining characteristic was based on 
performance on some psychological instrument, most commonly an 
LQWHOOLJHQFHWHVW´(Danziger 1990: 112) 
As this psychological research was incorporated into the school setting, 
therefore, Anglo-American educational systems began to organise themselves 
around the very groups and subjects that psychology informed them were there 
to be found; nowhere is this more obvious than in the introduction in the UK of 
the Eleven Plus exams in 1944 on the basis of I.Q. testing.  These changes in 
the education system would in turn affect subsequent psychological research, 
ad infinitum.  If such looping effects are at the centre of the psychological 
enterprise more broadly, and there are good reasons to suppose this is the case, 
then a recent emotional turn within the discipline is surely of importance where 
reflexivity is concerned.  
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  Contemporary psychology, and particularly contemporary 
neuroscience, attributes an increasingly important role to emotion within the 
spheres of human conduct.  The likes of Antonio Damasio (2005) argue that 
unreason in the form of emotion is inseparable from reason itself and must 
logically therefore lie at the heart of any reasonable, scientific psychology.  As 
psychology becomes increasingly about emotion, it must be concluded that it 
is increasingly emotional.  Once again, therefore, reflecting upon emotional 
closeness seems important. 
Even if Foucault views it as a historical contingency (Foucault 2006a: 
414-415), and without delving into the philosophy of emotion, we can 
probably agree with Hume that distance is crucial in determining our 
emotional response to an object:   
³+HUHWKHQZHDUHWRFRQVLGHUWZRNLQGVRIREMHFWVWKHFRQWLJXRXVDQG
remote; of which the former, by means of their relation to ourselves, 
approach an impression in force and vivacity; the latter by reason of the 
interruption in our manner of conceiving them, appear in a weaker and 
more imperfect light. This is their effect on the imagination.´ (Hume 
2000: 274) 
My personal distance from autism and psychology/neuroscience could not be 
more different from each other. I have never been diagnosed with autism.  
Neither have any of my family or close friends, at least at the time of writing.  
Like most people I have spoken to people with a diagnosis and, probably 
because of this project, discussed at reasonable length autism with numerous 
parties interested in my views.  On several occasions I have volunteered at an 
autism social group associated with the University of Nottingham.  
Nonetheless, I have almost certainly spent less time in the presence of people 
with autism and their families than the vast majority of autism researchers, 
teachers, or doctors.  I am remote from it and this distance may well make 
DXWLVPDSSHDUWRPHµLQDZHDNHUDQGPRUHLPSHUIHFWOLJKW¶&HUWDLQO\LWGRHV
not hold much vivacity for me.  By comparison to my distance from autism, I 
could certainly be identified as a psychologist.  So could members of my 
family and close friends.  I am a trained psychologist to postgraduate level, 
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have published in the field (e.g. Hollin & Derbyshire 2009; Hollin & Larkin 
2011), and retain an affinity to the discipline through one supervisor and her 
laboratory group.  Of course, a conscious act has been taken to distance this 
project from psychology, both geographically and intellectually, by positioning 
this project with STS (rather than, say, critical psychology ± see below) and 
under the primary supervision of two qualitative, sociologically-inclined 
researchers.  Nonetheless, twenty-ILYH \HDUV¶ ZRUWK RI DIILQLWLHV DUH KDUG WR
erase completely. 
It may be impossible to discern the impact upon the current project of 
this simultaneous distance from autism and proximity to psychology.  The 
social sciences in general, and Science Studies in particular, are certainly 
divided on that matter.  On occasion a particular standpoint is seen as being 
privileged, such as that of the proletariat in classical Marxist thought or women 
within feminist standpoint theory (Keller 1985).  On other occasions, a simple 
distance is seen to be preferable:  
³...¶VWHSSLQJ EDFN¶ IURP IXOO HQJDJHPHQW LQ FXOWXUDO DFWLYLW\ ZKLFK LV
RIWHQ VDLG WR EH HPEOHPDWLF RI WKH µVRFLRORJLFDO DWWLWXGH¶ UHTXLUHV D
form of ironic detachment: a disengagement from tribal custom and a 
heightened awareness of taken-for-granted assumptions.´ (Lynch, 
2000: 30)    
It does not seem wise to issue post-hoc defences of the preferability of either 
my closeness to psychology or my remoteness from autism given that neither 
standpoint was entirely under my control once this project had begun.  Instead, 
and continuing a position that is advocated in this chapter, it is merely worth 
noting this unusual situating and reflecting on how it may have influenced my 
data collection and analysis.  Ultimately, this impact may be determined at the 
UHDGHUV¶GLVFUHWLRQ.  
4. Critique, the purpose, and status of Science Studies 
4.1 What is critique? 
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In 1978 Michel Foucault gave a lecture entitled What is Critique? 
(Foucault 1997d). Foucault begins to answer this question by making it quite 
clear that critique is not, as such, one thing at all: 
³FULWLTXHRQO\H[LVWVLQUHODWLRQto something other than itself: it is an 
instrument, a means for a future or a truth that it will not know nor 
happen to be, it oversees a domain it would want to police and is 
unable to regulate.  All this means that it is a function which is 
subordinated in relation to what philosophy, science, politics, ethics, 
ODZOLWHUDWXUHHWFSRVLWLYHO\FRQVWLWXWH´(Foucault 1997d: 42) 
7KDW FULWLTXH RQO\ µH[LVWV LQ UHODWLRQ WR VRPHWKLQJ RWKHU WKDQ LWVHOI¶ DQG WKXV
cannot be understood outside of a relational framework does not mean that 
commonalities cannot be found across notions of critique.  What becomes clear 
is that, for Foucault, critique is very tightly bound to the tri-partite nature of 
experience which is of sustained concern within this thesis (see chapter 2: 23-
24 for an overview).  Above all: 
³RQHVHHVWKDWWKHFRUHRIFULWLTXHLVEDVLFDOO\PDGHRIWKHEXQGOHRI
relationships that are tied to one another, or one to two others, power, 
truth and the subject.  And if governmentalization is indeed this 
movement through which individuals are subjugated in the reality of a 
social practice through mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth, 
well, then!  I will say that critique is the movement by which the 
subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power 
and question power on its discourses of truth.  Well, then!: critique will 
be the art of voluntary insubordination, that of reflected intractability.  
Critique would essentially insure the desubjugation of the subject in the 
FRQWH[W RI ZKDW ZH ZRXOG FDOO LQ D ZRUG WKH SROLWLFV RI WUXWK´
(Foucault 1997d: 47) 
&ULWLTXH LV WKHQ WKH ³DUW RI QRW EHLQJ JRYHUQHG OLNH WKDW DQG DW WKDW FRVW´
(Foucault 1997d: 45). 
 Thomas Lemke has provided a detailed analysis of these links between 
H[SHULHQFHDQGFULWLTXHLQ)RXFDXOW¶VZRUN(Lemke 2011).  Lemke ties the tri-
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partite nature of experience to a tri-partite nature of critique.  Firstly, Lemke 
discusses the problematisation of the history of truth, highlighting that, for 
Foucault, experience is not only something that should be investigated but also 
SURYRNHG WKURXJK ZKDW )RXFDXOW ZRXOG HOVHZKHUH UHIHU WR DV µOLPLW-
H[SHULHQFH¶(e.g. Foucault 1994: 241-242):   
³2QWKHRQHKDQG)RXFDXOWFOHDUO\LQGLFDWHVDQREMHFWRIDQDO\VLV,WLV
something to be investigated to determine its emergence and its 
conditions of existence.  On the other hand, there is another sense of 
problematization, which refers to the activity of the observer who 
engages in the process of problematization.  He or she problematizes 
specific experiences and by doing so tries to move beyond the limits 
they impose.  Here, problematization is no longer the object, but rather 
WKHREMHFWLYHRIWKHFULWLFDOLQYHVWLJDWLRQ´(Lemke 2011: 32)  
Secondly, and in relation to structures dominant in power relations, Lemke 
KLJKOLJKWVWKHDUWRIµYROXQWDU\LQVXERUGLQDWLRQ¶WKHQRWLRQWKDWFULWLTXH³UHOLHV
on the existing normative and institutional system while seeking to expose its 
limLWVLQRUGHUWRH[SORUHZD\VWRWUDQVIRUPLW´(Lemke 2011: 33).  Finally, and 
LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKH SUREOHP RI WKH VXEMHFW FULWLTXH ³H[SRVHV RQH¶V RZQ
ontological status, it involves the danger of falling outside the established 
QRUPVRI UHFRJQLWLRQ´ (Lemke 2011: 36) and confronting the contingency of 
RXUµRQWRORJ\RIRXUVHOYHV¶(Meloni 2011: 151).  
Despite the fact that Science Studies in general, and actor-network 
theorists in particular, have a highly ambivalent relationship with Foucault 
(see, for example, Latour & Crawford 1993: 250-253; Law 2004: 35-36; Mol 
2002: 65-66) there are, in two respects, interesting convergences here between 
the Foucauldian project of critique and the broader endeavours of Science 
Studies.  The first similarity between Science Studies and the work of Foucault 
is to be found in the relationship between the project and the object of analysis.  
-XGLWK %XWOHU JLYHV WKH IROORZLQJ WDNH RI )RXFDXOW¶V QRWLRQ RI FULWLTXH
³&ULWLTXHZLOOEHGHSHQGHQWXSRQLWVREMHFWVEXW LWVREMHFWZLOOLQWXUQGHILQH
the very PHDQLQJ RI FULWLTXH´ (Butler 2003: 306). Similarly, Mario Biagioli 
defines the nature of Science Studies in the following form:   
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 ³>7@KHUH DUH SUREDEO\ DV PDQ\ ZD\V WR VWXG\ VFLHQFH DV WKHUH DUH WR
study literature.  But the fundamental difference is that, in the case of 
Science Studies, methodological disunity does not disunify its subject 
matter.  Its subject matter has become a historical fact and not the 
SURGXFWRIGLVFLSOLQDU\GHILQLWLRQ´(Biagioli 1999: xiii) 
Both Biagioli and Foucault/Butler give their objects a relational ontology, 
defining them in opposition to an other (philosophy in the case of Butler, 
science in the case of Biagioli).  It may be that critique and/or Science Studies 
is purely parasitic, that the host in no way engages with its dependent, or it 
may be that the relationship is dialectal or symbiotic.  In either instance, 
because the object defines the form of the response, there is always a 
separation between the activities.   
It is in this sense of the relational that the current work is separated 
from the laudable activities of, for example, the critical psychology network.  
:LWKLQ,DQ3DUNHU¶VNH\ WH[WThe Crisis in Modern Psychology ± and How to 
End it (Parker 1989), for example, there is just that, the sense of an ending, the 
suggestion that psychology could be suitably reformed and there would no 
longer be a need for critical psychology, there would simply be an enlightened 
psychology.  Despite its opposition to dominant thought, therefore, critical 
psychology is just that ± psychology.  Such an integration of academic 
disciplines is clearly the objective of many at a time when academic research is 
judged by its interdisciplinary aspirations and the impact agenda.  This project, 
however, sides with those (e.g. Armstrong 2012: 20) who remain sceptical 
about the desirability of consilience.  By explicitly defining the ongoing 
project as being inherently in relation to the practices of the psy-disciplines the 
project will be forever unfinished, regardless of future experiences that come 
to be constructed.  That the contemporary biosciences, in an age of epigenetics 
DQG QHXURSODVWLFLW\ ORRN LQFUHDVLQJO\ VLPLODU WR 'RQQD +DUDZD\¶V DQDO\Ves 
during the early 1990s, does not signal the end of that particular aspect of the 
Science Studies project, instead it implies that Science Studies must mutate 
with science, examining the claims to power, truth, and the subject made 
within these new disciplines.   
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 A second point of convergence between Science Studies and the 
Foucauldian project is illustrated in the following extract, again from Judith 
Butler: 
³WKH SULPDU\ WDVN RI FULWLTXH ZLOO QRW EH WR HYDOXDWH ZKHWKHU LWV
objects ± social conditions, practices, forms of knowledge, power, and 
discourse ± are good or bad, valued highly or demeaned, but to bring 
into relief the very framework of evaluation itself.  What is the relation 
of knowledge to power such that our epistemological certainties turn 
out to support a way of structuring the world that forecloses alternative 
SRVVLELOLWLHVRIRUGHULQJ"´(Butler 2003: 306-307) 
This dual goal of uncovering the contingency of singular experience and in 
doing so making space for alternatives is an area of agreement between 
Science Studies and Foucauldian work.  When John Law critiques the 
metaphysics of science in the following manner, one cannot help but think of 
)RXFDXOW¶V µKLVWRULFDOO\ VLQJXODU IRUP RI H[SHULHQFHV¶ (Foucault 1984a: 333) 
and the attempt to move beyond these: 
³7KH SUREOHP WKHQ LV WKDW WKH FRPPLWPHQW WR YLVLEOH VLQJXODULW\
directs us away from the possibility that realities might in some 
measure be made in other ways.  Or, to put it more generally, the 
presupposition of singularity not only hides the practice that enacts it, 
but also conceals the possibility that different constellations of practice 
and their hinterlands might make it possible to enact realities in 
GLIIHUHQWZD\V´(Law 2004: 66, italics in original) 
By placing this project at the juncture of Foucauldian and Science Studies, 
FRQFHUQLQJ  LWVHOI ZLWK WKH SUDFWLFHV ZKLFK RWKHUV KDYH UHIHUUHG WR DV µWKH
JRYHUQLQJRIWKHVRXO¶(Rose 1999; Rose 2010) RUµPHPRUR-SROLWLFV¶(Hacking 
1994), it is hoped that the purpose of the present study has begun to become 
clearer.  In considering the possibility that the cohesive condition of autism has 
EHHQ ³IDEULFDWHG LQ D SLHFHPHDO IDVKLRQ IURP DOLHQ IRUPV´ (Foucault 1977: 
142) the space is opened for alternative realities of social behaviour and 
sciences of those behaviour to take form.   
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4.2 The demonic machine: Disciplinary reflexivity 
 Simply noting that the current project, positioned as a critique from 
within Science Studies, is distinct from scientific activity does not, however, 
end the processes of reflexivity.  As David Bloor has said (Bloor 1991: 7) any 
methodology applicable for the studying of scientific knowledge should also 
be applicable when studying Science Studies, or the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (SSK).  This is especially the case given that research within 
Science Studies (Knorr Cetina 1999) and the history and philosophy of science 
(Dupré 1993; Galison & Stump 1996) has largely rejected a monolithic vision 
RI µVFLHQFH¶ demolishing the walls between science and other forms of 
knowledge production, including Science Studies. Positioning research as 
critique, as defined above, may ensure a continual separation of Science 
Studies and science, but critique cannot rescue ScieQFH 6WXGLHV¶
HSLVWHPRORJLFDO IRXQGDWLRQV %ORRU¶VFRQFOXVLRQproblematises any notion of 
µVHOHFWLYH UHODWLYLVP¶ WR ZKLFK WKH VRFLDO VFLHQFHV PD\ EH H[HPSW  One 
particular DVSHFWRIWKLVµV\PPHWULFDOUHIOH[LYLW\¶KRZHYHUKDVWKHSRWHQWLDOWR
be highly problematic for Science Studies; the so called tu quoque (you, also) 
problem (Ashmore 1989: 27).   
If Science Studies purports to have undermined claims of realism 
emanating from the natural sciences then on what epistemological basis can we 
believe the claims of Science Studies themselves to be real?  Like post-
structuralism (Hammersley 1992: 54), Science Studies potentially suffers from 
WKH ORJLFDO LQFRQVLVWHQF\ WKDW LV 5XVVHOO¶V 3DUDGR[ (Russell 1903: 101); if 
relativity must be applied symmetrically to all forms of knowledge, including 
this statement, then the initial truth claim of this statement is fundamentally 
XQGHUPLQHG  5HIOH[LYLW\ PD\ WKHQ EH ³OLNHQHG WR D GHPRQLF PDFKLQH WKDW
once set in motion, devours everything in its path and then turns on itself´
(Lynch 2000: 46). 
 This form of radical reflexivity (Lynch 2000: 36) has indeed been 
applied within Science Studies, most notably by Malcolm Ashmore (e.g. 
Ashmore 1989) and Steve Woolgar (e.g. Woolgar 1989; 1992)  $VKPRUH¶V
Reflexive Thesis (1989) is often cited as an exemplar of this type of research.  
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2QHRI WKHDQDO\VLVFKDSWHUV LVDQ66.DQDO\VLVRI&ROOLQV¶The Seven Sexes, 
itself a classic piece of SSK analysis (Collins 1975) and one which Collins 
claims to have been replicated on five occasions within an issue of Social 
Studies of Science (SSS; Travis 1981; Collins 1981; Pickering 1981; Harvey 
1981; Pinch 1981). 
 &ROOLQV¶Ney claim is that within science: 
"The reproducibility of scientists' findings is seen as the major 
epistemological guarantor of scientific validity while the 
institutionalisation of replication as a behavioural norm acts as an 
effective mechanism of social control...Collins's version, in contrast, 
treats replication as a problematic and complex phenomenon, the 
meaning of any particular instance of which is subject to social 
negotiation over the relevance of perceived similarities or differences 
between the events (e.g., experiments) concerned.  As no two events 
can be totally identical, there is always a "space" for this negotiation of 
sameness/difference.  The success or lack of success of any replication 
claim can never, therefore, rest on the way the world is; rather, it must 
rest on social agreement in the relevant community." (Ashmore 1989: 
115) 
5HWDLQLQJ&ROOLQV¶ VFKHPD LQZKLFK WKHUHDUH VL[ VWDJHVRI VRFLDOQHJRWLDWLRQ
before a decision regarding replicability is made, Ashmore examines claims 
regarding the replication of replicability studies and concludes that:  
"There is a sense in which the Schema is like a steeplechase with each 
Stage as a fence...All of our candidate-replicators [those articles 
appearing in SSS]...appear to have fallen at the third (with the possible 
exception of Pickering, who might, or might not, have picked himself 
up and Collins who might have refused!)" (Ashmore 1989: 129) 
Replicability within SSK is, then, just as problematic as replicability within 
natural science. Of course, Ashmore concludes this chapter by repeating the 
process again, this time with his own preceding analysis of Collins, and 
concludes his own findings are just as problematic.  Tu quoque forever. 
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If one formulates this paradox as a problem (and not all do, see below) 
then it is a problem with no philosophically definitive solution.  It is 
impossible to dissuade relativists, for no theoretical or empirical claim could 
be made which does not fit within that philosophy.  If, as Collins and Yearley 
suggested in 1992, relativistic portions of Science Studies and the social 
VFLHQFHV PRUH EURDGO\ DUH HQJDJHG LQ D JDPH RI µHSLVWHPRORJLFDO FKLFNHQ¶
standing on the road of relativism longer and longer in the face of oncoming 
traffic, then it is a game of chicken with no conceivable risk, for nothing is able 
to hit them.   
Numerous theorists take umbrage with the statements of Woolgar, 
Ashmore and colleagues, however, and view radical reflexivity as a very 
serious problem indeed.  Trevor Pinch has referred to radical reflexivity as 
³QDLYH GHELOLWDWLQJ DQG GDQJHURXV´ TXRWHG LQ $VKPRUH    +DUU\
Collins (who stated that hHKDV³EDQQHGUHIOH[LYLW\´$VKPRUH: 115)) and 
Stephen Yearley have wryly suggested that:   
³>7@KH VRFLRORJLVW NQRZV OHVV WKDW WKH QDWXUDO VFLHQWLVW ZKLOH WKH
sociologist of science knows still less.  Those engaged from day to day 
with the problem of reflexivity would, if they could achieve their aims, 
know nothing at all.  We might say that SSK has opened up new ways 
RINQRZLQJQRWKLQJ´(Collins & Yearley 1992: 302) 
Donna Haraway makes her concerns about this particularly clear: 
³,DQGRWKHUVVWDUWHGRXWZDQWLQJDVWURQJWRROIRUGHFRQVWUXFWLQJWKH
truth claims of hostile science by showing the radical historical 
specificity, and so contestability, of every layer of the onion of 
scientific and technological constructions, and we end up with a kind of 
epistemological electroshock therapy, which far from ushering us into 
the high stakes tables of the game of contesting public truths, lays us 
out on the table with self-induced multiple personality disorder... [W]e 
ended up with one more excuse for not learning any post-Newtonian 
physics and one more reason to drop the old feminist self-help practices 
RIUHSDLULQJRXURZQFDUV 7KH\¶UH MXVW WH[WVDQ\ZD\VR OHW WKHER\V
KDYHWKHPEDFN´(Haraway 1988: 578, italics in original)  
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6RPH ZKR ZHUH XQVDWLVILHG ZLWK µQHZ ZD\V RI NQRZLQJ QRWKLQJ¶
offered philosophical (rather than practical) critiques of the relativist 
programme, despite the fact that these are doomed to failure, at least in the 
eyes of relativists.  Perhaps the most frequent of these critiques is the claim 
WKDW5XVVHOO¶VSDUDGR[LVRQWRORJLFDOO\LPSRUWDQWDQGWKXVUHODWLYLVPVKRXOGEH
rejected for its internal inconsistency.  Andrew Sayer, for example, claims: 
³8QLYHUVDO UHODWLYL]DWLRQ LQYROYHV D SHUIRUPDWLYH FRQWUDGLFWLRQ ZKLFK
invites ridicule ± µWKHUHLVQRWUXWKEH\RQGZKDWHYHUDQ\RQHGHILQHVDV
the truth ± DQGWKDW¶VWKHWUXWK¶(YHQLIZHZHUHWRVD\WKDWRXURZQ
knowledge was also merely a function of our social position it would 
imply that this was true.  The only way we can relativize truth is 
selectively, by exempting some beliefs, including our own, from the 
relativization...universally relativizing truth as a function of power 
leDGVWRLQFRKHUHQFH´(Sayer 2000: 49) 
Unsurprisingly, those advocating radical reflexivity laugh this suggestion out 
RIFRXUWSUHIHUULQJWRµFHOHEUDWHWKHPRQVWHU¶ 
"He [Ashmore, speaking in the third person] understands that "to 
respond to the question seriously is to buy into the auspices of the 
question"...  The question asks him to accept that the appropriate thing 
to do with paradoxes is to (try to) resolve them.  He knows that this is a 
form of destruction and he feels reluctant to join in.  Eccentrically as he 
often thinks, he finds he enjoys paradoxes, even to the extent of taking 
pleasure in their increasing number." (Ashmore 1989: 16) 
5. Conclusion 
 Of course, numerous attempts have been made to move past the 
GLOHPPDV SRVHG E\ TXHVWLRQV RI UDGLFDO UHIOH[LYLW\  5R\ %KDVNDU¶V FULWLFDO
realism (Bhaskar 1979; Bhaskar 2008) has tried to put ontology back on the 
table and, within Science Studies, a great many have distanced themselves 
from post-structuralist thought following the science wars of the 1990s (Fuller 
2000: 196-197).  Instead of a radical reflexivity, many voices now vigorously 
FODLP D µrd ZD\¶ EHWZHHQ WKH GLFKRWRP\ RI ZRUGV DQG ZRUOGV DV
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epistemology and ontology are collapsed into each otKHU/DWRXU¶VUHVSRQVHWR
the science wars, 3DQGRUD¶V+RSH(1999), is perhaps the fullest articulation of 
this position, a stance Michael Lynch has recently suggested be called 
µRQWRJUDSK\¶(Lynch 2013)). 
 None of these suggestions can decisively defeat radical reflexivity.  As 
Ashmore (1989: 69) has stated, ³after truth, we should not think of reflexivity 
as a "problem". It has no conceivable solution.´  This chapter has respected 
this tradition, asking for the current project to be understood as a piece of 
situated knowledge and setting out at least some of the dazzling array of nodes, 
networks and standpoints that are utterly unique to this project.  The reader has 
been invited to consider the effects of these various positions and the manner 
in which they condense into particular findings in the light of discourses 
surrounding reflexivity.  Even if we resist running straight towards relativism, 
that this chapter should end with such an invitation to reflexivity, having been 
concerned almost entirely bound up with such questions, is itself surely 
demonstrative of the fact that the form and conclusions of this thesis should be 
considered as historical, complex, and local.  
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Constructing a social subject: Autism and human sociality in the 1980s. 
Introduction 
The second half of the 1980s is a key time-point for the emergence of 
the contemporary experience of autism, and the laboratories of cognitive 
psychologists are prime sites of interest.  The period between 1985 and 1989 
saw the arrival of three aetiological theories of autism at the psychological 
level, theories which continue to dominate the field today (Pellicano 2010).  
Those theories are the theories of Metarepresentations or Theory of Mind 
(Baron-Cohen et al. 1985), Executive Dysfunction (Rumsey 1985), and Weak 
Central Coherence (Frith 1989).  That these three theories of autism, so 
markedly different from their predecessors, were developed over such a short 
time period is intriguing.  As Hacking has suggested: 
³,I D FRQFHSW LV LQWURGXFHG E\ VRPH VWULNLQJ PXWDWLRQWKHUH may be 
some specific preconditions for the event that determine the possible 
future courses of development for the concept... I am inclined to think 
that the preconditions for the emergence of our concept ...determined 
the very nature of this intellectual object.´(Hacking 1975: 9) 
It is the goal of this chapter to ask if such preconditions existed for autism 
research during the 1980s. 
 A survey of existing literature (chapter two: 32-35) showed that 
WRZDUGV WKH HQG RI WKH WZHQWLHWK FHQWXU\ µWKH VRFLDO¶ LQ VRFLDO SV\FKRORJ\
came to mean something distinct and historically novel.   FLUVWO\³FRJQLWLRQLV
characterized as social merely by virtue of the objects to which it is directed, 
namely, other persons or social groups´ *UHHQZRRG a: 6).  This is a 
µVRFLDO LQ WKH VKDSH RI D FURZG¶ (Danziger 1992: 313) whereby social 
understanding means an understanding of proximal individuals and their 
intentions.  Secondly, ³WKHEDVLFFRJQLWLYHSURFHVVHVHQJDJHGLQWKHSHUFHSWLRQ
and cognition of nonsocial objects... are also engaged in the perception and 
FRJQLWLRQ RI VRFLDO REMHFWV´ (Greenwood 2004a: 6)  7KXV µWKH VRFLDO¶ LV
quantitatively and not qualitatively distinct from the nonsocial world and 
governed by the same cognitive mechanisms.  Finally, empathy is positioned 
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DVWKHTXLQWHVVHQWLDOVRFLDOHPRWLRQDQGEHOLHYHG WREHWKHµJOXHRI WKHVRFLDO
ZRUOG¶(Young 2012a: 170, 2012b: 414).   
 These claims, when woven together, constitute a savoir of the social for 
cognitive psychology.  In a useful distinction, Foucault used the French terms 
connaissance and savoir, both of which are translated into English as 
µknowledge¶, to mean very different things: 
³)RXFDXOW XVHV connaissance to refer to the conscious rules men 
themselves recognize as justifying a claim of knowledge and uses 
savoir to refer to another level constituting the underlying necessary 
conditions defining and making possible these recognitions.  These 
underlying conditions are unknown to the knower and his 
contemporaries and must be produced by the history ex post facto´
(Kennedy 1979: 271, italics in original)  
It is the latter of these knowledges, savoirZKLFK+DFNLQJWUDQVODWHVDVµGHSWK
NQRZOHGJH¶ (Hacking 1995a: 198) and which Foucault claims to be so 
important in determining the possible forms of knowledge (Foucault 1972: 15), 
WKHKLJKO\ LQWHUFRQQHFWHG³VHWRI UXOHV WKDWGHWHUPLQHZKDWNLQGRI VHQWHQFHV
DUHJRLQJWRFRXQWDVWUXHDQGIDOVH´(Hacking 1986b: 30).    
It is argued here that the three most significant contemporary models of 
autism rely upon a shared savoir, and that an understanding of this depth 
knowledge is crucial to explaining the contemporary truth of autism.  By 
considering autism in light of a savoir of the social in which proximal 
interpersonal conduct is synonymous with social conduct, the theories of 
Executive Dysfunction, Metarepresentation, and Weak Central Coherence are 
all able to position autism as a social disorder.  Further, by considering social 
conduct to be only quantitatively different from nonsocial conduct, and 
governed by the same cognitive mechanisms, these three theories are able to 
centralise hitherto unexplored and apparently nonsocial symptoms in autism, 
radically transforming the appearance of the disorder into something 
VLJQLILFDQWO\ JUHDWHU WKDQ WKH µGLVWXUEDQFH LQ DIIHFWLYH FRQWDFW¶ GHVFULEHG E\
Kanner (1943).  In addition, by describing autism as a disorder of empathy, 
metarepresentations theory in particular was able to centralise autism within 
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broader discourses of human sociality, positioning the condition as a natural 
experiment capable of illuminating human nature.   
The rest of this chapter will explore these questions of depth 
knowledge and the construction of social disorder.  The theories of Executive 
Dysfunction, Metarepresentation, and Weak Central Coherence will be 
examined in turn.  Further, a conflict between the protagonists of all three of 
these theories and a fourth hypothesis, the Emotion/ Affect Hypothesis, which 
has roots in psychoanalytic theory, will be used to show the 
incommensurability of competing savoirs. 
Accounts of autism from within cognitive psychology 
Autism as a disorder of executive functioning 
A new foundation for thinking about autism in cognitive terms arose in 
relation to a key construct from within cognitive psychology, executive 
functioning, generally assumed to have emerged in the aftermath of the 
landmark paper on working memory by Baddeley and Hitch in 1974.  That a 
construct founded upon an LQGLYLGXDO¶VZRUNLQJPHPRU\FRXOG be the basis of 
a model of autism as social disorder demonstrates just how radically autism 
was redefined to fit within the epistemological boundaries of cognitive 
psychology.  
The psychological concept of executive functioning is contested but, 
broadly, refers to behaviours where an individual must rely not just upon their 
LPPHGLDWH HQYLURQPHQW D µERWWRP-XS¶ UHVSRQVH EXW DOVR XSRQ WKHLU SDVW
H[SHULHQFHV DQG NQRZOHGJH EDVH µWRS-GRZQ¶ SURFHVVHV).  When discussed 
within the autism literature of the 1980s and early 1990s, there is general 
agreement that executive functioning abilities include, among other things, 
µIOH[LELOLW\RI WKRXJKW¶ (Ozonoff & McEvoy 1994: 415; Ozonoff et al. 1991: 
1083); WKH µLQKLELWLRQ RI SUHSRWHQW EXW LUUHOHYDQW UHVSRQVHV¶ (Ozonoff & 
McEvoy 1994: 415; Ozonoff et al. 1991: 1083; Pennington & Ozonoff 1996: 
55; Russell et al. 1996: 673) DQGµSODQQLQJ¶(Ozonoff & McEvoy 1994: 415; 
Ozonoff et al. 1991: 1083; Pennington & Ozonoff 1996: 55; Russell et al. 
1996: 673) . 
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Various tests have been designed to examine executive functioning.  
Foremost amongst the tests used in the study of autism was the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test (WCST), although by 1996 32 measures had been used in 
the study of autism (Pennington & Ozonoff 1996: 53).  In the WCST four 
stimulus cards are placed in front of the participant, differing in terms of 
stimulus colour, shape, and number.  For example, one card may show one 
blue cross, a second card two green triangles, a third card three red circles, and 
a fourth card four yellow stars (Rumsey 1985: 27).  Participants are given a 
pack of 64 cards which differ from the four stimulus cards along these 
dimensions of colour, shape, and number (for example, a card from the pack 
may show one green circle).  Participants are required to place the new card 
next to one of the stimuli cards according to an abstract ordering rule.  For 
H[DPSOHLIWKHUXOHLVµFDUGVRIWKHVDPHFRORXUEHORQJWRJHWKHU¶WKH new card 
should be placed next to the stimulus card showing two green triangles.  Two 
aspects mark the WCST out as particularly difficult.  Firstly, the experimenter 
does not inform the participant of the abstract sorting rule being employed ± 
only if their card placement is correct or incorrect.  Participants must therefore 
establish the sorting rule by a process of trial and error.  Secondly, once the 
participant has discovered the sorting rule the experimenter changes that rule 
so that the existing strategy must be rejected and a trial and error process 
recommenced.     
According to Ozonoff et al. (2005) the WCST is generally considered 
to be a test of cognitive flexibility but: 
³7R SHUIRUP ZHOO RQ WKLV WDVN VXEMHFWV PXVW EH DEOH WR GLVFULPLQDWH
among stimuli, classify them according to abstract principles, inhibit 
previously reinforced responses, sustain attention to appropriate 
attributes of compound stimuli, and use verbal feedback.´ (Ozonoff et 
al. 2005: 607)  
It should be clear that, in as much as we label anything an individual activity, 
the WCST is an individual activity.  It takes a very particular savoir of the 
social, one in which solitary activities can still be bonded to interpersonal 
conduct through shared cognitive mechanisms, to conceptualise the WCST as 
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µJHWWLQJDW¶ VRFLDOEHKDYLRXU.  The subsequent model of autism would follow 
this formula; for the first time autism could become a solitary activity. 
The first empirical papers examining executive functioning in autism 
FDPH RXW RI -XGLWK 5XPVH\¶V ODERUDWRU\ DW WKH 1DWLRQDO ,QVWitute for Metal 
Health (Rumsey 1985; Rumsey & Hamburger 1988; Rumsey & Hamburger 
1990).  In 1985 Rumsey VWXGLHG QLQH DGXOW PHQ ZLWK GLDJQRVHV RI µLQIDQWLOH
DXWLVP¶ DFFording to DSM-III guidelines) who were given the WCST and 
compared to control groups.  Following the WCST, Rumsey reached the 
following conclusions;  
³+LJK-functioning autistic men, i.e., those with good verbal skills 
and high IQs, as a group show significant deficits in conceptual 
problem-solving, (2) that these deficits involve both deficiencies in 
conceptual-level responding and a tendency to perseverate, (3) that the 
deficits are, to some extent, independent of Full Scale IQ, and (4) that 
considerable heterogeneity is FKDUDFWHULVWLFRIDXWLVP´5XPVH\: 
31) 
These conclusions were supported and extended, in similar populations, in two 
subsequent studies (Rumsey & Hamburger 1988; Rumsey & Hamburger 
1990).   
In the 1990s the research programme began to gather pace as executive 
dysfunctions in autism appeared to be differentiated from a control group 
comprising of children diagnosed with conduct disorder and also attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder, a finding which extended executive dysfunction 
to children, and also appeared to differentiate autism from highly co-morbid 
diagnoses (Szatmari et al. 1990).  Executive dysfunctioning was claimed to be 
exceptionally widespread, if not universal, in the autism population (Ozonoff 
et al. 1991) and present longitudinally (Ozonoff & McEvoy 1994), leading to 
FODLPV WKDW H[HFXWLYH G\VIXQFWLRQLQJ ZDV D ³SULPDU\ GHILFLW´ LQ DXWLVP 
(Ozonoff & McEvoy 1994: 424).  By 1996 14 papers had been published on 
the topic (outlined in the first review on the subject by Pennington & Ozonoff 
(1996)) and the first papers began to appear in which particular aspects of 
executive functioning were probed and more specific models (i.e., that the 
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primary deficit in autism may be an inability to inhibit prepotent responses) 
began to be formed (Russell et al. 1996).   
Rumsey was aware, even in the first articulation of the hypothesis 
(Rumsey 1985), that something interesting was occurring: 
³:KLOHLPSDLUPHQWVLQVRFLDOUHODWHGQHVVDUHLQFUHDVLQJO\FRQVLGHUHd to 
constitute the core symptoms of autism, cognitive impairments are now 
UHFRJQL]HGDVFRPPRQDFFRPSDQLPHQWV´ (Rumsey 1985: 23) 
Rumsey goes on to say that: 
³7he extent to which cognitive deficits actually underlie or contribute 
WRWKHVRFLDOLPSDLUPHQWVLVXQFOHDUKRZHYHU´ (Rumsey 1985: 24) 
The conclusion of the article is that: 
³7KHVKDUHGVRFLDOLPSDLUPHQWVLQDXWLVPPD\RFFXURQWKHEDVLVRID
variety of deficits ± motivational, sensory-perceptual, and higher 
cognitive deficits ± DQGRU SRVLWLYH SV\FKLDWULF V\PSWRPV´ (Rumsey 
1985: 34) 
These three extracts all reveal important insights.  Firstly, Rumsey, through 
WHUPV VXFK DV µVRFLDO relatedness¶ DGKHUHV WR WKH PRGHO RI D µVRFLDO LQ WKH
VKDSH RI D FURZG¶  6XFK D construction of the social seems to be a pre-
UHTXLVLWHWRIUDPLQJDXWLVPDVµVRFLDOGLVRUGHU¶VRPHWKLQJ5XPVH\GRHVZKHQ
claiming that deficits in social relatedness are understood as being primary to 
autism (Rumsey 1985: 23).  Secondly, the possibility that social impairments 
are symptomatic of cognitive impairments cannot be precluded (Rumsey 1985: 
24), indeed this is the very basis of the Executive Dysfunction account of 
autism which suggests that cognitive dysfunction may be central with social 
deficits emerging as a result of these deeper cognitive symptoms (Rumsey 
1985: 34).  Here too Rumsey adheres to a contemporary savoir of the social, 
positioning social and nonsocial behaviours along a quantitative spectrum 
rather than as qualitatively distinct arenas.   
The implicit theory of sociality inherent in the Executive Dysfunction 
account, and the operationalisation of that theory within the laboratory, would 
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be completely alien to a psychoanalytic framework, previously so dominant 
within autism research.  Hitherto ignored, uncovered, or symptomatic 
cognitive aspects of the disorder are being centralised.  In a very real sense, the 
capacity to form ordering rules is, within the Executive Dysfunction account, 
indicative of social ability.  Whether or not those described DV µFODVVLFDOO\
DXWLVWLF¶(Kanner 1943) also had these cognitive deficits, it is now clear that a 
great many people do have these deficits who are not classically autistic.  It 
was the conceptualisation of these behaviours as social which brought these 
people under the gaze of autism researchers and began the process of 
transforming the condition.   
Autism as a deficit in metarepresentations 
Arguably the most important paper in the history of autism since 
.DQQHU¶VLQLWLDOGHVFULSWLRQ(Kanner 1943), Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan Leslie, 
DQG8WD)ULWK¶VZRUNZDVWKHILUVWWRSURSRVHWKDWDXWLVPZDVDGLVRUGHU
of metarepresentations or Theory of Mind (ToM).   The theoretical basis 
behind the metarepresentational theory of autism has origins in a 1978 paper 
by Premack and Woodruff, µ'RHV WKH FKLPSDQ]HH KDYH D WKHRU\ RI PLQG"¶  
According the Premack and Woodruff, the concept of ToM is taken to mean 
WKDWDQLQGLYLGXDORIZKDWHYHUVSHFLHV³LPSXWHVPHQWDOstates to himself and 
to others´ (Premack & Woodruff 1978: 515). 
In extending upon this point, Premack and Woodruff state that: 
³,W VHHPV EH\RQG TXHVWLRQ WKDW purpose or intention is the state we 
[humans] impute most widely; several other states are not far behind, 
however.  They include all those designated by the italicized term in 
each of the following statements; John believes in ghosts; he thinks he 
has a fair chance of winning; Paul knows WKDW,GRQ¶Wlike roses; she is 
guessing when she says that; I doubt that Mary will come; Bill is only 
pretending´ (Premack & Woodruff 1978: 515, italics in original) 
3UHPDFNDQG:RRGUXIIFRQFOXGHWKHLUDUWLFOHE\VD\LQJWKDW³7KHVHLQIHUHQFHV
which amount to a theory of mind, are, to our knowledge, universal in human 
DGXOWV´ (Premack & Woodruff 1978: 525).   
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Evoking Premack and Woodruff, Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith 
(1985) questioned that universality of ToM in the human population in an 
article entitled 'RHVWKHDXWLVWLFFKLOGKDYHD³WKHRU\RIPLQG´"This question 
of Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) was asked, at least in part, upon the basis of a 
cognitive-based theory of pretense put forward by Alan Leslie that, while 
published afterwards in 1987, had clearly been in formation for some time 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith 1985: 38).   
The ability to pretend (for example, that a banana is a telephone) 
typically emerges in children between the ages of 18 and 24 months (Leslie 
1987: 414).  Leslie notes that it is in the interests of a given organism for its 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIREMHFWV WR FORVHO\PLUURU µWKH ZRUOG¶ IRU WKLV LV VXUHO\ WKH
best wa\ WR HQVXUH WKDW LQGLYLGXDO¶V VXUYLYDO  If adults confuse bananas and 
telephones as a result of pretense they engaged in as a child, they are likely to 
find life rather difficult.  Any being which engages in pretence must therefore 
possess the cognitive architecture that ensures that representations about the 
world (primary representations) are not affected by the ensuing act of 
SUHWHQGLQJDYRLGLQJZKDW/HVOLHFDOOV µUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDODEXVHV¶ (Leslie 1987: 
414).  /HVOLH SURSRVHV D µGHFRXSOLQJ¶ GHYLFH ZKLFK DOORZV VXFK
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDODEXVHWREHDYRLGHG(VVHQWLDOO\WKHPHFKDQLVPµGHFRXSOHV¶
the representation from reality and context and instead forms a representation 
of a representation, or a metarepresentation.  The decoupling device allows 
RQH WR VD\ µThis banana is a telephone, but only in this context, my primary 
representations of bananas and telephones remain unchDQJHG¶ (Leslie 1987: 
see 419 for an overview).   
Metarepresentation theory takes on importance for the study of autism 
because of the following point made by Leslie: 
³7KH HPHUJHQFH RI SUHWHQVH LV QRW VHHQ DV D GHYHORSPHQW LQ WKH
understandings of objects and events as such, but rather as the 
beginnings of a capacity to understanding cognition itself.  It is an early 
V\PSWRPRIWKHKXPDQPLQG¶VDELOLW\WRFKDUDFWHUL]HDQGPDQLSXODWHLWV
own attitudes to information.  Pretending oneself is thus a special case 
RIWKHDELOLW\WRXQGHUVWDQGSUHWHQVHLQRWKHUVVRPHRQHHOVH¶VDWWLWXGH
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to information).  In short, pretense is an early manifestation of what has 
been called theory of mind´(Leslie 1987: 416, italics in original) 
Lorna Wing (1977) and others had already noted that children diagnosed with 
autism do not engage in much pretend play, and Leslie would propose that a 
similar deficit may be found in other tasks which required ToM.   
In work emerging from his PhD thesis, Simon Baron-Cohen (Baron-
Cohen et al. 1985) VRXJKW HPSLULFDO VXSSRUW IRU /HVOLH¶V  WKHRU\ RI
autism through a recently devised (Wimmer & Perner 1983) scenario called the 
µ6DOO\-$QQH7HVW¶ 7KH 6DOO\-Anne is presented in a narrative format and is 
told by the experimenter, who is present throughout.  The participant is 
presented with a desk-top scenario in which two dolls (Sally and Anne) are in a 
room along with a closed box and a covered basket (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985: 
41).  Sally has a marble and, to keep it safe while she goes out, leaves the 
marble in the box with the lid shut.  Sally then leaves the room.  While Sally is 
out, Anne takes the marble out of the box and places it in the covered basket.  
Finally Sally returns to the room.  Following a series of control questions for 
PHPRU\DQGVRIRUWKWKHSDUWLFLSDQWLVVLPSO\DVNHG³ZKHUHZLOO6DOO\ORRNIRU
WKHPDUEOH"´:HNQRZWKDWWKHPDUEOHLVLQWKHEDVNHW,IZHKDYHDFFHVVWR
6DOO\¶Vbeliefs however, that is, if we have ToM, we know that she will look in 
the box.  A participant passes the Sally-Anne Test, therefore, if they correctly 
identify that Sally will look in the box. 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) compared the performance of three groups 
of participants on the Sally-Anne; a group of adolescents diagnosed with 
autism, a group of chronologically matched participants with Down Syndrome, 
DQG D µQRUPDO¶ FRQWURO JURXS RI FKLOGUHQ DJHG DURXQG IRXU-and-a-half years.  
Baron-Cohen found that, while the majority of the typical (86 per cent) and 
Down (85 per cent) control groups were able to pass the Sally-Anne, 80 per 
cent of the autism group failed the test.  Baron-Cohen et al. WKXV³FRQFOXGHWKDW
the autistic children did not appreciate the difference between their own and 
the doOO¶V NQRZOHGJH´ (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985: 43).  In other words, the 
autistic children lacked a ToM.   
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This initial paper was soon joined by others reporting similar findings 
utilising a range of different paradigms and making comparisons to different 
control groups (Baron-Cohen et al. 1986; Leslie & Frith 1988; Baron-Cohen 
1989a; Baron-Cohen 1989b; Baron-Cohen 1989c).  By far the most important 
of Baron-&RKHQ¶V WKUHH SDSHUV LQ  (Baron-Cohen 1989c) was that 
examining those individuals with autism who had passed the ToM tests 
presented in previous experiments.  That a significant minority (between 18 
and 28 per cent; Eisenmajer & Prior 1991: 352) of people with autism could 
pass ToM tests was a consistent finding.  This would seem to suggest that a 
ToM deficit could not be a primary deficit in autism as it would be possible to 
be autistic and have an intact ToM (Ozonoff & McEvoy 1994: 415).  Baron-
Cohen notes that all paradigms thus far investigating ToM deficits had utilised 
µILUVW RUGHU EHOLHI DWWULEXWLRQ¶ )2%$ WHVWV WKDW LV tests that require one to 
NQRZWKDWµ;EHOLHYHVWKLV¶ $VHFRQGRUGHUEHOLHIDWWULEXWLRQ62%$LV WKH
NQRZOHGJH WKDW µ< EHOLHYHV WKDW ; EHOLHYHV WKLV¶ HJ µZKHUH GRHV WKH
H[SHULPHQWHU EHOLHYHV WKDW 6DOO\ ZLOO ORRN IRU WKH PDUEOH"¶ D VLJQLILFDQWO\
more complex ability not usually found in children until around the age of 
seven (Baron-Cohen 1989c: 288).  When a group of 10 individuals with autism 
(who could all pass FOBA tests) were provided with a scenario in which 
SOBA was required they uniformly failed, thus restoring the possibility that a 
problem with metarepresentation was a core, universal deficit in autism. 
It is worth considering the model of sociality enacted within false-
belief tasks such as the Sally-Anne Test.  Firstly, sociality is, again, being 
directly equated with interpersonality.  As EHOLHIDERXW6DOO\¶VDFWLRQVUHTXLUHV
NQRZOHGJH RI 6DOO\¶V PHQWDO VWDWH, it is an a priori assumption of the Sally-
Anne Test that what is in question is a social belief and that an inability to 
FRPSUHKHQG6DOO\¶VPRWLYHV LV LQGLFDWLYHRI social disorder.  Further, and as 
would be expected for a theory dependent upon the contemporary savoir of the 
social, metarepresentations theory still considers social activities to emerge as 
symptoms of nonsocial cognitive modules.  While the relationship between 
VRFLDO EHKDYLRXU DQG /HVOLH¶V PHWDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV LV QXDQFHG WKH SURSRVHG
metarepresentation module does not deal exclusively with interpersonal 
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behaviour.  Once again social behaviour is seen as arising from nonsocial 
cognitive architecture.   
Indeed, a diagram in Leslie and Frith (1990: 124) makes this 
quantitative distinction between the social and the nonsocial clear.  The 
diagram proposes three possible aetiologies for autism; a basic affective 
disorder, a combined affective/ cognitive disorder, or a basic cognitive 
disorder.  The authors explicitly (Leslie & Frith 1990: 123) favoured the third 
of these options, stating that affective difficulties were an emergent 
consequence of this unitary disturbance.  While it would be wrong to conclude 
WKDWµDIIHFWLYH¶LVV\QRQ\PRXVZLWKµLQWHUSHUVRQDO¶LQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHZRUN
by Hobson, considered at length below, to which the article in question is a 
ULSRVWHWKHUHLVDVLJQLILFDQWRYHUODS7KHGLVPLVVDORIµDIIHFWLYH¶SURFHVVHVE\
Leslie and Frith (1990) (which Hobson explicitly distances from cognitive 
processes (1993: 79)) is also, to a significant extent, a dismissal of uniquely 
interpersonal processes $VTXRWHGDERYHIRU/HVOLHWKHVRFLDOLVDERXWRQH¶V
³RZQDWWLWXGHVWRLQIRUPDWLRQ´(Leslie 1987: 416).    
Authors from the same time period also recognised this aspect of the 
ToM hypothesis in which the division between social and nonsocial cognition 
is made quantitative.  In 1991, Leekam and Perner conducted empirical work 
which did not support the metarepresentational account of autism and 
prompted a theoretical shift from Leslie (Leslie & Thaiss 1992).  Leekam and 
Perner note: 
³7KLVVXJJHVWLRQ>RIFKDQJHLQWKHRU\IURP/HVOLH@GHSUives the original 
idea of one of its most interesting implications, namely that autism 
might involve very specific problems which do not involve the 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIKXPDQDJHQWVLQSDUWLFXODU´(Leekam & Perner 1991: 
214) 
Like Executive Dysfunction, ToM drew upon the savoir (Foucault 1972: 15; 
Hacking 1995a: 198-200) of cognitive psychology and its particular production 
of the social, reconstructing autism in ways we now know to be hugely 
significant.   
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Autism as a form of Weak Central Coherence 
The final cognitive model to be considered here is the Weak Central 
Coherence (WCC) hypothesis.  In a sense, WCC belongs not with ToM and 
Executive Dysfunction theories but with a second generation of theories (such 
as Empathising/Systemising Theory; Baron-Cohen et al. 2005) that emphasise 
autism as a social difference rather than social deficit.  WCC was the first 
model of autism to take this step and, analytically, culturally, and politically, 
that move should not be underestimated.  Nonetheless, WCC is suitably close 
to executive dysfunctioning and metarepresentation accounts of autism, 
temporally and aetiologically, to ensure it is worth considering alongside those 
models.  
The WCC hypothesis is demonstrably similar to the Executive 
Dysfunction account in that emphasis is placed XSRQ WKH µQRQ-WULDGLF¶ DQG
nonsocial aspects of autism such as savant abilities DQGDFKLOG¶V ,4SURILOH  
:KLOH PRUH FRQVLGHUDWLRQ LV JLYHQ WR WKH µWULDGLF¶ VRFLDO GHILFLWV IRXQG LQ
autism in WCC than in Executive Dysfunction hypotheses, these are explained 
with reference to the nonsocial cognitive style of those with autism.  As with 
Executive Dysfunction, difficulties in the comprehension of interpersonal 
relationships are made out to be symptomatic of a nonsocial deficit/difference 
(Frith 1989: 163).   
Uta Frith is, once again, the central figure (along with another of her 
PhD students, Francesca Happé) in the WCC account of autism.  It is the only 
one of the new cognitive theories which is first elucidated in a book, Autism: 
Explaining the Enigma (Frith 1989), rather than an empirical study.  Perhaps 
accordingly, there is an early emphasis on reinterpreting existing empirical 
work as well as work conducted further studies.  According to both Frith and 
Happé (Frith 1989: 174; Frith &  Happé 1994: 119; Happé 1997: 1) the theory 
of WCC emerged due, primarily, to the search for parsimony.  While a ToM 
deficit was excellent at explaining the famed triadic impairments of social 
functioning, communication, and imagination in autism it was less able to 
explain many of the non-triadic aspects of the disorder.  Frith and Happé 
(1994: 119) include among a list of consistently found non-triadic features in 
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autism restricted interests, desire for sameness, islets of ability, idiot savant 
abilities, excellent rote memory, and a preoccupation with parts of objects.  
7KH FRQVLVWHQW ILQGLQJV RI µLVOHWV RI DELOLW\¶ DQG µLGLRW VDYDQWV¶
manifests LWVHOI LQ ZKDW KDYH EHHQ FDOOHG µVSLN\¶ ,4 SURILOHV ZKHUH VRPH
areas of performance are exceptionally good and others exceptionally poor.  
The Wechsler-Intelligence Scales (W-IS), for example, have ten subtests 
(Happé 1994b: 1462) in which participants are expected to score reasonably 
HYHQO\  ,QDXWLVPKRZHYHU WKHUH DUHFRQVLVWHQWSHDNV VXFKDV LQ WKH µEORFN
GHVLJQ¶ VXEWHVW DQG FRQVLVWHQW WURXJKV DV LQ WKH µYHUEDO FRPSUHKHQVLRQ¶
subtest.  It is hard to explain this pattern of ability with reference only to ToM 
or metarepresentations.  A quest, initially at least, for parsimony therefore 
seems to have driven Frith to consider ToM deficits to be symptomatic of a 
larger difference, one that could explain both peaks and troughs. 
Frith incorporated research she had been involved in during the early 
1980s into the WCC account, firstly research conducted with Maggie 
Snowling (Frith & Snowling 1983; Snowling & Frith 1986) and secondly that 
conducted with Amitta Shah (Shah & Frith 1983).  With Snowling, Frith 
seemed to demonstrate that those with autism were less able to take account of 
word context when reading out loud.  Reading in context was tested by 
examining the number of errors those with autism made when reading 
homographs, words that are spelt identically but pronounced differently.  The 
findings suggested that while those with autism were more than capable of 
reading single wordsWKHUHZDVDOVRDGHILFLWZKHQµUHDGLQJIRUPHDQLQJ¶.  
In an apparently unrelated test, Shah and Frith (1983) demonstrated 
WKDW LQGLYLGXDOV ZLWK DXWLVP KDG DQ µLVOHW RI DELOLW\¶ LH, a peak in 
SHUIRUPDQFHZKHQLWFDPHWRFRPSOHWLQJDQµHPEHGGHGILJXUH¶SDUDGLJP,Q
an embedded figure paradigm a participant is given a cardboard shape, for 
example a circle.  The cardboard shape appears in a larger picture, and it is the 
role of the participant to find the location of that shape within the larger 
picture.  For example, our circle may be embedded in a picture of a car as one 
of its wheels.  In the Shah and Frith study (1983) participants were given 
various tasks of this nature.  Those diagnosed with autism vastly out-
93 
 
performed control groups and, indeed, performed in line with their 
chronological rather than mental ages (Shah & Frith 1983: 617).  Such a 
finding led to the conclusion that: 
³:LWKWKHSUHVHQW WHVWDQHIIRUW LVQHHGHGWRUHVLVW WKHWHQGHQF\WRVHH
only the forcefully created gestalt which in itself is a meaningful 
picture [e.g. the car]...Perhaps they were able to locate the target figure 
[e.g. the wheel] so easily because the overall meaning of the complex 
ILJXUHRUHPEHGGLQJFRQWH[WZDVQRWUHOHYDQWRUGRPLQDQWIRUWKHP´
(Shah & Frith 1983: 618) 
In this quote, then, we see both the perceived similarities with the Snowling 
work and also the beginnings of what would become the WCC hypothesis; that 
people with autism find it hard to see the wood for the trees. 
Frith describes the WCC in the following terms: 
"We have now enough evidence to formulate a hypothesis about the 
nature of the intellectual dysfunction in Autism.  In the normal 
cognitive system there is a built-in propensity to form coherence over 
as wide a range of stimuli as possible, and to generalize over as wide a 
range of contexts as possible.  It is this drive that results in grand 
systems of thought, and ultimately in the world's great religions.  It is 
this capacity of coherence that is diminished in autistic children.  As a 
result, their information-processing systems, like their very beings, are 
characterized by detachment." (Frith 1989: 100) 
An important point of interest is that, as of 1989, Frith proposed that WCC 
could itself explain ToM deficits.  As Frith notes: 
"Seeing something, expecting something, and being told something can 
all be equivalent in their consequences on mental states and on 
behaviour.  This draws our attention to the supramodal and hence 
central nature of mentalizing.  Information from different sources, the 
results of seeing, remembering and telling, are all pulled together in a 
coherent interpretation of what happened.  Because it is a coherent 
whole, the information content is so simple that any normal four-year-
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old can cope with it.  If it were not a coherent whole, perhaps because 
of a weak drive for coherence, but remained a complex set of separate 
pieces of information, then anybody would find it difficult.  This may 
be the situation for autistic people." (Frith 1989: 163) 
Such a grand-narrative allows for the parsimony that Frith sought.  
Nonetheless, this explanation of WCC as the explanation was fairly short lived 
and in the 1990s Frith concluded that WCC must be a separate deficit to ToM 
(Frith & Happé 1994, see chapter 5: 112-116).   
 Again with the WCC account of autism we see a hypothesis which 
entirely coheres with the savoir of late-twentieth century psychology.  The, 
apparently, social and nonsocial aspects of autism are united through a shared 
cognitive mechanism, erasing the divide between the two domains.  Further, 
ZHVHH WKHVRFLDODUWLFXODWHG LQ WHUPVRI µPHQWDOL]LQJ¶RUFRPSUHKHQGLQJ WKH
actions of those around us.  As with both the metarepresentations account and 
the Executive Dysfunction account we see autism re-positioned away from a 
FRQGLWLRQ ZKLFK LV LQKHUHQWO\ DERXW LQWHUSHUVRQDOLW\ DQG WRZDUGV D µVRFLDO
diVRUGHU¶ PRUH EURDGO\ GHILQHG WR LQFOXGH WKH FDSDFLW\ WR EXLOG MLJVDZ-like 
puzzles and read for context.  
A psychoanalytically inspired challenge 
+REVRQ¶Vaffective theory of the aetiology of autism 
Latour has famously claimed that it is in controversy that the workings 
of the sciences can most clearly be observed (Latour 1987: 15).  Fortunately 
for present purposes, the advocates of the three models of autism described 
above engaged in a prolonged and sometimes heated debate with RP Hobson.  
2QH QHHG RQO\ JODQFH DW +REVRQ¶V ZRUN SDUWLFXODUO\ KLV UHYLHZ DUWLFOHV WR
appreciate that this author comes from a very different place intellectually to 
WKH FRJQLWLYH SV\FKRORJLVWV  +REVRQ¶V ZRUN LV OLWWHUHG ZLWK UHIHUHQFHV WR
philosophers, most notably David Hamlyn, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and 
perhaps above all others Ludwig Wittgenstein (for example, Hobson 1990a: 
115-116, 1990b: 208, 1990c: 165, 1991: 35, 1993: 5).  Importantly, Hobson is 
also associated with, and sympathetic towards, psychoanalytic perspectives on 
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autism (Hobson 1989: 23, 1990c: 176-177, 1990d, 1993: x, 34) particularly 
those theories based in object relations (Hobson 1990d: 334).  In addition to 
these already notable differences, Hobson is also a medically trained 
psychiatrist (Hobson 2002: xv). 
+REVRQ VWDWHV WKDW KLV WKHRU\ RI DXWLVP LV WKDW LW LV D GLVRUGHU ³RI
affective and social relations ± DQG LUUHGXFLEO\ VR´ (Hobson 1989: 22), an 
opinion shared by Kanner who was similarly linked with psychoanalysis.  
While this description of autism coheres with the view of a social in the shape 
RIDFURZGWKXVNHHSLQJ+REVRQ¶VWKHRU\UHDVRQDEO\FORVHWRWKRVHHPHUJLQJ
from within cognitive psychology, there are also areas of sharp difference.  
Hobson, basing his work upon the philosophy of Martin Buber (1987), parses 
human interactions into two categories which he believes to be qualitatively 
distinct µ,-7KRX¶ UHODWLRQV DQG µ,-LW¶ UHODWLRQV  Thus Hobson, basing work 
from a psychoanalytic perspective, cannot be seen as working from within the 
same savoir as those researchers previously discussed.  Generally, I-thou 
relations refer to interactions between the self and other people (this is the 
µVRFLDO¶UHDOP) while I-it relations refer to encounters between the self and non-
human objects11, the nonsocial realm.  These two forms of interaction are, 
according to Hobson, qualitatively different and more or less independent.  It is 
actually in this SDUVLQJRILQWHUDFWLRQVLQWRµ,-WKRX¶DQGµ,-LW¶UHODWLRQVWKDWWKH
UHDVRQIRU+REVRQ¶VIRFXVXSRQDIIHFWEHFRPHVLPSRUWDQWIRU+REVRQEHOLHYHV
WKDWDOO µ,-WKRX¶UHODWLRQVDUH LQKHUHQWO\DIIHFWLYHZKLOHµ,-LW¶ UHODWLRQVGRQRW
necessarily contain this coPSRQHQW$VRQHRI+REVRQ¶VWLWOHV(Hobson 1993b) 
VXJJHVWVWKHUHDUH³HPRWLRQDORULJLQVRIVRFLDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJ´ 
It is not always entirely clear what Hobson means when he talks of 
µHPRWLRQ¶DQGµDIIHFW¶$WWLPHVµDIIHFWLYH¶RSHUDWLRQVVHHP to be qualitatively 
GLIIHUHQWIURPµFRQDWLYH¶RUµFRJQLWLYH¶RSHUDWLRQV(Hobson 1984: 86), at other 
times they are not ( Hobson 1993b: 228; Hobson 1993: 4).  At times a deficit 
LQ DIIHFW LV ³SLYRWDO´ (Hobson 1989a: 23) to the theory and apparently 
synonymous with (or at least inseparable from) the social (Hobson, Ouston & 
                                       
11
 This lack of complete harmony is found bHFDXVHLWLVSRVVLEOHWRWUHDWREMHFWVµDV¶SHRSOH± 
for example a pet, or a teddy bear ± DQGSHRSOHµDV¶REMHFWV± for example when taking their 
visual perspective (Hobson 1984). 
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Lee 1988b: 441; Hobson, Ouston & Lee 1988a: 919; Hobson 1989a: 23; 
Hobson 1989b: 198) at others affect seems less important (Hobson 1986: 339) 
and divisible from the social (Hobson 1989a: 36).  Certainly the issue of what 
exactly affect is warrants further attention than Hobson gives it.  It is tempting, 
DQG SHUKDSV XVHIXO WR FRQVLGHU +REVRQ¶V LQIDQW ZLWK µDIIHFWLYHO\ FKDUJHG
SHUFHSWLRQV¶ LQ /DFDQLDQ WHUPV DV D FROOHFWLRQ RI GULYHV ZLWKRXW D XQLILHG
sense of self, the pre-social ego before the mirror stage (Lacan 1968).  The fact 
that Hobson, like Lacan, compares infants¶ drives with the pre-symbolic affect 
of animals further renders this comparison tempting (see below).  However it 
should be remembered that the Lacanian branch of psychoanalysis is never 
explicitly mentioned by Hobson and must be considered to be aiding our 
understanding, rather than his.  Considering all of this, and while  remaining in 
keeping with the authors of the time (e.g., Baron-Cohen 1988; Leslie & Frith 
199012) and referring WR+REVRQ¶VWKHRU\DVWKHµ$IIHFWLYH7KHRU\¶RIDXWLVP
LW LV LPSRUWDQW WR UHPHPEHU WKDW WKH UROH RI DIIHFW LQ +REVRQ¶V WKHVLV LV
particularly nuanced.   
,WLVDJDLQVWWKLVWKHRUHWLFDOEDFNJURXQGWKDW+REVRQ¶VWKHRU\RIDXWLVP
can be articulated.  Hobson believes that we do not come into the world with a 
repertoire of I-thou and I-it modules ready to draw upon at suitable moments 
(as might be suggested in purely cognitive accounts), rather this understanding 
of the world develops over time based upon our intersubjective experience: 
³,QRUGHUWRDFTXLUHWKHFRQFHSWRISHUVRQVRQHQHHGVWRKDYHIHOWZKDW
it is like to be a person in relation to others.  One must have had 
emotional contact with others, and have apprehended what it is like to 
share experiences with someone else.  Without the kinds of 
interpersonally co-RUGLQDWHGIHHOLQJVWKDWPDNHµVKDULQJ¶RIH[SHULHQFHV
SRVVLEOHRQH ZRXOG LQKDELW DQ LPSHUVRQDO ZRUOG´ (Hobson 1993b: 
229) 
It is in this vein that Hobson titles his book Autism and the 
Development of Mind (Hobson 1993a); a mind is not give, it is something that 
                                       
12
 Ozonoff et al. (1990) SUHIHUµ(PRWLRQDO7KHRU\¶ affect and emotion are treated 
synonymously by all. 
97 
 
emerges slowly over time.  According to Hobson individuals with autism have, 
due to more or less severe innate biological deficits, been denied the 
opportunity to share in the interpersonal (social) world and form a complete 
concHSW RI µSHUVRQV¶  7KH biological deficits proposed here are far more 
rudimentary than, for example, the faulty decoupling mechanism proposed by 
Leslie (1987).  These deficits are pre-FRQFHSWXDO DQG DUH ³DIIHFWLYHO\
DSSUDLVHGLQWKHYHU\DFWRISHUFHSWLRQ´(Hobson 1993b: 240).  A dog does not 
QHHG WRSRVVHVV DGHWDLOHG FRQFHSWRI µIHDU¶ WR UHWUHDW IURP LWVRZQHU¶VKDUVK
voice, but such a perceptual response (in humans at least) may be a 
precondition to the subsequent development of the concept of fear.  If 
individuals with autism did not innately possess emotionally charged 
perceptions when relating to other people then they would be denied the 
RSSRUWXQLW\ WR IRUP WKH DSSURSULDWH FRQFHSW RI SHUVRQV 7KLV LV +REVRQ¶V
theory. 
Hobson lists a wealth RI H[DPSOHV RI ³LQWHUSHUVRQDO-affective co-
RUGLQDWLRQ´ IURPYHU\ HDUO\ FKLOGKRRGZKLFKHPHUJH LQQRUPDOO\GHYHORSLQJ
children (e.g. Hobson 1993a: 33-52) and which may be impaired in the autistic 
child, from the development of a social smile at 6 weeks of age to the tendency 
to engage in joint-attention.  The specific mechanisms relevant to autism do 
not seem to be of much interest to Hobson, and his focus on other conditions 
ZKLFK DOVR GHQ\ VRPH DFFHVV WR WKH µ,-WKRX¶ VSKHUH RI UHODWLRQV notably the 
personal pronoun confusion sometimes found in young children with 
congenital blindness (Hobson 1993a: 203-206; Hobson 1990c: 117-119)) 
GHPRQVWUDWH WKDW +REVRQ¶V IRFXV LV OHVV XSRQ WKHVH ELRORJLFDO SUH-cursors 
themselves and more upon the subsequent and crucial development trajectory.  
+REVRQ¶VH[SHULPHQWDOVWXGLHVRIHPRWLRQ 
As shown above, a focus upon affect/ emotion, in a simplistic sense, is 
somewhat misleading and critics who focus upon this aspect oI+REVRQ¶VZRUN
(e.g. Baron-Cohen 1988) are prone to miss the mark.  Nonetheless, the 
affective portLRQRI+REVRQ¶VZRUNGRHVUHWDLQSDUWLFXODULPSRUWDQFHIRU LWLV
affective relations which he sought to test in a laboratory environment.  As 
QRWHG DERYH PDQ\ DVSHFWV RI +REVRQ¶V EDFNJURXQG PD\ KDYH EHHQ YHU\
98 
 
different to the cognitive psychologists, but he was and is primarily an 
experimental psychologist and this is crucial for if he was not, it seems 
unlikely that Baron-Cohen, Frith, Leslie, or Ozonoff would have spent as much 
WLPHDVWKH\GLGFRQFHUQLQJWKHPVHOYHVZLWK+REVRQ¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOPXVLQJV
despite his direct attacks upon their theories (e.g. Hobson 1991a).   
%URDGO\VSHDNLQJ+REVRQ¶VH[SHULPHQWDOPHWKRGVIDOOLQWRRQHRIWZR
SDUDGLJPV µSRVW-ER[¶ H[SHULPHQWV (e.g. Hobson 1983; Weeks & Hobson 
1987) and matching experiments (e.g. Hobson 1986a; Hobson 1986b; Hobson 
1987; Hobson, Ouston & A Lee 1988a; Hobson, Ouston & A Lee 1988b; 
Hobson et al. 1989).  It is immediately apparent that even within a laboratory 
environment the stimulus always features another person, in clear contrast to a 
great many of the cognitive experiments described above.  Once more this 
JLYHV LQVLJKW LQWR +REVRQ¶V FRQVWUXFWLRQV RI WKH VRFLDO LW must concern 
interpersonal conduct.  The post-box design utilised in Weeks & Hobson 
(1987) was used to investigate the salience of facial expressions for children 
with autism.  Two post-boxes were placed in front of the children and on each 
post-box there ZDV D SKRWRJUDSK RI DQ DGXOW¶V face.  These photographs 
differed from one another in three ways; the sex of the model (male/female), 
the emotion of the model (happy/neutral), and the type of hat worn by the 
model (wide brimmed/woolly) (Weeks & Hobson 1987: 142).  The 
participants were presented with a stack of cards which featured similarly 
attired models; their task was to post the photograph into the matching post-
box.  Imagine our two post-boxes feature a (1) happy man wearing a woolly 
hat and a (2) neutral woman in a wide-brimmed hat.  If a stimulus photo was of 
a neutral man in a wide brimmed hat it would be perfectly reasonable to sort 
this photograph into either post-box; if we sorted by sex we could place the 
card in post-box (1), if we sorted by emotion or hat we could place it in post-
box (2).  By examining decisions made across the entire stack of cards, Weeks 
and Hobson sought to establish which feature was most salient for both autistic 
and control participants.  Both groups sorted by sex first (Weeks & Hobson 
1987: 144) but when the sex was removed as a variable (e.g. by changing the 
photograph on (1) to a  happy woman wearing a woolly hat) it was found that 
the control group next sorted by emotion, while the autistic group sorted by hat 
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type.  Indeed, only 6 of 15 autistic participants could sort by emotion in the 
absence of all other variables (Weeks & Hobson 1987: 148), leading to the 
conclusion that individuals with autism might have particular problems with 
the processing of emotional/ affective stimuli. 
A series of experiments were conducted by Hobson and colleagues in 
the late 1980s (e.g. Hobson 1986a; Hobson 1986b; Hobson 1987; Hobson, 
Ouston & A Lee 1988a; Hobson, Ouston & A Lee 1988b; Hobson et al. 1989) 
utilising a matching paradigm and the first of this set (Hobson 1986a) is 
typical.  In this experiment Hobson wanted to examine the ability to 
³XQGHUVWDQGWKHµPHDQLQJ¶RIGLIIHUHQWERGLO\H[SUHVVLRQVRIHPRWLRQVXFKDV
DKDSS\IDFHRUJHVWXUHRUYRFDOLVDWLRQ´(Hobson 1986a: 323).  Children from 
both autism and control groups were asked to watch a short video clip of an 
DFWRU µDFWLQJ RXW¶ D SDUWLFXODU HPRWLRQ  ,Q WKH YLGHR WKH DFWRU¶V IDFH ZDV
covered so that only the body could be seen.  When the video finished, 
participants were presented with a drawing of a figure reproducing the final 
pose of the character in the video.  Alongside the posing figure were placed 
five faces expressing different emotions.  The participants were immediately 
WROG ³There the person is.  Now what face goes with that SHUVRQ"´ (Hobson 
1986a: 327, italics in original).  While the statistical conclusions appear far 
from clear-cut (Hobson would later suggest this is because of the inherent 
difficulty in testing for emotions in a laboratory setting (Hobson 1991b)), 
Hobson concludes that: 
³7KH UHVXOWV IURP WKHVH H[SHULPHQWV DUH XQHTXLYRFDO FRPSDUHG ZLWK
young normal children and with same-age retarded children...autistic 
children demonstrated a marked impairment in choosing the 
appropriate drawings and photographs of facial expressions of emotion 
WR ³JR ZLWK´ YLGHRWDSHG JHVWXUHV YRFDOLVDWLRQV DQG FRQWH[WV
FKDUDFWHULVWLFRIKDSS\XQKDSS\DQJU\DQGIHDUIXOIHHOLQJV´(Hobson 
1986a: 336) 
Future studies would replicate these findings when videos were compared to 
photographs rather than drawings (Hobson 1986b), when participants were 
asked to differentiate stimuli in terms of age and sex (Hobson 1987), and when 
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participants were asked to match photographs of emotional people to different 
vocalisations ± both in forced (Hobson et al. 1988a) and free (Hobson et al. 
1989) recall scenarios.  Conclusions remain the same throughout however; that 
WKHUH DUH ³HPRWLRQ UHFRJQLWLRQGHIHFWV LQ DXWLVP´ (Hobson et al. 1989: 249), 
and with emotion comes an inherently interpersonal aspect to the disorder. 
 In the context of his body of work, we can now fully comprehend 
+REVRQ¶V FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW PHWDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO WKHRU\ LV ³QRQGHYHORSPHQWDO
QRQVRFLDODQGUHVWULFWLYHO\FRJQLWLYH´ and his declaration that he 
is µDJDLQVW WKH WKHRU\ RI WKHRU\ RI PLQG¶ .  In return, Leslie and Frith 
fervently deny their theory to be nonsocial, somewhat dismissively stating that 
WKH³theory can hardly be considered non-VRFLDO´Leslie & Frith, 1990: 122).  
TKH GLVFRXUVH LQ WKLV GHEDWH LV RIWHQ VWDUN  µ,W¶V FRJQLWLYH RU DIIHFWLYH¶ VD\V
Simon Baron-Cohen (1988).  Occasionally it gets personal; Leslie and Frith 
(1990) spot the opportunity for a pun and suggest that there is really only a 
µ+REVRQ¶VFKRLFH¶ 
It is apparent that at no point is a decisive empirical test established to 
falsify any of the theories involved in these disputes; within twenty years 
UHIHUHQFHVWR3HWHU+REVRQ¶VZRUNDQGFHUWDLQO\WRKLVWKHRUHWLFDOIUDPHZRUN
have simply fallen from the field while Executive Dysfunction, ToM, and 
WCC remain on the table.  Given the analyses presented here and in chapter 2 
it becomes easier to see why this is the case.  This was not a debate over 
empirical findings, over connaissance.  This was a debate over savoir and a 
pitting of the psychoanalytic conception of the social which inspired Hobson 
against the mainstream social psychological reading of Executive Dysfunction, 
Metarepresentation, and WCC.  As history has demonstrated it is perfectly 
conceivable for different constructions of the social to be investigated within 
an experimental paradigm.  But, just as the gestaltian analyses of Kurt Lewin 
were not compatible with the changing constructions of psychology during the 
1950s (Danziger 2000: 342; see chapter 2 (pp.32-35) for an overview), neither 
ZHUH +REVRQ¶V ZLWK WKH V  $XWLVP ZRXOG HPHUJH IURP WKH V
reflecting the image of only one, very particular, savoir and with a similarly 
particular trajectory determined for the disease concept. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has made several arguments.  Firstly it has been claimed 
that the groundwork for the contemporary experience of autism, as related to 
three key theoretical frameworks (Metarepresentations, Executive 
Dysfunction, Weak Central Coherence), was lain down over a remarkably 
short period of time in the latter half of the 1980s.  Secondly, focusing upon 
the notion of savoir it was claimed that a particular production of autism 
became available to questions of truth and falsity following a radical 
UHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI µWKH VRFLDO¶ LQ which human sociality was considered to be 
both intra-personal in nature and continuous with nonsocial cognition 
(Greenwood 2004a).  The savoir of the three dominant cognitive theories was 
brought into relief through an examination of PeteU +REVRQ¶V (PRWLRQDO
Affective Theory of autism which did not share this depth knowledge.   
As Hacking has said:   
³:KHQ QHZ GHVFULSWLRQV EHFRPH DYDLODEOH ZKHQ WKH\ FRPH LQWR
circulation... then there are new things to choose to do.  When new 
intentions become open to me, because new descriptions, new 
concepts, become available to me, I live in a world of new 
RSSRUWXQLWLHV´(Hacking 1995a: 236) 
The current chapter has argued that the savoir of cognitive psychology offered 
new descriptions of the social to autism researchers in which the social 
extended to a range of (what would previously have been seen as) nonsocial 
acts.  It thus became possible to see social disorder in new places, to perform 
novel actions, find novel truths, and construct novel autisms.  
Yet it was not just the construction of autism which changed during this 
time; the relationship between autism and the rest of humanity also changed 
radically.  In an ongoing project, Viney (e.g. 2013) has begun to think about 
how some human classifications come to be seen as µLQKHUHQWO\XVHIXO¶³not for 
ZKDW WKH\ GR´ ZLWKLQ D ODERUDWRU\ IRU LQVWDQFH but UDWKHU ³VLPSO\ IRU ZKDW
they are´(Viney 2013)9LQH\¶VRZQZRUNFHQWUHVRQWZLQVRILQWHUHVWVLQFH
antiquity but especially since monozygotic twins were seen to constitute a 
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natural experiment into Mendelian genetics and, thus, human nature more 
broadly.   
*LYHQ WKDW ZH DUH LQ DQ HUD RI µEUDLQKRRG¶ ZKHUHE\ WKH VHOI LV
frequently aligned to a particular brain state (Vidal 2009) it is perhaps 
unsurprising that some individuals with particular types of brain are articulated 
as being of inherent scientific value.  Allan Young has described how 
QHXURVFLHQFH KDV EURDGO\ DGRSWHG WKH QRWLRQ RI D µ-DFNVRQLDQ EUDLQ¶ (Young 
2012: 165), named after John Hughlings Jackson.  In the Jacksonian brain, 
there are posited to have evolved numerous more or less independent control 
centres.  Crudely, the reptilian sub-cortical brain evolved first, with the 
mammalian cortex evolving next, and the human neo-cortex evolving 
last.  Each of these centres has (literally) top-down control over existing 
regions of the brain.  When a brain region is damaged (because of alcohol, 
disease, or some innate disordering) then the inferior brain regions are 
µUHOHDVHG¶ and we behave in a manner akin to our evolutionarily distant 
relatives (Young 2012: 165).  In such instances a natural experiment into 
human nature has commenced.  It is this belief that the personality of an 
individual is essentially additive (rather than a non-localisable whole) 
assembled brain-region-by-brain-region that allows individuals such as 
3KLQHDV*DJHWREHFRPHRILQWHUHVWWRSV\FKRORJ\RQHPDQ¶VGLVRUGHUUHYHDOV
KXPDQLW\¶VRUGHU 
Allan Young has described how human nature became socialised when 
it was posited that our brain evolved in the manner it did not simply in 
response to past physical environments but also past interpersonal (social) 
environments.  What is more, empathy came to be seen as sitting at the heart of 
this interpersonally determined evolution, a crucial element in determining 
what it means to be human (see chapter two: 36-38).  Within this context, the 
Metarepresentations account of autism, which articulates a social disorder 
existing within the individual (rather than developmentally determined, qua 
Hobson) and specifically relating to empathy and ToM, positions autism as 
being absolutely at the heart of human nature, a natural experiment into 
human-minus-social.  This is a remarkable status to give to a condition that, 
until the 1940s, had never been described.  The rest of this thesis describes 
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how that condition continues to be performed and constructed within the 
discourse of cognitive scientists working today. 
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A coherence of alien forms: order and disorder in autism 
Introduction 
The previous chapter contains a description of how a very particular 
savoir of the social, with a history from within the social and cognitive 
psychologies, provided the conceptual framework to allow for a singular, novel 
construction of autism to emerge during the latter half of the 1980s.  
Nonetheless, at the level of connaissance and within the talk of contemporary 
psychologists and neuroscientists interviewed for this project, autism appears 
to be a classification in crisis. Autism is now described by one interviewee as: 
³...a multi-faceted thing that is quite hard to describe with, based on just one 
core, one variable´ -+-60).  This multiplicity means that it is, to give 
the title of one of the most important papers RQDXWLVPLQWKHODVWGHFDGHµWLPH
WRJLYHXSRQDVLQJOHH[SODQDWLRQIRUDXWLVP¶(Happé et al. 2006).  This view is 
echoed by BG, an Assistant Professor, who thinks that the search for a grand 
theory of everything, such a central narrative to debates in the 1980s, is 
unlikely to be successful: 
BG: Well there is no one (.) model like the physicists have, there is no, er, there is no 
RQHPRGHOWKDWH[SODLQVHUHYHU\WKLQJ(UDQG,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWZH¶OOJHWRQHPRdel 
that explains everything... (BG06: 120-123) 
BG, who has a background in the natural sciences, makes a stark point.  Unlike 
WKHREMHFWV RISK\VLFV WKHUH LV QRXQLWDU\ HVVHQFH WR DXWLVP µWKHUH LV QRRQH
PRGHOWKDWH[SODLQVHYHU\WKLQJ¶,WPLJKWEHSRVVLEOHIRURQHVFLHQWLILFWKHRU\
to capture completely the essence of atoms but something in the nature of 
autism resists such classification.  In the extract below a second interviewee, a 
Lecturer, makes a similar point.  EC explains how they are currently teaching 
undergraduates about the history of autism research and how there had 
prevLRXVO\ EHHQ D VHDUFK IRU D ³KRO\ JUDLO´ (&  LQ SV\FKRORJ\ RQH
cognitive theory that would explain all the behavioural manifestations of 
autism.  This, claims EC, is a search which has been largely abandoned: 
*+6R \RXGR\RXVR LW¶VQRW WKH FDVH\RXGR WKLQN WKDW WKHUH¶V WKHUH LVQ¶WD
KRO\JUDLORXWWKHUHGR\RXWKLQN",W¶VLW¶VQRW 
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(&2K,GRQ¶WWKLQNZH¶UHJRLQJWRZHOOLW¶VMXVWP\SHUVRQDORSLQLRQ,GRQ¶W\RX
NQRZ,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKHUH¶VJRLQJWREHone neat cognitive explanation. (EC11: 109-
114) 
:KLOH(&LVFDUHIXOWRIUDPHWKHLUDQVZHUDVµMXVWWKHLURSLQLRQ¶LWLVQRWLFHDEOH
how closely the statement mirrors that of BG; that autism is going to resist 
µRQHQHDWH[SODQDWLRQ¶0:D3URIHVVRUPDNes a similar point.  Not only has 
the search for the µKRO\ JUDLO¶ of autism, the unitary core at the cognitive or 
neurological level, failed up until this point, in all likelihood MW believes that 
future attempts will also be futile: 
MW: ...And there are clearly going to be, well there must be many, many different 
causes in different individuals on the autism spectrum.  Erm, whether those will unify 
down to a final common pathway in terms of some brain systems or some (.) 
interrupted neurodevelopmental processes (.), erm, again I wouldn¶ KPP , GRQ¶W
know how much money I would bet on that ((laughs)). (MW18: 432-438)    
Descriptions of this type, referring to a radical uncertainty in autism, 
are almost entirely missing from the research conducted during the 1980s.  
Indeed, several interviewees claim that these new issues of heterogeneity are 
among the most important contemporary discussions in the field:  
') , WKLQN RQH LVVXH LV ZKHWKHU RU QRW WKHVH HUP W¶ W¶ ZKHWKHU RU QRW WKH
behaviours in autism, the behavioural features of autism are:: dissociable, so whether 
you do have just, whether, basically, autism is made up of kind of a problems in 
social interaction, problems in communication and repetitive behaviours, that 
somehow get kind of, basically these people get, quote unquote, unlucky, erm, and get 
DOOWKUHHDQGWKDWFDXVHVDXWLVPHUP,¶PDQGWKDWREYLRXVO\OHDGVRQWR,PHDQLI
\RXORRNDWWKHFRJQLWLYHOHYHOWKHQWKHPDMRUGHEDWHZRXOGEHZHOO\RX¶YHJRWWKUHH
different things FDXVLQJ WKRVH HDFK RI WKRVH GLVWLQFW EHKDYLRXUV VR \RX¶YH JRW
something causing the, erm, some cognitive atypicality causing the, erm, social 
communication problems for example, and then some other cognitive atypicality 
causing the repetitive behaviours IRUH[DPSOH,GRQ¶WNQRZLILWLVD]HLWJHLVWPD\EH
it is, kind of the prevailing view maybe... (DF03: 206-220, 248-249). 
DF, a Reader, is clearly in agreement with EC, JH, BG, and MW who are 
TXRWHGDERYHWKHUHLVDµ]HLWJHLVW¶RUSHUKDSVD µSUHYDLOLQJYLHZ¶that the core 
V\PSWRPVRIDXWLVPDUHEHKDYLRXUDOO\DQGFRJQLWLYHO\µGLVVRFLDEOH¶ 
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While the word µ]HLWJHLVW¶LVQRWXVHG in the extract presented below, a 
very similar level of importance is clearly attributed to the notion of 
heterogeneity.  Prior to the extract presented below the interviewee (MN, a 
Research Fellow), who strongly refutes claims of heterogeneity, has stated 
within in the interview that they expected to find heterogeneity in their 
research sample but in fact did not.  MN was asked if they believe such 
findings of homogeneity to be typical of the field in general: 
GH: Saying, you know, heterogeneity at the core of this disorder.  Do you think a 
NLQG RI  WKDW LGHD¶V EHLQJ UHWKRXJKW VR WKDW WKHUH LV D JHQHUDO PRYH DZD\ IURP
heterogeneity?= 
MN: =No::: everybody, heterogeneity is the current thing in autism, like everyone 
ORYHV LW ZH¶YH JRW ZH¶YH JRW WKLV wonderful WKH DXWLVPV WHUP WKDW HYHU\ERG\¶V
WDONLQJDERXWDQGQRLW¶VWKHFXUUHQWYHU\LQWKLQJEXW,prefer to be working against, 
[against the] ((laughs)) (.) erm, status quo. 
GH:  [((Laughs))]. (MN05: 292-301) 
:KLOH01µHQMR\VWRZRUNDJDLQVWWKHVWDWXVTXR¶DQGWKXVUHIXWHVQRWLRQVRI
autistic heterogeneity, that statement in itself places the concept of 
heterogeneity at the very centre of connaissance of autism, as an accepted and 
known fact.  From these extracts, coming from interviews with six different 
researchers at six different institutions and covering all levels of seniority from 
Post Doctoral (JH) to Professorial (MW), there is the clear suggestion that 
µHYHU\ERG\ ORYHV¶ KHWHURJHQHLW\ LW LV µthe FXUUHQW WKLQJ¶ WR WKH H[WHQW WKDW
VRPHUHVHDUFKHUVQRZWDONDERXWµDXWLVPV¶UDWKHUWKDQDXWLVP 
 Extracts such as those presented above stand in direct contrast to the 
literature from the 1980s, which was the focus of the previous chapter, when it 
ZDV WKH QRUP WR GLVFXVV WKH µFRUH¶ GHILFLW DW WKH KHDUW RI D µXQLYHUVDO¶ DQG
µFURVV-FXOWXUDO¶ YLVLRQ RI DXWLVP 13 .  This chapter will explore notions of 
heterogeneity in autism research.  It will be argued that the construct of autistic 
heterogeneity is itself heterogeneous and, at different times, refers to 
                                       
13
 Direct comparisons between published literature and interview data should of course be 
PDGH FDXWLRXVO\ JLYHQ WKDW µORFDO XQFHUWDLQWLHV¶ PD\ ZHOO EH WUDQVIRUPHG LQWR µJOREDO
FHUWDLQWLHV¶ WKURXJK the act of scientific publication (Star 1985).  Nonetheless, uncertainty is 
also present in the contemporary published literature in a reasonably novel manner (see section 
Hackers and Passers, below) and so some tentative temporal conclusions might be hazarded. 
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heterogeneity at the level of epistemology, ontology, individual, and 
population.  The chapter then goes onto consider a lingering experience of 
social disorder and argues that it is this ordered experience that facilitates 
continuing scientific research in the face of a disordered connaissance.   
Heterogeneities 
When discussing heterogeneity it is important to consider that the term 
could mean a number of different things, and indeed many of these options are 
present in the interview data.  A key split in concepts of heterogeneity can be 
illustrated by comparing autistic heterogeneity with the notion of probability.  
In The Emergence of Probability, Hacking (1975: 11-17) argues that the 
concept of probability has an inherent duality.  Firstly, epistemological 
probability indicates that a lack of knowledge about a given event/object 
HQVXUHVDGHJUHHRIXQFHUWDLQW\)RUH[DPSOHZKHQLWLVFODLPHGWKDWµ6RFUDWHV
SUREDEO\ GLHG LQ %&¶ WKH µSUREDEO\¶ GRHV QRW UHIHU WR WKH QDWXUH RI
6RFUDWHV¶H[HFXWLRQEXWWRNQRZOHGJHDERXW the event.  Socrates is not usually 
WKRXJKWRIDVEHLQJOLNH6FKU|GLQJHU¶V&DWDSHUVRQFDOOHG6RFUDWHVHLWKHUGLG
or did not die in that year.  By comparison, aleatory probability refers to a 
probabilistic quality inherent in an object.  When it is claiPHGWKDWµWKHGLHZLOO
SUREDEO\ ODQG RQ D QXPEHU JUHDWHU WKDQ RQH¶ WKHUH LV UHDVRQDEOH FHUWDLQW\
regarding the knowledge of long-term frequency distributions of dice, and 
what is being referred to instead is the uncertainty inherent in the landing of 
the die itself.  Hacking has argued elsewhere (Hacking 1983; Hacking 1990) 
that it was an emergence of a biopolitical knowledge with aleatory conceptions 
of human populations at its heart which revolutionised constructions of the 
normal and abnormal in the nineteenth century (see chapter two: 20-22).  Such 
a duality may immediately be applied to concepts of autistic heterogeneity.  
Epistemic heterogeneity would refer to the claim that autism appears 
heterogeneous in the light of uncertain (scientific) knowledge.  Aleatoric 
heterogeneity would refer to the claim that autism is heterogeneous and that 
knowledge of this heterogeneity is sound. 
Epistemic heterogeneity 
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While rarely explicitly understood as statements about scientific 
connaissance, claims of epistemic heterogeneity took several forms within the 
interview data collected for this thesis.  Firstly, heterogeneity could be seen as 
an artefact of poor disease classification.  That the American Psychiatric 
$VVRFLDWLRQ¶V $3$ 'LDJQRVWLF DQG 6WDWLVWLFDO 0DQXDO RI 0HQWDO 'LVRUGHUV
(DSM) constructs psychiatric disorders as categorical rather than dimensional 
in nature has, of course, been an issue of prolonged debate (e.g. Anckarsäter 
2010) and this is a discussion from which autism has certainly not been exempt 
(e.g. Skuse 2012).  Indeed, the idea WKDWWKHUHLVµQRVXFKWKLQJDVDXWLVP¶DQG
that disparate subgroups of quite different individuals were being lumped 
together was a frequent claim within the research interviews.  HB, a Reader, 
for example states that: 
*+6RZH¶UHJRLQJWRJHWWRWKHUHDOFUX[RILWDQGZKDWLVDXWLVP" 
+%:HOO,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKHUHLVone autism so to say what, what autism is, is I think a 
bit of a (.) non-starter to be honest. (HB01: 184-188) 
HB is here advancing the viewpoint previously articulated by MN, who 
PRFNHGµthis wonderful the autisms term¶ WKDWKDVREWDLQHGSRSXODULW\ZLWKLQ
DXWLVPUHVHDUFK  ,Q+%¶VH[WUDFW LWDSSHDUV WKDW µDXWLVWLF¶ heterogeneity is an 
epistemic artefact RI JURXSLQJ GLIIHUHQW µDXWLVPV¶ WRJHWKHU  If scientific 
connaissance of autism improved, heterogeneity could conceivably disappear.  
The same point is made even more bluntly below by MC, a postdoctoral 
Research Fellow: 
GH: ...if I was going to ask you what you think autism isHUPKRZGR\RXWKLQNLW¶V
best described? 
0&(UP,KRQHVWO\ WKLQN WKDW LW¶VDW WKHPRPHQWZKDWZHFDOODXWLVPLV MXVWD
FROOHFWLRQRIPDQ\GLIIHUHQWVXEJURXSV ,GRQ¶WNQRZPD\EHWKLVLVFRQWURYHUVLDO,
GRQ¶WHYHQNQRZLf there is such a thing. (MC12: 169-174) 
The argument being advanced here, as with HB, is that it is unlikely that there 
is µVXFK D WKLQJ¶ DV DXWLVP; this is once more an epistemic claim about 
heterogeneity, that it is a faulty classification which leads to a number of 
diverse groups of individuals being placed together.  It is conceivable that a 
reorientation away from behaviour and towards, for example, genetics could 
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bring about the dissolution of autism and heterogeneity; the introduction of 
classifications based around single, known genetic abnormalities, for instance 
CATNAP2 condition (Peñagarikano et al. 2011) or Shank3 syndrome (Peça et 
al. 2011), may well solve this problem of disorder.  
 A second form of epistemic heterogeneity stems from an attempt to 
integrate numerous diverse scientific methods.  For example, since Baron-
Cohen first utilised the Sally-Anne test to examine autism in the 1985 (Baron-
Cohen et al. 1985), the number of theory of mind tests available has exploded.  
The sheer range of tests, and the differences between them, may lead to 
contradictory findings and apparent heterogeneity.  AO, a Research Fellow, 
states that: 
AO: ...I mean the experiments that are used are hugely mixed, erm, the samples that 
DUHXVHGYDULHVWKHPHQWDOVWDWHWKDW\RX¶UHORRNLQJDWYDULHVZKHWKHU\RX¶UHORRNDW
VRPHWKLQJOLNHDEHOLHIYHUVXVDQLQWHQWLRQ 6RLW¶VUHDOO\QRWVXUSULVLQJ WKDWWKHUH¶V
not a hu::ge amount of agreement.  (AO04: 549-554) 
According to AO heterogeneity is a performance artefact; it has been the 
DVVXPSWLRQ RI WKH VFLHQFHV WKDW H[DPLQLQJ GLIIHUHQW µPHQWDO VWDWHV¶ VXFK DV
µEHOLHI¶ DQG µLQWHQWLRQ¶ DQG GRLQJ VR WKURXJK D µKXJHO\ PL[HG¶ VHW RI
experimental paradigms should yield uniform results.  If science could order its 
epistemic tools then order could likewise emerge in autism.  This is an 
epistemic claim repeated by EC, a Lecturer, who states WKDW ³\RX ORRN DW
other areas and it becomes much more higgledy-piggled what people have 
XVHG DQG WKH WDVN WKH\¶YH XVHG DQG KRZ WKH\¶YH PHDVXUHG LW´ (& -
934).  &RJQLWLYHSV\FKRORJ\KDV WKXVEHFRPH µPXFKPRUHKLJJOHG\-SLJJOHG¶
DQG WKH µKXJHO\ PL[HG¶ H[SHULPHQWDO SDUDGLJPV HQVXUH D FHrtain lack of 
homogeneity.   
Diversity has not only increased within cognitive psychology.  Since 
the 1980s a vast array of new methodologies has been applied to the study of 
autism, including a number of emerging technologies allowing researchers to 
directly integrate biology.  The twenty psychologists spoken to for this project 
claimed an interest studying autism while utilising techniques as diverse as 
animal modelling, Bayesian Decision Theory, behavioural experimentation, 
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behavioural genetics, classical conditioning, cognitive experimentation, 
electroencephalography (EEG), epidemiology, event-related potential (ERP), 
eye-tracking, focus groups, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
galvanic skin response, longitudinal research, magnetoencephalography, near 
infra-red spectroscopy (NIRS), molecular genetics, optical brain imaging, 
proteomics, psychophysics, quantitative content analysis, resting state 
magnetic resonance imaging (rsMRI), screening studies, stem cell research, 
structural magnetic resonance imaging (sMRI), surveying, and tensor diffusion 
imaging (TDI).  Perhaps unsurprisingly, attempts to integrate these forms of 
analysis have proven difficult and, on occasion, have led to conflict and 
contradictory findings.  This conflict, the struggle to homogenise findings and 
work between forms of analysis, is perhaps best expressed in the following 
metaphor, where a Professor discusses attempts to integrate neuroscience and 
experimental psychology:  
67 , PHDQ , WKLQN WKHUH¶V D NLQG RI FXOWXUDO HUP QDUUDWLYH WKDW VD\V VRPHKRZ RU
other if we can nail it to bits of the brain that we understand it better, er, but (exhales). 
(ULQIDFWWKDWQDLOVDUHQRWYHU\WLJKWRUGHHSO\GULYHQLQHU WKH\¶UH WKH\¶UHPRUH
speculative nails. (ST07: 696-701) 
The inability to drive nails between different levels of analysis may thus give 
the impression of heterogeneity and this, presumably, is a failing of 
SV\FKRORJ\¶V µFXOWXUDO QDUUDWLYH¶ WKH DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW ELRORgical levels 
QHFHVVDULO\HQVXUHWKDWµZHXQGHUVWDQGLWEHWWHU¶ 
Aleatory heterogeneity 
Alongside these constructions of epistemic heterogeneity runs a quite 
different narrative which considers issues of heterogeneity at the ontological 
level, whereby chance and uncertainty are inherent to the autistic condition 
itself.  It is repeatedly stated by interviewees WKDWDXWLVPLV³DKHWHURJHQHRXV
GLVRUGHU´63³DXWLVPLVKHWHURJHQHRXV´&*³DXWLVP
LVVRKHWHURJHQHRXV´ 3&³, mean autism is a very heterogeneous 
FRQGLWLRQRND\",PHDQ,WKLQNWKDW¶VSUHWW\ZHOODFFHSWHGQRZLWGLGQ¶WXVHG
WREH´'5-297).  Within these four brief extracts, again coming from 
researchers spanning various institutions and seniority, we can see 
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heterogeneity being something which has come to scientific attention recently 
and then been positioned within autism, as an essential aspect of the condition 
itself; a condition determined by its indeterminacy.   
2QHLQWHUYLHZHHVWDWHV³,WKLnk one of the things we do know about 
DXWLVPLVKRZKHWHURJHQHRXVLWLV,PHDQLW¶VMXVWULGLFXORXV´(EC11: 117-119).  
According to EC (a Lecturer), therefore, it is not the case that the apparent 
failure of the cognitive sciences to locate the unitary essence of autism is a 
failing on its part, as suggested by notions of epistemic heterogeneity.  Rather, 
EHFDXVH³LW¶VTXLWHKDUGWR WDUHYHU\ERG\ZLWKWKHVDPHEUXVKLQVRPHWKLQJ
WKDW¶VVRHUPKHWHURJHQHRXVDVDXWLVm´<&-245), it is in the nature of 
autism to elude the descriptions of psychologists.  CG, a postdoctoral 
researcher, makes such a statement in the following extract: 
*+0PKP\HDK6R,PHDQLW¶VTXLWHVWULNLQJ,WKLQNWKDWVWLOOHUGHVSLWHWKDWZH
have these, clearly very sophisticated, models and some very sophisticated methods 
DV ZHOO WKDW WKHUH¶V VWLOO D ORW RI GLVDJUHHPHQW DERXW HUP ZKDW FDXVHV DXWLVP DQG
what autism is.  Erm, what, why do you think that there remains such a degree of 
GLVDJUHHPHQW HUP ZKHQ ZH¶YH VWXG¶, studying this condition for quite a long time 
now? 
CG: (.) Yeah. (.) Yeah. Well (.). I think one thing about it is the heterogeneity... 
(CG09: 494-503) 
Again and again when asked why psychological research has so frequently 
contradicted itself in terms of research findings, it was claimed, as Lecturer EC 
does here, that: ³,WKLQNWKHKHWHURJHQHLW\¶VSUREDEO\WKHELJJHVWEDUULHUDQG
>WKH ELJJHVW H[SODQDWLRQ IRU ZK\ LW¶V PHVV\´ (& -936).  Here, 
KHWHURJHQHLW\LVQRWDFRQVWUXFWRIVFLHQFHEXWµWKH ELJJHVWEDUULHU¶WRVFLHQFH
clearly locating heterogeneity in the essence of autism itself.  This is made 
abundantly clear in the following extract from MN, a Research Fellow:  
MN: ...So::, (.) yeah I guess because of all of that heterogeneity (.) that just makes it a 
much harder disorder to work with.  Erm, and harder to get to the core component, 
ZKDWHYHU OHYHO WKH\KDSSHQ WREH DW HUP EHFDXVHRI WKHKHWHURJHQHLW\ LW¶V UHDOO\
MXVW JHWWLQJ LQ WKH ZD\ RI XV DGYDQFLQJ VR DOWKRXJK ZH¶YH JRW D KXJH Dmount of 
DXWLVP UHVHDUFK LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH QRZ DQG D KXJH DPRXQW RI PRQH\¶V EHHQ SXPSHG
LQWRLWLQWKHODVWWHQWZHQW\\HDUV,WKLQNZHVWLOOGRQ¶WKDYHHQRXJKWRUHDOO\ZH
KDYHQ¶WJRQHIDUHQRXJKZLWKLW01-796)   
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MN claims here that heteroJHQHLW\LVµJHWWLQJLQWKHZD\RIXV advancing¶DQG
PDNLQJLWµKDUGHUWRJHWWRWKHFRUHFRPSRQHQW¶RIDXWLVP.  It is, once again, in 
the nature of autism to resist science. 
Hackers and Passers: Aleatoric heterogeneity in the 1990s 
These narratives of aleatoric heterogeneity in autism have a history 
which extends to the early 1990s, just after the period examined in the previous 
chapter.  In particular, a paper by Dermot Bowler published in 1992 is a key 
reference point in contemporary debates over heterogeneity.  Bowler sought to 
examine theory of mind abilities in an adolescent and adult population 
GLDJQRVHG ZLWK $VSHUJHU¶V 6\QGURPH  7KH XQLTXH DVSHFW RI %RZOHU¶V VWXG\
ZDV WKH IDFW WKDW WKH ILIWHHQ LQGLYLGXDOV GLDJQRVHG ZLWK $VSHUJHU¶V ZKR
comprised his experimental group were both significantly older and had 
significantly higher I.Q.s than the SOBA passing group in Baron-&RKHQ¶V
1989 study (Bowler 1992: 883, see chapter four (p.89) on SOBA tests).   
Surprisingly Bowler found that a high percentage of individuals with 
$VSHUJHU¶V6\QGURPHZHUHDEOHWRSDVV62%$WHVWVDQGWKDWWKHVHSDVVUDWHV
were indistinguishable from those of control subjects.  This finding was more 
interesting still when taken alongside two further pieces of information 
collected by Bowler.  Firstly, when participants were asked to provide 
justification for their answers, it was found that even those who passed 
consistently provided explanations without reference to second-order beliefs.  
,Q RWKHU ZRUGV MXVWLILFDWLRQV RI WKH VRUW ³EHFDXVH 0DU\ WKRXJKW WKDW -RKQ
WKRXJKW´ZHUHYLUWXDOO\QHYHUXWWHUHG 7KLVILQGLQJVXJJHVWHGWKDWDOWHUQDWLYH
routes, not requiring the understanding of agents, could be taken to arrive at 
the correct solution to SOBA tests.   Secondly, Bowler found that the parents 
RI WKH $VSHUJHU¶V JURXS ZKHQ SUHVHQWHG ZLWK D UHWURVSHFWLYH TXHVWLRQQDLUH
UHFDOOHG OLWWOH RU QR SUHWHQVH RU LPDJLQDU\ SOD\ GXULQJ WKHLU FKLOG¶V LQIDncy, 
hypothesised key markers of a metarepresentational deficit. 
Bowler is stinging in his criticism of the metarepresentation theory in 
the wake of these findings (Bowler 1992: 888-890).  Firstly, claims Bowler, 
the seeming ability to pass SOBA tests without the expected mind-based 
MXVWLILFDWLRQVVXJJHVWVWKDWWKH³DELOLW\WRVROYHSUREOHPVWKDWLQYROYHDVHFRQG-
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order theory of mind does not strongly depend on having developed either joint 
UHIHUHQFLQJRU V\PEROLF SOD\ VNLOOV´ (Bowler 1992: 886).  Instead, it may be 
the case that effortful, logical, cognitive processes can also lead to the correct 
answers on these tests.  If nothing else, this conclusion appears to undermine 
the primary piece of empirical evidence for a metarepresentation deficit in 
autism; the deficit in decoupling thoughts about the world from the world itself 
could just as easily be conceptualised as a deficit in problem solving abilities.  
Secondly, notes Bowler, in the metarepresentation account pretend play and 
ToM abilities should be indissociable14 , as the same cognitive capacity is 
believed to govern both behaviours (Leslie 1987)7KDWWKLV$VSHUJHU¶VJURXS
did not, according to their parents, engage in pretend play but could pass ToM 
WHVWVWKUHDWHQHGWRUHGXFH/HVOLH¶VPHWDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDODFFRXQWWRDZRUWKOHVV
tautology, the only evidence of a metarepresentation module coming from 
ToM tasks, and ToM task ability explained with reference to 
metarepresentation (Bowler 1992: 890).   
Partially in response to this research, Francesca Happé, today an 
esteemed Professor, commenced a thesis in 1991 concerned, primarily, with 
two issues.  Firstly, the repercussions for metarepresentation theory of the 
ILQGLQJWKDWVRPHLQGLYLGXDOVZLWK$VSHUJHU¶VDXWLVPZHUHDEOHWRSDVV62%$
tests (Bowler 1992; Ozonoff et al. 1991).  Secondly, the proposed relationship 
between WCC and metarepresention deficit, whereby metarepresentational 
deficit is proposed as a consequence of WCC (Frith 1989: 163).  The empirical 
work from this thesis would be published in the years immediately following 
Happé¶VWKHVLVVXEPLVVLRQDQGERWKZRXOGVXJJHVWFRJQLWLYHKHWHURJHQHLW\ 
Happé claimed that there were two possible reasons as to why 
individuals with autism would be able to pass SOBA tests.  The first, and most 
obviously damning possibility, was that at least some individuals with autism 
ZHUH µUHDOO\¶ DEOH WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH PHQWDO VWDWHV RI RWKHU LQGLYLGXDOV  7KH
second possibility, however, was of methodological rather theoretical 
importance.  In his paper, Bowler states the view, widely recognised within 
developmental psychology, that failure on a given test can never definitively 
                                       
14
 This aspect of the metarepresentation account is discussed at in the previous chapter (p.87-
88) 
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be claimed to demonstrate lack of ability it may, rather, demonstrate lack of 
performance (Bowler 1992: 890).  For instance, it is widely believed today that 
both young children and non-human animals may fail tests such as the Sally-
Anne not because they have no ToM (lack of ability) but because they are 
unable accurately to report their beliefs verbally (lack of performance) 
(Krachun et al. 2009: 521)  :KHQ FRQVLGHULQJ %RZOHU¶V ILQGLQJ WKDW VRPH
individuals succeed on SOBA tests, Happé applies the reverse logic; passing 
may demonstrate a specific performance, rather than a specific ability.   
In a phrase which is traced back to a paper by Frith et al. in 1991, but 
which is first used in press15 in 1994 (e.g. Frith et al. 1994: 110; Happé 1994: 
130), an ability to circumvent ToM tasks with the use of effortful logic based 
SURFHVVLQJLVFDOOHGµKDFNLQJRXW¶ 
³>$XWLVWLFLQGLYLGXDOV¶@VXFFHVVFRXOGEHVHHQQRWDVSURRIRIWKHRU\Rf 
PLQG DELOLW\ EXW UDWKHU DV HYLGHQFH RI WKH ³KDFNLQJ RXW´ RI VRPH
VWUDWHJ\IRUVROYLQJWKHWDVNV´(Frith et al. 1994: 130) 
The question to be asked was, therefore: 
³$UH WKH\ [autistic individuals] simply better problem-solvers, more 
able to devise a strategy to answer theory of mind questions ± thanks 
SHUKDSV WRPRUH H[SHULHQFHKLJKHU ,4RU DPRUH VRFLDO GLVSRVLWLRQ"´
(Happé 1993: 115) 
 ,WZDVSURSRVHGWKDW³³KDFNLQJ´ZRXOGHQDEOHLQGLYLGXDOVWRVROYHIDOVH
belief attribution tasks, but probably would not generalize to the large variety 
RIPHQWDOL]LQJVLWXDWLRQVLQUHDOOLIH´(Frith et al. 1994: 118).  However, when 
eight individuals with autism who could pass FOBA were quizzed over the 
µLQWHUDFWLYH VRFLDELOLW\¶ VNLOOV LW ZDV IRXQG WKDW WKUHH LQGLYLGXDOV GLG LQGHHG
score particularly highly (Frith et al. 1994: 118).  This finding, along with 
others like it (e.g. Happé 1993), is a crucial moment in the emergence of 
heterogeneity.  The authors conclude that: 
                                       
15
 Happé also uses the term in her doctoral thesis (e.g. Happé 1991: 78) 
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³2XUUHVXOWVWKHQVXJJHVWWKHH[LVWence of subgroups within the autistic 
spectrum.  The majority have no understanding of other minds, and 
GHPRQVWUDWH³PLQG-EOLQGQHVV´LQWKHODERUDWRU\DVZHOODVLQHYHU\GD\
life.  Then there are those who have learned limited strategies sufficient 
to pass highly structured artificial tests of theory of mind, but still show 
no evidence of mentalizing in real life.  In addition, our results suggest 
that there is a third subgroup who appear to be able, to some extent, to 
represent mental states.  They show evidence of this not only in the 
ODERUDWRU\EXWDOVRLQUHDOOLIH´(Frith et al. 1994: 118) 
What is particularly of note here is that metarepresentation theory is not 
rejected outright, it is still seen as relevant for some (but certainly not all) 
autistic individuals.  This is the essence of cognitive, aleatoric heterogeneity. 
Alongside these studies examining ToM ability in individuals with 
autism, Happé was also concerned with examining the relationship between 
ToM and Weak Central Coherence (WCC).  Simply stated, if WCC is able to 
account for ToM deficits (more WCC equals greater difficulty with ToM 
tasks), as suggested by Frith (1989: 163) then individuals who perform 
particularly well on WCC tasks should perform particularly badly on ToM 
tasks.  Happé found no relationship between WCC and ToM skills and thus 
proposes that:     
³7KHLQGHSHQGHQFHRIWKHRU\RIPLQGWDVNVVXFFHVVVXJJHVWVWKDWWKH
postulated weak central coherence must be thought of as separate from 
WKH PHQWDOLVLQJ LPSDLUPHQW LQ DXWLVP  7KLV LV D FKDQJH IURP )ULWK¶V
(1989) original position, and raises the interesting possibility that weak 
coherence may be able to explain persisting handicaps in even those 
VXEMHFWV ZKR DSSHDU WR EH DEOH WR UHSUHVHQW PHQWDO VWDWHV´ (Happé 
1994b: 1469) 
This is the crucial conclusion for the emergence of a heterogeneous autism and 
it is worth considering carefully, and in the context of the previous discussion 
of Happé¶V ZRUN  )LUVWO\ PHWDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO GHILFLW LV QRW IRXQG LQ DOO
autistic subjects ergo it can longer be considered the universal, core deficit at 
the heart of autism.  Secondly, WCC is found in all autistic subjects and 
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therefore could be at the centre of a cognitively homogeous account.  
However, WCC ability does not correlate with ToM ability, and so WCC can 
only offer a homogenous account of autism if the theory of 
PHWDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO GHILFLW LV GURSSHG HQWLUHO\  ,Q D SDSHU HQWLWOHG µDXWLVP
EH\RQG³WKHRU\RIPLQG´¶KRZHYHU)ULWKDQGHappé state: 
³$WSUHVHQWDOOWKHHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWZHVKRXOGUHWDLQWKHLGHDRID
modular and specific mentalizing deficit in our causal explanation of 
the triad of impairment in autism.  It is still our belief that nothing 
captures the essence of autism so precisely as the idea of 
PLQGEOLQGQHVV´ 
However: 
³WKLV H[SODQDWLRQ DORQH ZLOO QRW suffice.  Therefore, our present 
conception is that there may be two rather difference cognitive 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVWKDWXQGHUOLHDXWLVP´(Frith & Happé 1994: 126) 
  This conclusion, too, absolutely captures the notion of an aleatoric 
heterogeneitc in autism. 
Intra- and inter-individual heterogeneity 
 Within these findings of the 1990s, where Happé first puts forward the 
notion of aleatoric heterogeneity in autism, it is possible to see a further sub-
division, with two separate types of heterogeneity coming under discussion.  
When, following Bowler, Happé suggests that some individuals with autism 
may have impaired ToM while others do not, a model of inter-individual 
heterogeneity is being advanced.  By comparison, when Happé suggests that 
WCC may be core to autism but may not be able to explain all autistic 
symptomatology, a model of intra-individual heterogeneity is advanced, 
whereby more than one theory is required to explain that appearance of autism 
in any given individual.  These two constructions of autism, that it is 
aleatorous both within and between individuals are found throughout the 
interview transcripts. 
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The concept of an inter-individual heterogeneity refers to the idea that 
individuals with autism look very different to one another, genetically, 
neurologically, cognitively, and behaviourally.  This was a claim made 
repeatedly throughout the interviews.  For example PC, a Professor, states that: 
PC: ...But it just seems to me that autism is so heterogeneous.  You know that, that, 
WKDW \RX¶YH JRW \RX NQRZ LQRUGHU WRJHW \RX NQRZ \RX FDQ JLYH D GLDJQRVLV RI
DXWLVPXVLQJ$'26WRVRPHRQHZKR¶VDProfessor at Oxford and somebody who sits 
in the corner and hand flaps. (PC20: 125-129) 
In this extract we can see the now familiar claim that autism is heterogeneous.  
However, we can also see that this heterogeneity is constructed inter-
SHUVRQDOO\ EHWZHHQ D µProfessor DW 2[IRUG¶ DQG µVRPHRQH ZKR VLWV LQ WKH
FRUQHU DQG KDQG IODSV¶  $ VLPLODU LGHD WKDW µHYHU\ERG\ ZLWK DXWLVP LV
FRPSOHWHO\ GLIIHUHQW WR HYHU\ERG\ HOVH ZLWK DXWLVP¶ LV H[SUHVVHG by HB, a 
Reader, below: 
+%ZKHQ,¶YHVWXGHQWVDQGDQGWKH\FRPHDQGZRUN with me and say what have 
\RX OHDUQHG DERXW DXWLVP WKH\ VD\ ZHOO  DOO ,¶YH OHDUQHG LV WKDW HYHU\ERG\ ZLWK
autism is completely different to everybody else with autism ((laughs)) so how can 
\RXFDOOLWDOOWKHVDPHWKLQJDQGDQG,WKLQNWKDW¶VDUHDOO\ interesting point... (HB01: 
195-200) 
These extracts both unambiguously concern themselves with the differences 
between individuals with autism.  It may be that those interpersonal differences 
are theorised in very different ways.  Differences may arise because 
individuals have qualitatively different symptoms to one another, for example, 
the presence or absence of repetitive behaviours or sensory difficulties.  Such a 
situation is described by DR, a Professor ZKR DFNQRZOHGJHV WKDW µVHQVRU\
VHQVLWLYLWLHV¶ GR µDJJUHJDWH¶ ZLWK WKH µSUREOHPV LQ VRFLDO UHFLSURFLW\ DQG
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶ W\SLFDOO\ IRXQG LQ DXWLVP EXW DOVR LQVLVWV WKDW WKHUH DUH D
QXPEHURIFKLOGUHQZKRDUHSDUWRIWKHµGRPDLQRIDXWLVWLFEHKDYLRXU¶ZKR do 
not have these problems:   
DR: «,PHDQ\RXJHWWKDWDVZHOO\RX\RXJHWWKHVHVHQVRU\VHQVLWLYLWLHVZhich are 
now recognised in DSM-5 DXGLWRU\ K\SHUVHQVLWLYLW\ ZKDW WKH KHOO¶V WKDW JRW WR GR
ZLWKDQ\WKLQJ"0D\EHWKDW¶VDdamping LVVXHPD\EHWKDW¶VVRPHWKLQJWRGRZLWK
LQKLELWRU\IHHGEDFNWKDW¶VQRWZRUNLQJSURSHUO\SIIWGRQ¶WNQRZBut I mean you 
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do get this, these things (.) they tend to aggregate (.) but you, you, we, we would 
argue, we, we also see a lot of kids with very typical problems in social reciprocity 
DQG FRPPXQLFDWLRQ HUP ZKR GRQ¶W KDYH WKH UHVWULFWLYH UHSHWLWLYH EHKDYLRXUV DQG
VSHFLILFLQWHUHVWVDQGV¶VHQVRU\VHQVLWLYLWLHVDQGVRRQWKDWXVHWKDWDUHDUHS¶S¶
part of the, you know, of that domain of autistic behaviour.  Erm, (.) so, anyway, 
ZKDWHYHU¶VJRLQJRQ,ZRXOGVXJJHVW LW¶VJRWPXOWLSOHDHWLRORJLHV« (DR13: 409-423) 
Autism may, then, look qualitatively different in different individuals.  
Alternatively, interpersonal difference may be theorised as an issue of severity, 
LQGLYLGXDOV EHLQJ RQ GLIIHUHQW µSDUWV RI WKH VSHFWUXP¶  5HJDUGOHVV RI WKH
particular hypothesis, the defining issue here is of differences between 
individuals.   
By comparison, intra-individual heterogeneity refers to the claim that 
there are different causes of autism within an individual person.  For example, 
it might be claimed that the causative factors behind communication deficits 
are fundamentally different to the causative factors behind repetitive 
behaviours; this is the story being told when Happé claims that neither WCC 
nor ToM can explain all autistic symptomology.  Such a discourse of intra-
personal heterogeneity was also prominent within the interviews and is nicely 
expressed in the following extract.  BG, an Assistant Professor, has advocated 
a theory of autism known as the social reward hypothesis (see Chevallier et al. 
2012 for details) which argues that, rather than being unable to understand 
other agents (qua theory of mind), individuals with autism are simply not 
motivated to do so.  BG is asked how such a hypothesis PLJKWH[SODLQµQRQ-
WULDGLF¶DVSHFWVRIDXWLVP 
GH: Erm, how does this, er, how do you see repetitive behaviours fitting into, erm, 
for example, theories about social reward, I mean how, how do these come together? 
BG: (.) Well (.) the, there is no direct, erm::, there is no direct way where the social, 
er, reward hypothesis will have a prediction for higher or lower social, er, lower 
repetitive behaviour... it appears that these two aspects of autism may have different 
aetiologies so they happen to co-exist LQYDULRXVFDVHVEXWHUPWKHUHZRXOGQ¶WEHD
single phenomenon that could explain both at the same time, erm, (.) from the looks 
of it, from, from the looks of the factor analyses that have been done... I mean I think 
LW¶V LW¶V DOPRVW D ZURQJ TXHVWLRQ to ask, whether, say, for example, the enhanced 
perceptual function model which, er, erm, l, which erm, erm,[Laurent] Mottron, er, 
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and Kate Plaisted-Grant, er, talk about (.) whether, to ask those perceptual based 
models that whether they can explain the social phenomenon or to ask a social 
motivation type, a social based model to ask whether they can explain the perceptual, 
,PHDQZK\GRZHQHHGDVLQJOHH[SODQDWLRQ":HZHGRQ¶W%*-340, 341-
347, 358-366) 
We can see here that, despite also advocating a form of aleatoric heterogeneity, 
the form of heterogeneity is quite different to those described in the previous 
H[WUDFWV+HUHLQGLYLGXDOGLIIHUHQFHVDUHQRWPHQWLRQHG,QVWHDGµWZRDVSHFWV
RIDXWLVP¶± µVRFLDO¶DQGµUHSHWLWLYH¶EHKDYLRXUV± haYHµGLIIHUHQWDHWLRORJLHV¶
EXWµFR-H[LVW¶LQFHUWDLQLQGLYLGXDOV,QGHHGWKHVWXG\RIDXWLVPKDVDGYDQFHG
WR WKH SRLQW ZKHUH WKH TXHVWLRQ KDV WR EH DVNHG µZK\ GR ZH QHHG D VLQJOH
H[SODQDWLRQ¶± WKHDQVZHULVWKDWµZHGRQ¶W¶ ([DFWO\WKHVDPHSRLQWLV made 
by a Research Fellow, MC, in the extract below.  MC suggests that there are 
µWZRGLVWLQFWWKLQJV¶ZLWKLQDQLQGLYLGXDOZLWKDXWLVP 
MC: ...I find it hard to explain all of the social components with non-social 
FRPSRQHQWV VR , ZRQGHU ZKHWKHU WKHUH¶V WZR distinct things, erm, that have to 
coincide for you to have autism but they are distinct. (MC12: 223-226) 
These findings of intra-personal heterogeneity have led many researchers to 
reach WKH FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW WKHUH LV QR µVLQJOH SV\FKRORJLFDO GHILFLW¶ DQG What 
µPRUH RI D PL[¶ RI WKHRULHV LV UHTXLUHG WR H[SODLQ DXWLVP.  AO, a research 
fellow, states that: 
AO: SHRSOH DUH PRUH DFFHSWLQJ RI WKH LGHD WKDW \RX GRQ¶W KDYH D VLQJOH
psychological deficit.  So:: the days of Weak Central Coherence versus Executive 
Functioning versus Theory of Mind seem to be gone, and people are understanding 
more thDWWKHUH¶VPXFKPRUHRIDPL[(AO04: 508-513) 
Heterogeneity has, then, been constructed as both intra-individual and inter-
individual in nature.   
The nature and nurture of heterogeneity  
It has been argued within this chapter that one of the most striking 
changes in autism research since the 1980s is that autism is now constructed as 
a µKHWHURJHQHRXV¶FRQGLWLRQ  This is true to the extent that heterogeneity has 
become a rallying-FDOO IRU WKRVH ZRUNLQJ LQ ILHOGV UHODWLQJ WR DXWLVP µLI \RX
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NQRZRQHSHUVRQZLWKDXWLVP\RXNQRZRQHSHUVRQZLWKDXWLVP¶LVWKHDXWLVP
DGYRFDF\VHFWRU¶VXQRIILFLDOVORJDQ 
This chapter has gone beyond existing analyses of autistic 
heterogeneity by critically examining how cognitive heterogeneity is 
constructed by autism researchers within the context of research interviews, 
and how these constructions relate to the history of autism research.  It has 
EHHQDUJXHG WKDW µDXWLVWLFKHWHURJHQHLW\¶DVD FRQFHSWGRHVQRWHDVLO\FRKHUH
that at different times heterogeneity refers to differences between people and at 
others times to differences within individuals.  At yet other times heterogeneity 
is located not in the condition of autism itself but at the level of epistemology, 
as an artefact of classification or methodology.  This conclusion regarding the 
incoherence of autistic heterogeneity is reminiscent of Foucault when he states 
that: 
³LI WKH JHQHDORJLVW UHIXVHV WR H[WHQG his faith to metaphysics, if he 
OLVWHQV WR KLVWRU\ KH ILQGV WKHUH LV ³VRPHWKLQJ DOWRJHWKHU GLIIHUHQW´
behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that 
they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal 
fashion IURPDOLHQIRUPV´(Foucault 1977: 142) 
The findings within this chapter concur with such conclusions, at least in the 
case of autistic heterogeneity: the disorder within the disorder of autism is 
itself disordered. 
The striking references to heterogeneity within the fields of autism 
research have not escaped the attention of social science scholars (e.g. 
Fitzgerald 2012: 58-84; Verhoeff 2012)  Indeed, Verhoeff (2012) makes the 
strong claim that autism researchers concerned with heterogeneity cling to a 
EHOLHI WKDW DXWLVP LV D µQDWXUDO NLQG¶ ZKLOVW VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ Dnd apparently 
contradictorily, stating that there is no single autism.  Verhoeff is here arguing 
that autism is epistemologically heterogeneous.  As has been shown above, 
autism researchers too make this claim on occasion and construct 
heterogeneity as an artefact of, for example, diagnostic or methodological 
procedures.  However autism researchers also contest that autism has an 
aleatoric heterogeneity, both intra- and inter- personally, and this is the 
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construction which Verhoeff, understandably, disagrees with.  Simply to 
dismiss autistic heterogeneity as incorrect, however, surely misses much of 
KHWHURJHQHLW\¶VSURGXFWLYHYDOXH,IDXWLVPKDGQRWEHHQFRQVWUXFWHGDVTXLWH
so heterogeneous, if it had not been possible to domesticate the social 
EHKDYLRXUVRIWKHµ2[IRUG3URIHVVRU¶DQGWKHDGROHVFHQWZKRµVLWVLQWKHFRUQHU
DQG KDQG IODSV¶ XQGHU WKH EDQQHU RI DXWLVP WKHQ LW VHHPV XQOLNHO\ WKDW WKH
disease construct could have radically expanded in quite the manner it has over 
the past thirty years.  Indeed, it seems likely that the autism epidemic and 
heterogeneity are in some senses mutually constituting phenomena; as the 
DXWLVP HSLGHPLF µUHYHDOHG¶ YHU\ GLIIHUHQW SHRSOH WR EH DXWLVWLc it became 
apparent that autism itself was very heterogeneous, thus enabling more people 
to labelled autistic, and so forth.    
Nonetheless, the question of autistic heterogeneity does raise 
interesting questions for autism research, namely; how is autism research able 
to continue, and indeed increase, given that the scientific connaissance of 
autism seems to be so poorly ordered?  How has autism managed to 
domesticate the Oxford Professor and the profoundly disabled adolescent 
given that no laboratory test has thus far been able to unite them?  A 
heterogeneous condition may be productive, it may lend itself to increased 
rates of diagnosis, but as Verhoeff demonstrates it leaves the scientific research 
open to ridicule.  By further examining interview transcripts, the following 
VHFWLRQ ZLOO DUJXH WKDW DXWLVP¶V RUGHU LV IRXQG ZKHQ UHVHDUFKHUV UHSRUW DQ
unmistakable experience of social disorder in autism.  For the researchers, it is 
WKLVH[SHULHQFHRIDXWLVPWKDWLQVRPHVHQVHSURYHVWKDWDXWLVPLVµDUHDOWKLQJ¶
which deserves to be named as such despite its surprisingly heterogeneous 
nature. 
A singular experience of autism 
Throughout the interviews, discussions surrounding a fascination with 
the otherness of autism were present, arising during two specific points in 
particular.  Firstly, narratives of otherness occurred during a number of 
UHVHDUFKHUV¶RULJLQVWRULHV7KHIROORZLQJH[WUDFWLVW\SLFDOLQWKLVUHVSHFW&7, 
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a Senior Lecturer, described their first contact with autism as a teenager 
volunteering in a psychiatric hospital: 
&7«WKDWH[SHULHQFHRIZRUNLQJZLWKWKHVHFKLOGUHQZLWKDXWLVPVWXFNLQP\PLQG
erm::, I just found it very, very compelling and fascinating, of course there ZDVQ¶W
QHDUO\DVPXFKNQRZQWKHQDERXWDXWLVPDVWKHUHLVQRZEXW,MXVWWKHUH¶VVRPHWKLQJ
about the:: kind of mysterious nature of the way they are and I remember the, the kind 
of, this is from way back when I was an undergraduate, but I remember this kind of 
experience of having this child take me by the hand and use my hand to get things 
WKDWKHZDQWHGDQG,GLGQ¶WWKHQJRRQDQGGRD3K'RQDXWLVPDQG,¶PQRWUHDOO\
quite sure why.  (CT02: 23-27) 
7KHµP\VWHULRXVQDWXUHRIWKHZD\WKH\DUH¶ZDVµFRPSHOOLQJ¶DQGµIDVFLQDWLQJ¶
and the experience with a child, perhaps using CT as an object, is certainly 
striking.  A similarly profound and deeply moving experience is reported by 
MW, a Professor: 
0:«,ZHQWDQGGXULQJWKHVXPPHUKROLGD\VHUZHQWDQGcollected data for them 
[two researchers] from people with autism, children mainly, some adults, er, who had 
extraordinary memory skills.  And then, erm, other children and adults with autism 
ZKRZHUHPDWFKHGIRUDELOLW\EXWGLGQ¶WKDYHPHPRU\VNLOOV $nd so that was my 
first experience of really what autism was as opposed to reading about it.  And it 
really, really blew my mind actually ((laughs)) how, how different the reality was and 
to go into some of the special schools then and see, you know, a playground full of 
children all:: moving and all making sounds, often very unusual sounds, and not 
usually playing together and not (.) you know responding to you as somebody coming 
in in the way that you would expect, you know, an ordinary child, or a child with 
LQWHOOHFWXDOGLVDELOLWLHVWRR$QGLW¶VMXVWFRPSOHWHO\IDVFLQDWLQJ$QGHUPDQGDIWHU
that I thought that autism was utterly fascinating but so upsetting that I was going to 
GRD3K'«0:-45) 
0:DUWLFXODWHVWKHµUHDOLW\¶RIDXWLVPEHLQJDEOHWRµVHH¶LWUDWKHUWKDQVLPSO\
µUHDG¶ DERXW LW DV D FUXFLDO IRUPDWLYH H[SHULHQFH LW µUHDOO\ EOHZ P\ PLQG
DFWXDOO\¶ LW ZDV µXWWHUO\ IDVFLQDWLQJ EXW VR XSVHWWLQJ¶.  It can be seen even 
ZLWKLQ WKLV H[WUDFW KRZ WKH µUHDO¶ DXWLVP LV VRPHWKLQJ WKDW LV VHHQ and 
experienced, rather than merely read about in scientific tomes.  The description 
RIµDSOD\JURXQGIXOORIFKLOGUHQDOOPRYLQJDQGDOOPDNLQJXQXVXDOVRXQGV¶DV
being so obviously socially disordered, is described as being a prime 
motivating factor in embarking upon a career in autism research.  
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The second occasion on which these narratives of otherness and being 
were called upon during the research interviews is perhaps more striking still.  
One of the first questions asked, in one form or another, was what exactly the 
researcher thinks autism is.  Among the textbook answers (e.g. that autism was 
a µQHXURGHYHORSPHQWDO FRQGLWLRQ¶ a particular subset of interviewees once 
DJDLQGHVFULEHGDXWLVPDVDµZD\RIEHLQJ¶RUDVD particular form of existence.  
There was no indication that the interviewees who comprised this group were 
linked in any sense in terms of seniority or institutional affiliation.  These 
GLVFRXUVHV RQ µEHLQJ¶ DUH VWULNLQJ FRPLQJ IURP VHQLRU VFLHQWLVWV IURP ZKRP
one may expect earthy, material explanations of their subject matter.  The 
following two extracts, the first from a Lecturer and the second from a Reader, 
DUHW\SLFDORIWKHµZD\RIEHLQJ¶DUWLFXODWLRQVIRXQGZLWKLQWKHLQWHUYLHZV, the 
VHQVHWKDWDXWLVPLVDQµXQGHUVWDQGLQJDERXWWKH ZRUOG¶:   
GH: So if, if I was going to ask what autism is KRZ GR \RX WKLQN LW¶V EHVW
characterised? 
FC: Erm:: (.) just a, being slightly different really.  ((Laughs))  Being a::, having, er, 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJDERXW WKHZRUOG %XWHU\HDK LW¶V MXVWDERXW EHLQJ LQWHUSUHWLQJ
the world differently. (FC15: 308-312, 320-322) 
And: 
') , WKLQN LW¶VD ZD\RIEHLQJHUPHUP DZD\RIEHLQJ WKDW LVRE¶REYLRXVO\
different from (.) the norm, or what we like to think is kind of normative, erm::, but 
WKDW KDV D SDWWHUQ RI HUP WKHUH¶V LW KDV LW KDV D VNLOO VHW WKDW LV FKDUDFWHULVWLFDOO\
different from, from non-autistic people... (DF03: 211-216) 
ST, a Professor, used the same phUDVHµZD\RIEHLQJ¶RQQumerous occasions 
throughout the interview.  Before the following extract ST had been musing on 
an individual diagnosed with autism who they know particularly well.  This 
individual in question lives alone but does not work, preferring instead to play 
computer games.  The ethical dilemma, for ST, is whether this individual 
should be forced into employment or whether they should be supported by 
society: ³,¶GEHLQFOLQHGWRVD\ZHOOZHKDYHWRVXSSRUWWKHPEHFDXVHhe has 
a different way of being´ 67 -454).  The same phrase is used again 
ZKHQ FRQVLGHULQJ LI VFLHQWLVWV VKRXOG GLVSXWH WKH QHXURGLYHUVLW\ PRYHPHQW¶V
claim that autism is a difference rather than a deficit: 
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67 %XW ,¶PTXLWHKDSS\ WR VD\ WKDW HU \RXNQRZ , , ,¶PTXLWHKDSS\ZLWK WKH
view that we just (.) recognise it as, erm, a way of being and help that individual to 
DFKLHYHDOHYHORIFRPIRUWWKDWWKH\¶UHKDSS\ZLWKHUDQGOHDYHLWDWWKDW67-
794)  
The extracts presented above continue a long trend of metaphor use around 
autism which is vast and replete with examples that suggest an altered state or 
another way of being.  Sometimes these constructed figures arise from within 
science, for example the µHQLJPD¶ RI )ULWK¶V (1989; 2003) Rapunzelian 
FKDUDFWHU RFFXS\LQJ WKH FHQWUH RI %HWWOHKHLP¶V µHPSW\ IRUWUHVV¶ (1972).  On 
other occasions it is from within the autistic community itself that metaphors 
arise (Silverman 2008b: 333) and it is from here that metaphors of aliens (see 
Hacking 2009b), extraterrestrial planets, and Harawayian cyborgs (see 
Nadesan 2005: 128-132) seem to emerge.  For better or worse, the thread 
running through all of these descriptions is autism as an altered state, as 
unknowable, and as other.  
What is clear, however, is that despite constructing autism as being 
µXQNQRZDEOH¶LQWHUYLHZHHVFRQVLVWently claimed that autism could be seen, or 
H[SHULHQFHGLQTXLWHDYLYLGPDQQHUDVVXJJHVWHGE\0:¶VH[SHULHQFHLQWKH
SOD\JURXQGDQG&7¶VH[SHULHQFH LQ WKHKRVSLWDO $VRQHSDUWLFXODU LQWHUYLHZ
was concluding, an interviewee was asked ³...is there anything else which 
\RX¶G OLNH WR DGG RU WKDW \RX WKLQN ZH¶YH QRW GLVFXVVHG DQ\ ELWV RI \RXU
UHVHDUFKZKLFK\RXWKLQNDUHLQWHUHVWLQJ"´ (YC19: 824-826)  The response was 
the following: 
<&³(UPRQH WKLQJ,GLGGR LV ,JRWDVHFRQGUDWHU WR ORRNDWP\YLGHRV and code 
them in terms of, erm, quality and quantity of facial expression use and things like 
WKDWDQGKHZDVDVL¶DYHU\SURILFLHQWVLJQODQJXDJHXVHU>WKHFKLOGUHQLQ WKHVWXG\
were deaf ± *+@$QG,GLGQ¶WWHOOKLPZKLFKJURXSVZHUHZKLFK,MXVWyou know, 
er, kept everything [kind of (.)] 
GH:     [Mm hm, mm hm.] 
<& <RX NQRZ DQRQ\PRXV  (UP ZHOO DV DQRQ\PRXV DV \RX FDQ ZKHQ \RX¶UH
ORRNLQJDWVRPHRQHEXWKHGLGQ¶WNQRZWKHJURXSLQIRUPDWLRQDWDOO 
GH: Yeah. 
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YC: And I asked him who, like, who do you, can you, just out of interest can you tell 
PH ZKR \RX WKLQN LV LQ WKH NLQG RI $6' JURXS  $QG KH L¶ KH ZDV DEOH WR HYHQ
WKRXJKWKH\¶UHQRWFRPLQJXSDVmassively different in a lot of their communication 
he was able to say they were the autistic chiOGUHQDQGWKH\ZHUHWKHRQHVZKRGLGQ¶W
KDYH DXWLVP VR LW¶V WKHUH LV WKLV VRPHWKLQJ WKDW VHHPV WR EH WKHUH WKDW GRHVQ¶W
necessarily come up that makes you kind of, have that kind of gut instinct.  And I 
NQRZ WKDW¶V RQO\ RQH SHUVRQ ORRNLQJ DW YLGHRV EXW WKere was something I felt I 
FRXOGQ¶WSXWP\ILQJHURQZLWKWKRVHFKLOGUHQWKDW\RXNQHZMXVWNLQGRIORRNLQJDW
WKHLUFRPPXQLFDWLRQVRPHWKLQJWKDWFRPHVDFURVV$QG,¶YHKHDUGWKLVZLWKTXLWHD
lot of people talking about individuals with autism, that you just get this kind of, you, 
\RXNQRZEXW\RXGRQ¶WNQRZHUP  \RXFDQ¶W UHDOO\SXW \RXU ILQJHURQZKDW LW
ZKDWLWVSHFLILFDOO\LV´<&-858) 
6HYHUDO WKHPHVDUHSURPLQHQW LQ WKLVH[WUDFW 7KH³KLVWRULFDOO\VLQJXODUIRUP
RIH[SHULHQFH´(Foucault 1984a: 333) of autism, discussed in chapter 2 (pp.24-
25)LVHYLGHQWO\SUHVHQW7ZRFHQWUDOHOHPHQWVRIWKDWH[SHULHQFHWKDWµZD\RI
EHLQJ¶ DUH FDSWXUHG KHUH  )LUVWO\ GHVSLWH WKH IDFW WKDW RQ WKH SDUWLFXODU
emotion recognition task under discussion, the children diagnosed with autism 
were performing more-or-less identically to those without a diagnosis, µthere is 
WKLVVRPHWKLQJWKDWVHHPVWREHWKHUHWKDWGRHVQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\FRPHXS¶DµJXW
LQVWLQFW¶, DVHQVHWKDWµ\RXNQRZEXW\RXGRQ¶WNQRZ¶   
This sentiment, that the essence of autism somehow eludes scientific 
description, is echoed in a second interview with PC, a Professor.  Once again, 
empirical evidence in any formal sense is not required to experience autism:  
*+ $QG  HU KRZ GR \RX IHH¶ KRZ GR you feel about the ADOS [Autism 
Diagnosis Observation Schedule] as a diagnostic technique? 
PC: Er:: LW¶VSUREDEO\WKHEHVWWKLQJZH¶YHJRW,PHDQ,\RXNQRZ,WKLQNLW¶V
,,KD¶,OLNHWKHWKHFKLOGYHUVLRQVEHWWHUWKDQWKHDGXOWYHUVLRQ  ,WKLQNWKDWLW¶VT¶
I think the adults that are very able, that have done a lot of developing. 
GH: Mm hm. 
PC: Especially the ones that come in here because they travel around on their own, a 
lot of them live independently, and I think that some of them GRQ¶WPHHWFULWHULDXVLQJ
ADO6DQGWKH\¶UHFOHDUO\DXWLVWLF  (PC20: 544-555) 
3& GHVFULEHV VRPH RI KHU SDUWLFLSDQWV DV µFOHDUO\ DXWLVWLF¶ HYHQ WKRXJK WKH
ADOS, the formal, gold-standard, diagnostic measure does not mark them as 
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such.  PC makes the same point again later in the interview when a complaint 
from PC about a lack of scientific publications concerning aging in autism was 
followed up: 
PC: ...I mean if you look at the number of papers that are published on adults there are 
really not that many. 
GH: And why do you think that is? 
3& :HOO IURP P\ H[SHULHQFH LW¶V EHFDXVH HUP ODXJKV ZHOO FHUWDLQO\ RQ WKH
DXGLWRU\ HUP ZRUN ZH¶YH GRQH LV WKDW WKH\ GRQ¶W UHDOO\ SHUIRUP YHU\ YHU\
differently to adults without autism. (PC20: 597-603)   
It does not sHHPRFFXUWR3&WKDWDQLQGLYLGXDOZKRGRHVQRWµPHHWFULWHULD¶RQ
WKH$'26ZKRGRHVQRWµSHUIRUPYHU\GLIIHUHQWO\¶WRµDGXOWVZLWKRXWDXWLVP¶
might in fact not have autism.  This possibility does not occur because, for 
these researchers at least, autism LV D µZD\RIEHLQJ¶ WKDWDSSHDUV DVREYLRXV
DQGJLYHQWKH\NQRZHYHQWKRXJKWKH\GRQ¶WNQRZ 
Returning to the extract above from the interview with YC, a second 
notable feature of the experience of autism is that it is presented as being not 
only available to the autism researcher, but also to the second-rater who is a 
non-expert.  This idea that experts and non-experts alike experience autism as 
immediate, obvious, and given was repeated across interviews and used as 
evidence for the reality of autism.  MW, a Professor, states that: 
MW: $QGWKHUH¶VQRGHQ\LQJWKDWHUPZLWKLQWKLVJUHDWUDQJHRIWKHDXWLVPVSHFWUXP
WKHUH¶VDDELJFKXQNZKHUHDXWLVPLVHQRUPRXVO\UHFRJQLVDEOH,PHDQ\RXNQRZ
the, what people will say fairly flippantly is that for clinicians their, the person in the 
UHFHSWLRQHUZKR¶VPDQQLQJUHFHSWLRQFDQWHOO\RXDOUHDG\ZKHWKHUWKH\¶UHJRLQJWR
get a diagnosis or not.  Or, you know, from seeing them walking down the street 
towards the reception door they can tell. ((Laughs)) 
GH: ((Laughs)) 
0: 6R WKHUH¶V D VRUW RI VHQVH WKDW DXWLVP WKH core autism is really very, very 
recognisable. (MW18: 396-407) 
,Q WKLV H[WUDFW 0: FODLPV WKDW µD UHFHSWLRQLVW¶ ZRXOG EH DEOH WR LGHQWLI\
correctly individuals with autism before they have spoken, before they have 
HYHQ HQWHUHG WKH URRP 7KLV H[SHULHQFH WKDW DXWLVP LV µHQRUPRXVO\
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UHFRJQLVDEOH¶ XQGHUVWDQGDEO\ OHDGV D JUHDW QXPEHU RI researchers to the 
FRQFOXVLRQWKDW³WKHUHPXVWPXVWEHVRPHWKLQJLQLW´&*102). That sense 
is well captured again in the following extract with MD, a further Professor: 
MD: ...Clinically I, I sort of think there is something quite striking because it seems to 
EH WKH WKLQJ WKDW ORWVRI XVZKR¶YHEHHQ \RXNQRZEHHQ LQYROYHG LQFOLQLFDOZRUN
with, you know, children with autism for more than twenty years and research for the 
best part of, you know, twenty-five years so::, erm, clinically there is a sort of notion 
that when you see that constellation of developmental and behavioural characteristics 
together (.) it, you know, it, it, it seems to one like, you know, like a thing. 
GH: Mmm.  
MD: Er::, you know, so it belongs in some n::osological sort of system... So some sort 
of notion that, erm, er, erm, erm, the medical model, you know, erm, (.) y::, you 
know, is, erm, sort of demonising sort of, you know, individuals in a way that is going 
WREHGLVDGYD¶µYDQWDJRXVVRUWRIWRWKHPWRVRPHVRUWRIQRWLRQWKDWGLVRUGHUVOLNH
autism are, are (.), erm, primarily a sort of social construct are both rather silly I think, 
\RXNQRZ,GRQ¶WWKLQNSHRSOH,WKLQNSUREDEO\PRVWVHQVLEOHSHRSOHZRXOGQ¶WWKLQN
hold either of those extreme sort of views.  (MD17: 454-466; 495-503) 
7ZHQW\\HDUVRIFOLQLFDOµexperience¶ lHDGVWRWKHFRQFOXVLRQVWKDWDXWLVPLVµD
WKLQJ¶ WKDW WR FODLP WKDW DXWLVP LV D µVRFLDO FRQVWUXFW¶ LV µUDWKHU VLOO\¶ DQG
VRPHWKLQJ WKDW µVHQVLEOHSHRSOHZRXOGQ¶W WKLQN¶  2QFHRQHKDV experienced 
autism in the clinic, denying its reality becomes untenable.   
Conclusion 
The latter half of this chapter has argued that autism researchers do not 
FOLQJ WR WKH QRWLRQ WKDW DXWLVP LV D µQDWXUDO NLQG¶ LQ WKH DEVHQFH RI DQ\
evidence.  Instead, the striking evidence that researchers have for the reality of 
autism is found outside of experimental research, in the experience of meeting 
an individual in the street, playground, hospital, clinic or, indeed, laboratory 
who is socially disordered.  It is when an individual is encountered within 
society and, for whatever reason, their behaviour deviates from the normative 
framework prescribed by that society, that they become unambiguously 
experienced as autistic.  It is these intense experiences of social disorder which 
reportedly persuade research scientists of the singular reality of autism and 
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provides the means through which they are convinced of the coherence of 
autism.   
This finding, that experiences that exist outside of the laboratory are 
crucial in constructions of autism, is consistent with existing hypotheses from 
within the social sciences regarding knowledge production and autism.  
6LOYHUPDQ IRU H[DPSOH KDV DUJXHG WKDW ORYH ³DV D ZD\ RI NQRZLQJ DERXW
ERGLHV >DQG@ SHUVRQV´ (2012: 3) is central to contemporary articulations of 
autism.  Similarly)LW]JHUDOGDUJXHVWKDWVFLHQWLVWV¶³XQDPELJXRXVO\DIIHFWLYH
DQGHPRWLRQDO ODERXU´ (2012: 116) is central to accounts within biomedicine.  
)LW]JHUDOG¶V SRLQW LQ SDUWLFXODU WKDW HPRWLRQDO ODERur is important within 
biomedicine, is crucial to understanding autism.  What these accounts have in 
common is the finding that scientific knowledge about autism includes far 
more than is readily allowed within the scientific method.  In essence, 
FitzgeralGHFKRHVRQHRIWKHIRXQGDWLRQDOFODLPVRI676WKDWLWLV³SRVVLEOHWR
VSHDN DERXW WKDW ZKLFK FDQQRW EH VSRNHQ´ (Collins 1974: 184), and that 
science does not progress in spite of tacit and ambiguous knowledges and 
experiences but, in the case of autism at least, because of them (Fitzgerald 
2012: 84).  That autism cannot be reduced to a single act, a specific cognitive 
profile, or the connaissance of laboratory science does not seem to undermine 
these moving, troubling and profound experiences of confronting social 
disorder.   
It might also be hypothesised that a combination of a heterogeneous 
connaissance and a singular experience also holds significant productive value 
for autism science.  Inter-personal heterogeneity ensures that any two 
individuals with autism do not need to appear similar - cognitively, 
behaviourally, and so on - to each other in order to procure a diagnosis of 
autism.  Similarly, intra-personal heterogeneity ensures that a single causative 
factor is not required to explain the presence of autism within a given 
individual.  Once autism has been constructed in this heterogeneous manner 
there is significant scope for diagnostic increase, as no limits have been 
imposed upon what may count as an autistic symptom.  The problematic aspect 
of heterogeneity, as highlighted by Verhoeff (2012), is the accusation of 
conceptual incoherence.  However, as the scientists interviewed for this project 
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have demonstrated, the accusation of incoherence can be refuted with recourse 
WRDQH[SHULHQFHRIDXWLVPLQZKLFKDXWLVPµVHHPVOLNHDWKLQJ¶7KLVLWFRXOG
be argued, is a very powerful combination.  
What must be remembered, however, is that whatever status is given to 
the nosological category of autism we can be certain its experience is 
historically novel; it is a fact that no one experienced autism like this 100 years 
ago.  The Foucauldian perspective outlined within chapter 2 (pp.24-25) 
questions the immediacy of experience, instead arguing that experience should 
be understood as the outcome of particular processes, of particular ³JULGV RI
YLVXDOL]DWLRQ YRFDEXODULHV QRUPV DQG V\VWHPV RI MXGJHPHQW´ (Rose 1996a: 
130) which come together to produce a particular type of subject based upon 
³IRUPV RI SRVVLEOH NQRZOHGJH QRUPDWLYH IUDPHZRUNV RI EHKDYLRU DQG
potential modes of existence IRU SRVVLEOH VXEMHFWV´ Foucault 2010: 254).  
Chapter four began to describe the forms of possible knowledge, a savoir of 
the social from within cognitive psychology, which was required in order for 
the experience of autism as a social disorder to take place.  However, the 
experience of autism within a society, how the experience of autism relates to 
µQRUPDWLYH IUDPHZRUNV RI EHKDYLRXU¶ KDV WKXV IDU EHHQ OHIW EURDGO\
unexamined.  The normativity inherent in notions of social disorder will be one 
of the themes of the following chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
Autism, the social, and society 
Autism and society 
 Within the interviews conducted for this thesis there was a great deal of 
WHFKQLFDOGLVFXVVLRQRIµWKHVRFLDO¶DVDQREMHFWRISV\FKRORJLFDOLQYHVWLJDWLRQ
IRULQVWDQFHDVVRPHWKLQJWREHGHPDUFDWHGIURPWKHµQRQVRFLDO¶DVVRPHWKLQJ
with neural underpinnings, as something that is exposed as being deficient in 
individuals with autism through cognitive experiments such as the Sally-Anne 
Test, and so forth.  Simultaneously, however, the social seems to be used to 
mean something quite different.  For example, one Lecturer, when discussing 
how they came to be interested in studying autism, stated that their interest 
stemmed from an undergraduate research project; ³)RU P\ WKLUG \HDU
undergraduate project I was writing about Theory of Mind in terms of social 
theorLHV YHUVXV ELRORJLFDO WKHRULHV  RI RI KRZ WKLV GHILFLW PLJKW RFFXU´
(AO04: 19-22).  There is something curious in the concept of the social as it is 
being used by AO here; the possibility of a social theory of social 
understanding.  This social, positiRQHGDV VRPHWKLQJ WKDW LV µYHUVXV¶ELRORJ\
does not seem to be being used in a particularly technical sense but, instead, 
has a more every day, lay meaning.  Donna works in the social sciences and 
not the biological sciences.  Sheila is not good in social situations.  Similarly, 
an eminent Professor, again discussing how it is that they came to be interested 
LQWKHLUUHVHDUFKWRSLFMX[WDSRVHVDXWLVPZLWKµVRFLDOGLVRUGHUV¶ 
DR: I was interested in the neurodevelopmental disorders in general, erm, so 
disorders where there might be abnormalities in brain development as opposed sort of 
social disorders, ((laughs)) if you like. (DR13: 28-31)   
/XUNLQJEHKLQG'5¶VFODLPLVDVZLWK$2WKHVHQVHRIDQRSSRVLWLRQEHWZHHQ
QDWXUH DQG QXUWXUH µQHXURGHYHORSPHQWDO¶ DQG µVRFLDO¶ FRQGLWLRQV  7KLV
FRQWUDVW EHWZHHQ µELRORJLFDO¶ µFRJQLWLYH¶ DQG µVRFLDO¶ IDFWRUV LV DJDLQ
considered by YC, a postdoctoral researcher:   
<&6R WKDW¶V NLQGRIXVLQJ D OLWWOHELWRI WKHDSSURDFKRINLQGRIELRORJLFDO YHUVXV
cognitive, erm, and social, because the families or carers are usually there as well so 
\RX¶UH JHWWLQJ WKH NLQG RI UHDOO\ EURDG SLFWXUH RI ZKDW¶V JRLQJ RQ ZLWK WKH SHUVRQ
(YC19: 642-646) 
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Autism is perhaps the archetypal social disorder examined and addressed 
within the psy-disciplines.  And yet at particular times for these researchers, 
who have been researching autism for periods of time ranging for a few years 
(YC) to several decades (DR), the social means something quite different and, 
certainly for DR, autism is of interest precisely because it is not social but 
rather biological. 
 7KHVHOD\FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQVRIµWKHVRFLDO¶DUHDOVRGUDZQXSRQZKHQ
considering intervention within autism.  In the extract below SP, another 
Professor, is discussing the changing field of autism studies.  SP has previously 
discussed advancements within the sciences, considering proteomics and stem 
FHOO UHVHDUFK DPRQJ RWKHU WRSLFV  63 WKHQ JRHV RQWR WR GLVFXVV µH[FLWLQJ
WKLQJV¶WKDWDUHµJRLQJRQ¶LQWKHµVRFLDOGRPDLQ¶ 
SP: Other important and really exciting things I think are going on, in the social 
domain are:: how some employers are coming and actively saying we want to help 
out, we want to help out with the employment and retention of individuals with 
DXWLVPEHFDXVHZHWKLQNWKH\¶YHJot special skills, which again is something that you 
would never have thought of five years ago... (SP16: 716-722) 
,QWKLVH[WUDFWZKHQ63GLVFXVVHVµWKHVRFLDOGRPDLQ¶LWLVTXLWHFOHDUWKDWWKH\
are considering factors different to those discussed within the technical 
literature.  The social under discussion here seems to have little, if anything, in 
FRPPRQZLWKWKHVRFLDORIWKHµVRFLDOEUDLQ¶RUWKHVRFLDOEHLQJIRXJKWRYHUE\
Peter Hobson and Alan Leslie in debates over metarepresentations.  Instead, 
this social is about employment and working conditions.  This looks more like 
the social of political science and economics than it does psychology and 
neuroscience; society rather than the social. 
 It is not, of course, surprising that scientists are also people and speak 
as such.  Following on, both from these extracts and the discussion of an 
experience of social disorder presented in the previous chapter (p.121 
onwards), a question of interest is quite how effectively these normative 
versions of the social are parsed out from the apparently objective notions of 
the social which underpin scientific endeavours into autism.  Bennett and 
Hacker have discussed the implications for the neurosciences of adopting 
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terminology, traditionally applied to individuals and societies, and projecting 
these terms onto brain regions or cognitive faculties (Bennett & Hacker 2003).  
Following Wittgenstein, Bennett and Hacker refer to this tendency as the 
µPHUHRORJLFDOIDOODF\¶- the attribution of qualities to the part that should only 
be attributed to the whole ± and deem such mereological usage meaningless.  
Another approach, however, would be to follow Giddens and consider the 
potential of a double hermeneutic (Giddens 1987) whereby lay and technical 
uses of a term loop and mutually inform one another.  If such hermeneutic 
practices were present within autism research it may suggest significant 
consequences  )LUVWO\ ORRSLQJ ZRXOG VXJJHVW WKDW WKH µREMHFWLYH¶ VRFLDO RI
autism research is itself normative and inflected with the values of the 
contemporary Western societies in which the concept of autism emerged.  
Secondly, it would open the possibility that contemporary lay notions of the 
social are themselves taking on the appearance of autism.  This chapter will 
consider those possibilities. 
The social as an ethical substance 
As discussed at length in chapter 4, within the psychological literature 
there has EHHQDQLQFUHDVLQJHPSKDVLVXSRQµQRQVRFLDO¶DVSHFWVRIDXWLVPVXFK
as processing styles and sensory difficulties.  Several interviewees explicitly 
stated that they were not interested in, or did not focus upon, the social 
difficulties experienced by individuals with autism.  ST, a Professor, was one 
VXFKUHVHDUFKHU0XFKRI67¶VLQWHUYLHZZDVFRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHDVVHUWLRQWKDW
social impairments in autism were not caused by any deficit in social 
processing per se, but rather an inability to understand complex relational 
processing in general.  Given this position, ST was asked if it was incorrect to 
WKLQNRIDXWLVPDVDµVRFLDOGLVRUGHU¶ 
67 (UP H[KDOHV ZHOO FDQ¶W VWRS WKLQNLQJ DERXW LW DV D VRFLDO GLVRUGHU EHFDXVH
SUD¶SHUKDSVWKHELWWKDWSRVHVPRst problems both for the individuals themselves and 
for the people that have to deal with them in one way or another, either live with 
them, love them, or:: educate them or whatever.  Erm:: but (.) we say it is all these 
things including a social disorder, rather than saying all it is is a social disorder and 
everything is secondary to that. (ST07: 722-729) 
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There are two features of this extract which are worthy of consideration.  
)LUVWO\ GHVSLWH 67¶V HDUOLHU FODLP WKDW WKHUH LV QR VSHFLILF GHILFLW LQ VRFLal 
processing, it is contested within this extract that it remains reasonable to 
classify autism as a social disorder.  Continuing the theme discussed above, 
WKLV µVRFLDO GLVRUGHU¶ LV TXLWH GLIIHUHQW IURP D GLVRUGHU RI WKH VRFLDO EUDLQ
autism is a social disorder because it is within social contexts, within a society, 
that the disorder becomes apparent.  It is a social disorder because society is 
µWKH ELW WKDW SRVHV PRVW SUREOHPV¶ QRW RQO\ IRU WKH LQGLYLGXDO EXW IRU WKRVH
ZKR µKDYH WR GHDO ZLWK WKHP¶ EH Whose individuals their loved ones or state 
officials.  This is one of the first instances, which will be considered in more 
depth below, of a normative conceptualisation of societal functioning being 
localised and reified within an individual.  Secondly, there is the assertion from 
67WKDWZHµFDQ¶WVWRSWKLQNLQJDERXWLWDVDVRFLDOGLVRUGHU¶SUHFLVHO\EHFDXVH
RIWKHVHVRFLHWDOGLIILFXOWLHV7KHVRFLDOLVKHUHEHLQJSRVLWLRQHGDVDQ³HWKLFDO
VXEVWDQFH´(Foucault 1984a: 26; Foucault 1997a: 264), it is the part of autism 
that is ethically relevant and there is thus a requirement for scientists to 
continue to act on it. 
 Similar issues are present in the extract with MC, a Research Fellow, 
below:  
GH: So do you see those nonsocial aspects as being really central [to the disorder?] 
MC:              [Yeah I do. Yeah.] 
*+$QGGR\RXWKLQNWKDW¶VEHHQDOLNHDPLVSODFHGHPSKDVLVLQWKHSDVWRUHUP
do think increasing the emphasis on the nonsocial aspects is? 
0& , WKLQN WKHUH LV DQ LQFUHDVLQJ HPSKDVLV  %XW ,¶P QRW VXUH LI LW¶V PLVSODFHG
EHFDXVH, WKLQN WKH VRFLDOGHILFLWVDUHYHU\ LPSRUWDQWDVZHOO $QG WKH\¶UH WKHRQHV
that are most obvious when you:: meet someone.  So, maybe that, it is necessary to 
KDYH HPS¶ HPSKDVLV RQ WKH VRFLDO LPSDLUPHQWV IRU GLDJQRVLV DQG also for helping 
SHRSOHLQWHUDFWEHWWHULQWKHUHDOZRUOGEHFDXVHWKDW¶VSUREDEO\WKHELJJHVWGLIILFXOW\
for people with autism, like on the face of it. 
GH: And, sort of theoretically do you see, erm, so you mentioned Weak Central 
Coherence 
MC: Yeah. 
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GH: Do you see:: one underlying (.) cause being responsible for nonsocial and social 
GHILFLWVRUGR\RXWKLQNWKH\¶UHLQGHSHQGHQW"2UZKDW¶VWKHUHODWLRQVKLSWKHUH" 
0&(UP,¶PJRLQJWRFKHDWDQGJRZLWKVRPHRQHHOVH¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQZKLFKLV
that the nonsocial stuff feeds into the social but not the other way around.  (MC12: 
200-222) 
As with ST, MC does not position autism as a social disorder in the expected 
VHQVH VWDWLQJ WKDW WKH µQRQVRFLDO VWXII IHHGV LQWR WKH VRFLDO EXW QRW WKH RWKHU
ZD\DURXQG¶1onetheless, and again like ST, MC resists the claim that social 
factors should be downplayed because, again, there is an ethical requirement to 
KHOSLQGLYLGXDOVZLWKDXWLVPRYHUFRPHWKHLUµELJJHVWEDUULHU¶WRIXQFWLRQLQJµLQ
WKHUHDOZRUOG¶WKDWLVWRDGhere to the demands made of them by society.   
This ethical requirement to act on the social difficulties found within 
autism, because it should be defined by its place within society, is perhaps 
most starkly stated by MW, a Professor, here considering the ethics of 
intervention: 
MW: ...I would say look giving people more social insight is probably a good thing, 
you know? 
GH: Mm hm. 
MW: They can then choose whether they want to be hermits, whether they want to 
engage with the social world, but actually not being vulnerable to other people being 
DEOH WR SXW RQH RYHU RQ \RX EHFDXVH \RX GRQ¶W KDYH D FRQFHSW RI GHFHSWLRQ LV
probably not a nice way to be in the world.  Erm, and on the other hand changing 
SHRSOH¶VGHWDLO IRFXV ZH KDYH DEVROXWHO\QR ULJKW WR WRPeddle with that. (MW18: 
675-681) 
As in the previous extracts0:LVDJDLQXVLQJWKHZRUGµVRFLDO¶WRGRDORWRI
work.  The individual with autism simultaneously has a social deficit ± they 
GRQ¶WKDYHDµFRQFHSWRIGHFHSWLRQ¶± but must also be in DµVRFLDOZRUOG¶LQD
society.  Further, there remains an ethical requirement in relation to the social; 
µJLYLQJ¶ PRUH VRFLDO LQVLJKW LV D µJRRG WKLQJ¶ VFLHQFH DQG VRFLHW\ ought to 
intervene, it is right to do so.  Detail focus (an aspect of Weak Central 
Coherence), however, is quite different, it just isµZHKDYHDEVROXWHO\QRULJKW
WRPHGGOHZLWKWKDW¶ 
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It should be noted that, as might be expected of ethical problems, there 
is not necessarily agreement between autism researchers on how they believe 
ZH µRXJKW¶ WRSURFHHG ZLWK UHJDUG WR VRFLDO LVVXHV LQ DXWLVP 7KH IROORZLQJ
extract from an interview with DF, a Reader, makes this clear:   
DF: ...I think the emphasis on, on the social ((exhales)) (.), ahh, the emphasis on 
problems in social communication in autism, ahh, kind of stresses the (.), the:: erm (.) 
maybe just illustrates this norm, the normative framework that we live in, you know, 
we are social and we want people who DUHQ¶W social to be social like us, erm, and (.), 
DKK , , WKLQN ,¶P , WKLQN ,¶P JHQXLQHO\ FRQF¶ JHQHUDOO\ FRQFHUQHG DERXW WKDW
DSSURDFKXPµFDXVH,GRQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\ZDQWDQ\RQHODXJKVWRPDNHVRPHRQH
else like me or like or, yeah, us generally... (DF03: 345-354) 
This extract shares a great deal with those that precede it.  Like the previously 
presented extracts from ST, MW, and MC, social functioning is positioned as 
an ethical substance.  Like those extracts, too, there is a sense that research into 
social functioning is based upon an intention to make individuals fit into 
broader society.  DF, however, reaches a different conclusion to other 
UHVHDUFKHUV VWDWLQJ WKDW ZH RXJKW QRW WR LQWHUYHQH LQ µSUREOHPV RI VRFLDO
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶SUHFLVHO\EHFDXVHLWLVDQDWWHPSWWRPDNHLQGLYLGXDOVFRKHUH
ZLWKD µQRUPDWLYH IUDPHZRUN¶ 7KLV LV H[DFWO\ WKH W\SHRIGLVDJUHHPHQWRQH
might expect over an arena constructed as ethical in nature.  The social in these 
discussions of autism is not, or is not only, a scientific object but an ethical 
substance related to being a particular type of individual in a particular type of 
society. 
Transforming ought into is 
The preceding discussion has been attempting to elucidate how, within 
various interview extracts, the social is enacted as an ethical substance which 
scientists ought to consider and ought to act on differently to the other objects 
which come under their consideration.  The discussion has also sought to show 
WKDWZLWKLQWKHVHH[WUDFWV WKHLVDQGWKHRXJKWRIWKHµVRFLDOO\DEQRUPDO¶DUH
brought into close proximity with each other; close enough that, on occasion, it 
LV TXLWH KDUG WR WHOO LI WKH µVRFLDO GLVRUGHU¶ XQGHU GLVFXVVLRQ UHIHUV WR WKH
functioning of an individual-in-society who has certain demands thrust upon 
her by educators, parents and the like, or if it refers to the isolated properties of 
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a biological organism.  The following sections will attempt to show spaces 
where ought is transformed into is, where the normative requirements of 
society become the objective items of scientific study.  Four such spaces will 
be considered: i) in diagnostic criteria ii) in diagnostic practice iii) in 
laboratory practice and iv) in narratives of neuroplasticity.  
i) Diagnostic criteria 
 June 2013 saw the publication of the 5th edition of the American 
3V\FKLDWULF $VVRFLDWLRQ¶V 'LDJQRVWLF DQG 6WDWLVWLFDO 0DQXDO RI 0HQWDO
Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association 2013).  Within what is a 
hugely controversial text, the revised criteria for autism remain among the 
most controversial.  In DSM-IV, text revisions (DSM-IV-TR; American 
Psychiatric Association 2000) µ$XWLVWLF 'LVRUGHU¶ ZDV RQH RI D JDJJOH RI
µ3HUYDVLYH 'HYHORSPHQWDO 'LVRUGHUV¶ WKDW DOVR LQFOXGHG µ5HWW¶V 'LVRUGHU¶
µ&KLOGKRRG 'LVLQWHJUDWLYH 'LVRUGHU¶ &'' µ$VSHUJHU¶V 'LVRUGHU¶ DQG
µ3HUYDVLYH 'HYHORSPHQWDO 'LVRUGHU 1RW 2WKHUZLVH 6SHFLILHG¶ 3''-NOS).  
Within DSM-5 this classification has changed radically.  The subgroups 
$XWLVWLF'LVRUGHU$VSHUJHU¶V DQG&&'KDYHEHHQ UHPRYHGDQG UHSODFHGE\
the siQJOHGLPHQVLRQDOFODVVLILFDWLRQRI µ$XWLVWLF6SHFWUXP'LVRUGHU¶ $6'
It is intended that this classification will also include the overwhelming 
majority of individuals currently diagnosed with PDD-NOS, a classification 
which has also been removed.  Any individuals who would previously have 
been diagnosed with PDD-NOS and who do not meet the new criteria for ASD 
ZLOO LQ DOO OLNHOLKRRG EH GLDJQRVHG ZLWK D IXUWKHU QHZ FRQGLWLRQ µ6RFLDO
&RPPXQLFDWLRQ'LVRUGHU¶ 6&'ZKLFK LVQRWGLUHFWO\ OLQNHG WR$6'EXW is 
UDWKHULQFOXGHGDVRQHRIWKHFRPPXQLFDWLRQGLVRUGHUV µ5HWW¶V'LVRUGHU¶KDV
been entirely removed from DSM-5, intriguingly because its genetic basis has 
been determined (Kurita 2011: 609). 
 The formalisation of an autistic spectrum has also necessitated the 
DGYHQWRI µVHYHULW\ VFRUHV¶ZKLFKSODFHDQ LQGLYLGXDODW DSDUWLFXODUSRLQWRQ
that spectrum.  Further, the symptoms required for this base diagnosis have 
also altered.  Sensory abnormalities have been included as a possible symptom 
and included amongst the category of restricted interests and repetitive 
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behaviours (RRBIs), a category afforded increased importance by transforming 
the existing triad of impairments (social impairments, communication 
impairments, RRBIs) into a dyad; achieved by a merger of social and 
communication impairments into socio-communicative impairments.  It is also 
SRVVLEOH WR KDYH D GLDJQRVLV µPRGLILHG¶ E\ RQH RI DQRWKHU UDQJH RI IDFWRUV
from intellectual disability to normal language onset (christened ASD, 
$VSHUJHU¶VW\SH 
As noted above, critics have questioned numerous aspects of these 
changes in diagnostic classification.  Firstly, it has been asked whether the 
amended criteria sacrifice sensitivity in exchange for their undoubtedly 
specificity (Skuse 2012), with a particular concern that high functioning 
individuals may no longer meet criteria (McPartland et al. 2012).  Secondly, 
the justification for SCD has been repeatedly questioned (e.g. Tanguay 2011).  
Finally, perhaps the most hotly contested change has been the removal of 
$VSHUJHU¶V 6\QGURPH (Mattila et al. 2011) which has become central within 
contemporary discussions of ASD. 
The research interviews for this project took place between August 
2012 and February 2013 and, over this period, the DSM-5 classification went 
IURPDVWDJHRIµILQDOSURRILQJ¶WRKDYLQJLWVFRPSRVLtion confirmed.  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly most, although certainly not all, researchers held strong and 
usually nuanced opinions about DSM-5.  Three areas of concern were 
repeatedly raised when researchers discussed what they thought DSM-5 ought 
to achieve.  These three areas of concern to researchers within DSM-5 were 
those of scientific validity, socio-economic politics, and identity politics.  It 
should be noted, however, that exactly where one of these arenas ended and 
another began was rarely straightforward.  What is noticeable, once again, is 
how easily normative prescriptions and scientific descriptions merge.  The 
following extract from AO, a Research Fellow, discusses the manoeuvring 
VXUURXQGLQJ$VSHUJHU¶VZLWKLQ'60-5: 
AO: I mean Asperger syndrome, there was a lot of, erm, objections to the possibility 
RI WKDW JRLQJ EHFDXVH WKHUH¶V D YHU\ VWURQJ $VSHUJHU LGHQWLW\ ZKLFK , FRPSOHWHO\
understand and that the committee I think completely understand and accept which is 
ZK\WKH\¶UHNHHSLQg that as a qualifier I think [is the word they use. (AO04: 377-382) 
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7RSURYLGHFRQWH[W WR WKLV H[WUDFW$2KDVSUHYLRXVO\ VWDWHG WKDW WKHUH ³LVQ¶W
the research evidence that consistently backs up that it >$VSHUJHU¶V@ is a 
different diagnosis´ (AO04: 123-125).  Nonetheless, AO believes that there 
KDYH EHHQ µREMHFWLRQV¶ WR WKH SRVVLELOLW\ WKDW $VSHUJHU¶V PLJKW EH UHPRYHG
EHFDXVHRIWKHµVWURQJ$VSHUJHULGHQWLW\¶ZKLFKKDVIRUPHGDURXQGLW 7KHVH
DUHREMHFWLRQVWKDW$2LVDEOHWRµFRPSOHWHO\XQGHUVWDQGDQGDFFHSW¶, and AO 
seems reasonably happy for the inclusion of a qualifier to pacify these needs. 
 CT, a Senior Lecturer, makes a similar point.  It is particularly 
noticeable in this extract the extent to which the line between scientific 
evidence and identity politics is repeatedly blurred: 
CT: The:: rationale for the changes in the diagnostic classification is indeed that the 
reliably of the sub-GLDJQRVHV\RXNQRZEHWZHHQ$VSHUJHU¶VDQG+LJK)XQFWLRQLQJ
Autism and so on was low, so a child who was diagnosed ZLWK$VSHUJHU¶V6\QGURPH
in one setting or one, by one clinician might go to another with, showing the same 
symptoms and so on, and receive a diagnosis of High Functioning Autism so the sub-
GLDJQRVHVZHUHQRWVXIILFLHQWO\UHOLDEOH7KDW¶VWKHUDWLRQDOHIRr changing the way the 
GLDJQRVLVLVGRQH,GRKDYHUHVHUYDWLRQVDERXWWKHVHFKDQJHV,GRQ¶WNQRZZKHWKHU
WKLVLVDSUHSUHILJXULQJRUSUHMXGJLQJZKDW\RX¶UHJRLQJWRDVNPHQext, but do you 
want me to    [carry on?] 
GH:        [Oh no, go,] go ahead 
CT: Well, erm, (.) I think for one thing in terms of thinking, thinking of the interests 
DQGQHHGVRISHRSOHRQ WKHDXWLVP VSHFWUXP WKDW$VSHUJHU¶V6\QGURPH LVD NLQGRI
EDGJHRI LGHQWLW\ HUP IRUSHRSOHRQ WKH$XWLVP6SHFWUXPSHRSOHZLWK$VSHUJHU¶V
Syndrome, they see it as sort of maybe less stigmatising than a diagnosis of autism, 
HUPLW¶VEHHQDURXQGIRUDZKLOHHUPLW¶VYHU\PXFKSDUWSDUWRIWKHZD\ZHWKLQN
DQGFRQ¶WKLQNDERXWDQGFRQFHSWXDOLVHDXWLVP6R,WKLQNWKDW¶VJRLQJWREHDELJ
shift, erm, I think it might be a bit premature.  No.  It may be that the ways in which 
$VSHUJHU¶V 6\QGURPH LV GLIIHUHQWLDWHG IURP  DXWLVP SURSHU VR WR VSHDN DUH QRW
VXIILFLHQWO\ UHOLDEOH DW WKH PRPHQW LW GRHVQ¶W QHFHVVDULO\ PHDQ \RX WKURZ RXW WKDW
sub-diagnosis.  (CT02: 239-265) 
&7EHJLQVWKLVH[WUDFWE\H[SODLQLQJWKHµUDWLRQDOH¶IRUWKHFKDQJLQJGLDJQRVWLF
criteria in terms of reliability, considering how individuals diagnosed as having 
$VSHUJHU¶V µLQ RQH VHWWLQJ RU E\ RQH FOLQLFLDQ¶ PD\ UHFHLYH D GLIIerent 
diagnosis within another setting, or with another clinician.  The rationale for 
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DSM-5 is therefore laid down broadly in terms of the reliability and validity of 
GLDJQRVHV  &7 µKDV UHVHUYDWLRQV¶ DERXW WKHVH FKDQJHV KRZHYHU SULQFLSDOO\
WKDWWKHµLQWHUHVWVDQGQHHGVRISHRSOHRQWKHDXWLVPVSHFWUXP¶PD\QRWEHPHW
WKDW WKH ORVV RI WKH µOHVV VWLJPDWLVLQJ¶ µEDGJH RI LGHQWLW\¶ WKDW LV $VSHUJHU¶V
may be unduly damaging.  These reservations, therefore, broadly concern 
issues of identity.  Within a sentence, however, CT reverts to considering the 
re-formulation of diagnoses in terms of reliability and concludes, apparently on 
WKH EDVLV RI WKH LGHQWLW\ SROLWLFV RI $VSHUJHU¶V WKDW ZKLOH VXE-diagnoses are 
µQRWVXIILFLHQWO\UHOLDEOH¶LWµGRHVQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\PHan you throw out that sub-
GLDJQRVLV¶  ,Q &7¶V WDON ZH DUH QRW VHHLQJ QRUPDWLYH YDOXH-laden concepts 
LQWUXGHLQWRWKHµREMHFWLYH¶ZRUOGRIGLDJQRVLVWKHGRRULVWKUXVWRSHQDQGWKH\
are being actively encouraged in.  As AO notes, this is a view that the working 
committee for DSM-5 seem to have held as well, with original drafts excluding 
$VSHUJHU¶V HQWLUHO\ (Happé 2011) only for it to be re-introduced following 
public consultation.    
 Similar claims, that DSM-5 ought to consider the societal consequences 
of diagnostic criteria, were made in relation to the socio-political effects of 
diagnostic change.  For example an Assistant Professor, BG, made the 
following point: 
BG: ...the manifestation of the symptoms may not be very distinguishable between 
Asperger and high functioning autism.  However, it has a larger impact to keep in 
mind, in terms of clinical and service provide, service users because, erm, you can, y, 
I mean, one needs to think about what will happen to all those people who have a 
$VSHUJHU¶V6\QGURPHGLDJQRVLVIURPIURPZLOOWKH\ZLOO they go into SCD or 
ZLOOWKH\JRLQWR$6'EHFDXVHVRPH$VSHUJHU¶V6\QGURPHSDWLHQWVPD\QRWKDYHKDG
er, mm, a repetitive behaviour issue.  Now, that would be true also for ASD, I mean, 
they may not have had repetitive behaviour issues, so:: (.) that in, in that sense, as 
long as the service users can be protected and those people who need services can be, 
can, can continue to access them, then:: that, that, then the, otherwise this general 
move from, er, creating separate categories called Asperger and autism into one 
category called ASD I think is a generally good move... (BG06: 430-446) 
BG agrees with the DSM-FRPPLWWHHWKDWµWKHPDQLIHVWDWLRQRIWKHV\PSWRPV
PD\ QRW EH YHU\ GLVWLQJXLVKDEOH EHWZHHQ $VSHUJHU¶V DQG KLJK IXQFWLRQLQJ
DXWLVP¶ DQG DFFHSWV WKDt the merger of these diagnoses into one category is 
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µJHQHUDOO\ D JRRG PRYH¶  '60-5 is here applauded for supporting recent 
scientific evidence.  This merger would only be appropriate, however, if the 
FRQVHTXHQFHV IRU µFOLQLFDO DQG VHUYLFH SURYLGHUV¶ DQG µVHUYLFH XVHUV¶ ZHUH
FRQVLGHUHG  ,W LVRISDUDPRXQW LPSRUWDQFH IRU%* WKDW µVHUYLFHXVHUVFDQEH
SURWHFWHG¶DQGWKDWµWKRVHLQGLYLGXDOVZKRQHHGVHUYLFHVFDQFRQWLQXHWRDFFHVV
WKHP¶  ,IDQGRQO\LI WKHVHFRQGLWLRQVDUHPHWVKRXOGWKHGLDJQRVWLFFULWHUia 
change. 
 ST, a Professor, is particularly explicit about the requirement of DSM-5 
to protect the imagined socio-political futures of individuals with autism.  ST 
states that, within their own research, sub-diagnoses have never been used.  
This is at leaVWSDUWLDOO\EHFDXVHDGLDJQRVLVRI$VSHUJHU¶VLVGHSHQGHQWXSRQD
retrospective interview which seeks to establish the onset of communication 
difficulties, a process which ST believes is simply too problematic.  When 
asked if the move within DSM-WRµPDNHWKDWRIILFLDO¶ZDVSRVLWLYH67VWDWHV
that: 
67 (UP \HDK  , WKLQN LW¶V EURDGO\ D VHQVLEOH RQH EHFDXVH GLD¶ GLDJQRVLV LV
generally to help the individual, erm, be managed and cared for appropriately, and 
,¶PQRWVRVXUH WKDWHUDQ LQGLYLGXDOZKRKas perfectly good language now and a 
SHUIHFWO\ JRRG OHYHO RI LQWHOOHFWXDO IXQFWLRQLQJ HU LW LW GRHVQ¶W PDNH DQ\ GLIIHUHQW
whether their language is a bit delayed when they were, er, three or whatever. (ST07: 
382-389) 
It is immediately evident here that ST does not frame the change within DSM-
5 as positive because it aligns with research requirements; rather it is positive 
EHFDXVH LW VKRXOG µKHOS WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶ EH µPDQDJHG DQG FDUHG IRU
DSSURSULDWHO\¶  67 JRHV RQWR DFFHSW WKDW WKH UHPRYDO RI $VSHUJHU¶V is 
problematic for those who have forged identities around that label but states 
that: 
ST: ...well, you can start to think about this in various different ways, you can start to 
say, erm, why not keep, why not keep the labels? Fine, but then, er, er, services 
DJHQFLHVDUHJRLQJWRZDQWWRORRNIRUUHDVRQVQRWWRVSHQGPRQH\HUPDQGVRWKH\¶OO
VD\ ZHOO ZH¶OO RQO\ JLYH WKLV VHUYLFH WR SHRSOH ZLWK $VSHUJHU¶V 6\QGURPH DQG ZH
ZRQ¶WJLYHLWWRSHRSOHZKR¶YHJRWDXWLVPHUEXW\RXWDNHSLFNWZRLQGLYLGXDOVDQG 
WKH\¶G EH LQGLVWLQJXLVKDEOH DSDUW IURP VRPHWKLQJ WKDW KDSSHQHG ZKHQ WKH\ ZHUH
WKUHHHUPDQG\RX¶GVD\ZHOOWKLVJX\¶VJRLQJWRJHWVHUYLFHVDQGWKLVJX\LVQ¶WDQG
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WKDW¶VQRWIDLUZKDWHYHUDERXWWKLVJX\¶VLGHQWLW\DQGWKLVJX\¶VLGHQWLW\DQGVRWKHUH
WKHUH¶VFRPSOH[LVVXHVZKLFK,¶PQRWFRPSHWHQWWRWRWDONDERXWHYHQWKRXJK,¶PD
D DZDUH RI WKHP DV D LPSRUWDQW LVVXHV IRU WKH LQGLYLGXDOV WKHPVHOYHV , PHDQ LW¶V
RQHLW¶VTXLWHVRPHWKLQJWRVD\WRVRPHERG\ZHOOZHNQRZZH¶YHDOZD\VFDOOHG\RX
AsperJHU EXW \RX NQRZ \RX¶UH QRW DQ\PRUH \RX¶UH MXVW \RX¶YH JRW $XWLVP
Spectrum Disorder, maybe, of the Asperger type or something like that, because they 
can, they can put qualifications into the diagnosis now on the basis of DSM-5. (ST07: 
403-422) 
It is clear that, for ST, service provision trumps identity politics.  The fact that 
µVHUYLFH DJHQFLHV DUH JRLQJ WRZDQW WR ORRN IRU UHDVRQVQRW WR VSHQGPRQH\¶
PHDQVWKDWLWLVVLPSO\QRWIHDVLEOHWRKDYHDXWLVPDQG$VSHUJHU¶VFR-exist as it 
is possible that this there will be D µVHUYLFH WR SHRSOH ZLWK $VSHUJHU¶V
6\QGURPH DQG ZH ZRQ¶W JLYH LW WR SHRSOH ZKR¶YH JRW DXWLVP¶.  This, quite 
VLPSO\ µLV QRW IDLU¶ DQG IDLUQHVV PXVW EH FRQVLGHUHG ZLWKLQ WKH GLDJQRVWLF
manual.  The addition of qualifiers, allowing somebody WR EH µRI WKH
$VSHUJHU¶V W\SH¶ LV DQRG WRZDUGV WKH LPSRUWDQFHRI LGHQWLW\SROLWLFVEXW IRU
ST it is service provision which should drive DSM-5. 
It is interesting that, despite clearly giving the issue a great deal of 
WKRXJKW 67 VWDWHV WKDW µWKH\ DUH QRW FRPSHWHQW WR WDON DERXW¶ WKHVH LVVXHV¶
And yet the DSM-5 working committee was comprised entirely of British and 
American psychiatrists and psychologists with similar knowledge bases.  One 
Lecturer stated that: 
(& ,Q D VHQVH \RX \RX¶UH WU\LQJ WR GHVFribe and understanding what people with 
autism and families with autism think is the core of autism, what they think is 
SUREOHPDWLFZKDWWKH\¶UHILQGLQJGLIILFXOW(&-172) 
This position nicely captures the general sentiments expressed with the 
interview data; diagnoses ought WR EH QRUPDWLYH WKH\ VKRXOG µGHVFULEH DQG
XQGHUVWDQG¶ ZKDW µSHRSOH ZLWK DXWLVP DQG IDPLOLHV ZLWK DXWLVP WKLQN LV WKH
FRUH¶ µZKDW WKH\¶UH ILQGLQJ GLIILFXOW¶ DQG µZKDW WKH\ WKLQN LV SUREOHPDWLF¶
Historical analyses of the DSM have revealed that socio-political matters have 
been always been crucial in the determination of mental disease classification 
(Pickersgill 2012a).  What is added to that analysis here is that within these 
interviews scientists state that DSM should be a socio-political act, it should be 
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working to ensure the best possible future for those deemed to be in need of 
care.  What is not acknowledged, however, is that ought becomes is within a 
research setting, that societal values become social truths, and that a 
classification which only makes sense within a particular historical-cultural 
moment is localised and reified within an individual. 
ii) Diagnostic practice 
 The autism researchers interviewed repeatedly claimed that, in order to 
EHSXEOLVKHGLQWKHµWRSMRXUQDOV¶LWZDVHVVHQWLDOIRUSDUWLFLSDQWVWREHJiven a 
score on the Autism Diagnosis Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al. 
1989; Lord et al. 2000) and, thus, despite complaints over costs of both 
training and the kit itself, most interviewees had qualified to administer the 
ADOS and/or had students who were.   
The ADOS itself takes the form of a highly structured observation.  A 
researcher sits one-on-one with an individual who potentially has autism.  Over 
the next 45 minutes or so, and following guidelines, researchers run through a 
series of fifteen different tasks, including telling a story from a book, an 
attempt at a back-and-forth conversation, questions concerning work and 
school, and a demonstration task whereby the participant must pretend to brush 
their teeth with a finger.  The encounter is video recorded and, following 
completion of the observation, the researcher watches back the interactions.  
The researcher then gives the individual a score, between 0-3 for example, on 
various measures seen to be indicative of one portion of the triad of autism 
V\PSWRPV  )RU H[DPSOH 55%,V DUH EURNHQ GRZQ LQWR ³XQXVXDO VHQVRU\
LQWHUHVWLQSOD\´WKLVPay take, for example, the form of repeatedly brushing a 
WR\ DJDLQVW RQH¶V FKHHN ³KDQG DQG ILQJHU DQG RWKHU FRPSOH[ PDQQHULVPV´
³VHOI-LQMXULRXVEHKDYLRU´³FRPSXOVLRQVRU ULWXDOV´DQG³H[FHVVLYH LQWHUHVW LQ
or references to or highly specific topics or REMHFWV RU UHSHWLWLYH EHKDYLRUV´
The total scores are then tallied and any individual who scores above a 
particular cut-off is, for the purpose of research at least, classified as autistic. 
 Reading through the ADOS procedure, or better, watching the ADOS 
being performed with a teenager suspected of having autism, it is remarkable 
TXLWHKRZKHWHURQRUPDWLYHDSURFHVVLWLV)RUPDOTXHVWLRQVLQFOXGH³'R\RX
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KDYHDMRE´³:KDWDERXWPRQH\"'R\RXWDNHFDUHRI\RXURZQPRQH\"´DQG
³'R\RXKDYHDJLUOIULHQGER\IULHQG":KDWLVKHUKLVQDPH"´16  While it is not 
TXLWH DV VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG DV D IDLOXUH WR DQVZHU WKHVH TXHVWLRQV µFRUUHFWO\¶
leading to a diagnosis of autism, it is striking just how readily societal norms 
are introduced into this supposedly objective diagnosis. 
There is also something of a semantic sleight of hand in the title of 
Autism Diagnosis Observation Schedule because it is quite clear that the 
ADOS is an encounter and not an observation.  Bruno Latour has claimed that 
scientists "should never speak of "data" - what is given - but rather of "sublata", 
that is, of "achievements"" (Latour 1999: 42) and that is certainly the case with 
the ADOS.  The objective scientific finding in the ADOS, that an individual 
has autism, is not given to the researcher but only becomes apparent following 
a significant amount of work on their behalf; a diagnosis is not revealed, it is 
achieved.  MC, a Research Fellow, for example, says: 
0& ,W >WKH $'26@ LV LW LV XVHIXO  $QG LW¶V DOVR D XVHIXO SUDFWLFH WKDW LW LW UHDOO\
PHDQV\RXGRXSJHWWRXQGHUVWDQGWKDWSHUVRQ(UPDQGLW¶VDJRRGZD\RIHOLFLWLQJ
the various bHKDYLRXUVWKDW\RX¶UH\RX¶UHWU\LQJWRORRNDWSo yeah,WKLQNLW¶VWKH
measure itself is very good... (MC12: 618-623) 
0&KHUHVWDWHV WKDW WKH$'26µLVXVHIXO¶DQGWKDWµWKHPHDVXUHLWVHOI LVYHU\
JRRG¶+RZHYHUWKHFODLPWKDWWKH$'26LVDJRRGZD\RIµHOLFLWLQJ¶YDULRXV
EHKDYLRXUV µ\RX¶UH WU\LQJ WR ORRNDW¶ LV TXLWH VWULNLQJ UHIOHFWLQJ WKH IDFW WKDW
autism only becomes visible following the activities of the researcher.  That 
claim is put even more starkly by EC, a Lecturer, discussing the utility of the 
ADOS for examining social symptoms in autism as compared to RRBIs: 
EC: Well we can, you can provoke a child to be crap at social interaction, excuse my 
language, by trying to have a conversation with them and they just fall apart.  But you 
FDQ¶W UHDOO\ SURYRNH D FKLOG LQWR VKRZLQJ W¶ W¶ WKHLU OLNH \RX NQRZ UHSHWLWLYH
EHKDYLRXURUVRPHWKLQJXQOHVVWKH\<RXNQRZLW¶VMXVWPXFKPRUHGLIILFXOWWRHOLFLW
WKDW6RRQWKDWLW¶VQRWJRRGDWWKDWDWDOO(&-978)  
                                       
16
 7KLV TXHVWLRQ LV H[SDQGHG XSRQ ZLWK ³+RZ GR \RX NQRZ VKH KH LV \RXU
JLUOIULHQGER\IULHQG"´DQG³'R\RXHYHUWKLQNDERXWKDYLQJDORQJ-term relationship or getting 
PDUULHG"´ 
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Once again we can see that EC talks about the ADOS as a place where it is 
SRVVLEOHWRµHOLFLW¶VRFLDODEQRUPDOLW\ 7KHWHUPµSURYRNHG¶KRZHYHUVHHPV
EOXQWHU VWLOO  7KH LGHD WKDW \RX FDQ µprovoke a child to be crap at social 
LQWHUDFWLRQ¶VHHPV LIDQ\WKLQJTXLWHVLQLVWHU'HVSLWH this, EC would go onto 
VD\WKDWWKH$'26ZDVDVSDFHZKHUH\RXFDQ³VHHWKHDXWLVPUHDOO\VWDULQJDW
\RX´ (&.  This is the central paradox within the ADOS and within 
autism ± LWLVDVSDFHZKHUHDXWLVPLVVHHQEXWRQO\ZKHQLWLVµSURYRNHG¶DQG
µHOLFLWHG¶IRUFHGblinking from the shadows into the blinding light of truth, as 
Foucault says of madness (2006a: 79).   
 To a significant extent, autism researchers know this of the ADOS, that 
as within DSM-5, autism only makes sense within a normative framework, 
within a society, that the social of cognitive science cannot truly be separated 
from society.  For example HB, a senior Lecturer, states that: 
HB: Well, (.) Hmm.(.) Well I think IRU D VWDUW LW¶V >WKH $'2S] quite verbal, the, 
WKHUH¶V ORWV RI LVVXHV  6R RQH LV WKDW WKHUH¶V QRW SDUWLFXODUO\ JUHDW GHYHORSPHQWDO
research using things like the ADOS so, if you wanted WRVD\\RX¶UHNLQGRIUDWLQJ
NLGVRQWKLQJVOLNHGRWKH\XQGHUVWDQGPDUULDJHRUIULHQGVKLSDQGDQG\HWZHGRQ¶W
really have any kind of hard and fast norms for how typical kids understand those 
things or how much eye contact is appropriate, or how likely are teenage boys to 
HQJDJHLQDFRQYHUVDWLRQZLWKD\RXQJZRPDQWKH\¶YHQHYHUPHWEHIRUHDERXWDERXW
their friends or their experiences you know so (.) and the modules, so module three 
for example goes from age four to fourteen and you would expect all of those things 
to be developing over time but you use the same set of codings for that entire age 
range so people have to kind of internally adjust what their expectations are according 
to what they think typical kids at that age might do which is quite hard, I think, and so 
a lot of it is still quite subjective. (HB01: 276-293) 
+%XQGHUVWDQGVKHUHWKDWWKH$'26LVDWWHPSWLQJWRµUDWHNLGV¶RQWKLQJVOLNH
µPDUULDJHDQGIULHQGVKLS¶WRGHWHUPLQHLIWKH\DUHQRUPDORUµW\SLFDO¶DQGWKDW
these ratings depenGXSRQWKHµH[SHFWDWLRQV¶RIWKHUHVHDUFKHU7KHUHLVDOVRDQ
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKDWPXFKRIDQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V UHVSRQVH LVGHWHUPLQHGE\IDFWRUV
not accounted for within the ADOS, such as the age of the child and the 
relationship between the researcher and the participant.  As hinted at by HB, 
the majority of individuals being assessed are young boys while the majority of 
autism researchers are young women and this relationship is undoubtedly 
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influential and dynamic both within and between ADOS sittings.  The 
conclusion from these extracts is that, within the ADOS at least, autism is 
QHYHU µMXVW¶ VHHQ LW LV µHOLFLWHG¶ DQG µSURYRNHG¶ LQWR DSSHDULQJ E\ WKH
researcher when they interact with the individual in question.  That specific 
dynamic, the relationship between the researcher and the child is key to 
GHWHUPLQLQJ WKHIRUPWKDWDXWLVPZLOO WDNHDQG WKHUHVHDUFKHU¶V LGHDRIZKDW
µW\SLFDO NLGV¶ ZRXOG GR LQ WKDW VLWXDWLRQ JRHV D ORQJ ZD\ WR GHWHUPLQLQJ
whether or not a diagnosis is appropriate.  As with the researcKHUV¶GLVFXVVLRQV
over DSM, what a child ought to do in a given situation is the basis of deciding 
what that child is. 
iii) Laboratory practice 
Continuing with the theme that seeing autism should be considered a 
mutual achievement, participants repeatedly constructed the social as 
something that was very hard to measure objectively within a laboratory 
setting.  In the extract below DR, a Professor, considers individuals with 
7XUQHU¶V 6\QGURPH D JHQHWLF FRQGLWLRQ ZKLFK '5 EHOLHYHV SUHGLVSRVHV
individuals to autism.  Recognition that this condition is linked with autism has 
been, according to DR, slow coming, at least in part because many of these 
individuals are able to complete traditional cognitive tests of social 
functioning: 
DR: ...they can do Theory of Mind tasks, they can, you can chuck a whole bunch of 
GLIIHUHQWWDVNVDWWKHPDQGWKH\¶OOEHDEOHWRSDVVWKHP6R\RXVD\ZHOOZK\DUHWKH\
so socially incompetent?  Well because actually measuring social competence is 
something which is very, very difficult to do in a s::, you know, in a scientific way. 
(DR13: 373-378) 
0RVW LQWHUHVWLQJ KHUH IRU SUHVHQW SXUSRVHV LV '5¶V FODLP WKDW µVRFLDO
FRPSHWHQFH¶ LV µYHU\ YHU\ GLIILFXOW¶ WR PHDVXUH LQ D µVFLHQWLILF ZD\¶  :KDW
this statement reflects is a frequently stated position of autism researchers that 
µWKHVRFLDO¶LVVRPHWKLQJZKLFKLVKDUGLIQRWLPSRVVLEOHWRFRQWDLQZLWKLQWKH
decontaminated realms of the laboratory. 
That struggle to get the social to cohere to the demands of an 
experimental regime is remarked upon by MN, a Research Fellow: 
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MN: ...social behaviours just are such a (.) awkward thing to define compared to, like, 
G\VOH[LDZKHUH\RXJHWWKHPWRGRDUHDGLQJWHVWDQGWKHQ WKDW¶V\RX¶UHEHKDYLRXUDO
WHVW(UPVRFLDOEHKDYLRXU¶VUHDOO\KDUGWRassess and test EHFDXVHLW¶VLQWHUDFWLRQDO
VRZKDWHYHUWKHWKLQJLVWKDW\RX¶UHLQWHUDFWLQJZLWKLVDOVRYDULDEOHVRLW¶VMXVWTXLWH
complex to test it. (MN05: 781-787)  
MN here focuses upon two themes that would reoccur throughout the 
LQWHUYLHZV  )LUVWO\ µVRFLDO EHKDYLRXUV¶ DUH SDUWLFXODUO\ KDUG WR GHILQH
Another interviewee would say, while problematising the notion of the social 
EUDLQ WKDW ³almost anything we can do can be construed as social under 
certain circumstances´ (ST07:961-962) and that sense comes across clearly 
here.  Secondly, and following DR, there is the claim that because social 
EHKDYLRXULVµLQWHUDFWLRQDO¶LWLVµTXLWHFRPSOH[¶WRH[DPLQH7KLVSUREOHPLV
further considered by EC, a Lecturer, below: 
(&(UPVRH[KDOH,WKLQNWKHSUREOHPZLWKDXWLVPLVWKDWZKHQ\RX¶UHFD¶\RX¶UH
FDSWXULQJVRPHWKLQJDERXWDVRFLDOG\QDPLFDQGLW¶V LW¶VDERXWVRPHERG\¶VDELOLWLHV
falling down within a social setting, well expHULPHQWDOO\ WKDW¶V TXLWH GLIILFXOW WR
replicate, so I think, I suppose the other way of looking at it is if you can, to think 
EHWWHUDERXWFDSWXULQJUHDOOLIHLQDQH[SHULPHQWDOVHWWLQJEHFDXVHPD\EHWKH\¶UHEDG
DWHUPWKH\¶UHEDGDWUHFRJQLVLQJHPRWLRQZKHQLW¶VLQWKHFRQWH[WRIVRPHWKLQJYHU\
G\QDPLFWKDW¶VKDSSHQLQJLQDVKRUWSHULRGRIWLPHLQDUHDOOLIHLQWHUDFWLRQZKHUHDVLI
\RXJLYHVRPHWKLQJDQGWKH\KDYH\RXNQRZILYHVHFRQGVWRZRUNLWRXWDQGLW¶VD
VWLOOLPDJHWKH\¶UHJRLQJWREHILQH6RWKHUH¶VVRPXFKGDWDWKDW¶VFRQWUDGLFWRU\DQG
QRW ZHOO XQGHUVWRRG DQG , WKLQN D ELJ SUREOHP LV WKDW LW¶V QRW  LW LW \HDK LW¶V
VRPHWKLQJ DERXW WKH VRFLDO FRQWH[W WKDW ZH MXVW QRW \RX GRQ¶W KDYH LQKHUHQW LQ DQ
experimental task, you know? (EC11: 1069-1081, 1088-1092) 
$VZLWKWKHSUHYLRXVH[WUDFWV(&KHUHFRQVLGHUVWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIµFDSWXULQJ
VRPHWKLQJ DERXW D VRFLDO G\QDPLF¶ ZLWKLQ D ODERUDWRU\ VHWWLQJ
([SHULPHQWDOO\ WKLV VRFLDO G\QDPLF LV VRPHWKLQJ ZKLFK LV µTXLWH GLIILFXOW WR
UHSOLFDWH¶LQGHHGLWPD\EHWKDWWKHµVRFLDOFRQWH[W¶LVVRPHWKLQJWKDWMXVWLVQ¶W
µLQKHUHQW LQ DQ H[SHULPHQWDO WDVN¶  7KLV LV TXLWH D FODLP WKDW WKH GHILQLQJ
features of autism resist the dominant methods of the human sciences.  It is a 
claim, however, that clearly resonates with both the views of MN and DR, 
above, as well as some of those discussed in a previous chapter on 
heterogeneity, where researchers claimed that there was something about 
autism which made it hard to grasp scientifically (see in particular pp.124-
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126).  It also resonates with the above discussion concerning the ADOS in 
ZKLFKVRFLDODEQRUPDOLW\KDGWREHµHOLFLWHG¶RUµSURYRNHG¶E\H[SHULPHQWHUV
It is also interesting that EC seeks to overcome this problem by calling for an 
DWWHPSW WR µWKLQN EHWWHU DERXW FDSWXULQJ UHDO OLIH LQ DQ H[SHULPHQWDO VHWWLQJ¶
Utterances such as these continue to reframe the relationship between science 
and society within autism research.  Rather than position the laboratory as an 
a-geographical, a-temporal space, there is the possibility suggested at here that 
one should deliberately attempt to bring society into the experimental setting.  
,WLVRIFRXUVH³OHVVRQQXPEHURQHRIWKHVRFLRORJ\RIVFLHQWLILFNQRZOHGJH´
(Shapin 2012: 171) that society is present within the laboratory, but the 
suggestion that society should be introduced deliberately is perhaps more 
surprising.     
iv) neuroplasticity 
Placing narratives of neuroplasticity within contemporary neuroscience 
remains complicated.  On the one hand, and as others have noted (Callard & 
Margulies 2011; 228; Papadopoulos 2011), it seems undoubtedly the case that 
the possibilities of co-opting science into the attempt to eradicate the 
boundaries between material and semiotic, inner and outer, nature and culture 
have lead to a certain overexcitement within the social sciences, and 
contemporaneous dearth of critical thinking on the matter.  Similarly, it cannot 
be denied that the Nature Publishing Group alone have published hundreds if 
not thousands of articles on the plasticity of biology over the last decade.   
With reference to autism in particular, there is an interesting aspect to debates 
over neuroplasticity as there is the suggestion the societal norms may indeed 
be written into the biology of the social brain, thus society enters the laboratory 
within the heads of participants.  RS, a Professor, notes the following:  
RS: ...when you constitute small groups for say brain scanning and find homogeneity 
WKDW VXJJHVWV WR PH WKDW LW¶V (.) certainly plausible WKDW ZKDW \RX¶UH VHHLQJ LV D
reflection of a developmental outcome of what might be diverse stories that correlates 
ZLWKWKHDXWLVPWKDW\RX¶UHVHHLQJEXWPD\LQGHHGQRWEHWKHXQGHUSLQQLQJVRILWWKHUH
may be different underpinnings, because the idea that I would suggest is that you 
explain the heterogeneity leading to homogeneity by a final common pathway in the 
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psychological level of explanation in terms of the development of these children 
(RS10: 348-357) 
According to RS, it is µSODXVLEOH¶ WKDW QHXURLPDJHV DUH D µUHIOHFWLRQ RI D
GHYHORSPHQWDORXWFRPH¶UDWKHUWKDQLPDJHVRILQQDWHELRORJ\,QRWKHUZRUGV
there is the possibility that differences in the social brain reveal not so much 
WKHµXQGHUSLQQLQJV¶RIDXWLVPEXWUDWKHUWKHoutcome of having autism within a 
particular societal configuration.  CG, a postdoctoral researcher, bases much of 
their research around this relationship between the self and society:   
GH: So what are the, yeah, so I mean the mechanisms which are underpinning, er, (.) 
the social cognitive behaviours I guess, or (.) 
CG: Well (.) 
GH: (.) Or that might be, er, atypical in an autistic population? 
&*<HDK:KDWLVDW\SLFDOLQWKHDXWLVPSRSXODWLRQ(UPWKDW¶VSDUWRIWKH
UHDVRQZK\,¶PKHUHWRstudy this developmental neuroscience, to understand autism.  
%HFDXVH DXWLVP LV KHWHURJHQHRXV EXW LW¶V WHQGV WR VKRZ HU SDWWHUQ RI OLNH
developmental trajectory.  So::, any understanding, to understand social, and then 
WKHUH¶VVRFLDOFRJQLWLRQ LVDOVo the (.), erm::, the type of cognition which adapts to, 
the:: human world through experience and interaction, through the peer to peer 
interaction, through the interaction with wider members of the society.  So:: I think 
that the key question is like, how they learn, how this brain like appeared in the real, 
erm, the world. (CG09:577-594) 
&*LVLQWHUHVWHGLQVWXG\LQJµGHYHORSPHQWDOQHXURVFLHQFH¶µ6RFLDOFRJQLWLRQ¶
ZKLFK&*WDNHVDVFHQWUDOWRXQGHUVWDQGLQJDXWLVPµDGDSWVWRWKHVRFLDOZRUOG
through expHULHQFH DQG LQWHUDFWLRQ¶ LW ORRNV WKH ZD\ LW GRHV EHFDXVH RI
µLQWHUDFWLRQZLWKZLGHUPHPEHUVRIVRFLHW\¶ 7KHTXHVWLRQRI LQWHUHVW LVKRZ
WKHEUDLQORRNVµLQWKHUHDOZRUOG¶KDYLQJEHHQVKDSHGDWOHDVWSDUWLDOO\IURP
the society in which it is embedded.  CG is not alone in asking these questions, 
EH, another postdoctoral researcher claims that ³,¶PJRLQJWREHORRNLQJDW
EEG responses to social and nonsocial stimuli, that kind of thing to look at 
KRZKRZWKHEUDLQ¶VGHYHORSLQJKRZWKHVRFLDOEUDLQ¶VGHYHORSLQJ´ (+
483-485).  $JDLQ WKH HPSKDVLV KHUH LV XSRQ GHYHORSPHQW µKRZ WKH VRFLDO
EUDLQ LV GHYHORSLQJ¶ DQG FRPHV WR ORRN WKH ZD\ LW GRHV EHFDXVH RI WKH
environment in which it finds itself.  
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 In discussions over DSM-5, the ADOS, and laboratory practice, there is 
D IROGLQJ RI µWKH VRFLDO¶ LQ D UDWLRQDOLVWLF VFLHQWLILF VHQVH LQWR D SROLWLFDO
LQVWLWXWLRQDO DQG HFRQRPLF µVRFLHW\¶ ZKHUH LGHQWLW\ SROLWLFV DUH WR WKH IRUH
These discussions reach their logical end point at neuroplasticity where society 
is literally written into the social brain, where the social disorder under 
examination has developed in the manner it has because of the society in which 
it formed.  In all of these narratives, the divisions between is and ought has 
been completely erased.    
Conclusion 
7KURXJKRXWWKLVFKDSWHU&DQJXLOKHP¶VFODLPWKDW"the sick man is not 
abnormal because of the absence of a norm but because of his incapacity to be 
normative" (Canguilhem 1991: 186) has been endorsed.  By examining 
discussion of the social in the diverse contexts of DSM-5, the ADOS, 
laboratory settings, and the concept of neuroplasticity, it has been claimed that 
WKLVREMHFWRIµWKHVRFLDO¶WKDWHPHUJHVZLWKLQVFLHQWLILFGLVFXVVLRQKas several 
properties.  Firstly, the social is not given, it is achieved in a local encounter 
between a scientist and a participant.  In this sense, this chapter follows Mark 
Rapley when he claimed that, with reference to intellectual disability: 
³ZKHWKer we look at formalised quality of life assessments conducted 
by psychologists; informal interviews...; or at the mundane interaction 
of staff members and the people they support in community based 
homes ± that what is to count as (in)competence is negotiated and 
constructed ORFDOO\ DQG IRU ORFDO SXUSRVHV E\ ORFDO PHDQV´ (Rapley 
2004: 202, italics in original) 
This argument has already been made with reference to autism (Stribling et al. 
2009; Muskett et al. 2010).  Secondly, but far from independently, the social of 
cognitive scientists is inextricably tied to notions of society.  Chapter two 
(pp.31-32) LQ H[DPLQLQJ WKH $OOSRUWV¶ FRQVWUXFWLRQV RI QRUPDO DQG
pathological social behaviours in the 1950s, has shown that this has been the 
FDVHWKURXJKRXWWKHKLVWRU\RIVRFLDOSV\FKRORJ\7KHµREMHFWLYHVRFLDO¶RIWKH
cognitive neurosciences only makes sense in relation to societal norms at a 
particular historical, philosophical, and societal juncture and, hence, the 
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experience of autism as social abnormality, likewise, could only have occurred 
at a particular moment.  Finally, the social is, and unlike other aspects of 
autism symptomology, constructed as an ethical substance, something that 
scientists ought to be concerned about; there is a duty of care and a compulsion 
to act upon this aspect of autism.  The conclusion of this analysis has been 
accurately captured by Nikolas Rose.  Musing on the claim of Canguilhem 
(considered in chapter 2:22-23WKDWµKHDOWKLVOLIHLQWKHVLOHQFHRIWKHRUJDQV¶
Rose claims that there is a problem for psychology when: 
³ZKDW FRXQWV DV DEnormality is set by a norm of adaption to 
conventions of a socio-economic order.  Health, for the psychology of 
the individual, is not so much life in the silence of the organs as life in 
the silence of the DXWKRULWLHV´(Rose 1985: 231) 
This is absolutely the case for autism.  Without institutions (including science) 
WRµSURYRNH¶DQGµHOLFLW¶DXWLVPit would simply not be seen. 
 7KHUH LV RQH ILQDO SRLQW ZKLFK LV ZRUWK\ RI FRQVLGHUDWLRQ  ,I µVRFLDO
GLVRUGHU¶ UHIHUV WRDQ LQFDSDFLW\ WREHQRUPDWLYHUDWKHU WKDQ WKHDEVHQFHRID
norm, as Canguilhem claims, then attempts to study autism within diverse 
cultural settings with diverse norms is necessarily problematic.  BG, a Senior 
Lecturer, made the following comment concerning an ongoing project seeking 
to examine autism within an international context: 
, PHDQ WKDW¶V WKH SUREOHP RI D EHKDYLRXUDOO\ GHILQHG disorder, especially a social 
EHKDYLRXUDOO\ GHILQHG GLVRUGHU LW¶V QRW D , PHDQ LW¶V QRW D EORRG WHVW LW¶V QRW
VRPHWKLQJWKDWWKDW¶VPRUHVR,WKLQNWKDWWKDWKDVQRWEHHQGHDOWZLWKYHU\FDUHIXOO\
or, or in much detail.  I mean so far people have been just translating, er, the Western 
criteria into various regional languages and, er, and trying to use the same criteria (.) 
and recently there was a Korean study that found a significantly high proportion of, of 
the population with autism.  Now, whether that is due to the fact that the Western 
criteria are not well suited to identify, er, or are picking up abnormalities than normal, 
WKDQWKDQWKDQHUZHGRQ¶WNQRZ,PHDQ,WKLQNHUZHZHKDYHWRKDYHDPRUH
concerted approach towards, er, intercultural in, in diagnosing autism. 
7KHVHFRQFHUQVRI%*ZLWKUHJDUGWRµSLFNLQJXSDEQRUPDOLWLHV¶ZLWKWKHXVH
µ:HVWHUQFULWHULD¶LQJHQHUDODQGDQLQIDPRXV.RUHDQVWXG\(Kim et al. 2011) 
in particular deserve careful consideration.  Indeed Hacking has described this 
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research, led by Roy Grinker, which concluded that 1 in 38 South Korean 
FKLOGUHQ ZHUH GLDJQRVDEOH ZLWK DXWLVP DV D ³% DWWDFN´ +DFNLQJ 3).   
This is a worryingly apt description.  If, as is suggested in this chapter, the 
experience of autism is forged within a social encounter, then the risk of a 
pathological imperialism is quite evidently present. 
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Ontologies of our social selves: Normalisation and pathologisation in 
autism 
Introduction 
The previous chapter was largely concerned with the ways in which the 
condition of autism has been shaped by broader society.  On a local scale, it 
ZDVDUJXHGWKDW WKHLQGLYLGXDOVFLHQWLVWµDFKLHYHV¶DXWLVPE\µHOLFLWLQJ¶VRFLDO
disorder within, for example, a diagnostic encounter.  Globally, it was argued 
that interviewees describe autism as becoming visible within particular societal 
configurations, that notions of how individuals ought to behave or ought to be 
cared for in some sense determined what those individuals were.  This chapter 
moves on from that discussion and begins to consider not only how autism has 
been shaped by society, but how autism itself has the capacity to shape society.  
As was argued in chapter 1 (p.8)DXWLVPKDVEHFRPH³the condition of 
fascination of the moment´ (Murray 2008: 5), not (only) because it is 
interesting in and of itself, but also because autism has been constructed in 
such a way as to convince us that the condition reveals something fundamental 
about humanity in toto (Murray 2008: 16).  It has been argued in chapters 2 
(p.39-40) and 4 (pp.102-103DQGIROORZLQJ$OODQ<RXQJ¶VDQDO\VHV (Young 
2012a; Young 2012b), that such a positioning of autism within discussions of 
the human condition is related to the recent centrality ascribed to empathy in 
both discourses concerning autism and those regarding humanity more 
generally.   
The first portion of the present chapter will examine the relationship 
between autism and the rest of the human population.  It will be argued that 
there are a number of contemporary research streams which attempt to 
µQRUPDOLVH¶DXWLVPWKHVHHQGHDYRXUVERWKUHFRQVWUXFWDXWLVPXVKHULQJLQQHZ
possibilities, and cease to treat autism as a qualitatively distinct disease 
experience which reveals something about humanity through what is lacking 
(human-minus-social).  Instead these normalising research practices transform 
the condition into a quantitative variation which is itself fundamental to an 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRI WKHKXPDQFRQGLWLRQ µZH¶UH DOO D OLWWOHELW DXWLVWLF¶  ,I DV
Canguilhem claims (chapter 2: 22-23), health has no voice except that of 
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disease, then the quantification and normalisation of autism provide the 
opportunity for non-pathological behaviours found across the human 
population to be given voice.  Thus, autism not only looks the way it does 
because of constructions of the social, autism is itself an increasingly key 
factor in contemporary constructions.  This chapter concludes by considering 
whether this new vision of autistic sociality may be influenced by novel 
µUHVWLQJ VWDWH¶ UHVHDUFK PHWKRGRORJLHV DQG WKe new populations these 
methodologies attempt to surveil. 
Researching up the autism spectrum 
The researchers interviewed for this project agreed that the last thirty 
years has been a period of intense change for autism.  Perhaps the single 
µbiggest change¶ has been a vast increase in diagnosis: 
ST: There were a lot of changes I mean the biggest change was the acceptance 
WKDWDXWLVPZDVQ¶WWKLVOLWWOHFLUFXPVFULEHGVHWRIGLVRUGHUVDIIHFWLQJZKDWLV
it, four children in 10,000, er::, ((coughs)) but that it was this much larger 
collection of conditions that affected about one percent of the population. 
(ST07: 63-68) 
The diagnosis rates offered by ST, a Professor, reflect those presented in the 
literature, with a widespread claim that there has been an increase in autism 
prevalence from around 4:10,000 individuals in 1978 to around 100:10,000 in 
2009 (Baron-Cohen et al. 2009: 500).  Autism LV QR ORQJHU D µOLWWOH
FLUFXPVFULEHG VHW RI GLVRUGHUV¶ EXW RQH RI WKH PRVW SUHYDOHQW RI DOO
neurodevelopmental conditions, and certainly the one garnering the most 
attention.   
It is worth noting, however, that interviewees saw a further movement 
within this broader trend for increased rates in diagnosis, and that is a focus 
XSRQ WKH µKLJK IXQFWLRQLQJ¶ HQG RI WKH VSHFWUXP  2QH Professor noted that 
³WKHUH¶V EHHQ D VHFXODU WUHQG WR ILQG VPDOOHU DQG VPDOOHU SHUFHQWDJHV RI WKH
autism population having very low ,4´ 0: -825).  This claim is 
supported by DR, a further Professor, who goes as far as to state WKDW³LQP\
RSLQLRQ DXWLVP LV QRW D FRQGLWLRQ RI PHQWDO UHWDUGDWLRQ´ '5 -294), 
FODLPLQJ WKDW µLQ WKHLU RSLQLRQ¶ UHVHDUFKHUV KDYH EHHQ µPLVOHDG¶ EHFDXVH RI
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the failure of two key diagnostic instruments, the Autism Diagnostic Interview 
and the Autism Diagnosis Observation Schedule, to correctly diagnose 
individuals with autism who have a high level of functioning17.   
MW, a Professor, says that DWWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHLUFDUHHUWKH\³PHW
very few, very few high functioning people, I mean there were very few high 
IXQFWLRQLQJ SHRSOH LGHQWLILHG´ 0: -988).  This suggestion is 
repeated by EC, a Lecturer: 
EC: ...And the early days of autism research was always these low functioning 
NLGVEHFDXVHSHRSOHGLGQ¶WUHDOLVH\RXFRXOGEHDORWEULJKWHUDQGKDYHDXWLVP
((laughs)) because they were the quirky ones in mainstream schools. (EC11: 
347-350)   
3HRSOHµGLGQ¶WUHDOLVH¶WKDW\RXFRXOGEHµEULJKWHUDQGKDYHDXWLVP¶DQGWKXV
WKH PHGLFDOLVDWLRQ RI µTXLUN\¶ EHKDYLRXU FRXOG EH FRQFHLYHG RI DV DQ DFW RI
consciousness raising on the part of autism researchers.  Interestingly, while 
noting ostensibly the same phenomenon, CT reaches a quite different 
conclusion:   
&7RYHUWKHODVWWZHQW\\HDUVWKHUH¶VEHHQDKXJH,WKLQNUHYROXWLRQLQWKH
way that autism is considered, erm, and some of the pathologising, erm, has 
JRQH IRUEHWWHURU IRUZRUVH\RXNQRZ WKHUH¶VEHHQD VZLQJ WRZDUGV HUP
looking at, erm, the high functioning end of the spectrum and, you know, 
celebrating some of the skills of people who are high functioning and so on, 
erm, so yes I have, I guess, you know, been able to witness a massive 
evolution. (CT02: 67-74) 
CT, a Senior Lecturer, claims that a shift to the high functioning end of the 
VSHFWUXP KDV UHPRYHG VRPH RI WKH µSDWKRORJLVLQJ¶ DQG WKDW WKLV µKXJH
UHYROXWLRQ¶RUµPDVVLYHHYROXWLRQ¶LVRIJUHDWVLJQLILFDQFH7KHGLIIHUHQFHLQ
the conclusions reached by CT and EC is at least partially explicable in terms 
RI IRFXV(&¶V VWDWHPHQWFRQFHUQV LQGLYLGXDOV VRPHRIZKRPKDYHFHUWDLQO\
EHHQ µSDWKRORJLVHG¶ ZKLOH &7¶V VWDWHPHQW LV FRQFHUQHG ZLWK WKH SRSXODWLRQ
and its perception, which may indeed have be normalised.  This duel move of 
                                       
17
 For a consideration of the inability of the ADOS to diagnose high functioning autism see 
chapter 6: 125-126  
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pathologising the individual while normalising the population will be a running 
concern throughout this chapter.   
What seems certain is that a shift in focus away from individuals with 
lower levels of functioning and towards individuals with higher functioning is 
seen as a hallmark of the contemporary field.  This is captured nicely in the 
following extract by DR: 
DR: ...I would say a particularly, erm (.), forward looking state, erm, the, the 
deep south seems to have much more traditional views, which is a sort of 
interesting geographical er, erm, er, split, er, but Utah, the new cases about 
eighty, eighty-five percent are high functioning.  Erm, newly diagnosed cases.  
'RZQLQ\RXNQRZ6RXWK&DUROLQDLW¶VOLNHWZHQW\SHUFHQWZKLFKLVZKDWLW
was thirty years ago, twenty years ago. (DR13: 318-325) 
Here DR, a Professor, VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH µIRUZDUG ORRNLQJ¶ $PHULFDQ states, 
VXFKDV8WDKGLYRUFHDXWLVPIURPLQWHOOHFWXDOGLVDELOLW\ZKLOHWKHµWUDGLWLRQDO¶
µGHHS VRXWK¶ FRQWLQXHV ZLWK D SRVLWLRQ DGYRFDWHG WZHQW\-to-thirty years ago, 
believing that autism is associated with intellectual disability.  The 
disassociation of autism from intellectual disability is here directly positioned 
as modern and progressive.  
Taking the increase in the diagnosis rates in conjunction with the shift 
towards higher functioning individuals with autism, it seems that a quite 
spectacular transformation in the concept of autism has taken place over the 
last thirty years, a change which, as CT states, researchers KDYHµEHHQDEOHWR
ZLWQHVV¶ :KLOH WKHSUHFLVHQXPEHUV DUHQRWRI SDUWLFXODU LPSRUWDQFH OHW XV
assume that there is some validity to the oft quoted claim that autism 
prevalence in 1978 was approximately 4:10,000.  DR claims that, around 1978, 
twenty per cent of individuals with autism were high functioning18 .  This 
would mean that prevalence rates of high functioning autism in the general 
population were approximately 1:12,500 in 1978.   Prevalence rates in 2009 
have increased to approximately 100:10,000, or one instance of autism per 
hundred individuals in the population, and DR notes that eight-five percent of 
                                       
18
 This may be an overestimate, although it is similar to the figure offered in the 1990s 
(Charman et al. 2011: 619).   
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individuals diagnosed with autism in Utah, in 2009 are high functioning19.  If 
this were the case, as is suggested above, prevalence rates of high functioning 
autism would have jumped to around 1:118.  This is a staggering 
transformation. 
 The changing nature of the autistic population has gone hand-in-hand 
with a changing research programme.  The ability to study autistic 
symptomology in highly skilled individuals reflects the experimental 
requirements of cognitive psychology.  The cognitive paradigms of interest 
since the 1980s required individuals to act upon verbal instructions beyond the 
capability of the vast majority of individuals diagnosed as autistic at the time, 
DQG ZKR ZRXOG QRZ EH WKRXJKW RI DV µORZ IXQFWLRQLQJ¶  7KHVH prohibitive 
experimental requirements have ensured a literature seeking to make 
inferences about autism as a whole on the basis of samples consisting entirely 
of individuals with autism who have exceptionally high I.Q.s.  One 
interviewee, for example, states that: 
DR: ...We certainly got some very nice data IURPQHXURLPDJLQJZH¶YHGRQH
UHFHQWO\ LW¶V WKH ILUVW VWXG\ WKDW¶V EHHQ GRQH HUP RI LWV W\SH LQ KLJK KLJK
IXQFWLRQLQJDGXOWVHUPZKHUHZH¶YHVKRZQZKLWHPDWWHUWUDFWDQRPDOLHVDOO
RYHUWKHEUDLQLW¶VQRWLQRQHDUHDLW¶VDOORYHUWKHGDUQSODFH%ut, very high 
ability individuals, an average I.Q. of around one hundred and twenty five or 
so, higher than the average student at [a large British university]. (DR13: 464-
471)  
There is a claim here that general models of connectivity in autism can be 
examined with reference only to this particular high-functioning sub-group. 
7KLVLVQRWDQXQXVXDOFODLPZLWKRWKHULQWHUYLHZHHVVWDWLQJWKDW³ZHMXVWGHDO
ZLWKKLJK IXQFWLRQLQJJURXSV´ )&-403).  As stated above, such high 
functioning groups are attractive to researchers as they are able to complete 
more complex tasks, are easier to match with control groups comprised of 
undergraduate students, and so forth.  Perhaps because of these abilities, 
                                       
19
 The figures quoted by DR would certainly be disputed in the UK, where a recent 
epistemological study claimed that around 50 percent of individuals with autism are free of 
intellectual disability (Charman et al. 2011).  Some researchers (e.g. Skuse 2007) claim that 
this continuing association between ID and autism is a result of a clinical bias rather than the 
nature of autism.  However, even this lower figure of 50 per cent denotes a quite remarkable 
increase in the prevalence of high functioning autism. 
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research with high functioning individuals has a long history, with a stretching 
of the spectruP DZD\ IURP WKH µFRUH¶ DXWLVP LGHQWLILHG LQ .DQQHU¶V LQLWLDO
study continuing since at least the 1970s (Baron-Cohen et al. 2005: 628). 
Researching autism outside of the spectrum 
  7KH WUHQG RI µUHVHDUFKLQJ XS¶ WKH VSHFWUXP LV QRW FRQVWUDLQHG WR WKH
analysis of individuals diagnosed with autism who are particularly high 
functioning.  Two other trends are also discernable. First is the consideration of 
autistic symptomology within sub- or non-clinical populations.  Within sub-
FOLQLFDOSRSXODWLRQVLQGLYLGXDOVZLWKLQWKHµ%URDGHU$XWLVP3KHQRW\SH¶%$3
are deemed to be in a group with:  
³µVXE-WKUHVKROG¶ VRFLDO VNLOOV DQG FRPPXQLFDWLRQ WUDLWV DQG XQXVXDO
personality features that are frequently found in the relatives of people 
with autism and which are believed to be milder manifestations of traits 
FKDUDFWHULVWLF IRU FOLQLFDOO\ GLDJQRVHG DXWLVP´ (Sucksmith, Roth, & 
Hoekstra 2011: 360) 
The concept of the BAP is believed to have emerged around 1998 (Sucksmith 
et al. 2011: 360) and is now used to examine autistic symptomology in 
research concerning, for example, hormonal (Ingudomnukul et al. 2007), 
neurological (Elsabbagh et al. 2009), and cognitive (Briskman et al. 2001) 
phenotypes in autism.  
 The work of Angelica Ronald and colleagues (e.g. Happé, Ronald, & 
Plomin 2006; Happé & Ronald 2008; Ronald, Happé, & Plomin 2005; Ronald, 
Happé, Price, Baron-Cohen, & Plomin 2006), investigating the so-called 
µIUDFWLRQDEOH WULDG¶ RI DXWLVWLF V\PSWRPV is the most notable project 
considering autistic symptomology within an almost entirely non-clinical 
population.  5RQDOG¶V work forms part of the ongoing Twins Early 
Development Study (TEDS), a longitudinal project featuring a representative 
sample of 12,054 twin pairs born in England and Wales during the years 1994, 
1995, and 1996 (Kovas, Haworth, Dale, & Plomin 2007: 14), based at the 
Institute of Psychiatry, and funded by the Medical Research Council.  
Different subsets of that overall sample have been involved in different 
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SURMHFWV DQG IRU YDULRXV SRUWLRQV RI 5RQDOG¶V ZRUN EHWZHHQ -4,000 twin 
pairs aged 7 were involved (Ronald, Happé, & Plomin 2005: 446; Ronald, 
Happé, Price, Baron-Cohen, & Plomin 2006: 692).  Only a tiny proportion of 
individuals included in the studies had been diagnosed with autism (e.g. 37 in 
Ronald et al. 2005) and this is important to note; this study is entirely 
concerned with autistic symptoms in the general population.   
:LWKLQ WKH LQWHUYLHZ GDWD WKLV FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI V\PSWRPV LQ D µJHQHUDO
SRSXODWLRQ¶LVOLNHWKHHPHUJHQFHRIWKH%$3VHHQDVQRYHOSDUWRIDµVHFXODU
WLPHWUHQG¶ 
MW:  ...one can see a sort of secular time trHQG LQ WKDW WKDW ZH WKDW WKHUH¶V D
ch::ange from, historically, for studying autism in groups that are diagnosed, erm, 
WR VWXG\LQJ DXWLVP LQ D JHQHUDO SRSXODWLRQ JURXS WKDW DUHQ¶W GLDJQRVHG DQG
taking, sort of, trait-wise approach. (MW18: 469-473)    
This body of research, then, in studying autistic symptoms within both the 
BAP and the general population, seeks to draw conclusions about the nature of 
autism from an analysis of groups outside of that diagnostic sphere.  This 
ability to study autism in the general population seems to represent a distinct 
shift in the relations between those with and without a diagnosis.  In the 1980s 
cognitive abilities known to be present in the general population (Theory of 
Mind, Executive Functions, and so forth) were taken to autism in order to 
reveal what was deficient in those individuals.  In the 2000s it is conceivable to 
move in the opposite direction; to take traits known to be characteristic of 
autism and then apply them to the general population.  Such a move 
demonstrably requires autism to be understood as a quantitatively, rather than 
qualitatively, distinct state.    
Researching autism through exceptional abilities 
6WXDUW0XUUD\KDVFODLPHGWKDWWKHUHLVD³FXUUHQWREVHVVLRQZLWKWKHVDYDQW
ILJXUH´(Murray 2008: 83) within fiction concerning itself with autism, and it is 
FHUWDLQO\WKHFDVHWKDWDIXUWKHUDUHDRIµUHVHDUFKLQJXS¶ZLWKLQDXWLVPVWXGLHVis 
the body of research that considers autism in the light of Savant Syndrome, 
ZKHUH DQ LQGLYLGXDO VKRZV ³LVODQGV RI JHQLXV´ ZKLFK YDVWO\ VXUSDVV RWKHU
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abilities (Treffert 2009: 1351).  Several interviewees had an interest in autistic 
LQGLYLGXDOVZLWK VXFKVNLOOVZLWKRQH LQWHUYLHZHHVWDWLQJ WKDW³SUHWW\PXFK
all my research is looking at, erm, increased ability in aXWLVP´0&-
262).  MC used this information regarding exceptional abilities to draw 
inferences about autism as a whole, claiming that the particular cognitive 
model developed within this research field explained deficits as well as 
strengths in autism: 
MC: ...I would argue that that underlies a lot of the superiorities but also the 
GHILFLWVEHFDXVHHUPLI\RX¶YHJRWH[WUDFDSDFLW\LWVSLOOVRYHUDXWRPDWLFDOO\
ZKDWHYHU \RX¶UH GRLQJ DQG LQ VRPH FDVHV WKDW¶OO EH UHOHYDQW VR LW¶OO EH DQ
advantage but iQRWKHUFDVHVLW¶OOEHDGLVDGYDQWDJHEHFDXVHLW¶OOEHLUUHOHYDQW
information... (MC12: 379-385) 
While the exceptional abilities studied by MC were those manifested within 
particular cognitive experiments, CT researched savant skills of more general 
interest, being concerned with the work of artists with autism such as Jessica 
Park and Jayson Valles who produce well recognised cityscapes and scenes 
from life in Manhattan.  What CT, a Senior Lecturer, does have in common 
with MC, however, is a belief that a consideration of exceptional abilities will 
inform about autism more broadly: 
CT,¶PDFWXDOO\PXFKPXFKPRUHZLGHO\YHU\LQWHUHVWHGLQWKHQRWLRQRI
imagination in autism, erm, and in (.) erm, I guess people with, people with 
talents and what that can tell us about, erm, the rest of the autism spectrum 
and what it tells us about, erm::, imagination more widely. (CT02: 538-543)  
2QFH DJDLQ ZH VHH IURP &7 WKH FODLP WKDW DQ H[DPLQDWLRQ RI µWDOHQWV¶ FDQ
LQIRUP DERXW µWKH UHVW RI WKH DXWLVP VSHFWUXP¶  7KHUH LV DOVR WKH DGGLWLRQDO
claim that researching autistic savants will also inform about the non-autistic 
population; it is a goal of CT to study talents in autism in order to learn about 
µLPDJLQDWLRQPRUHZLGHO\¶ 
PC, a Professor, who considers exceptional musical ability within 
individuals diagnosed with autism, makes a similar claim to CT regarding the 
capacity to learn about autism generally from the study of exceptional ability:  
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GH: So what, what do we think that might be telling us about what, about the 
nature of autism? 
PC: I think that, I mean my thinking about autism is that autistic people, erm, 
have got a capacity to GHYHORS TXLWH D XQLTXH W\SH RI LQWHOOL¶ , WKLQN
LQWHOOLJHQFHLVYHU\GLIIHUHQWLQDXWLVP(UPLW¶VDNLQGRIIOXLGLQWHOOLJHQFH
that it is just quite different to the sort of nature of intelligence in neurotypical 
people. 
GH: Mmm. 
PC: Erm, and I think WKDWWKHWKLQJDERXWVDYDQWV\QGURPHWKDW¶VLQWHUHVWLQJLV
that savant skills are clustered LQ GRPDLQ  6R WKHUH¶UH REYLRXVO\ GRPDLQV
where having that kind of intelligence will make you really good at it. (PC20: 
288-293; 309-311)   
For PC, savant skills rHYHDO D µXQLTXH¶ µDXWLVWLF LQWHOOLJHQFH¶ TXLWH GLIIHUHQW
froPWKDWLQµQHXURW\SLFDOSHRSOH¶DQGLWZDVRQO\WKURXJKWKHVWXG\RIDXWLVWLF
savants that this fluid, autistic intelligence could be observed. 
Canguilhem and autism 
These three research poles ± studying autism in non-clinical 
populations, savants, and individuals with exceptionally high I.Q.s - are more 
or less independent experimental developments and, indeed, a single 
participant could not meet the criteria to be in two groups; one either has 
autism and an I.Q. within the normal range (high functioning autism), has 
stand-out abilities (Savant Syndrome), or does not have a diagnosis 
(BAP/JHQHUDOSRSXODWLRQ1RQHWKHOHVVEH\RQGPHUHO\GULYLQJUHVHDUFKµXS¶
these three poles share some notable effects which are worthy of consideration.  
Firstly, these studies conducted with individuals who have a high level of 
functioning do not only reflect the requirements of the cognitive neurosciences, 
but usher in new possibilities.  As well as allowing quantitatively harder tasks 
to be utilised with autistic individuals (for instance, those requiring second 
order belief attribution, see chapter 5: 112-113), the presence of new highly 
intelligent populations means that it is now feasible to examine the autistic 
experience in qualitatively different ways, for example by interviewing 
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individuals with autism (e.g. Bagatell 2007) or considering works of art, poetry 
or autobiography (e.g. Roth 2008) produced by those same individuals.  
A second consequence of the stretching of the spectrum comes from 
the fact that individuals with autism are no longer simply the objects of 
scientific research, but also the producers of scientific research.  As Steve 
Epstein has famously shown (Epstein 1995; Epstein 1996) some groups are 
preferentially situated to inform scientific practice.  While advocacy groups 
have long held an influence over autism research (see Silverman 2012 for  a 
comprehensive analysis) the emergence of self-advocates able to speak in the 
language of science has been a relatively recent phenomena, leading MD, a 
Professor, to claim that ZH¶UHLQDµSHULRGZKHUHWKHDXWLVWLFYRLFHLVEHJLQQLQJ
WREHKHDUG¶ 
0' RI FRXUVH ZH¶UH LQ WKDW SHULRG DV ,¶P VXUH \RX¶UH H[WUHPHO\ DZDUH
where, where, where, you know, the autistic voice, you know, erm, i::, you 
know, is, erm, (.) beginning to be heard... (MD17: 512-514) 
It is now not uncommon for individuals with autism to be directly linked with 
laboratory work, a trend most famously illustrated by Michelle Dawson, an 
individual with autism who works within the laboratory of Laurent Mottron in 
Montreal (Mottron et al. 2006; Dawson et al. 2007).  At least one interviewee 
wanted to replicate this scenario within their own laboratory: 
67 WKHUH¶V RQH JX\ DQG ZH¶UH KRSLQJ WR JHW KLP RQ RXU RQ RXU NLQG RI
steering group in the lab here because he was genuinely insightful and 
WKRXJKWIXOWKLQJVWRVD\DERXWWKHLQQHUH[SHULHQFHRIZKDWLW¶VOLNHWRIRURQH
person to have autism. (ST07:1032-1036)     
The incorporation of the autistic voice into autism research is certainly 
not complete, and other researchers bemoaned the lack of opportunity to 
further consult individuals with autism about research directions, but there are 
undeniably many new spaces emerging in which high functioning individuals 
with autism have become able to contribute to the autism research agenda. 
Neither, and as discussed in chapter three (pp.65-66), is the emergence of an 
µDXWLVWLFYRLFH¶HQWLUHO\XQSUREOHPDWLFLQWHUPVRISURYLGLQJDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI
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autism.  What can certainly be said, however, is that the emergence of autism 
self-advocates is of potential importance.  
These consequences of stretching the spectrum seem like classic 
instances of looping (Hacking 1995b).  The experiments of cognitive science 
required a new population of individuals who were self-aware and able to 
engage verbally with scientists.  As the gaze of the sciences shifted towards 
this top end of the spectrum the number of individuals found who met the 
necessary criteria expanded enormously.  Once the scientific gaze had 
uncovered this wealth of potential subjects, the subjects themselves held 
numerous opportunities to influence scientific activity, from the possibility of 
new methodologies which required even higher levels of ability, to new forms 
RI HQJDJHPHQW ZKHUH WKH µDXWLVWLF YRLFH¶ ZDV KHDUG ZLWKLQ WKH ODERUDWRU\
Thus, these newly diagnosed individuals would be able to feed back into the 
cognitive science and alter its make-up in turn.   
 Further effects of researching up the autism spectrum can, as discussed 
above, perhaps best be understood by thinking about the research body in 
relation to Georges Canguilhem, whose work was considered at length in 
chapter 2.  Canguilhem made two related arguments which are of relevance 
here.  Firstly, it was claimed that during the 19th century it became possible to 
think of normal and pathological states as being quantitatively rather than 
qualitatively distinct (Canguilhem 1991: 41-42).  Secondly, Canguilhem 
DUJXHGWKDWµKHDOWKLVOLIHLQWKHVLOHQFHRIWKHRUJDQV¶(Canguilhem 1991: 100-
101), that normalcy is defined in relation to pathology and not vice versa.  
&RQVLGHULQJWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWµQRUPDO¶EHKDYLRXUVPD\EHDUWLFXODWHGLQGHHG
may become visible, only after it has been framed by the discourse provided by 
a pathological state brings with it the possibility that, through processes of 
subjectification (Rose 1996a: 130)YDULRXV IRUPVRI µVRFLDO¶ DFW ILQGDYRLFH
through autism: autism may now be able to contribute to an ontology of our 
social selves. 
 The first portion of this chapter has suggested that these duel 
Canguilhemian processes are occurring, at least in the talk and activities of 
research scientists.  The research into the BAP and non-clinical groups detailed 
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above has demonstrated that autism scientists have been able to take the 
vocabulary of autism and apply it in such a way as to understand the 
behaviours of the rest of the population.  This move has, undoubtedly, been 
facilitated by research into autistic savants and individuals with high 
functioning autism who begin to bridge the gap between the pathological and 
the normal.  That the researchers involved in the TEDS study then sought to 
re-apply their findings in the normal population back to autism further 
confirms the dialogue between the normal and the pathological in the case of 
autism.  These findings suggest the possibility that the autistic experience, of 
concern throughout this thesis, may increasingly be an experience applicable to 
all subjects and not only a small proportion of individuals who have been 
diagnosed as socially disordered.     
 ,I WKH ILUVW KDOI RI WKLV FKDSWHU KDV EHHQ FRQFHUQHG ZLWK µUHVHDUFKLQJ
XS¶ EULGJLQJ WKH GLYLVLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH QRUPDO DQG SDWKRORJLFDO SRSXODWLRQV
the second half of the chapter is concerned with a second contemporary trend; 
WR µUHVHDUFK GRZQ¶ ZLWK WKH DLG RI QRYHO WHFKQRORJLHV  ,W LV VXJJHVWHG WKDW
these technologies, which focus upon the subject at rest, may be facilitating 
further changes in the construction of social disorder with an increasing focus 
upon the body, rather than the mind. 
Putting the subject to rest 
Callard and Margulies (2011) KDYHFODLPHGWKDWWKHUHKDYHEHHQµWKree 
SROHV¶ ZLWKLQ WKH FRJQLWLYH neurosciences that have particularly excited 
neuroscientists and social scientists alike.  Those poles are the concepts of: i) 
neuroplasticity/neurogenesis, which reconceptualises the brain as an open 
system (Papadopoulos 2011: 439); ii) analyses of emotion/affect which are 
taken to challenge a rationalistic view of the self, a field of research 
FKDUDFWHULVHG DV µELRORJ\¶V JLIW¶ WR WKH KXPDQLWLHV E\ Papoulias and Callard 
(2010: 33) and iii) a consideration of mirror neurons and the broader concept 
of the social brain (Young 2012b).   
As has been discussed throughout this thesis, poles ii) and iii) have 
been of longstanding interest in relation to autism; from PeWHU +REVRQ¶V
Emotion/Affect Theory of autism during the late 1980s and early 1990s 
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(Hobson 1993a; see chapter four, p.94 onwards) WRPRUHUHFHQWO\WKHµEURNHQ
PLUURU¶ K\SRWKHVLV RI DXWLVP ZKLFK FRQWHVWV WKDW DXWLVP LV FDXVHG E\ D
dysfunctional mirror neuron network (Ramachandran & Oberman 2007).  With 
regards to the remaining pole, that which is focused around issues of 
neuroplasticity, within the interviews there appeared to be a sense of increased 
RSHQQHVV WRZDUGV WKH LPSDFW RI µHQYLURQPHQWDO¶ IDFWRUV DQG µGHYHORSPHQW¶
more broadly from within the cognitive neurosciences.  ST, a Professor, for 
example noted the following:  
ST: ... And I, I often wondered and I often speculated to myself, like, maybe 
even care giving practices and of coursHLW¶VDV\RXNQRZLW¶VYHU\GLIILFXOW
to raise issues like this because of the whole refrigerator mother type of thing. 
GH: Mm hm. 
ST: But actually (.) erm, maybe, certain kind of, erm, things you would do 
with a typical baby are things which will drive an autistic child, you know, (.) 
GH: Mm hm. 
ST: Kind of, into its autism a little bit more.  Er, whereas if you kind of hold 
back and are a little bit more aloof with the child maybe they just kind of are a 
little bit better.  Who knows, who knows.  But I,¶PNLQGRIJUDWLILHGWRVHH
that the, people are beginning to think about ways of pushing people around 
WKH DXWLVP VSHFWUXP D OLWWOH ELW VR WKDW WKH\¶UH OHVV KDQGLFDSSHG E\ WKHLU
autism. (ST07: 765-781) 
ST does not here frame the turn towards the environment in neuroscientific 
language but the position is consistent with it, and ST claims that they have 
ORQJEHOLHYHGWKDWWKHµQHXUR-¶ VKRXOGQRWQHFHVVDULO\EHSULYLOHJHGRYHUWKHµ-
GHYHORSPHQWDO¶ LQ DXWLVP, and that they DUH µJUDWLILHG¶ WKDW WKHUH KDV EHHQ D
shift in this direction more broadly.  EH, a postdoctoral researcher, notes a 
similar occurrence.  When asked why it might be that siblings of children with 
autism are at an increased risk of diagnosis themselves, EH replied: 
(+:HOOSHRSOHKDYHWUDGLWLRQDOO\WKRXJKWWKDWLWPHDQVWKDWLW¶VJHQHWLFRU
DOORILW¶VJHQHWLFULJKWHUPDQGVRVLEOLQJVKDYHDKLJKHUULVNEHFDXVHWKH\
have an older sibling and they share the same genetic background.  Erm, but 
environmental theories of autism have become a lot more popular recently 
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DQGRIFRXUVHLWFRXOGEHWKDWWKHUH¶VDQHQYLURQPHQWDOIDFWRUWKDW¶VDIIHFWLQJ
that family that means that subsequent children are more likely to develop 
autism. (EH14: 401-408) 
As with ST, (&VHHVWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIDQµHQYLURQPHQWDOIDFWRUWKDW¶VDIIHFWLQJ
WKHIDPLO\¶DVDSRVVLELOLW\LQGHWHUPLQLQJWKHDHWLRORJ\RIDXWLVPDQGEHOLHYHV
VXFKSHUVSHFWLYHVKDYHEHFRPHµDORWPRUHSRSXODUUHFHQWO\¶ As ST notes with 
UHIHUHQFH WR %HWWHOKHLP¶V (1972) QRWLRQ RI WKH µUHIULJHUDWRU PRWKHU¶ WKHVH
topics of environment and family practice have been, and continue to be, 
difficult for autism researchers to approach (see chapter 2: 45).  Nonetheless, 
championed by researchers like Annette Karmiloff-Smith (e.g. Karmiloff-
Smith 2009), there has been something of a move away from the innatist 
theories of Alan Leslie and colleagues which dominated during the 1980s and 
towards a consideration of neuroplasticity (e.g. Dawson 2008; Mundy & Neal 
2000)20.   
The central point of CallDUG DQG 0DUJXOLHV¶ DUWLFOH, however, is to 
suggest that: 
³,W LVRXUFRQWHQWLRQ WKDW WKHEUDLQ± as it is being conceptualized and 
modelled by the neurosciences, as well as disseminated beyond them ± 
is in the process of being reframed by a fourth potent arm of research, 
WKDW RQ WKH EUDLQ¶V resting state...´ (Callard & Margulies 2011: 228, 
italics in original) 
It is hard to overestimate the importance of the movement identified by Callard 
and Margulies.  The authors themselves claim that:   
³WKHUH DSSHDUDOUHDG\ WREH LQGLFDWLRQV WKDW WKH UHVWLQJVWDWHDQG WKH
DMN [Default Mode Network] might be installed as a new foundation 
RIWKHVHOILWLVWKHVXEMHFWµDWUHVW¶WKDW± by dint of her default mode 
brain activity ± potentially holds the key to subjectivity tout court´
(Callard & Margulies 2011: 244, italics in original) 
&DOODUG DQG 0DUJXOLHV¶ DQDO\VLV VSHFLILFDlly and exclusively examines the 
influence of resting state magnetic resonance imaging (rsMRI).  Without 
                                       
20
 See chapter 6 (p.147-149) for a further consideration of narratives of neuroplasticity 
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wishing to question to importance of rsMRI as a qualitatively distinct method 
with distinct consequences, it is also possible to broaden out an analysis and 
consider rsMRI as the archetype for a set of methods which seek to reduce task 
GHPDQGVWRDPLQLPXPDQGDGGUHVVDXWLVPZLWKLQLWVµQDWXUDOVWDWH¶  For the 
current analysis, the defining characteristic of these methods is that they are 
constructed as requiring no explicit response from the participant.   
Seeing the real autism: resting state technologies and autism 
GH: ...So how, how do you think all the, or how do you think that (.) imaging 
and the neurosciences are (.) contributing to (.) issues around autism? 
0&(UP,WKLQNWKH\¶UHFRQWULEXWLQJDORW,WKLQNHUPVRP\SHUVRQDO
YLHZ LV WKDW  RQH RQH RI WKH EHVW ELWV RI UHVHDUFK WKDW¶V FRPH RXW DW WKH
moment is looking at increased noise in the neural networks in, erm, in people 
with autism.  And I think that finding a neural marker is so important because 
it means that it can be seen irrespective of tasks so, and also in whatever age 
and whatever level of functioning.  So I think a lot of the problem with 
behaviour is, erm, you just don¶W NQRZ ZKDW¶V EHKLQG LW DQG \RX DOVR \RX
GRQ¶W NQRZ ZKHWKHU WDVN GHPDQGV DUH VWRSSLQJ \RX VHH WKH UHDO WKH WUXH
abilities of people.  Whereas if you put them in the scanner then, and 
especially if you can put them in the scanner at rest or asleep and be able to 
see a difference between autism and typical populations then you have an 
amazing ability to diagnose. (MC12: 705-722) 
The above quotation from MC, a Postdoctoral Fellow, captures so 
much of the hype and the hope surrounding resting state technologies.  Autism 
research is constructed here as being fundamentally hampered by reliance upon 
behavioural measures, the results of which may not reflect ability as much as 
they reflHFWµWDVNGHPDQGV¶IRUH[DPSOHWKHLQDELOLW\RISDUWLFLSDQWVWRIROORZ
verbal instructions (see chapter 5: 113-114).  Neuroscientific technologies, 
HVSHFLDOO\ WKRVH WKDW FDQ EH XVHG ZKLOH WKH SDUWLFLSDQW LV µDW UHVW RU DVOHHS¶
provide the opportunity to µNQRZZKDW¶VEHKLQG¶EHKDYLRXUDQGµVHHWKHUHDO
the true abilitLHV RI DXWLVP¶  7KLV FDSDFLW\ WR VHH µWKH UHDO DXWLVP¶ LQ
LQGLYLGXDOVRIµZKDWHYHUDJHDQGZKDWHYHUDELOLW\¶SURIIHUVDQµDPD]LQJDELOLW\
WRGLDJQRVH¶7KHVHDUHVLJQLILFDQWFODLPVWREHPDking of a new technology.  
One can immediately identify the model of subjectivity commented upon by 
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Callard DQG 0DUJXOLHV ZKHUHE\ UHVW LV µinstalled as a new foundation of the 
VHOI¶ and of the autistic condition. 
 There are two further points which need to be made with regard to the 
above extract.  Firstly, MC is not alone in stressing the importance of these 
HPHUJLQJ PHWKRGV ZKLFK JHW µEH\RQG¶ RU µEHKLQG¶ WDVN GHPDQGV.  MD, a 
Professor, for example, says that: 
0',WKLQNWKDW¶VVRUWRITXLWHDLQWHUHVWing sort of methodology because it 
VXGGHQO\GRHVQ¶WUHO\RQ\RXHUPDVNLQJVRPHRQHDTXHVWLRQ\RXNQRZ
HUPDQGRIFRXUVHD¶\RXNQRZWKHUH¶VDORQJKLVWRU\LW¶VDOVRWUXHLQLQIDQW
you know, experimentation where you do things like habituation tasks that, or 
looking time tasks, or whatever it is.  But this is a sort of, you know, different 
sort of methodology.  (MD17: 1000-1007) 
/LNH0&0'KHUHIRFXVHVXSRQQHZW\SHVRIPHWKRGRORJ\ZKLFKµVXGGHQO\¶
GRQ¶WUHTXLUHWKHH[SHULPHQWHUWRDVNµVRPHRQH DTXHVWLRQ¶, thus reducing tasks 
demands.  Once again, therefore, this new direction for understanding autism is 
constructed as both possessing quite a significant degree of importance and as 
being distinctly different from existing methods.  A second point made by MD 
is that, by relating these new technologies to an existing literature within 
GHYHORSPHQWDOSV\FKRORJ\PHWKRGVZKLFKGRQ¶WµUHO\XSRQDVNLQJVRPHRQHD
TXHVWLRQ¶DUHQRWWKHH[FOXVLYHGRPDLQRIWKHQHXURVFLHQFHV,QPXFKWKHVDPH
way that the vast majority of fMRI, for example, has been task dependent21, it 
possible, albeit in a more limited sense, to develop behavioural or cognitive 
experiments which are not task dependent.  Eye-tracking experiments, for 
example, are behavioural experiments that have proven to be exceptionally 
popular within the field because the: 
CG: ...data set is very rich so you can finish the experiment very quick with it, 
\RX GRQ¶W KDYH WR JHW KXQGUHG WULDOV \RX PD\EH KDYH WHQ WULDOV DQG JHW RI
course, in a sample, sampling (data) could be like two hundred and fifty trials 
                                       
21
 The majority of the autism literature utilising fMRI continues to give participants a task to 
complete but analyses brain rather than behavioural responses to that task. 
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or could be a thousand trials, so you get like a thousand data points in, in, [in 
a matter of seconds. (CG09: 483-488)22 
Eye-tracking is an ideal technology for reducing task demands; it is perfectly 
feasible to ask how individuals ³visually attend to the world, and we 
look at their attention, memory mechanisms, erm, social attention, 
WKRVHNLQGVRIWKLQJV´(+-132) without requiring participants to 
either comprehend instructions or give deliberate responses.  While the 
neurosciences, and particularly rsMRI, are primary movers in the examination 
RIDXWLVPLQLWVµQDWXUDOVWDWH¶LWLVLPSRUWDQWWRUHPHPEHUWKDWRWKHUIRUPVRI
experimentation are frequently conducted in which the participant is 
constructed as being entirely passive.   
Regardless of the particular methodology being utilised, two key 
populations were repeatedly identified as being available for experimentation 
which, prior to methods which did not require one to answer a question, would 
have been much harder to examine.  These two populations consist of 
individuals with low functioning autism and infants. 
Infants 
One Professor, RS, mused upon what they saw as the fiHOG¶VPLVSODFHG
emphasis upon innate modules following the work on ToM conducted during 
the 1980s and early 1990s.  Considering the importance of those errors within 
the field today RS concludes that:  
56 ,Q IDFW ZKDW¶V KDSSHQHG DV IDU DV , FDQ VHH  is that, er::, empirical 
changes have somewhat ((coughs)) modified the whole field anyway so it 
KDVQ¶WEHHQDJUHDWGLVDGYDQWDJHHUDQGLQSDUWLFXODUDVSHRSOHKDYHORRNHG
at, er, studies of younger and younger and their siblings really you get into a 
rHDOPZKHUHLW¶VFOHDUO\DQLVVXHRIQRQ-YHUEDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQWKDW¶V WKDW¶V
er, at stake, and so things like joint-attention, which was kind of assimilated to 
a theory of mind picture, actually itself needs to be understood, erm, not in 
terms of what follows from it but in terms of its, what, its own standing, its 
own importance, and indeed what it derives from.  (RC10: 131-142) 
                                       
22
 Eye-tracking is also cheaper than neuroimaging to several degrees of magnitude. 
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$FFRUGLQJ WR 56 µHPSLULFDO FKDQJHV¶ KDYH µPRGLILHG WKH ZKROH ILHOG¶ RI
autism research since the 1980s.  The most significant of these empirical 
changes has been the tendency for research to focus upon participants who are 
µ\RXQJHU DQG \RXQJHU¶ D FKDQJH ZKLFK ZDV VKLIWHG DWWHQWLRQ WRZDUGV µQRQ-
YHUEDO FRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶  $V QRWHG LQ WKH VHFWLRQ DERYH WKHVH HPSLULFDO
changes have largely come about due to the emergence of technologies 
(rsMRI, eye-tracking, and so forth) that do not require participants to actively 
engage with the experimental scenario.  This point concerning the importance 
of research into infancy is expanded upon by MD, a Professor, below:   
MD: ...One [important strand of research] is groups who:: are running these at 
risk sibling or pre-WHUPWKDW¶VDQRWKHUGHVLJQZKHUH\RXFDQORRNDWSU¶\RX
NQRZ NLGV ERUQ SUHPDWXUHO\ HUP EHFDXVH WKH\¶YH FRPSURPLVHG
development not just for autism but for a whole bunch of other 
neurodevelopmental outcomes.  Erm, you, and, erm, (.) and, and, and then 
that overlaps with the group of people who use new technologies.  So they 
use, you know, erm, eye-tracking and::, you know, erm, EE* DQG Q¶ Q¶
QHDUVQ¶Q¶QHDULQIUDUHGVSHFWURVFRS\DQGRWKHURWKHUVRUWVRI\RXNQRZ
Z¶Z¶ZHOOQRZVRPHRIWKHJURXSVQRZGR05,LQFOXGLQJIXQFWLRQDO05,
LQIRXUPRQWKROGV %XWDQ\ZD\WKHUH¶VVWRU\REYLRXVO\,¶PQRWDQLPDJHU
but, you know, EXW LW¶V TXLWH FRRO  (UP , GLGQ¶W NQRZ \RX FRXOG GR
functional MRI with four month olds, but you can. 
GH: ((Laughs)). 
MD: Erm, erm, which is great.  Erm, well you can do, you can do functional 
ODXJKVHUP05,ZLWKIRHWXVHVEXWWKDW¶VDQRWKHUVWRU\WRR$QGDV,VD\
LW¶VQRWP\VWRU\EXWHUPHUPDQGWKHQWKHUH¶VDJURXSZKRDUHLQYROYHGLQ
erm, screening studies across Europe and, erm, or have been and, and a group 
involved in early intervention. (MD17: 252-272)   
Within this extract there is the explicit linking of research into infants at risk of 
DXWLVP DQG µWKH JURXS RI SHRSOH ZKR XVH QHZ WHFKQRORJLHV¶ VSHFLILFDOO\
tHFKQRORJLHV PHQWLRQHG LQFOXGH µ((*¶ µQHDU LQIUDUHG VSHFWURVFRS\¶ 1,56
µI05,¶ DQG µH\H-WUDFNLQJ¶The type of study mentioned by MD, that which 
H[DPLQHVµat risk LQIDQWVLEOLQJV¶LVE\IDU WKHPRVWFRPPRQIRUPRIPHWKRG
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examining autism in infancy.  This type of study is possible because, out of 
those children who have an elder sibling with autism:   
EH: About twenty percent end up with autism, erm, and about twenty percent 
end up with some other difficulty so social problems or language problems, 
erm, or just general developmental delays, erm, and then the rest tend to be 
typically developing. (EH14: 392-396) 
While there will still be a significant attrition rate in experiments utilising at 
risk infants, therefore, a sample of one hundred infants might be expected to 
yield a sample of around twenty individuals who will go on to develop autism.  
This is a sample sufficient for many statistical analyses. 
 It should be noted that there are at least three independent 
developments which have made such study designs conceivable.  The first is a 
conceptualisation of autism whereby signs of the condition are, even if only 
marked out as such retrospectively, conceived as being diagnosable in an 
apparently non-symptomatic individual.  Continuing the Canguilhemian 
theme, this conceptualisation of autism is further suggestive of a quantitative 
rather than qualitative division between healthy and ill or normal and 
abnormal, in the case of autism and immediately makes us consider the 
literature on risk within the biosciences and its application to human kinds 
within, for example, healthcare (e.g. Shostak 2010) and judicial (e.g. Rose 
2010) settings.  Secondly, a diagnosis rate of between fifteen and twenty 
percent makes LQIDQWVLEOLQJVWXGLHVµHIILFLHQW¶ ,QWKHVVXFKHIILFLHQF\
would have been drastically reduced with diagnosis rates being so much lower; 
the autism epidemic of the 1990s has certainly facilitated this type of research.  
Finally, and of most relevance to the current discussion, methodologies are 
required with task demands sufficiently low that even very young infants are 
DEOHWREHH[DPLQHG,QGHHGDV0'QRWHVWHFKQRORJLHVZKLFKµGRQ¶WUHTXLUHD
TXHVWLRQWREHDVNHG¶VXFKDVI05,UV05,1,56(EG, and eye-tracking go 
µKDQGLQKDQG¶ZLWKWKHVHH[SHULPHQWV 
 The importance of new technologies to the developing field of infancy 
research in autism was stressed repeatedly by participants, including EH, a 
postdoctoral researcher: 
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GH: And it perhaps goes hand in hand with the, erm, (.) recruiting younger 
and younger infants because there are methodologies which allow you, er, to 
test hypotheses in different age groups than behavioural tests? 
EH: Yeah, exactly so we test four month olds and, you know, tKHUH¶VVROLWWOH
you can do with a four month old, you can basically look at what they look at 
and you can look at what their brain does. (EH14: 1040-1047) 
$UDQJHRIPHWKRGVDUHDYDLODEOHWRµORRNDWZKDWWKHLUEUDLQGRHV¶DQGWKHVH
by definition, are neuroscientific technologies.  A further postdoctoral 
researcher, JH, for example describes how they use a range of neuroscientific 
technologies WR VHH µKRZ WKH EUDLQ UHVSRQVHV¶ DQG µGHYHORSV¶ LQ very young 
infants: 
-+:H¶UHXVLQJHU(53((*VRKRZWhe brain responses to:: novelty, to 
UHSHDWHG VRXQGV WR JD]H HU ZH¶UH DOVR GRLQJ I05, WR ORRN DW DJDLQ
whether, how the specialisation of brain areas develops to social stimuli 
versus nonsocial stimuli.  So we are doing (.) a lot of things. 
GH: And are you ((laughs)), yeah, and are you able to use those, erm, (.) 
neuroscientific tools on very young children, or= 
JH: =Yeah so we can, the youngest we are seeing in this project is four 
months and we do, er::, MRI on that age, structural MRI, just to look at the 
VWUXFWXUHRIWKHEUDLQWRORRNDWWKLVLVVXHRIFRQQHFWLYLW\(UPDQGWKH\¶UH
DVOHHSLQWKHVFDQQHUVRWKH\FDQ¶WEHVHHLQJWKLQJVEXWZHDOVRSUHVHQWVRPH
auditory stimulation. (JH08: 340-354) 
The methodologies mentioned by JH are very different to one another.  Some, 
such as fMRI and EEG examine brain function while others, such as sMRI 
examine brain structure.  What these methods have in common is that there is 
QR FRPSUHKHQVLRQ UHTXLUHG RQ EHKDOI RI WKH LQIDQW VWLPXOL VD\ µDXGLWRU\
stimulatLRQ¶ DUH SUHVHQWHG DQG QHXUDO UHVSRQVH LV PHDVXUHG  7KH DELOLW\ WR
µVHH¶ WKHGLfference between social and nonsocial stimuli which are inscribed 
onto the brain in the absence of any task demands directly facilitates this form 
of knowledge. 
 While, as MD noted above, there is a long history within 
GHYHORSPHQWDO SV\FKRORJ\ RI µORRNLQJ DW ZKDW LQIDQWV FDQ ORRN DW¶ eye 
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tracking technologies are now frequently used to give particularly fine-grained 
analysis.  As JH, a postdoctoral researcher, says of their work with eye-
tracking: 
JH: ...we could be looking at attention, for example, how are, whether they are 
shifting attention from one object to another.  Again you can do this with the 
young, very young infants just showing something on a computer screen, 
makiQJ WKHP ORRN DW WKLV REMHFW DQG WKHQ WKHUH¶V VRPHWKLQJ HOVH DSSHDULQJ
how fast are they to orient.  (JH08: 322-328) 
 7KHVHWHFKQRORJLHVGRQRWUHTXLUHVXEMHFWVWREHµDWUHVW¶LQWKHVWULFWVHQVHDV
they are in rsMRI WKHUH LV VWLOO D SURFHVV RI µPDNLQJ¶ the infant look at a 
computer screen.  Nonetheless, WKLVµPDNLQJ¶LVGRQHLQWKHDEVHQFHRIVSHFLILF
instruction and, as in rsMRI and the other neuroimaging technologies 
considered above, there are no specific demands made of the participant.  It is 
only because no demands are made that infants are able to be examined and 
used in experiments concerning autism. 
Low functioning autism 
 A second population to come under (renewed) scrutiny following the 
proliferation of methodologies allowing experiments in which task demands 
are minimised consists of individuals with low functioning autism.  Research 
into low functioning autism was discussed far less frequently than research 
into infant populations during the interviews.  Indeed, a concern at the lack of 
research into individuals with low levels of functioning was itself a reoccurring 
theme within the interviews. Considering a finding that suggested that 
individuals with autism were less able to complete paired-association tasks 
than control subjects a Professor (ST) concluded that: 
67 1RZ  HUP WKDW¶V LPSRUWDQW EHFDXVH  LW WHOOV XV DERXW SDUWLFXODU
processes that you can test out using much simpler paradigms that could be 
used with very severely autistic individuals.  Very severely autistic 
individuals DUH XQGHU UHVHDUFKHG WKH\¶UH DOPRVW VFDQGDORXVO\ XQGHU
researched. (ST07: 512-517) 
173 
 
7KDW LQGLYLGXDOV ZLWK ORZ IXQFWLRQLQJ DXWLVP RU ZKR DUH µPRUH VHYHUHO\
DXWLVWLF¶DUHXQGHUUHVHDUFKHGLVRIFRXUVHWKHIOLS-side of the trend, identified 
DERYHWRµUHVHDUFKXS¶WKHVSHFWUXP5HVHDUFKHUVJDYHQXPHURXVUHDVRQVIRU
WKLV ODFN RI UHVHDUFK IURP LQGLYLGXDOV¶ LQDELOLW\ WR FRPSOHWH WKH WDVNV WKDW
would be required of them, to an inability to find suitable control groups: 
GH: So, so I guess maybe, so as you sa\LIWKHUH¶VPRUHRI a focus on high, 
on the high [funct]ioning end 
EC:          [Yeah]. 
GH: do you think by incorporating lower functioning [and]comparing that 
across a broad range of people, I mean 
EC:                     [Yeah. Yeah.] (.) 
Yeah, I mean , WKLQN WKHUH¶V D KXJH YDOXH WR WKDW , WKLQN LW¶V PPP \RX
NQRZ,WKLQNLW¶VUHDOO\UHPLVVRI,PHDQLWWRWDOO\PDNHVVHQVHZK\LWKDVQ¶W
EHHQGRQHDQGWKHELJJHVWLVVXHZLWKWHVWLQJORZIXQFWLRQLQJFKLOGUHQDQGLW¶V
the same problem that we had, is that how do you find a good match group? 
(EC11: 334-345) 
 While the issue of control groups may not be resolved by emerging 
technologies, there is a broad discourse that new technologies will be able to 
facilitate a return, within cognitive science, to the study of those individuals 
with lower functioning autism.  As MD, a Professor, states: 
0':HOOSRWHQWLDOO\\HDK\HDKSRWHQWLDOO\LQWRDQG,PHDQLW¶VDOVRWUXHWKDW
you know, you, you sometimes you, these are paradigms you can use with, 
HUPSHRSOHZLWK LQWHOOHFWXDOGLVDELOLW\EHFDXVH\RX¶UHQRW requiring them to 
understand an instruction or produce a response so if you can keep them still 
ZKLFKLVFKDOOHQJHDVIDUDV,¶P\RXNQRZ,¶PQRWWKHSHUVRQZKRGRHVWKH
imaging but if you can keep them still, which is a challenge, erm, an::d erm 
get them to look at a monitor and be interested in WKHWKLQJWKDW¶VLQIURQWRI
them then you can, erm, you know, you can be doing experiments with 
SHRSOHHUP\RXNQRZZLWKDYHU\Z¶DZLGHVRUWRIUDQJHRI,4VZKLFK,
think has also not been done as much as it sort of should be. (MD17: 1037-
1049) 
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AVZLWKUHVHDUFKFRQGXFWHGZLWKLQIDQWVWKHFDSDFLW\WRXVHµSDUDGLJPV¶ZKHUH
WKH UHVHDUFK LV µQRW UHTXLULQJ WKHP WRXQGHUVWDQGDQ LQVWUXFWLRQRUSURGXFHD
UHVSRQVH¶ RSHQV WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI FRQGXFWLQJ UHVHDUFK ZLWK WKLV QRYHO
population.   
In the following extract, EH makes it clear that neurotechnologies, and 
specifically EEG, are ideally situated to offer experimental paradigms of utility 
for the study of individuDOVZLWKORZIXQFWLRQLQJDXWLVPWKRVHµZLWKRXWPDQ\
ODQJXDJHVNLOOV¶RUZLWKOLWWOHXQGHUVWanding of what is required of them within 
an experiment: 
EH: I think, and again for kids with autism, for lower functioning kids who 
KDYH HUP ZKR VD\ GRQ¶W KDYH YHU\ PDQ\ ODQJXDJH VNLOOV RU ZKR  GRQ¶W
have many cognitive skills again for them behavioural tasks can be really 
difficult, sort of pressing a button can be really hard, erm, you know 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJWKDWWKH\¶YHJRWWRSUHVVDEXWWRQZKHQHYHUVRPHWKLQJKDSSHQV
or (continues), just that kind of stuff.  So something like EEG where you can 
show them stuff and look at how their brain responds without having to do 
something, erm, can actually be a really good technique. (EH14: 1060-1078) 
It is worth noting that EH mentioned EEG specifically and not the full gamut 
of neuroscientific technologies mentioned in relation to the infant literature.  
EH expands upon this point in the following extract:  
EH: And again, fMRI really is almost impossible with low functioning kids 
EHFDXVHWKH\GRQ¶WOLNHO\LQJGRZQLQWKHVFDQQHUDQGLW¶VGDUNDQGLW¶VQRLV\
and iW¶VZKHUHDV((*WKH\FDQVLWXSDQGLW¶VOLJKWDQGWKH\FDQZDWFKDYLGHR
and they have the hat on and, so in terms of practicalities you can get, collect 
data from children right across the spectrum which is very hard with other 
methods.  Erm, and I thinN WKDW¶V LPSRUWDQW LQ DXWLVP UHVHDUFK WR WU\ DQG
include children and individuals right across the (.) functioning spectrum. 
(EH1069-1078) 
This extract reminds us that, for all their similarities, neurotechnologies remain 
diverse tools and come coupled with a range of contextual factors that are 
essential to understanding their knowledge production (Joyce 2005).  
Nonetheless, it is not only EEG that is suitable for the study of individuals with 
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low functioning autism.  Just as for eye-tracking in infancy, technologies can 
be used to make behavioural experimentation feasible in this population: 
67 7KH\¶UHmuch harder to test and you can¶WGR WKLQJVDQG\RXNQRZD
ORWDDDFODVVLFSDUDGLJPWKDWZH¶YHXVHG LQRXUPHPRU\UHVHDUFKLV\RX
know, asking you to, erm, describe, er, imagine the last time you went to the 
PRYLHVZLWKDIULHQGDQGMXVWGHVFULEHWKLVWRPH:HOO\RXFDQ¶WGRWhat with 
D NLG ZKR¶V MXVW UXQQLQJ URXQG DQG IODSSLQJ DQG URFNLQJ DQG LV PLQLPDOO\
YHUEDODQGKH¶VQRWJRLQJWRJLYH\RXDQ\NLQGRIFRKHUHQWDFFRXQWLIKHFDQ
speak at all.  Whereas if you can just have a series of things where you present 
simple, er, shaped stimuli, and combinations of stimuli and so on and reward 
them for peck, picking one rather than the other and the touch screen and 
technologies have improved enormously as well, er::, then, you know, by 
structuring those kinds of investigations you can get an, an enormous amount 
of information about what kinds of very simple, er::, psychological tasks are 
SRVVLEOHDQGZKDWDUHQ¶WLQNLGVOLNHWKDW67-558) 
+HUHQHZµWRXFKVFUHHQ¶WHFKQRORJLHVKDYHDLGHGUHVHDUFKHUVLQEHLQJDEOHWR
work with neZSRSXODWLRQVUHGXFLQJWDVNGHPDQGVDQGXQFRYHULQJWKHµWUXH
DXWLVP¶WKDWOLHVEHQHDWKWKHP 
The performativity of rest 
There are two narratives running through the research into infancy and 
low functioning autism that has been depicted above.  The first narrative is 
that, due to the ability of various technologies to remove or reduce task 
GHPDQGV WR JHW µEHKLQG¶ EHKDYLRXU DQG VHH µWKH UHDO¶ RU µWKH WUXH¶ DXWLVm, 
emerging neurotechnologies RIIHU DQ µDPD]LQJ DELOLW\¶ WR GLDJQRVH DQG
examine autism in all its forms, in new populations, and in new ways.  The 
second narrative stands in direct contrast to the first.  The inability to 
domesticate23 research subjects and make them conform to the demands of 
these methodological innovations radically constricts the type of questions that 
can be asked.  Looking at the extracts above, there are repeated references to 
WKHIDFWWKDWWKHUHLVµVROLWWOH\RX FDQGRZLWKDIRXUPRQWKROG¶WKDWUHVHDUFK
FDQRQO\SURJUHVVµLI\RXFDQNHHSWKHPVWLOOZKLFKLVFKDOOHQJH¶EHFDXVHµWKH\
                                       
23
 7KHWHUPµGRPHVWLFDWH¶LVWDNHQKHUHIURP3UDVDG(2005) and his analysis of attempts to 
make the body cohere with the demands of the magnetic resonance scanner. 
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GRQ¶W OLNH O\LQJGRZQLQ WKHVFDQQHUDQG LW¶VGDUNDQG LW¶VQRLV\¶DQGHYHQ LI
WKH\¶UH LQ WKHVFDQQHU WKH UHVHDUFKHUQHHGV WR µJHW them to look at a monitor 
DQG EH LQWHUHVWHG LQ WKH WKLQJ WKDW¶V LQ IURQW RI WKHP¶  7KHVH OLPLWDWLRQV RI
course, drive the questions which are asked within this form of research: 
GH: And does a lot of this [research] focus around the area of attention?  Is 
that a kind of 
(+ <HDK LW¶V RQH RI WKH NH\ DUHDV  %HFDXVH EHFDXVH WKH WKLQJV WKDW
ODXJKVLQIDQWVFDQ¶W,PHDQWKH\FDQGRDELWEXWWKHUH¶VWKHUH¶VWKHUH¶V
not a lot they can do, erm, but I think focusing on the more, sort of, domain 
general mechanisms like paying attention to things, which they can do, they 
can learn, erm, to habituation (.), erm, they can show preference to a social 
stimuli, which is important in terms of them getting enough social input, they 
can, you know, basic vocalisation which is important in terms of getting, so 
those sort of basic learning processes that, that all infants have to an extent, 
but to a varying extent. (EC10: 513-525) 
In this extract the topic of attention is, apparently, not so much of interest a 
priori but rather a psychological construct that happens to match the ability 
OHYHOVRI LQIDQWVDQG WKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRI WKH WHFKQRORJ\  ,QIDQWVFDQµOHDUQ¶
µKDELWXDWH¶ DQG µVKRZ SUHIHUHQFH¶ EXW DV (+ QRWHG HOVHZKHUH ³WKH\¶UH QRW
going to point at something´(+ 
What these resting state technologies reveal is a partial picture, but this 
LVDSDUWLDOSLFWXUHWKDWLVSUHVHQWHGDVEHLQJµEHKLQG¶PHWKRGRORJ\ZKROHDV
µWKH WUXWK¶ DV µWKH UHDO DXWLVP¶  7KLV OHDGV WR D FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ RI DXWLVP
made in the image of scanner, where a significant number of behaviours are 
µRWKHUHG¶DVWKH\GRQRWFRQIRUPWRWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIWKHVHPHWKRGV,WLVLQ
this sense that these technologies can be described as productive, forming new 
visions of autism and social behaviour.  This performance of autism can be 
described as a somatisation. 
Within a somatised autism, there is an increased importance attributed 
WRWKHERG\DQGLWVµQDWXUDOVWDWH¶DVLWLVWKHµVXEMHFWDWUHVW¶WKDWFRPHVXQGHU 
the gaze of emerging technologies.  Secondly, there is decreased importance 
attributed to language.  When these scientific studies seek to present social 
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stimuli those stimuli are based upon eyes, faces, or whole bodies presented in 
the absence of speech, for it is these bodily responses that can be turned into 
data within the bounds of the neurosciences.  Similarly, when one wishes to 
examine social response what is examined is not a verbal report or anything 
which might require some form of internal monologue based upon rumination, 
contemplation, conscious understanding or the like.  Instead, social 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ LV EDVHG XSRQ RQH¶V ERGLO\ UHVSRQVHV HLWKHU H[WHUQDO
movements (e.g. eye saccades), or internal changes (e.g. particular activations 
of the social brain network).  These responses are both extra- and pre-
discursive in nature.  These responses are pre-discursive in the sense that social 
(in)ability can be measured in those without language abilities; this category 
includes infants, animals, and those individuals (with or without autism) who 
may never be expected to gain significant language abilities.  Responses are 
extra-discursive because social (in)ability can be measured without recourse to 
language, thus ensuring that individuals with competent language use can still 
be classified as socially abnormal.   
Conclusion 
 This chapter has been concerned with two trends within contemporary 
autism research.  Both of the identified novel trends have the capacity to 
reconstruct autism and broader descriptions of social behaviour.  The first half 
of the chapter was concerned with three research strands into high functioning 
autism, savants, and the BAP/normal population.  It was argued that all three 
of these strands have engaged in a process of normalisation and extended the 
concept of autism towards the non-clinical population.  It has been argued that 
such research practices are indicative of a changing relationship between the 
normal and the pathological in the case of autism.  Existing processes of 
subjectification (detailed in the preceding chapters) seem to show autism 
taking on an appearance based, at least in part, upon experimental 
SV\FKRORJ\¶V savoir of the social and particular requirements made of an 
individual within a given society (autism in the shape of society).  By 
comparison, these normalising research programmes begin to understand 
society through the lens of autism (society in the shape of autism).  The 
argument, here, is that these regimes have brought about a form of 
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VXEMHFWLILFDWLRQZKHUHE\ µKHDOWK\¶ VRFLDOEHKDYLRXUKDVEHFRPHH[SOLFDEOH LQ
terms of a discourse based upon autism, and that autism is being incorporated 
LQWRDQµRQWRORJ\RIRXUVRFLDOVHOYHV¶:HDUHDOOLQFUHDVLQJO\µDOLWWOHELW
DXWLVWLF¶ 
The second portion of this chapter has been more directly concerned 
ZLWKUHFRQVWUXFWLRQVRIµDXWLVWLFVRFLDOLW\¶ZLWKLQSRSXODWLRQVGLDJQRVHGRUDW
risk of being diagnosed, with autism.  It has been argued that research into two 
new populations ± infants and low functioning individuals with autism ± has 
intensified as new technologies have facilitated research in which the 
SDUWLFLSDQW LV DEOH WR EH µDW UHVW¶ and is not required to have any particular 
comprehension of the experiment taking place.  It has been argued here, and 
elsewhere (Callard and Margulies 2011), that resting state technologies are 
becoming increasingly influential sites for self-making.  In particular, the claim 
is that, because of the perceived abilities of the individuals engaged in these 
research practices and the requirements of the methodologies themselves, this 
research utilising resting state technologies has privileged the body to the 
exclusion of discourse.  7KH VRFLDO KDV WKXV EHHQ µVRPDWLVHG¶ ZLWK DQ
increased focus upon automatic and unconscious bodily states and a decreased 
focus upon intentionality, language, meaning, and the abstract symbolic world.   
 What is it that unites these two research trends, seemingly heading in 
opposite directions?  One Professor, MD, speculated that emerging 
technologies might offer one further possibility for understanding autism: 
0' \RX FDQ DFWXDOO\ JHW H[¶ WKH VDPH experiment which would rely on 
new technologies like, erm, (.) eye-tracking or:: EEG or ERP that you can use 
ZLWK LQIDQWV DQG DGXOWV DQG \ VR \RX NQRZ \RX FDQ¶W GR WKDW ZLWK
EHKDYLRXUDO H[SHULPHQWV \RX KDYH WR KDYH GLIIHUHQW H[SHULPHQWV \¶ HUP
HUPWKHUH¶VDQ even issue, even an issue of whether you can really sort of do 
it with infants and sort of adults.  But, but you can get parallel versions at the 
very least and possibly even completely identical sort of versions.  Which I 
think opens up all sorts of possibilities in terms of, you know, erm, 
investigating things across a wide sort of span of development which I think 
is, erm, good. (MD17: 1011-1022)  
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µ1HZWHFKQRORJLHV¶PD\DOORZIRUµWKHVDPHH[SHULPHQW¶WREHGHSOR\HGZLWK 
adults and infants, thereby facilitating comparisons between those populations.  
It has been argued, above, that the resting state experiments conducted upon 
LQIDQWV DQG ORZ IXQFWLRQLQJ LQGLYLGXDOV FRQVWUXFW D QRYHO µVRPDWLVHG VRFLDO¶
IROORZLQJ WKH IRUFHG µRWKHULQJ¶ RI EHKDYLRXUV ZKLFK Fognitive experiments 
upon higher functioning individuals routinely investigate, including the use of 
language, conscious understanding, and so forth.  If it is also the case, as this 
chapter has argued, that a general process of subjectification has begun to take 
place whereby autism is incorporated into an ontology of our social selves, 
then the possibility for that ontology to be likewise somatised must be 
considered.    
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Conclusion: Autism, history, and socio-emotive politics 
Across four analytic chapters, this thesis has sought to examine the 
emergence and subsequent enactment of a particular type of socially 
disordered subject, the individual diagnosed as having autism, within the 
discourse of cognitive (neuro)scientists.  There has been an attempt to examine 
the constructions of autism during the 1980s, when the contemporary vision of 
autism emerged within the cognitive sciences; in discourses discussing 
heterogeneity; with regards to broader constructions of society; and finally in 
relation to emerging neurotechnologies.  Across all of these chapters there has 
EHHQ DQ LQWHUHVW LQ KRZ FRQVWUXFWLRQV RI µDXWLVP¶ DQG FRQVWUXFWLRQV RI µWKH
VRFLDO¶DUHUHODWHGDQGZKHWKHUWKHFRQFHSWVDUHLQVRPHVHQVHGHSHQGHQWXSRQ
one another or indeed mutually constitutive.  This conclusion will discuss the 
findings of this thesis; firstly on a chapter-by-chapter basis, and then by 
drawing together overarching themes and asking questions for possible future 
research.  The limitations of the project will also be considered.   
Chapter findings 
Chapter 4 
 The empirical portion of this thesis began by claiming that, within the 
psy-disciplines, a contemporary foundation for autism was lain down during 
the 1980s within the laboratories of cognitive psychologists.  Three theories of 
autism were examined in detail within this chapter.  The first of these was the 
metarepresentations hypothesis (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Leslie 1987) which 
claimed that autism was a specific deficit in a proposed decoupling mechanism 
allowing for a cognitive separation between representations of the world and 
knowledge of the world itself.  It was proposed that, if a faulty decoupling 
mechanism were the primary deficit in autism, pretend play and knowledge of 
other minds might be areas of particular difficulty.  The theory of Executive 
Dysfunction (Rumsey 1985) suggested that individuals with autism had a 
particular difficulty in integrating top-down existing knowledge about the 
world with bottom-up incoming sensory information and that this difficulty 
was manifest in particular experimental paradigms such as the Tower of Hanoi 
task.  Finally, the theory of Weak Central Coherence (Frith 1989) argued that 
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the primary GLIIHUHQFHLQDXWLVPZDVDµGHWDLOIRFXV¶DQRYHUHPSKDVLVRQSDUWV
of a system to the detriment of the whole.  This particular cognitive processing 
style was demonstrated in weaknesses on tasks which involved reading for 
meaning (Frith & Snowling 1983), but also strengths in tasks such as the 
embedded figures paradigm (Shah & Frith 1983; Happé 1994b).  
The central claim of this first analysis chapter was that these three 
hypotheses of autistic aetiology share a particular savoir (Foucault 1972: 15), a 
particular depth knowledge (Hacking 1995a: 198), of the social taken from 
cognitivist models of social psychology dominant since the mid-twentieth 
century (Danziger 1992; Danziger 2000; Greenwood 2004a).  The construction 
of the social deployed within these models conceptualised social cognition as 
being entirely concerned with interpersonal engagement and differing from 
nonsocial cognition by degree rather than by kind.  The social as an 
autonomous sphere does not exist within this framework.  Considering the 
social in such a way allowed behaviours such as restricted interests and 
repetitive behaviours (RRBIs) and sensory abnormalities to become, in some 
sense, social deficits and at the very core of the autistic condition, a trend 
which has continued through to the 5th edition of the American Psychiatric 
$VVRFLDWLRQ¶V'LDJQRVWLFDQG6WDWLVWLFDO0DQXDORI0HQWDO'LVRUGHUV(DSM-5; 
American Psychiatric Association 2013).  The radical break from existing 
conceptualisations of autism that this savoir of the social ushered in was 
demonstrated by considering the work of Peter Hobson, and the disputes 
between Hobson and the proponents of the cognitivist models.  While still 
FRQVLGHULQJ µWKH VRFLDO¶ WR EH WLHG WR LQWHUSHUVRQDO XQGHUVWDQGLQJ  +REVRQ¶V
affective theory of autism (Hobson 1993a) relied upon the I-Thou/I-It 
distinction of Martin Buber (Buber 1987) which posits a qualitative divide 
between social and nonsocial acts.  The chapter concluded by showing the 
apparent incommensurability RI +REVRQ DQG WKH FRJQLWLYLVWV¶ SRVLWLRQV E\
discussing the failure of all parties to find any empirical evidence to separate 
their theories. 
There are two noticeable differences between the analysis presented 
here and existing histories of autism.  The first is that this analysis centralises 
FRQVWUXFWLRQV RI µWKH VRFLDO¶ VRPHWKLQJ DOPRVW HQWLUely neglected within the 
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existing social science autism literature.  The second key novelty, which is not 
unrelated, is that the focus is upon the 1980s when previously the focus has 
been upon the 1960s and the effects of deinstitutionalisation (see, for instance, 
Evans' (2013) analysis of the UK context, and Eyal et al.'s (2010) version 
within a US context).  This difference can, in part, be explained by the decision 
to focus upon cognitive psychology rather than upon child psychiatry.  Within 
the UK context at least, such a decision seems justified.  A recent study 
examining research trends showed that 56 per cent of all autism research in the 
United Kingdom (and around 44 per cent in the United States) concerns 
µELRORJ\ EUDLQ DQG FRJQLWLRQ¶ (Pellicano et al. 2013: 26) and this is to a 
significant degree the legacy of Uta Frith and the research conducted during 
the 1980s.  Nonetheless, and without unproblematically accepting the link 
between autism and deinstitutionalisation (see chapter 2: 44-45), there is no 
fundamental incompatibility between those works focusing upon the 1960s and 
the emphasis that is placed here upon the 1980s.  The metaphor of archaeology 
LQ)RXFDXOW¶VZRUN(e.g. Foucault 1972) alludes not only to excavation but also 
to addition of layer upon layer upon layer in the continual process of 
subjectification.  Important work, for example, remains to be done surrounding 
the first decades of the twentieth century and the matrices that allowed both 
Kanner and Asperger to identify the first individuals diagnosed with autism as 
experiencing some form of impaired affective engagement.  The key points 
raised within this chapter were, firstly, that the 1980s are a crucial and 
neglected decade in the concept formation of contemporary autism and, 
secondly, that constructions of the social have been key to understandings of 
autism.   
Chapter 5 
Just as a focus upon the 1980s does not preclude the importance of the 
1960s, neither does it exclude the possibility of subsequent changes in the 
concept of autism.  The final analytic chapters of the thesis consider the 
possibilities of changes since the 1980s.  The first change documented 
concerns the notion of autistic heterogeneity at the level of cognition, a concept 
which did not emerge until the 1990s (e.g. Happé 1991).  This concept of 
heterogeneity underpins the oft-quoted maxim that µLI \RX NQRZ RQH SHUVRQ
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ZLWK DXWLVP \RX NQRZ RQH SHUVRQ ZLWK DXWLVP¶  ([DPLQLQJ GLVFXVVLRQV RI
autistic heterogeneity within the research interviews it was concluded that the 
term is itself heterogeneous.  Firstly, the heterogeneity of autism was located 
within scientific knowledge production (epistemic heterogeneity), seen as an 
artefact of attempts to unify the findings of diverse methods and theoretical 
positions.  Secondly, heterogeneity was positioned within the autistic condition 
itself (aleatoric heterogeneity), as a key part of the constitution of autism.  
Further, aleatoric heterogeneity could be further sub-divided into intra-personal 
heterogeneity and inter-personal heterogeneity.  Inter-personal heterogeneity 
refers to the claim that there may be no one feature (at the biological, 
psychological, or behavioural level) which is shared by all individuals with 
autism.  For example, during the mid-1990s (e.g. Frith & Happé 1994) it was 
suggested that while some individuals with autism had an impaired theory of 
PLQGRWKHUV¶ DELOLWLHVZHUH LQWDFW LQ WKLV UHVSHFW 7KXV DGLIIHUHQW FDXVDWLYH
factor was deemed responsible for different instances of autism.  Intra-personal 
heterogeneity refers to the claim that one cognitive deficit cannot be 
responsible for all autistic symptomology within a single individual.  Within 
the contemporary literature, intra-personal heterogeneity is most readily 
applied to the concept of the fractionable triad (e.g. Happé et al. 2006) which 
claims that the social impairments, the communication impairments, and the 
RRBIs typical of autism do not emerge from a single cognitive deficit.  While 
other pieces (e.g. Verhoeff 2012) have begun to consider the importance of 
heterogeneity within the contemporary autism concept, this thesis represents 
the first detailed consideration of the nature of autistic heterogeneity both 
historically and within interviews. 
Following this consideration of autistic heterogeneity, the question was 
asked; how is autism research able to progress with such a disordered, 
incoherent conceptualisation of the object of study?  Further analysis of the 
interviews seemed to show that order and coherence was found within a 
qualitatively distinct experience of autism which, for the researcher, was 
immediate, self-evident, and yet resistant to the scientific project.  Autism was 
thus constructed in two quite different ways within the interview data; as a 
messy, disordered, difference of degree, and as an easily recognisable, 
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qualitatively distinct way of being in the world.  It was argued that, to a 
significant extent, it was this qualitatively distinct experience of autism which 
allowed research to continue despite the disorder in laboratory settings.  The 
work presented here is in agreement with both Silverman (Silverman 2004; 
Silverman 2012) and Fitzgerald (Fitzgerald 2012; Fitzgerald 2013), as well as 
the broader science studies literature on tacit knowledges (e.g. Collins 1974), 
in arguing that knowledge production in autism research is dependent upon a 
particularly broad range of activities, many far divorced from traditional 
conceptualisations of the scientific method.  The recalled emotional reactions 
of researchers to early encounters with individuals with autism, a topic focused 
upon by both Fitzgerald and Silverman, was regarded as central to a continuing 
narrative constructing autism as a thing-in-the-world.  Without these 
experiences, it seems far less likely that autism researchers would be able to 
continue unproblematically with their project.   
Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 continued to interrogate this experience of autism as the 
socially abnormal and sought to show that such experiences were only ever 
intelligible within particular societal frameworks.  Firstly, the chapter 
considers autism in relation to the requirements of DSM-5 and it is shown that 
UHVHDUFKHUV FRQVLGHU WKH VRFLDO DV DQ µHWKLFDO VXEVWDQFH¶  7KHUH LV DQ HWKLFDO
UHTXLUHPHQW WR FRQVLGHU DXWLVP DV D µVRFLDO GLVRUGHU¶ EHFDXVH LW LV LQ
interactions with society that autism most clearly shows itself.  It follows that 
there is a moral project; DSM-5 should FRQVWUXFWDXWLVPDVDµVRFLDOGLVRUGHU¶
in order to ensure service provision for individuals with autism.  This explicit 
consideration of autism within a value-based framework is taken to show that 
WKHµREMHFWLYHVRFLDO¶RIWKHODERUDWRU\LVLQGHHGQRUPDWLYHDQGEHVWXQGHUVWRRG
within the contexts provided by a particular society. 
The chapter next considers the Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (ADOS) and it is again shown that normative frameworks are 
required in order to observe autism.  What is more, researchers discuss how 
WKH\ PXVW µHOLFLW¶ RU µSURYRNH¶ VRFLDO GLVRUGHU LQWR PDNLQJ DQ DSSHDUDQFH
Similar claims are made of cognitive experimentation, with the suggestion that 
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social disorder is hard if not impossible to observe within an objective 
scientific framework.  Finally, the chapter considers discourses of 
neuroplasticity and the notion that the normative somehow becomes the 
objective, that society is manifest within the brains of individuals with autism.   
'UDZLQJXSRQ/DWRXU¶VQRWLRQRIµVXEODWD¶WKLVFKDSWHUVXJJHVWVWKDWWKH
appearance of autism at a given moment is a multi-IDFHWHG µDFKLHYHPHQW¶
(Latour 1999: 47).  The achievement of autism relies upon a local encounter 
between the researcher and the participant, but this encounter itself is situated 
within a particular societal formation and with the availability of various 
methodologies and technologies; all of these are essential for autism to appear 
DV LWGRHV  ,QDYHU\ UHDO VHQVH WKLV FKDSWHU WDNHVXS5RVHQEHUJ¶V FODLP WKDW
³GLVHDVH GRHV QRW H[LVW XQWLO ZH KDYH DJUHHG WKDW LW GRHV E\ SHUFHLYLQJ
QDPLQJDQGUHVSRQGLQJWRLW´(Rosenberg & Golden 1992: xiii) by suggesting 
that knowledge of autism, indeed autism itself, is always relational, always 
situated. 
Chapter 7 
 Finally, chapter 7 directly considers changing notions of autism within 
an era of cognitive neuroscience.  It is claimed within this chapter that the 
autism spectrum is being stretched at both ends.  It is first shown that three 
separate research programmes are extending the concept of autism towards the 
normal population.  Firstly, there is now a significant amount of research 
conducted into the Broader Autism Phenotype (BAP; e.g. Sucksmith et al. 
2011) which examines autistic-like traits within a sub-clinical population.  
Indeed, an increasingly significant amount of research into autism concerns 
entirely non-clinical populations (e.g. Ronald et al. 2005).  Second is research 
into autistic savants who have exceptional talents in particular areas (e.g. 
Treffert 2009).  For example, interviewees considered artists, poets, and 
musicians with autism.  Finally, there is research into individuals with autism 
who are of generally high intelligence and who have no co-morbid conditions 
(for example, intellectual disability).  It is argued that, despite working with 
populations that differ in many ways, these three research programmes all 
breach the divide between normal and pathological, quantifying the difference 
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EHWZHHQ VRFLDO GLVRUGHU DQG µQRUPDO¶ KXPDQ VRFLDO EHKDYLRXU  ,Q D sense, 
WKHVH UHVHDUFK VWUDQGV DUH PDNLQJ LW SRVVLEOH WR LQWHUSUHW µQRUPDO¶ EHKDYLRXU
through the lens of autism.  This is a novel suggestion in relation to autism, 
although the current project supports recent articles broadly centred around the 
larger notion of biomedicalization (Clarke et al. 2003; Clarke et al. 2010) 
which have argued that a quantification in construction of disease has lead to 
the pathologicalisation of normal human behaviours (Dumit 2004; Shostak 
2010; Williams et al. 2011). 
 If the aforementioned research streams are stretching the spectrum into 
the normal population, a range of emerging technologies are facilitating a quite 
different expansion.  It is claimed that emerging neurotechnologies such eye-
tracking, electroencephalography (EEG), and resting state functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (rsfMRI) are allowing autism to be studied in populations 
who previously stood outside of the experimental regime of cognitive 
psychology.  What is novel about these new technologies is that they require 
no significant degree of comprehension on behalf of the participant; this is 
markedly different to the experiments of the 1980s (for example) which 
required participants to follow complex instructions and be able to report upon 
their thought processes.  The analysis presented here agrees with Callard and 
Margulies (2011) that these methods are becoming key sites of interest in 
contemporary productions of the self.   
The two most significant of the populations to come under the gaze of 
WKHVHQHZPHWKRGVDUHILUVWO\LQGLYLGXDOVZLWKµFODVVLF¶DXWLVPRUZLWKVHYHUH
intellectual disabilities and, secondly, pre-verbal infants.  In both cases the 
researchers interviewed claimed that studies using these novel methods got 
µEHKLQG¶PHWKRGWRUHYHDOWKHµUHDO¶DXWLVP&KDSWHUVHYHQDUJXHVWKDWRQWKH
contrary, these methods requLUHDJUHDWGHDOWREHµRWKHUHG¶LQRUGHUWRDVVXPH
that they examine social behaviour.  It is claimed in particular that within these 
UHVHDUFKVWUHDPVWKHVRFLDO LVPDGHµVRPDWLF¶ WKLVHQWDLOV ODQJXDJHPHDQLQJ
and intentionality to be divested of their importance and a focus upon the body 
JLYHQSULPDF\$QH[DPSOHRIWKHµVRPDWLFLVDWLRQRIWKHVRFLDO¶PD\EHIRXQG
in research concerning mimicry (e.g. Marsh et al. 2013).  In such experiments 
participants watch an actor perform an act and the response is deemed to be 
187 
 
µVRFLDO¶LIWKDWDFWLVPLPLFNHG+HUHµVRFLDOLQSXW¶UHIHUVWRDERGLO\VWDWHDQ
action, for example), social processing refers to bodily states (eye movements, 
activation of the social brain network, etc), and µVRFLDO UHVSRQVH¶ UHIHUV WR D
bodily state (mimicry of the initial action).  It is argued here that this 
description of the social is novel and deviates markedly from existing 
articulations that have thus far been described (e.g. by Danziger (2000), 
Greenwood (2004a), Matusall (2013), or Young (2012a)). 
  Finally, chapter 7 argues that, as studies seek to make comparisons 
between the two ends of the autism spectrum, the inability to make the 
intentionality, meaning, and language of the normal population intelligible 
within the context of, for instance, pre-YHUEDO LQIDQWV HQVXUHV WKDW µVRFLDO
behaviour¶ LQ WKH QRUPDO SRSXODWLRQ LV OLNHZLVH EHLQJ PDGH VRPDWLF  2QFH
again the novel suggestion here is that bodily action is being made visible 
through the language of autism. 
 This relationship between normalcy and pathology in an age of 
neurotechology has a distinctly Canguilhemian appearance (Canguilhem 
1991).  Firstly, the distinction between normal and pathological is quantitative 
UDWKHU WKDQ TXDOLWDWLYH  6HFRQGO\ µQRUPDO¶ VRFLDO EHKDYLRXU LV EHLQJ JLYHQ
voice through pathological behaviour.  And finally, and as discussed in chapter 
six, biological norms are shown to be normative.  Returning to evidence 
presented in chapter four, however, a Canguilhemian framework is rejected as 
a general rule.  The model of the social applied to autism in the 1980s emerged 
within the psy-disciplines for many reasons but primary among them was to 
seek knowledge about two social environments in particular; the classroom and 
the battlefield (Danziger 1992: 325).  In the first instance it was a model of 
normal social behaviour, alongside various institutions with the aim of 
surveillance over childhood (Armstrong 1983: 27; Danziger 1990: 79), which 
facilitated the disease classification of autism and it was only later that the 
autism became a possible model through which to articulate general social 
functioning.  The relationship between the normal and the pathological, 
science and society, autism and the social is dialectal and reciprocal; 
attempting to understand one in the absence of the other is futile. 
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Overarching claims 
Constructing the social 
Excluding that literature which has rather uncritically welcomed the 
neurosciences into the cannon of the social sciences (e.g. Camerer et al. 2005; 
Glimcher 2009; see Papoulias & Callard (2010) for an analysis), the existing 
literature has generally taken one of two approaches when considering 
cognitive/neuroscientific approaches to studying the social.  The first approach 
is perhaps best captured by Michel Callon when he claims that when:  
³WKH VRFLHW\ GHVFULEHG E\ VRFLRORJLVWV FRQIURQWV QDWXUH QR PDWWHU
which description they give), society always has the last word.  If the 
QRUPVDUHUHPRYHGWKHVFLHQFHFROODSVHV´(Callon 1986: 2) 
Shostak and Waggoner (2011), for example, entitle an article Narration and 
QHXURVFLHQFH (QFRXQWHULQJ WKH VRFLDO RQ WKH ³ODVW IURQWLHU RI PHGLFLQH´.  
6XFK DSSURDFKHV ZKLFK VWDWH WKDW VFLHQFH µHQFRXQWHUV¶ WKH VRFLDO FOHDUO\
SRVLWLRQWKHVRFLDODVH[WHULRUDQGLQVRPHVHQVHSULRUWRQHXURVFLHQFHDQGµWKH
VRFLDO¶DVVRPHWKLQJwhich invades the laboratory at every turn and that can be 
used by science studies scholars to undermine the objectivity of the 
(neuro)sciences.   
The work of Joyce (Joyce 2005; Joyce 2006; Joyce 2008; Joyce 2010; 
Joyce 2011) and the ongoing project entitled critical neuroscience (Choudhury 
et al. 2009; Choudhury & Slaby 2011; Slaby 2010) perhaps typify this type of 
analysis.  Both the critical neuroscience network and Joyce continue to provide 
key insights into the ways in which neuroscience and the human sciences are 
embedded within society, but this thesis has suggested limitations to this 
approach.  Most simply, this thesis has sought to reconfirm that the social is an 
explicit object of concern that comes under scientific investigation.  It is not 
DOZD\V µHQFRXQWHUHG¶ LQ WKH ODERUDWRU\ LW LV VWXGLHG DQG FUHDWHG WKHUH  7KLV
position has been repeatedly stressed throughout the thesis.  Secondly, and 
perhaSV PRUH LQWHUHVWLQJO\ WKLV WKHVLV KDV VRXJKW WR VKRZ WKDW µWKH VRFLDO¶
within the laboratory is continually walking with, informing, and being 
informed by broader society.  In chapter four it was shown that constructions 
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of the social formed within the psy-disciplines have been core to the concept of 
autism.  Chapter six sought to show that the social was constructed as an 
ethical substance by researchers, and that they stated that societal norms should 
be incorporated within research agendas and diagnostic criteria.  Chapter seven 
H[DPLQHG LQSDUW WKHFDSDFLW\RIWKHFRQFHSWRI µDXWLVWLFVRFLDOLW\¶WR LQIRUP
broader identities and societal configurations far beyond the laboratory through 
the concepts of the Broader Autism Phenotype and research into autistic 
savants.  Others have noted that there is a:    
 ³SRWHQWLDO QRYHOW\ DQG SURGXFWLYLW\ LQ WKH DZNZDUG DQG VRPHWLPHV
WURXEOLQJZD\VWKDWµFXOWXUH¶DQGµQHXURELRORJ\¶FDQEHWUDFHGWRJHWKHU
± and not as separate-but-HTXDO GRPDLQV RI VLJQLILFDWLRQ´ (Fitzgerald 
2012: 46) 
This thesis here sides here with Fitzgerald, as well as with those who, like 
Callon, see the practices of the neurosciences as having a constitutive and 
reciprocal relationship with society.  When one views the cognitive sciences 
only as cultural products, a great deal of the productive work that they engage 
in goes unexamined. 
The second approach towards the social in science is found within the 
small literature which has considered the construction of the social within the 
laboratories of social psychology (Danziger 1992; Danziger 2000; Greenwood 
2004a; Stam 2006) and social neuroscience (Matusall et al. 2011; Matusall 
2013; Young 2012a; Young 2012b).  The current analysis can certainly be 
made to fit within this literature.  Two aspects mark the current project out 
from the existing literature however.  Firstly, previous studies have relied 
almost exclusively upon published sources meaning that the current project is 
amongst the first studies to utilise, in part, an interview methodology to 
H[DPLQH VFLHQWLVWV¶ FRQVWUXFWLRQV RI WKH VRFLDO  6HFRQGO\ WKH H[LVWLQJ
literature considering constructions of the social within the psy- and neuro- 
disciplines have all addressed the issue directly, concerning themselves with 
research endeavours entirely concerned with the social. This project, by 
comparison, has sought to examine the social as it is constructed within the 
context of a disease classification, autism.  In this sense the project has 
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mimicked the processes of the neurosciences which so often use atypicality ± 
from Phineas Gage, to individuals with acquired brain damage, and indeed 
individuals with autism ± as a way into typicality.  It is also an approach which 
has been used productively in the examination of other psychological 
constructs, most notably memory (Hacking 1995a; Hacking 2002; Roth 1989; 
Young 1995). 
Utilising these novel approaches, the current project has sought to 
complement the existing literature into the nature of the social by making two 
arguments.  The first regards the multiplicity of socials swirling within the 
human sciences.  The key works of Greenwood and Danziger have, perhaps 
because of their historical scope, argued that there have been relatively few 
variations in the way in which the social has been thought of within the 
psychological sciences.  Greenwood (2004a), for example, sees only two 
models of sociality across twentieth century psychology.  The current analysis 
FRPHVIDUFORVHUWR0RO¶VKRVSLWDOHWKQRJUDSK\(2002) in its conclusions.  Mol 
contends that, not only has the birth of the clinic ensured that diseases are 
different in the twenty-first century to the eighteenth, but also that diseases are 
diverse within different rooms of the hospital as various practices, 
technologies, and so forth constitute different objects. This claim resonates 
with the current thesis.  In chapter four it was argued that there were two 
competing versions of the social being enacted within the 1980s autism 
literature.  In chapter seven it was further argued that a specific branch of the 
neurosciences ± those examining the subject at rest ± were conceptualising the 
social in a novel way which, once again, looked quite different.  More broadly, 
it has been argued across this work that constructions of the social are being 
partially shaped by a consideration of autism itself.   
It is crucial to remember just how disparate the psy-disciplines are.  
The focus, in chapter five, on heterogeneity, draws attention to the differences 
within the cognitive sciences.  The focus upon resting state technologies in 
chapter seven has drawn attention to the differences within the social 
neurosciences.  It is an achievement of these disciplines that they appear to 
cohere, but it remains important to focus upon the disorder, as well as the 
order, found within these disciplines.  
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Finally, the existing literature has frequently appealed to a 
perspectivalist (Law 2004: 25) notion of the social whereby it pre-exists 
LQYHVWLJDWLRQ RI LW  7KLV LV SDUWLFXODUO\ HYLGHQW LQ WH[WV ZKLFK VSHDN RI µWKH
mark RI WKH VRFLDO¶ (Greenwood 1997) µWKH disappearance RI WKH VRFLDO¶
(Greenwood 2004a) DQG WKHQHHG WR µreclaim WKH VRFLDO¶ (Stam 2006).  This 
thesis has once again (Callon 1986; Latour 1987; Latour 2005; Law & Urry 
2004) questioned that assumption.  The social that comes under the study of 
science is always historical and stands in relational to broader 
conceptualisations of society.  
The place of autism in history 
In his earlier writings on the human subject, Ian Hacking goes to great 
lengths to avoid questions of the reality or otherwise of Multiple Personality 
Disorder (MPD; Hacking 1995a: 16; Hacking 2003: 122).  By 2007, however, 
Hacking is prepared to consider the reality or otherwise of human kinds and, of 
particular interest here, autism.  It is particularly noticeable that in writings on 
DXWLVP +DFNLQJ GHFODUHV WKDW LW LV ³DEVROXWHO\ IDOVH´ DQG ³DEVXUG´ WR VD\
³LQIDQWLOH DXWLVP GLG QRW H[LVW EHIRUH ´ (Hacking 2007: 303.  See also 
Hacking 2009a: 500; Madsen et al. 2013: 39).  In a recently published 
interview, Hacking says in UHODWLRQWRKLVEHOLHILQWKHµUHDOLW\¶RIDXWLVPWKDW
it:   
³LV QRW D PDWWHU RI SHUVRQDO FRQYLFWLRQ ZKHQ , VWDWH WKDW LW LV QRW
transient, and when I say that something answering to the current 
descriptions has been with human beings forever, but has only been 
separated out rather recently.  This is the conviction of nearly everyone 
ZKRZRUNVLQWKHILHOG´(Madsen et al., 2013: 41) 
Of course Hacking is not a naive realist, and nuances this claim with reference 
to the following distinction: 
³$7KHUHZHUHQRKLJK-functioning autists in 1950; there were many 
in 2000. 
(B)  In 1950 this was not a way to be a person, people did not 
experience themselves in this way, they did not interact with their 
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friends, their families, their employers, their counsellors, in this way; 
but in 2000 this was a way to be a person, to experience oneself, to live 
LQVRFLHW\´(Hacking 2007: 303)24 
With the relevant labels and dates altered accordingly, Hacking accepts both 
(A) and (B) as being true of MPD.  However, while Hacking concedes the 
possible veracity of (B) with regards to autism he, as quoted above, believes 
$WREHµDEVXUG¶ (although little explanation is given for that position beyond 
quotes such as that provided in the interview, above). 
 Hacking is joined in this position by other notable scholars from within 
the medical humanities.  Stuart Murray, for example, states that that:  
"...autism is both timeless and totally contemporary.  It is part of human 
life, as it always has been, and yet today it is represented in certain 
formations that exist only because of the peculiar contemporary 
inflections that discussions of the condition have been given." (Murray 
2008: 11) 
0XUUD\¶VVXPPDU\PDSVPRUH-or-less perfectly with +DFNLQJ¶VGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ
between (A) and (B), above, and allows Murray to state that Herman Melville's 
story Bartleby the Scrivener, published in 1853, is one of the greatest 
depictions of autism in fiction (Murray 2008: 50-60). 
                                       
247KHHPSKDVLVZLWKLQ%RI+DFNLQJ¶VWD[RQRP\VHHPVWREHILUPO\XSRQ self-construction 
and self-experience and this seems to stand in contrast to the structuralist approach which 
flavours much of the work of Hacking and Foucault (and, indeed, this thesis).  For example, 
and with relation to the concept of probability, Hacking wrote in 1975: 
"The probability to be described is autonomous, with a life of its own.  It exists in 
discourse and not in the minds of speakers.  We are concerned not with the authors 
but with the sentences they have uttered and left for us to read.  We do of course tag 
sentences with the names of authors, but this is largely a matter of convenience.  This 
shall be particularly so in prehistory.  We are not concerned with who wrote, but with 
ZKDWLVVDLG´ (Hacking 1975: 16) 
It is hard to see how the self-construction of (B) can be reconciled with the kind of structuralist 
claim made here.  This is not the place to ask whether the importance ascribed to self-
construction, above, marks a dHILQLWLYHFKDQJHLQ+DFNLQJ¶VZRUNDOWKRXJK+DFNLQJKLPVHOI
has begun to consider such questions and appears to believe the position advocated in (B) is 
indeed consistent with his oeuvre  (e.g. Hacking 2004).  
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 There are several good reasons to problematise the conclusion reached 
by both Murray and Hacking.  Perhaps the most obvious would come from the 
perspective of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and dispute (or collapse) the 
division between (A) and (B); if the metaphysical assumption (what Law 
KDVFDOOHGµSHUVSHFWLYDOLVP¶WKDW$LVSULRUDQGLQGHSHQGHQWIURP
% LV UHMHFWHG DV LW LV LQ $17 WKHQ +DFNLQJ¶V DUJXPHQW LV ZHDN  7KLV
weakness is apparent because, unless it is assumed that autism somehow exists 
prior to its enactment in particular individuals, then the division between (A) 
and (B) is meaningless (see Law (2004: chapter 2) for a discussion of ANT's 
rejection of perspectivalist approaches and for an example see Latour (1999: 
145-146) on the historicity of microbes).  However Hacking has stated that, 
ZKLOH IDVFLQDWHG E\ /DWRXU¶V ZRUN KH LV QRW FRQYLQFHG E\ WKH FRQFOXVLRQV
(Hacking 1992: 512) and, thus, a critique from ANT is perhaps not that 
damaging with regards to autism as a particular case.  Of greater relevance is 
WKH IDFW WKDW +DFNLQJ¶V FRQFOXVLRQV DUH QRW FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH LQVLJKWV RI
Foucault. 
 Consider the issue of sexuality in Ancient Greece with which Foucault 
concerned himself (e.g. Foucault 1984b).  It is not the goal here to defend the 
theses of Dover, Foucault, Veyne et al. who have concerned themselves with 
sexual conduct in Greece, only to outline the logic behind their claim, a logic 
which is not particular to sexuality and which holds particular relevance for 
autism.   
Scholarship in the final decades of the twentieth century has 
revolutionised the study of sex in Ancient Greece to the extent that Davidson 
summarises current consensus in the following manner: 
³>7KH@ VH[XDOL]DWLRQ RI *UHHN KRPRVH[XDOLW\ ZDV LPSHOOHG DERYH DOO
by two powerful tendencies: a desire to uncover more and more of the 
truth of sex that modern historians and ancient sources were thought to 
be covering up, and a desire to demonstrate the spuriousness of Greek 
homosexuality (Devereux), of homosexuality (Dover), of 80 per cent of 
sexuality (Veyne), of sexuality in toto (Foucault).  Inasmuch as Greek 
(homo)sexuality was said to be concerned with roles in sexual acts 
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rather than gender-orientation it was demonstrably different from 
modern (homo)sexuality, thus proving that (Greek) (homo)sexuality 
wDV D VH[XDOLW\RI UROHV DQG ZDV µVRFLDO¶ LW GHPRQVWUDWHG LQ LWVHOI D
non-essential, gestural, social performativity in the field of (Greek) 
KRPRVH[XDOLGHQWLW\´(Davidson 2001: 46)  
Within his work on Greek sexuality, Foucault is not denying, of course, that 
individuals have engaged in particular physical acts since the beginning of 
time (this is an evolutionary truism) or that, when acts across a lifespan are 
examined from a contemporary perspective individuals appear to be 
(exhaustively) non-, hetero-, homo-, or bi- VH[XDO  )RXFDXOW¶V FODLP LQVWHDG
rests on two points.  Firstly, Foucault claims that sexuality is not about (or is 
certainly about more than) acts; sexuality is an experience, a mode of being, a 
stable state that subjects are believed to carry with them throughout their lives.  
This is a compelling argument; how else does it make sense for someone to 
µNQRZ¶WKHLUVH[XDOLW\SULRUWRHQJDJLQJLQDQ\DFWVRUWRµFRPHRXW¶Ds being 
gay within an existing heterosexual relationship?  If sexuality is about more 
than acts then the fact that acts that look to be demonstrative of particular 
forms of sexuality in ancient Greece is largely irrelevant to the question at 
hand.  That acts look to be demonstrative of particular forms of sexuality in 
ancient Greece is as much evidence for the pervasiveness of the contemporary 
experience of sexuality as it is evidence for particular types of subject during 
that ancient time period.  This is )RXFDXOW¶VJHQHUDOSRLQW+LVVHFRQGVSHFLILF
point is that evidence of contemporary experiences of sexuality are not to be 
IRXQG LQ *UHHFH  7KH UHDVRQ WKDW 9H\QH DQG 'DYLGVRQ WDON RI ³)RXFDXOW¶V
SRVLWLYLVP´ (Davidson 2001: 41) is that there is an attempt within the 
genealogical endeavour to examine historical periods without a teleological 
search for origins (Foucault 1977: 140), without the metaphysical assumption 
that the same acts are demonstrative of the same subjects or the same 
experiences.     
It is curious that Hacking in particular should so radically depart from 
Foucault on this matter in the particular instance of autism for, in relation to 
other objects, his writings have been entirely consistent with the viewpoint 
outlined above.  Michel Foucault famously opens The Birth of the Clinic with 
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two descriptions of the arachnoid mater, the protective membrane of the brain 
and spinal cord (Foucault 2003: ix-x).  Pomme, speaking in 1769, sees the 
WLVVXHDV³SLHFHVRIGDPSSDUFKPHQW´WKDWSHHODZD\DQGDUHH[FUHWHGE\WKH
patient.  Bayle, speaking in 1825, provides an acutely observed visual 
description of the arachnoid and the membranes, their colour, and their 
thickness.  The visual descriptions differ so greatly that, without the 
knowledge that it is indeed the brain under discussion, it would be hard to 
ascertain that a supposedly unitary object lay beneath.  Considering these 
descriptions, Hacking states:    
³7KHNLQGVRIWKLQJVWREHVDLGDERXWWKHEUDLQLQDUHQRWWKHNLQGV
of things to be said a quarter-century later.  This is not because we have 
different bHOLHIVDERXWEUDLQVEXWEHFDXVHµEUDLQ¶denotes a new kind of 
object in the later discourse, and occurs in diffHUHQWVRUWVRIVHQWHQFHV´
(Hacking 1986b: 30-31, emphasis added).  
It is difficult to see why Hacking should reach the conclusion he does about 
brains and yet be so reluctant to extend that position to autism.  This project 
has repeatedly shown that cultural experience of autism as social disorder is 
produced ± could only have been produced and understood - within the context 
of particular forms of knowledge; it has been shown that the experience of 
DXWLVPUHVWVXSRQSDUWLFXODUFRQVWUXFWLRQVRIµWKHVRFLDO¶IURPZLWKLQDFDGHPLF
psychology and that, within interview, scientists are unable to make autism 
stand alone and instead only consider autism within a societal context.  This 
SRLQWGRHVQRWGHQ\WKDWDXWLVPKDVVRPHµSUHKLVWRU\¶LQPXFKWKHVDPHZD\
WKDWVH[DFWV LQ$QFLHQW*UHHFHDUHLQVRPHVHQVHDµSUHKLVWRU\¶WRVH[uality) 
but it does suggest that, firstly, autism is about far more than any 
straightforward biological reality and, secondly, that without a teleological 
search for its origins autism would not be identified in any individual prior to 
1943.  This is the move from passive observation to active encounter, and the 
conclusions from this thesis are that autism was formed within an encounter 
and did not, in any particularly meaningful sense, pre-exist it.  Thus, pro-
Foucault (and Young, among others) but contra-Hacking, this thesis advocates 
a position of historical nominalism and claims that, to all intents and purposes, 
autism came into existence in living memory.  Just as with sexuality, it may 
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convincingly be argued that the fact that we can see autism everywhere in 
history is evidence of the pervasiveness of the contemporary experience. 
The birth of socio-emotive politics? 
Chapter 2 (pp.20-22, 26-27) contained a discussion of various forms of 
knowledge, and associated mechanisms of surveillance, which have been 
hypothesised to have systematically formed various types of human subject 
over the centuries.  Foucault claimed, for example, that across the 17th and 18th 
centuries a form of knowledge came about which was centred upon the 
individual(ised) body (anatamo-politics; Foucault 1997b: 241-242).  This pole 
of knowledge was complemented at some point around 1820 by knowledges 
concerning populations, now conceived of as aleatoric entities with their own 
properties (biopolitics; Foucault 1997b: 242-243; Hacking 1983: 292).  
Finally, between 1875 and 1925 (Rose 1985: 3) DQµHYHQW¶RFFXUUHGZKHUHE\
WKHJRYHUQDQFHRIWKHKXPDQVRXOEHFDPHDWKLUGSROHDJDLQVWZKLFK³ZHFDQ
WULDQJXODWHUHFHQWNQRZOHGJH´(Hacking 1994: 35).   
Ian Hacking refers to this new form of knowledge over the soul, which 
emerged between 1875 and 1925 and is most readily applied to the psy-
GLVFLSOLQHV DV µPHPRUR-SROLWLFV¶  +HQFH LQ +DFNLQJ¶V ZULWLQJ µPHPRUR-
SROLWLFV¶UHIHUVWRIRUPVRINQRZOHGJHEH\RQd those explicitly concerned with 
PHPRU\LQVWHDGVWDWLQJWKDW³ZKDWLVPHPRUR-politics a politics of?  Of the 
KXPDQPLQG WKHVHOI WKHµVXEMHFW¶"  ,SUHIHUWRVD\DPHPRUR-politics of the 
KXPDQ VRXO´ (Hacking 1994: 35).  Such a definition positions memoro-
SROLWLFV DV V\QRQ\PRXV ZLWK 1LNRODV 5RVH¶V µJRYHUQDQFH RI WKH VRXO¶ (Rose 
1999)  )RU WKH PRPHQW KRZHYHU LW LV XVHIXO WR UHLQ LQ +DFNLQJ¶V XVDJH
5HVHUYLQJ 5RVH¶V µJRYHUQDQFH RI WKH VRXO¶ WR UHIHU to the extreme pole of 
knowledge-power positioned against bio- and anatamo-SROLWLFV µPHPRUR-
SROLWLFV¶FDQEHXVHIXOO\GHSOR\HGLQDVOLJKWO\PRUHSUHFLVHPDQQHUUHIHUULQJ
to forms of knowledge-power production relating specifically to memory and 
which nonetheless had far reaching and profound consequences for the human 
subject from the twentieth century onwards.   
Re-positioning memoro-politics in the aforementioned manner 
performs two important services.  Firstly, memoro-politics is moved towards 
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WKH³FOXVWHULQJRILQWHUPHGLDU\UHODWLRQV´(Foucault 1978: 139) at the centre of 
the bio-/anatamo-/soul- nexus rather than at one of the poles for, as Allan 
Young has said, the sciences of memory emerging in the late 19th century were 
³ERUQ DW WKH LQWHUVHFWLRQ RI WZR VWUHDPV RI VFLHQWLILF LQTXLU\ VRPDWLF DQG
SV\FKRORJLFDO´(Young 1995: 11), that is, between anatamo- and soul-politics.  
Secondly, focusing upon memory itself and the central clDLP WKDW ³ZKDW KDV
EHHQIRUJRWWHQLVZKDWIRUPV>SDUWRI@RXUFKDUDFWHURXUSHUVRQDOLW\RXUVRXO´
(Hacking 1994: 33) brings into relief how important knowledges of memory 
per se have been for recent projects of subjectification. 
The new forms of knowledge production associated with the birth of 
memoro-politics at the end of the 19th century, and the mechanisms of 
surveillance intended to observe and surveil this space, had several specific 
FRQVHTXHQFHV )LUVWO\YDULRXVIRUPVRIGLVRUGHUHGVXEMHFWZHUHµGLVFRYHUHG¶
within the newly mapped territory; the classifications of amnesia (Roth 1989), 
MPD (Hacking 1995a), and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Young 
1995) may all be seen to have emerged within this new knowledge-power 
nexus.  Secondly, there was a comprehensive process of subjectification 
extending to the normal population.  Just as it would not only have been the 
SULVRQHU LQ %HQWKDP¶V SURSRVHG SDQRSWLFRQ ZKR ZDV DOWHUHG LQ WKH ZDNH RI
anatamo-politics, it was not just the soldier with their traumatic memories who 
was affected by memoro-politics; we all understand ourselves differently in the 
wake of these processes. 
It is these two factors ± that more than one type of disordered subject 
emerged in the wake of a particular knowledge-power nexus and the fact that 
these knowledges affected general processes of subjectification ± which lift the 
study of memoro-politics, as divorced from the study of MPD or PTSD, above 
mere tautology.  There seems little to gain by studying a condition that is 
known a priori to be novel (as was the case with these disorders of memory 
and, indeed, autism), hypothesising that these disorders are evidence of a new 
form of generalised knowledge, and finally claiming that the newly 
hypothesised form of knowledge can be empirically demonstrated only in 
those who come under the label which initiated the original investigation.  The 
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ability of empirical investigation to reveal these broader effects of memoro-
politics are what continues to give the concept its utility and its validity. 
A question which thus emerges from the current study into autism, 
HVSHFLDOO\ JLYHQ UHFHQW UHVHDUFK QRWLQJ D µWXUQ WR HPSDWK\¶ ZLWKLQ WKH
biosciences (Meloni 2013), is this: is the emergence of autism in the late-
twentieth century demonstrative of a broader process of knowledge production, 
a socio-emotive politics akin to memoro-politics?  Have emerging processes of 
subjectification, centred around the notion of the individual as a particular type 
RI µVRFLDO VXEMHFW¶ ZLWK HPSDWK\ DW LWV FRUH FKDQJHG RXU YHU\ QDWXUH"  $V
stated above, evidence of a socio-emotive politics would need to be 
demonstrated through both an analysis of various forms of disorder and an 
examination of subjectification within the non-clinical population.  An analysis 
of the requisite institutional frameworks would also be required.   
The current project, focusing as it does solely upon autism, cannot 
begin to answer questions regarding socio-emotive politics.  There are, 
however, certainly hints that suggest there is significant value in future 
research.  The first question to ask is whether, besides autism, there are any 
other disorders which may have emerged within the knowledge-power nexus 
of a socio-emotive politics.  Two such conditions are obvious candidates: 
alexithymia and psychopathy.  Alexithymia is a condition, first described in 
the 1970s (Nemiah & Sifneos 1970; Nemiah et al. 1976), which garnered 
increased interest during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Bagby et al. 1994: 
23).  Alexithymia is believed to affect approximately ten per cent of the 
population and has been described aV ³D VXEFOLQLFDO SKHQRPHQD PDUNHG E\
difficulties in identifying and describing feelings and difficulties in 
GLVWLQJXLVKLQJIHHOLQJVIURPWKHERGLO\VHQVDWLRQVRIHPRWLRQDODURXVDO´(Bird 
et al. 2010: 1516).  In short, alexithymia can be described as difficulty in 
ascribing socio-empathetic states to the self.  Psychopaths, by comparison, 
KDYH EHHQ GHVFULEHG DV ³VXSHUILFLDOO\ FKDUPLQJ RIWHQ LQWHOOLJHQW LQGLYLGXDOV
who nevertheless had shallow emotional depth  and engaged in antisocial, 
VRPHWLPHVYLROHQW EHKDYLRXU´ (Pickersgill 2012a: 546).  While the construct 
of psychopathy has a long history (see Pickersgill (2012a) for an overview) it, 
OLNHDXWLVPDQGDOH[LWK\PLDKDVXQGHUJRQHD³UDSLGHODERUDWLRQ´VLQFHDURXQG
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1980 (Manning 2000: 621).  Also like alexithymia and autism, psychopathy is 
constructed as an inherent characteristic of an individual, rather than as an 
illness or disease which may pass, or be cured. 
Within the research interviews conducted for this thesis, both 
alexithymia and psychopathy came under discussion: 
GH: Erm, could you speak a little bit about how, erm, maybe your general theories of 
empathy have helped you understand autism and perhaps vice versa as well? 
BG: Right, I mean the::, the idea that I have about empathy is very simple actually so 
LW¶VPRUH OLNHD OHQVHV WKURXJKZKLFK\RXYLHZHPRWLRQV VR LI \RXKDYHDFORXGHG
OHQVHV\RXFDQ¶WVHHHPRtions clearly and, er, and if you have a clear lenses you can 
VHHWKHPYHU\ZHOO6RDQGLWGRHVQRWKDYHWRGRZLWKDXWLVPLW¶VDXWLVPLVMXVWRQH
kind of clouding of the lenses, er, there may be other kinds of clouding of the lenses 
as in:: psychopathy. (BG06: 458-468) 
In this extract BG, an Associate Professor, positions psychopathy very closely 
WRDXWLVPDVDVLPLODUµFORXGLQJRIWKHHPSDWKHWLFOHQVHV¶7KLVLVDWKHPHWKDW
BG would return to repeatedly, mulling over the differences and similarities 
between psychopathy and autism: 
BG: ...if you think about psychopathy the person might be perfectly okay at 
understanding your mental states, erm, and making you believe that he or she is, er, 
KH¶VD LVDDSRVWPDQRUVRPHWKLQJDQG WKHQFKRSSLQJ\RXU head off really.  So:: 
QRZKHUHLVDSUREOHPDJDLQLI\RXWKLQNRILWLW¶VQRWMXVWDSUREOHPRIGHILFLWRI
HPSDWK\ ,W¶VQRWMXVWWKDW,GRQ¶W IHHO\RXUSDLQ ,PD\QRWIHHO\RXUSDLQEXW WKDW
does not give me the::, the impetus to chop your head RII WKDW¶V D VHSDUDWH WKLQJ
(BG06: 496-505) 
3V\FKRSDWK\ LV µD SUREOHP DJDLQ¶ RI HPSDWK\ EXW TXLWH D GLIIHUHQW SUREOHP
µLW¶VQRWMXVWDSUREOHPRIDGHILFLWLQHPSDWK\¶WKDWPDNHV\RXZDQWWRµFKRS
\RXUKHDGRII¶ 
 MN, a Research Fellow, again draws comparisons between autism and 
psychopathy but also introduces alexithymia: 
MN: And there are lots and lots of areas of social processing that are totally intact in 
DXWLVPEXWZKLFKWKH\¶UHQRWJLYHQWKDWFUHGLWEHFDXVHLW¶VMXVWDVVXPHGWKDWDQ\WKLQJ
social will be impaired in autism. 
GH: So do you think the definition of autism as a social disorder then is misleading? 
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01 +PP WKDW¶V DQ LQWHUHVWLQJ SRLQW  7KDW¶V DQ LQWHUHVWLQJ SRLQW  ODXJKV
3RVVLEO\,,GRQ¶WUHDOO\KDYHDSUREOHPZLWKWKDWWKRXJKEHFDXVHLW¶VFHUWDLQO\ WKH
FDVH WKDWHU +PP OHWPH WKLQNDERXW WKDW ODXJKV ,GRQ¶WNQRZZKHWKHU ,
KDYHWKRXJKWDERXWWKDWVSHFLILFDOO\EHIRUH3RVVLEO\3RVVLEO\SRVVLEO\7KHUH¶V
ZHOO,PHDQVROHW¶VWDNHSV\FKRSDWK\IRUDPRPHQWZKHUH,¶PJRLQJWRXVHWKH
term we loosely, where we think that, erm, that really is empathetic problems. 
GH: Mm hm. 
01(UPDQG WKDWFHUWDLQO\ OHDGV WRSUREOHPV LQVRFLDO LQWHUDFWLRQEXW WKH\¶UHYHU\
different to the autistic problems.  And equally, this other term that people are 
bandying around with autism at the moment, alexithymia have you come across it? 
GH: Uh huh, uh huh. 
01 <HDK (UP DJDLQ  ZH WKLQN WKDW WKH\¶UH WRWDOO\ GLVVRFLD¶ WKDW¶V WRWDOO\
dissociable from autism, erm, but agDLQLW¶VDLWKDVHIIHFWVRQVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQ(U
so yeah, possibly. (MN05: 516-541) 
3V\FKRSDWK\LVEDVHGDURXQGµHPSDWKHWLFSUREOHPV¶DQGDOH[LWK\PLDWRRKDV
µHIIHFWVRQVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQ¶GHVSLWHEHLQJµWRWDOO\GLVVRFLDEOH¶ 
 Similar links between autism, psychopathy, and alexithymia have also 
been made within the literature.  In Simon Baron-&RKHQ¶V UHFHQWERRN Zero 
Degrees of Empathy, autism, alexithymia (Baron-Cohen 2011: 69), and 
psychopathy (Baron-Cohen 2011: 54) are all described as conditions arising 
from atypicalities in the empathetic brain.  With his usual eye for a headline, 
Baron-Cohen would make the same argument within the pages of The 
Guardian, suggestinJWKDW/LRQHO6KULYHU¶VEHVWVHOOLQJERRNFRQFHUQLQJDKLJK
school massacre (Shriver 2005) ZRXOGEHEHWWHU WLWOHGµZHQHHG WR WDONDERXW
.HYLQ¶VODFNRIHPSDWK\¶(Baron-Cohen 2011a).   
The purpose of introducing these extracts and this literature regarding 
psychopathy and alexithymia at this point in the thesis is not to analyse them as 
such, but rather to suggest that there may well be a school of disorders 
emerging from a shared basis in a socio-emotive politics centred around the 
empathic, social subject.  The possible relationships between these disorders, 
the institutional frameworks designed to monitor them, and the knowledge 
bases from which these classifications arise are all in need of significant 
research. 
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The second question to ask in relation to socio-emotive politics is 
whether the language of autism is used by members of the non-clinical 
population to articulate their own sense of self.  Some of the processes of 
normalisation referred to in chapter 7 (pp.153-160) do indeed hint that the 
language of autism is increasingly being used to understand those at quite 
some distance from the condition.  Similarly, the description of alexithymia as 
D µVXEFOLQLFDO SKHQRPHQD¶ (Bird et al. 2010: 1516) positions it within the 
UHDOPV RI µQRUPDO¶ KXPDQ EHKDYLRXU  $ number of interviewees also 
interpreted their own behaviour through the lens of autism.  For example AO, a 
5HVHDUFK )HOORZ VD\V WKDW WKH\ µUHPHPEHU GRLQJ WKDW¶ ZKHQ WKH\ UHDG D
check-OLVWRIDXWLVPV\PSWRPVDQGWKDWµZH¶YHDOOJRWDVSHFWVRILW¶ 
AO: ...I mean behaviours that yRXVHHLQDXWLVPDUHQ¶WUHDOO\VSHFLILFWRDXWLVPLQWKDW
ZH¶YHDOOJRWDVSHFWVRILW,PHDQWKHPRUH\RXORRNDWWKHGLDJQRVWLFHUPFULWHULD
the more you think hang on a minute I remember doing that ((laughs)) 
GH: ((Laughs)) 
AO: Erm, which is slightly worrying. (AO04: 146-152) 
As with the references to psychopathy and alexithymia however, these are no 
more than hints and robust empirical work would be required to examine the 
veracity of claims towards socio-emotive politics as a general framework of 
subjectification.  A productive area of investigation may be to work with the 
families of children diagnosed with autism in order to examine if parental (for 
example) self-constructions have altered in the wake of encounters with 
autism.  The work is yet to be done, but one of the potentially most important, 
and entirely novel, suggestions to come out of this thesis is that there is an 
emerging general framework of human behaviour, a socio-emotive politics, 
which may have a profound impact upon what it means to be human in the 
twenty-first century.   
It is in the uniting of these overarching themes that the central tenet of 
this thesis is found.  The contemporary vision of autism emerged within a 
particular power-knowledge nexus of the social, a power-knowledge nexus 
which may extend into a broader notion socio-emotive politics.  However, 
conceptions of the social are more malleable than existing analyses have 
assumed and autism is itself becoming fundamental to visions of the social 
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within the psy-disciplines.  In autism, the social is finding a new language and 
taking on a new appearance as a result.  This looping process between autism 
and the social is becoming increasingly key to the ontology of our social 
selves. 
Limits 
Who is asked?  
If this project is to take seriously claims of situating knowledge (as 
discussed in chapter 3), it is crucial to situate not only the knowledge under 
analysis but also the knowledge that has been, hopefully, produced here.  The 
story told within this thesis is partial at best; there are numerous aspects of 
autism which have not been considered.  Perhaps most obviously, only 
individuals associated with academic psychology, and holding academic posts, 
were interviewed for this project.  It is evidently the case that there are a great 
number of (neuro)scientists and professional groups, therefore, who are 
excluded from this analysis.  Previous work has left us in little doubt that, if 
autism is to be understood in anything like a comprehensive manner, it is 
important to consider autism as it is understood from within education (Fein 
2011), genetics (Navon 2011),  psychiatry (C. Silverman 2010), and so on.  It 
is also essential to consider autism within clinical settings, and consider the 
back and forth between clinic and laboratory.  None of these areas come under 
empirical investigation within this piece and that is worthy of consideration 
when considering the claims made. 
 Similarly, an exceptionally powerful group of actors in autism are those 
policymakers and advocates who have, since at least the 1960s, informed, 
disputed and indeed merged with scientific thought.  Further, at least since Jim 
Sinclair wrote 'RQ¶W 0RXUQ IRU 8V in 1993 (Sinclair 1993), those advocates 
have been joined by the powerful new voice of the self-advocate, and autistic 
people themselves are now contributing to the discourses constituting autism in 
an increasingly important fashion.  Once more, these voices are absent and, 
thus, the story is incomplete.   
203 
 
 If important voices are missing from this work then it is undoubtedly 
the case that important places are also missing.  Interviewees repeatedly 
stressed just how different they believed the UK context to be from the US 
context; how the ties between the clinical and the research spheres were much 
closer in America, how different the research experience would be in the 
absence of universal healthcare and the relationship with the National Health 
Service, and how much more divisive the (self-)advocacy groups were in 
America compared to the generally well-liked National Autistic Society in the 
UK.  It might, however, be argued that the repeated mentioning of the United 
States demonstrated that, despite the perceived differences, research in the US 
is in some senses quite close to the UK; what autism looks like in, for instance, 
Francophone territories where the psychoanalytic tradition continues to play a 
key role, or in the Middle Eastern clinic mentioned by one interviewee is 
completely unknown here.  There is no suggestion that autism in these places 
is even intelligible to the researchers interviewed for this project.  
 If the absence of these voices is worrying, or in the case of self-
advocates perhaps distasteful, it is perhaps just as troublesome that the manner 
in which the work of (self-) advocates intersects with the discourses of the psy-
disciplines and informs what is written here is also absent.  By considering 
only work emanating from within the British cognitive sciences there is the 
possibility of treating these knowledges as hermetically sealed, as if all work is 
carried out under the Haldane Principle.  This is patently false and a project, 
surely to be completed, which considers the construction of DSM-5 in relation 
to autism will reveal it to be so.  Reading chapter six it may be easy to 
conclude that what British psychologists thought about the social in DSM-5 
directly determined the nature of the final document.  Yet evidently policy-
makers, psychiatrists, advocates, self-advocates, American conceptions of 
DXWLVP DQG LQWHUHVWHG SXEOLFV VKDSHG ERWK WKH SV\FKLDWULVWV¶ ELEOH and the 
discourse of those psychologists interviewed for this project.  The inability of 
this project to trace that full web of associations ensures that not only is it 
impossible for autism to be fully understood, it is impossible for the interview 
data to be fully understood.  And of course by interview data, what is meant is 
interview sublata, for the notion that data are achievements applies as readily 
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to the data of science studies as it does to cognitive science. (See chapter 6 
(p.143) on the data/sublata distinction, chapter 3 (pp.58-60) for the interview 
as a situated encounter). 
What is considered? 
 If one limitation of the study concerns who was asked for answers, a 
second is surely the manner in which those questions were asked.  The 
methods utilised here focus upon the published literature and qualitative 
interview data.  For the reasons given in chapter three there is every reason to 
suppose that these were suitable methods for the questions under investigation 
here.  Nonetheless, there is an irony in this choice of method which has to be 
noted.  In chapter 7 (pp.163-167) it is claimed that rsfMRI and associated 
technologies were broadly turning away from a model of the social which 
incorporated meaning, language, and intentionality and turning instead towards 
a somatic version of the social which focuses upon unconscious understanding 
of bodily states and that, in turn, manifests itself within the body through acts 
such as unconscious mimicry and gaze following.  The irony, of course, is that 
in focusing upon methods which only approach the world through discourse 
any examination of how the social is constructed bodily within the cognitive 
sciences becomes impossible.  Watching ADOS examinations, or even the 
interactions between different members of a laboratory, it is clear that bodies 
and the interactions between them are crucial to constructing social 
abnormality and yet, because a broader ethnography is not considered here, 
analysis of those bodily states is not possible.  Bodies have become: 
 ³EDFNJURXQG plasma, namely that which is not yet formatted, not yet 
measured, not yet socialized, not yet engaged in metrological chains, and 
QRW\HWFRYHUHGVXUYH\HGPRELOL]HGRUVXEMHFWLILHG´(Latour 2005: 244, 
italics in original) 
Transforming the bodies of scientists, and individuals with autism, from 
background plasma and into something more solid remains one of the most 
important tasks in the study of autism.  If the methods considered in chapter 7, 
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those transforming the social into an ever more bodily phenomenon, become 
truly dominant then it will be absolutely crucial for future projects. 
What is not claimed? 
It is worth considering three things which are not absent in this analysis 
as such, but which are actively opposed.  Firstly, the current project is not 
intended to demean or undermine the intensely troubling experiences that, at 
least some, individuals with autism endure.  Allan Young said of his analysis 
concerning the contingent nature of PTSD: 
³7R VD\ WKDW WUDXPDWLF PHPRU\ DQG 376' DUH FRQVWLWXWHG WKURXJK D
UHVHDUFKHU¶V WHFKQR-phenomena and styles of scientific reasoning does 
not deny the pain that is suffered by people who are diagnosed or 
diagnosable with PTSD.  Nothing that I have written in this book 
should be construed as trivializing the acts of violence and terrible 
SHUVRQDO ORVVHV WKDW VWDQGEHKLQGPDQ\ WUDXPDWLFPHPRULHV´ (Young 
1995: 10) 
That point deserves to be re-emphasised; no claim of malingering, self-interest 
RU µFKRLFH¶ LV PDGH KHUH  7KH QHHGV RI LQGLYLGXDOV ZLWK DXWLVP DQG WKHLU
families, remain as important within this framework as they do within any 
other. 
 Secondly, any account concerning autism which shifts attention 
WRZDUGV µWKH HQYLURQPHQW¶ UXQV WKH ULVN RI EHLQJ DFFXVHG RI µEODPLQJ WKH
SDUHQWV¶ 2QFHDJDLQ LW VKRXOGEHVWUHVVHG WKDWSDUHQWVDUH not being blamed 
KHUH  ,QGHHG LQ FRQVWUXFWLQJ µWKH VRFLDO HQYLURQPHQW¶ DV EHLQJ ³ORFDO
SUR[LPDO VKRUW WHUPDQGGHFRPSRVDEOH´ (Danziger 2000: 334) it is the psy-
disciplines who arguably centralise the parent within the environment.  This 
thesis, which has focused upon structure, history, and relationality has said 
little about parents and that is broadly appropriate given the goals here.  As 
Silverman has demonstrated (Silverman & Brosco 2007; Silverman 2004; 
Silverman 2012), parents can contribute a great deal to our understanding of 
autism, but they are not to blame for it. 
206 
 
 Finally, in suggesting that there are alternative visions of autism 
available, the thesis is not taking a relativist position which states that the 
social world, the social brain, or social disorder can be any way we choose it to 
be.  As Haraway (2004: 589) has said, the body is both structured and 
structuring.  The possibility for change is not infinite but it is there, there are 
alternatives. 
The shape of things to come 
If the previous sections of this conclusion have considered the 
H[SHULHQFH RI DXWLVP LQ WKH ILUVW )RXFDXOGLDQ VHQVH DV ³VRPHWKLQJ WR EH
investigated to determine its emergence DQG LWV FRQGLWLRQV RI H[LVWHQFH´
(Lemke 2011: 32), then it is right to finish by considering experience in the 
VHFRQGVHQVHDVDQµREMHFWLYH¶DQDWWHPSWWRPRYHEH\RQGWKHOLPLWVWKDWKDYH
been imposed (see chapter 3: 72).   
This study has argued that autism cannot be understood outside of a 
historical and sociological context, that the condition emerges as a result of 
work done both by individual researchers and clinicians at particular moments, 
for instance in diagnosis, and as a result of larger historical trends that have led 
WRDµVRFLDOGLVRUGHU¶EHLQJFRQVWUXFWHGLQDSDUWLFXODUPDQQHU,WVHHPVHDVLHU
to affect the course of local interactions than it does broader historical trends.  
Psychologists and clinicians could more critically examine their own conduct 
by considering diagnosis as an encounter between two individuals, each of 
whom are worthy of respect, and each of whom contribute to the diagnosis.  
Similarly, if those coming under diagnosis constitute themselves as a subject in 
a relational encounter rather than an object under observation, then there is a 
realisation that there is:  
³QHFHVVDULO\ WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI UHVLVWDQFH EHFDXVH LI WKHUH ZHUH QR
possibility of resistance (of violent resistance, flight, deception, 
strategies capable of reversing the situation), there would be no power 
UHODWLRQVDWDOO´(Foucault 1997c: 292)  
The present study cannot present evidence to suggest that such treatment 
would have positive consequences clinically, but if psychologists are also 
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serious about ethical and societal issues in autism then this would surely be a 
positive step.   
Further, and in relation to the social, this thesis has reiterated the claim, 
neatly captured by Danziger, that methodology is not ontologically neutral 
(Danziger 2000: 332).  When psychologists take the social to the scanner, 
different realities are produced (Law 2004) and giving some thought to those 
social realities is a worthwhile exercise.  This is perhaps an even more 
important exercise for qualitative social scientists who must carefully consider 
if these new socials emerging from within the neurosciences are ones that they 
wish to engage with, and if so, how.      
Finally, more fundamental changes into the nature of the social and the 
nature of autism are harder to imagine and are certainly not for the researcher 
to prescribe.  What is more, opening spaces to think differently is an inherently 
risky activity and any change would require extreme bravery from those 
affected.  This is especially the case because, in many senses, the constructions 
of autism which emerge out of the neurosciences appear to be significantly less 
problematic, less violent, that those of psychoanalysis ± particularly when they 
take the form advocated by Bettleheim (or Kanner, for that matter).  It should 
be recalled, however, that contemporary constructions of autism can also be far 
more insidious, and certainly far more invasive, than previous descriptions, as 
infants and previously-non-clinical populations fall under the gaze and 
direction of scientific, juridical, pharmaceutical, and educational authorities 
like never before.  There remains a need for change.  In continuing a project 
that is beginning to piece together the historical ontology of autism, this 
project is also concerned with the historical ontology of the twenty-first 
century subject.  It is only once this contemporary experience has been mapped 
that the edges are revealed and it becomes possible to think of ways to exceed 
RXUH[SHULHQFH¶VOLPLWV 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Interview Schedule 
Personal Background 
1) Could you tell me a little about your career history? How did you 
come to be interested in your projects on autism and neuroscience? 
What is autism? 
General 
1) Why do you think it is important to study autism? 
2) To start of very broadly, there seems to be a good deal of debate 
about what exactly autism is and what causes it.  Do you have a 
particular view of about what autism is? 
3) How do we go about diagnosing autism and how should we aim to in 
the future? 
  - DSM V 
 - International prevalence  
4) And what are the interventions? 
5) How do you see psychology contributing to these issues? 
6) How do you see neuroscience contributing to these issues? 
7) On quite a specific level, psychologists too seem to have quite 
different theories about autism.  What do you think the main areas of 
dispute, the main questions, are within psychology? 
8)  And are there any areas which you think psychologists generally 
agree upon? 
Personal 
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9) Focusing more upon your work, which goals would you like your 
research to achieve? 
10) Do you prefer one theory of autism in particular? Could you 
explain this theory to me? 
10) What makes you think the theoretical framework you work within 
provides the best model for thinking about autism? What is the 
evidence for this theory and against the others? 
11) And what about method, why do you choose the methods that you 
do?  
11) Is there anything about the neurosciences in particular that has 
moved our understanding of autism beyond that of an era based entirely 
upon cognitive psychology? 
12) Do you think that autistic advocates, or the voluntary sector, are an 
important factor in how your research is conducted? 
The contribution of social neuroscience 
1) Could you tell me a little bit about social neuroscience?  What its 
aims and underlying philosophy are?  Is it a label you identify with? 
2) What are the outstanding questions in autism which you see 
neuroscience tackling in the future? 
3) Beyond the study of autism in particular, what do you think the 
impact of social neuroscience has been upon psychology as an 
academic discipline? 
Conclusion 
 ,V WKHUH DQ\WKLQJ \RX¶G OLNH WR DGG" $Q\WKLQJ LPSRUWDQW WKDW \RX
WKLQN,¶YHPLVVHGRUWKDW\RX¶GOLNHWRHODERUDWHXSRQ" 
2) Are there any other researchers you think I should talk to? 
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Appendix B: Information for Participants 
 
Information for Participants 
Gregory Hollin 
Institute for Science and Society 
School of Sociology and Social Policy 
University of Nottingham 
University Park 
Nottingham 
NG7 2RD 
gregory.hollin@nottingham.ac.uk 
 
What is this study is about? 
This interview is part of a PhD project considering models of autistic spectrum 
disorders (ASD) within psychology and social neuroscience, how these models 
are taken up by advocacy groups, and what these changes might tell us about 
our knowledge of ASD and the social world more generally. 
What will the participant have to do? 
The participant is being asked to consent to a semi-structured interview in 
which the topics of ASD, psychology, neuroscience, and advocacy groups will 
be discussed.  Interviews are expected to last roughly an hour, although length 
may vary considerably.  If the participant wishes to limit the length of the 
interview they are able to do so.  Participants may request the questions in 
advance, although novel questions may arise during the course of the 
interview.  
What are the benefits of participating in the study? 
The participant cannot expect any immediate, tangible benefit.   
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Are there any foreseeable risks to the individual if they participate in the 
research? 
There are no foreseeable risks in taking part in this research. 
Are there any costs or inducements to taking part in the research? 
Other than the time taken to complete the interview, there are no costs 
associated with this research. 
Is participation voluntary?  What should l do if I not want to participate? 
Your participation in this research study is completely voluntary and you are 
free to withdraw at any point up until the project completion in the Summer of 
2013. Whether or not you provide your consent for participation in this 
research study will have no effect on your current or future relationship with 
the University of Nottingham. 
:KDWKDSSHQVWRWKHFROOHFWHGLQIRUPDWLRQ"´ 
The interview will be recorded by the principle investigator and some notes 
may be made both during and after the interview.  The recording of the 
interview will then be transcribed for subsequent analysis.  Both the audio file 
and the transcript will be saved as encrypted files to ensure the security of the 
SDUWLFLSDQW¶VGDWD 
Is the collected data confidential? 
The researcher will employ pseudonyms for the individual/institution in all 
research output.   
What are the research outputs? 
Interview transcripts will be analysed and this analysis will be included in a 
forthcoming PhD thesis and may be included in subsequent projects (e.g. peer 
review publications).   
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What other sorts of people are being asked to take part, and how are they 
being identified/selected? 
Interviews have targeted two particular groups.  Firstly, academics within the 
UK who have experience with both neuroscience and ASD.  Secondly, 
representatives for various ASD advocacy groups. 
Contact details 
The researcher can be contacted via the means detailed above.  If you wish to 
FRQWDFWWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VVXSHUYLVRUVSOHDVHFRQWDFW 
Prof. Alison Pilnick  
School of Sociology and Social Policy 
University of Nottingham 
University Park 
Nottingham 
NG7 2RD 
alison.pilnick@nottingham.ac.uk 
 
Complaint procedure 
If you wish to complain about the way in which the research is being 
conducted or have any concerns about the research then in the first instance 
please contact the Alison Pilnick.  If this does not resolve the matter to your 
VDWLVIDFWLRQWKHQSOHDVHFRQWDFWWKH6FKRRO¶V5esearch Ethics Officer, Professor 
Brigitte Nerlich (tel. 0115 846 7065, email Brigitte.Nerlich@nottingham.ac.uk.  
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Appendix C: Participant Consent Form 
 
Institute for Science and Society 
School of Sociology and Social Policy 
University of Nottingham 
 
Participant Consent Form 
 
µ1HXURVFLHQFHSDWLHQWJURXSVDQGWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIQHZDXWLVWLF
LGHQWLWLHV¶ 
 
In signing this consent form I confirm that: 
 
I have read the Participant Information Sheet and the 
nature and purpose of the research project has been 
explained to me. 
Yes  No  
I have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
Yes  No  
I understand the purpose of the research project and my 
involvement in it. 
Yes  No  
I understand that my participation is voluntary and I 
may withdraw from the research project at any stage, 
without having to give any reason and withdrawing will 
not penalize or disadvantaged me in any way. 
Yes  No  
I understand that the researcher may be required to 
report to the authorities any significant harm to a 
child/young person (up to the age of 18 years) that 
he/she becomes aware of during the research.  I agree 
that such harm may violate the principle of 
confidentiality. 
Yes  No  
I agree that extracts from the interview may be quoted 
in any report or publication arising from the research  
Yes  No  
I understand that the interview will be recorded using 
electronic voice recorder 
Yes  No  
I understand that data will be securely stored  
 
Yes  No  
I understand that I may contact the researcher if I 
require further information about the research, and that 
Yes  No  
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I may contact the Research Ethics Officer of the School 
of Sociology and Social Policy, University of 
Nottingham, if I wish to make a complaint relating to 
my involvement in the research. 
I am aware that I will, if referred to at all, be referred to 
by pseudonym in any research output. 
Yes  No  
I am aware that my institution will, if referred to at all, 
be referred to by pseudonym in any research output.  
Yes  No  
I agree to take part in the above research project.   
 
Yes  No  
     
     
 
 
     
3DUWLFLSDQW¶VQDPH
(BLOCK CAPITAL) 
 3DUWLFLSDQW¶VVLJQDWXUH  Date 
 
     
5HVHDUFKHU¶VQDPH
(BLOCK CAPITAL) 
 5HVHDUFKHU¶VVLJQDWXUH  Date 
 
 
